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Collage with Woman  
in Foreground
h e r e ’ s  t o  y o u ,  m r s .  r o b i n s o n
Joan Robinson was one of the most original and prolific economists of 
the twentieth century and unquestionably the most important woman in 
the history of economic thought. In the latter regard, no one else comes 
close, not even the abundantly gifted Rosa Luxemburg, the Marxist econo­
mist and political leader whose work she came to admire in the 1940s. 
Her publications in economic theory began in 1932 and ended two years 
after her death, in 1983. A comprehensive but incomplete bibliography 
compiled by Cristina Marcuzzo (1996) runs to 443 items, a body of work 
that covers most of economic theory: production, distribution, employ­
ment, accumulation, innovation, and economic growth as well as meth­
odological and philosophical reflections and contributions to the study of 
economic education. Since 1933, there has been an extensive and lively lit­
erature on Robinsonia. It has grown considerably since her death and the 
centenary of her birth in 1903.1 A book on her life and work by Geoffrey 
Harcourt, her Cambridge colleague and friend of many years, and Prue 
Kerr, her student and friend, is in preparation.
Robinson studied economics at Cambridge University, where she 
made a career that lasted some fifty years. Her work falls into three re­
search programs, each a product of developments in economic theory at 
Cambridge: the innovations from the mid­1920s to the early 1930s that 
led to the theory of imperfect competition, the Keynesian revolution of 
the 1930s, and the attempts in the 1950s and 1960s to develop a general 
analysis of long­term economic growth. Her first book, The Economics of 
Imperfect Competition (1933d), achieved international recognition. In the 
early 1930s, she also became an ardent follower of John Maynard Keynes’s 
new approach to economics. Soon after The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest, and Money appeared in 1936, she published Essays in the Theory of 
Employment (1937a), which refined and extended Keynes’s ideas. She fol­
lowed this book with the Introduction to the Theory of Employment (1937b), 
a Keynesian primer designed to revolutionize undergraduate pedagogy in 
economics.
Shortly after publication of The General Theory, Robinson concluded 
that neither neoclassical nor Keynesian economics could account for long­
term economic changes. However, she was convinced that if Keynes’s ideas 
were reformulated and generalized on the basis of supplementary assump­
tions, such an analysis would be possible. This was her last major effort: 
the development of a dynamic theory of capital accumulation that rested 
on the assumptions of historicity and historical temporality. Its result was 
The Accumulation of Capital (1956), a daunting work of uncompromis­
ing formalism and an important stimulus of the “capital controversy,” 
one of the most acrimonious disputes in the history of economic analysis. 
The debate spanned two decades, produced hundreds of books, articles, 
and notes, and consumed the energies of its antagonists.2 To Robinson’s 
dismay and consternation, neoclassical economists admitted the validity 
of her criticisms but dismissed them as empirically inconsequential and 
irrelevant. Thus the battle ended not with a bang but a whimper.
Robinson ended her long career covered with honors. In 1971, she de­
livered the prestigious Richard T. Ely address of the American Economic 
Association. The year before, no less a figure than Paul Samuelson judged 
her “one of the greatest analytical economists of our era” (Samuelson 1970, 
397). An honorary doctorate from Harvard followed in 1980. Through­
out, she remained enmeshed in controversy: denouncing neoclassical eco­
nomics for failing to address the most serious economic problems of the 
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time, censuring American economic theory for contributing to the nuclear 
arms race, attacking the government of Margaret Thatcher in Great Brit­
ain, and celebrating the communist regimes of China and North Korea. 
In surveying Robinson’s work, Samuelson concluded that a number of 
her accomplishments would merit the Nobel Memorial Prize in econom­
ics, which was created in 1969 (Samuelson 1970, 397). By the mid­1970s, 
she was under consideration by the Swedish Academy. Although appar­
ently short­listed for several years, she was repeatedly passed over. The 
reasons offered by her contemporaries varied considerably. Would she 
be considered on the basis of The Economics of Imperfect Competition, her 
best­known and most successful book? That seemed likely, in which case 
an award would have been awkward. Edward Chamberlin’s doctoral dis­
sertation at Harvard in 1927, revised and published a few months before 
her book appeared, covered the same ground (1933). But he had died in 
1967. Moreover, Robinson had recanted much of the book’s argument 
and mode of analysis (see Robinson 1953). She was an unsparing critic of 
orthodox economics and rejected its dependence on mathematical models 
and quantification generally. She exhibited the public persona of a radical 
of the left, claiming to find virtues in both the Maoist Cultural Revolu­
tion and the North Korean totalitarian state of Kim Il Sung. Her writings 
often gave the impression that her greatest strength lay in polemics rather 
than in building original theories of her own. She was a woman in a dis­
cipline overwhelmingly dominated by men. Finally, she seems to have 
adopted, or perhaps affected, a Sartre­like pose toward the Nobel Prize by 
holding it in some contempt. If she did not want it and would not accept 
it, it would not be surprising if the Swedish Academy was reluctant to of­
fer it (Turner 1989, 214–21).
After her death, Robinson achieved near canonization in the eulogies 
of numerous economists, including several perennial adversaries whose 
work was quite remote from the Cambridge tradition. The Robinsonian 
conduct of intellectual life as a mode of partisan warfare was interpreted 
as a mark of flinty integrity and selfless dedication to the pursuit of truth, 
uncompromised by academic ambition (Matthews 1989, 911–15; Goodwin 
1989, 916–17). One commentator even saw in her “the stark and deadly 
simplicity of Antigone” (Walsh 1989, 881). Milton Friedman, not a cham­
pion of Cambridge economics, declared that economists would have 
achieved a rare consensus in judging Robinson the only woman to meet 
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the standards of the Swedish Academy (Friedman 1986, 77). She would 
not have taken the compliment. In her view, economic theory was an an­
drogynous enterprise, and her work transcended differences of gender.
p r o f e s s i o n a l  i d e n t i t y  f o r m a t i o n  a n d 
a c a d e m i c  c a r e e r  p r o d u c t i o n
This is a book about Robinson’s career in the 1930s. Her professional 
identity, first as a microeconomist and then as a Keynesian, was formed 
in acquiring credentials that would qualify her as a Cambridge theorist. 
In 1930, she had no professional identity and no apparent resources that 
would enable her to assemble these credentials. Becoming a Cambridge 
economist called for strategies of academic career production and tactics 
for executing them. She recruited mentors who would serve as guides, 
and advocates—allies who would become masters of her apprenticeship. 
Although she proved to be adept in acquiring supporters, her initiatives 
also met resistance. Not all economists at Cambridge were prepared to 
tolerate the zeal with which she pursued objectives and her tendentious 
approach to teaching.
In early 1933, Richard Kahn, Robinson’s best friend on the faculty, was 
at Harvard, and Robinson kept him up to date on Cambridge econom­
ics and economists. Writing on February 20, she ventured the breath­
taking speculation that, like women generally, she had no ambition 
(rfk/13/90/1/127–30). Really? The subject of this letter was Robinson her­
self and her recent progress in promoting her budding career at Cam­
bridge. It had a major and a minor theme. She was chiefly interested in 
giving Kahn an account of the latest developments in the allocation of 
credit for original work in the theory of imperfect competition at Cam­
bridge. This issue first arose in summer 1931. Although Gerald Shove 
had been working on theories of value and distribution for several years, 
he was notoriously slow to publish. That summer Kahn told him that 
Robinson was not only lecturing in his area but writing a book. Initially, 
Shove was merely uneasy. He was developing new and largely unpub­
lished material in his lectures and saw Robinson as an ambitious, dis­
ciplined, and theoretically promising economist. Would she credit him 
with priority for ideas that he believed were his? In pressing her for 
assurances on this point, he became increasingly meddlesome and offen­
sive. Robinson was annoyed but also in a difficult position, one requir­
ing subtle diplomacy. She was determined to see her book recognized as 
an important original contribution. This called for efforts to secure her 
claims to priority. However, it would be dangerous to antagonize Shove, 
who would have a voice and a vote in any decision on a lectureship for her 
at Cambridge. Shove’s long intimacy with Keynes was even more wor­
risome. Robinson had been courting Keynes since early 1932, hoping to 
become one of the economists on whom he relied for advice concerning 
his work in progress. Could she risk infuriating Shove without placing 
in jeopardy her project of becoming a Keynesian? Robinson’s tactic was 
to stand her ground where significant issues of priority were at stake and 
at the same time present herself to Keynes as his ally—civil, reasonable, 
moderate, and ready to compromise in their joint effort to mollify Shove 
and cool his volatile temperament.
The second theme concerned Robinson’s efforts to manage the recep­
tion of her book before it appeared. An early version of one of her argu­
ments (1932b) had caught the eye of A. C. Pigou, the Cambridge Professor 
of Political Economy, who detected a mathematical defect in her analy­
sis. Conversations chaperoned by her husband, Austin, also a Cambridge 
economist, and exchanges of letters ensued. Robinson could not solve 
Pigou’s problem. She could not even understand his objection, and she 
was not prepared to tell him why: as she later admitted, she was almost 
entirely ignorant of mathematics. What to do? Pigou’s critique could not 
be ignored or dismissed, and Kahn, her mentor on questions of formal 
analysis, was in the United States. She temporized, became confused, 
and tried to change the subject, all the while maintaining a dialogue with 
Pigou by keeping him engaged in the problem posed by his objection. 
In this fashion, Robinson placed herself and the problem in his capable 
hands. The result was a tactical tour de force. It was Pigou, not Robinson, 
who found an answer to his criticism by demonstrating that her argument 
was, after all, formally valid. Pigou performed a remarkable reversal of the 
conventional relationship between novice and senior scientist. He found a 
flaw in her argument, solved the problem, published his result some three 
months before her book appeared, and gave her credit for the fundamen­
tal elements of his proof. Robinson embraced his solution and accepted 
the credit. Pigou’s imprimatur on a book that had not been published or 
even completed was a stunning endorsement. Robinson made good use 
of it, including a reference to his published proof in her book (Robinson 
1933d, 100, n.1)
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In these episodes, Robinson was engaged in producing resources that 
advanced her nascent Cambridge career. Throughout the 1930s, she dem­
onstrated impressive skills in selecting and defining objectives that prom­
ised substantial benefits. She was flexible in matters of tactics, astute in 
perceiving opportunities, and deft in exploiting them. In turning to her 
advantage interventions by others that she neither planned nor antici­
pated, she was able to simplify and strengthen the operation of her tactics, 
at the same time confounding her adversaries and weakening their pow­
ers of resistance. In managing adventitious events that seemed to jeopar­
dize her chances of success, she translated threats into opportunities that 
served her purposes.
On Robinson’s strategic and tactical sense—the objectives she set in 
attempting to establish herself at Cambridge and the steps she took to 
execute them—the archival evidence of the 1930s is unequivocal. Her 
Cambridge contemporaries, both advocates and adversaries, saw her as a 
woman of considerable enterprise and energy, determined to achieve suc­
cess by making a reputation as a theorist. As the ensuing account shows, 
Kahn took her ambitions seriously and did everything in his power to help 
her achieve them. Pigou saw her first book in careerist terms. In his view, 
it would make her a strong candidate for the next university lectureship 
in economics.3 He also took a careerist perspective on her work generally 
and gave her advice on how to write her next book to best advantage.4 
Austin, too, encouraged Robinson’s ambitions and accommodated her 
career plans, in part by agreeing to postpone having children until she had 
“reorganized economics.”5 Robinson’s antagonists took a darker but no 
less serious view of her aims. Shove saw her work in drafting The Econom-
ics of Imperfect Competition as a threat to his unwritten book. He believed 
she had drawn some of her analyses from his unpublished lectures without 
his knowledge and took measures to extract priority concessions. By early 
1935, Dennis Robertson believed that Robinson was attempting to alter 
the Cambridge curriculum in money in order to strengthen the Keynes­
ian position, denigrate his lectures on monetary theory, and marginalize 
him generally. The economic historian C. R. Fay shared this view and was 
much more frank in expressing it: “The assumption has always seemed to 
me that if she wants it [anything], of course she can have it.”6
In the ensuing we trace the operation of strategies of career production 
in three early phases of Robinson’s professional life: (1) In early 1932, she 
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was an unlikely candidate for success at Cambridge. A woman in a uni­
versity dominated by men, she did not have a remarkable academic rec­
ord, a college fellowship, significant publications, or a powerful patron. 
She responded to this predicament by proposing a distinctive concep­
tion of the condition of Cambridge economics and creating for herself 
the key role in advancing the research program based on this conception. 
Appropriating and radicalizing Pigou’s idea of economic theory as a box 
of tools, she developed a fragmentary but uncompromising view of eco­
nomics as pure theory. In the Robinsonian philosophy of economic sci­
ence, theory was limited to tool­like techniques or methods of analysis. 
Although her heroes Alfred Marshall, Pigou, and Keynes had discovered 
ideas of singular greatness, each had failed to grasp the essential method­
ological significance of his thought. Who would reinterpret their work 
and place it on a sound theoretical footing? Who would consummate the 
Cambridge tradition by reconceptualizing the truths that its innovators 
had envisioned but failed to understand? The young Joan Robinson, who 
represented herself as taking the next big step in Cambridge economics. 
In part 1, we consider the relationship between career production and 
professional identity construction by examining Robinson’s early efforts 
to imagine and fashion a place for herself in the social and theoretical 
space of Cambridge economics.
(2) In her first research program, Robinson entered a new area of 
economic theory and achieved an impressive payoff. The personal costs 
were low in large measure because she moved quickly to identify local 
Cambridge assets on which she could draw without undue difficulty. 
Cultural resources were at hand in the Cambridge practice of collabora­
tive research, of which Robinson became a master. Colleagues became 
coworkers, critics, editors, or collaborators. They supplied her with ideas, 
arguments, data, scholarly advice, and mathematical analyses. In tutor­
ing her, filling the gaps in her training, and easing the task of writing an 
ambitious book, they accelerated her progress from relative ignorance of 
her subject to a complete book manuscript in less than three years. New 
intellectual resources were also available. The introduction of the mar­
ginal revenue curve at Cambridge was an auspicious event for Robinson, 
who became the first economist to make serious use of it. At the same 
time, the Cambridge culture of Marshallian economics provided favorable 
conditions for work on monopoly. Following Piero Sraffa, Kahn began 
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research in the area by analyzing the short period in his fellowship disser­
tation. What could be established by a long­period analysis of imperfectly 
competitive markets that employed the marginal revenue curve systemati­
cally? This was an unexplored question at Cambridge and a promising re­
search problem for an economist on the scene who was capable of moving 
quickly. In part 2, we consider the relationship between book production 
and career production by examining the circumstances under which Rob­
inson wrote The Economics of Imperfect Competition.
(3) Robinson became an enthusiast of Keynes quite early. In spring 
1932, she was attempting to establish a close professional relationship, and 
by January 1933, she was intent on achieving the status of a client—per­
forming intellectual services for Keynes, basking in his glory, and enjoying 
the benefits that scientific clientage would bring. She saw in Keynes “the 
charismatic glorification of ‘Reason’ ” (Weber 1978, 1209). Robinson was 
seduced by his brilliance and attracted by the prospect of admission into 
the small circle of his confidants in economic theory. The promise of intel­
lectual adventure—participating in a bold new heterodoxy and following 
the lead of a thinker who could revolutionize his field with a fundamental 
breakthrough—was irresistible.
Keynes was slow to respond. He had no interest in doing research 
on imperfect competition. As his letters to his wife, Lydia, show, he was 
troubled by Robinson’s liaison with Kahn, which was also a danger to 
Austin’s position. Robinson’s relations with Robertson, the Cambridge 
economist with whom Keynes had enjoyed his closest and most reward­
ing intellectual friendship, were increasingly strained and abrasive. Dur­
ing the 1920s, the etiquette of Cambridge economists was grounded in 
a principle of liberal civility: unsparing frankness in debate and an ab­
solute distinction between ideas and persons. Intellectual positions but 
not their advocates were open to criticism. This principle rested on a 
dichotomy—difficult to sustain, unrealistic, and perhaps ultimately in­
defensible—between who you are and what you think. In scientific de­
bate and academic disputation, Robinson was not averse to ad hominem 
tactics that transgressed this etiquette. Moreover, her transgressions ex­
hibited a lack of finesse and tact that suggested malice. As Keynes’s con­
temporary and fellow Kingsman Fay complained to him, “It is a pity 
she’s so bloody rude.”7 Robertson, with whom she clashed on issues of 
theory and curriculum, was a favorite object of her invective. Any move 
on Keynes’s part that indicated support for the role she was construct­
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ing for herself at Cambridge would, it seemed, put him at odds with 
Robertson.
Robinson persisted. Beginning in 1934, she made it her business to 
become au courant with the latest developments in Keynes’s post­Treatise 
work, a taxing undertaking in view of his intellectual agility and disposi­
tion to discard newly acquired views for alternatives that seemed more 
promising. In this project, she labored under the disadvantage of having 
little direct contact with Keynes himself. Her response to this problem 
was to employ his confidants as sources of information on changes in 
his views. Kahn, who was a frequent guest at Keynes’s country house in 
Sussex, kept her informed by a regular stream of letters that were sup­
plemented by fuller discussions on his return. Because of Sraffa’s regular 
conversations with Keynes on their current research interests, he too was 
a source of information, which Robinson extracted on their walks around 
Cambridge and its environs.
Robinson was a believer in a Keynesian revolution even before Keynes 
himself understood the implications of A Treatise on Money (1930) in these 
dramatic terms. Although she was a partisan of the revolution, Keynes did 
not acknowledge her as a member of the revolutionary elite until June 1935. 
At that point, her efforts finally succeeded when he sent her the proofs of 
The General Theory and asked for her help. In 1935, she was one of only five 
economists to whom he entrusted his new ideas for criticism and revi­
sion. Kahn was his disciple and friend. Roy Harrod, Ralph Hawtrey, and 
Robertson, all of whom were figures of considerable prestige in econom­
ics, had known Keynes for many years. In this manner, Robinson entered 
Keynes’s inner circle, a move that placed her at the center of Cambridge 
economics. The following year, she and Keynes exchanged roles as au­
thor and commentator. In spring 1936, he was reading the proofs of her 
Essays in the Theory of Employment. Later, in 1937, she finally convinced 
him that the fate of The General Theory would be decided not by debating 
the defects of orthodoxy with his contemporaries but by revolutionizing 
the teaching of economics. As a result of these discussions, he gave his 
blessing to the Introduction to the Theory of Employment, the first textbook 
in Keynesian economics. Robinson had arrived as an internationally ac­
knowledged leader of the Keynesian revolution. In part 3, we consider the 
relationship between patronage and career production by examining the 
tactical history of Robinson’s long and ultimately successful courtship of 
Keynes.
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An investigation of the genesis of Robinson’s professional identity and the 
strategies on which her early career was based is best explored from two 
perspectives. One is historical. Who did what, to and for whom, and on 
the basis of what intentions and purposes? In what institutional settings 
and under what circumstances were intentions formed and actions taken? 
Who won, who lost, and what consequences followed? In this respect, 
our book is a small­scale local history of certain episodes in Cambridge 
economics during the 1930s. It is not a collective scientific biography or 
a sketch for such a study but rather an account of Robinson’s early pro­
fessional world. This social sphere was characterized by rapid changes in 
theoretical idiom, reconfigurations of alliances, and a transformation of 
the Cambridge disciplinary culture.
The second perspective is theoretical, in a modest and perhaps even 
minimalist sense. We offer various analyses that are intended to clarify 
the history. In this respect, the book is an anthropology of Cambridge 
economics in the 1930s. Conventionally, anthropology is an investigation 
of a culture and its artifacts. We pursue this course by investigating the 
academic and disciplinary culture in which Robinson did her early work. 
There is an older sense of anthropology embodied in European philos­
ophy (Schnädelbach 1984): Anthropologie, an account of what it means 
to be a certain kind of human being—in our case a Cambridge econo­
mist of the 1930s, endowed with the powers and constrained by the lim­
itations of this species of Homo academicus. We take this course as well by 
exploring Robinson’s objectives and the strategies she employed to achieve 
them.
The historical and theoretical perspectives intersect. Although our 
microtheories are not generally the analyses of the actors themselves, they 
are based in local knowledge and built close to the ground they cover. We 
do not stray far from the conduct of Cambridge economists in the 1930s 
and their stories—what they thought they were doing and wanted to 
achieve by acting as they did. Much of what follows qualifies as Geertzian 
“thick description” or Wittgensteinian “perspicuous representation”: an 
account of social interactions and their artifacts considered within the in­
stitutional frames and cultural settings in which actors attempted to make 
sense of their enterprises (Geertz 1973, 1983; Wittgenstein 1953, 1971).
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Our microtheories are linked to two lines of investigation in science 
studies, a loose synthesis and an uneasy coalition of the history, soci­
ology, and philosophy of science. We explore various respects in which 
the formation of Robinson’s identity as a Cambridge economist and her 
early career moves were results of strategic efforts. On this point, our 
analysis is a contribution to research on the social constitution of scientific 
careers and the role of strategy in forming scientific research programs and 
professional identities. Mario Biagioli has argued that Galileo conceived a 
new socioprofessional status for the mathematician as natural philosopher 
and employed the intellectual and cultural assets at his disposal in order 
to occupy this status (Biagioli 1993).8 We argue that Robinson imagined a 
new project of Cambridge analytical economics and mobilized resources 
at hand to become such an economist. Throughout, our work draws on 
the thinking of two precursors of science studies, both of whom stress the 
importance of strategies of identity formation and career production: Max 
Weber’s writings on the role of institutional orders and cultural spheres in 
setting criteria for selection and success in career paths (Weber 1978) and 
Erving Goffman’s studies on the creation, reproduction, and presentation 
of social identities (Goffman 1959, 1969).
We also argue that Robinson’s professional identity was embedded 
in a local scientific culture, the changing Marshallian guild—students of 
Marshall, the father of Cambridge economics, and successive generations 
of their students—of Cambridge economists in the late 1920s and early 
1930s. This argument connects our account to recent work on microso­
cial geographies of science, which is based on the premise that scientific 
research programs and the socialization of the scientists who execute 
them are formed in local scientific cultures. The geography of science 
has sharpened doubts concerning the “everywhere and nowhere” con­
ception of science and scientific institutions: the view that in the origins 
and development of scientific research and careers, there are no special 
or privileged places (Golinski 1998, 80). Microsocial geographies of sci­
ence take the position that the cultural spaces of science are among the 
conditions that identify scientific performances that are treated as accept­
able or respectable in these spaces. Local cultures distinguish claims that 
are acknowledged as interesting and promising from those that are re­
jected as hopelessly confused and scientifically worthless. Sites of research 
are characterized by distinctive methodological regimes that govern what 
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qualifies as a legitimate scientific move. “Spaces of discursive exchange” 
define the modes of consensus and disagreement that are possible as well 
as how they are framed and interpreted (Livingstone 2003, 7). What can 
reasonably be claimed or questioned in a scientific investigation depends 
in part on the places from which investigators speak—the connection be­
tween location and locution (Livingstone 2007). In sum, an understand­
ing of locales of scientific production is essential to understanding the 
circumstances under which scientific work is done and scientific careers 
made.9 Our analysis proceeds from recent ideas on local cultures in sci­
ence, transposing them from the natural sciences, the site of their use thus 
far, to the circumstances of Robinson’s career.
s i g n p o s t s  a n d  c a v e a t s
An Epistolary Anthropology
To a remarkable extent, Cambridge economists of the 1930s conducted 
their professional lives in correspondence. Because of the wealth of un­
published sources housed in the University of Cambridge archives, we 
have been able to write this book largely as a study in epistolary anthro­
pology (Biagioli 1993, 19). We read the story of the formation of Robin­
son’s professional identity in the letters she and her colleagues exchanged 
at the time. The riches of the archives make it possible to act on the his­
toriographic principle: follow the primary sources of the 1930s.10 This 
principle also answers the question of why no accounts of interviews? 
After all, as of this writing some of Robinson’s students and younger col­
leagues are distinguished economists with memories intact and stories to 
tell. These are stories of the post–Second World War Robinson. When 
she was in her fifties, sixties, and seventies, she reminisced on the years of 
her apprenticeship, remembrances that were refracted through the events 
of later decades. This book considers Robinson in the 1930s. It is not an 
investigation of how she may have recalled Cambridge economics of the 
1930s after the experiences of a quarter of a century or more. The revision­
ism of distant recollections—the fact that what is remembered is formed 
by the experience of a more recent past and recalled from the perspective 
of the present—suggests that what Robinson and her colleagues wrote in 
the 1930s outweighs later recollections.
It follows that readers who knew the later Robinson may find it dif­
ficult to recognize the young economist of the 1930s—discovering new 
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research programs, honing her skills, and working to establish herself. 
If that is the case, it should not cause surprise. The battles of the 1930s 
were fought and on the whole won at the time. Her priorities of the 1930s 
were not the desiderata of her postwar career. By the mid­1960s, when 
she was the Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge and an inter­
nationally celebrated economist, the question of her professional identity 
and the problem of how to fashion an academic career had not been on 
her agenda for decades.11
Narratives of Career Strategy and  
Analyses of Economic Theory
Robinson’s enterprise of career production cannot be detached from her 
projects in economic theory. This means that in telling her story, it is not 
always sensible to take a path of strict chronological linearity. Robinson 
and her colleagues were academic intellectuals, passionately devoted to 
their work. An exploration of her social world does not permit a fine dis­
tinction between a narrative of action and an analysis of economic ideas. 
More often than not, the narrative concerns a problem of economic the­
ory. To advance the narrative, it is necessary to consider the economic 
ideas in which it is embedded. Robinson’s efforts in promoting her career 
were generally tied to the books or papers in which she was engaged. It is 
not even clear that she made a distinction between her work in economics 
and her contemporaneous work in career management. Little sense can 
be made of Robinson in the 1930s without interweaving her theoretical 
and strategic interests—the details of her economic thought and the ele­
ments of her career planning. It follows that evidence for our account of 
her strategic projects often unfolds in an analysis of her work in economic 
theory.
It also follows that the character of the narrative varies with the prob­
lems on which Robinson and her colleagues were engaged. In part 2, we 
show that she embraced the Cambridge practice of economic research 
as dialogue with considerable élan. It is not possible to tell an intelligent 
story of how her kinked demand curve (Robinson 1933d, 81) was pro­
duced in dialogues with Kahn without explaining what the kinked de­
mand curve is. For the same reason, an account of Pigou’s exchange with 
Robinson over the problem of equilibrium in imperfect markets would 
be incomprehensible without commentary on technical and theoretical 
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details. Comparable considerations hold for our history of Robinson’s 
attempts to secure Keynes’s patronage in part 3. She attempted to gain 
his recognition in the course of struggling to understand his Treatise on 
Money in 1934, commenting on the proofs of The General Theory in 1935, 
and debating with him in 1936 on the proofs of her Essays in the Theory 
of Employment. The story of her success in winning his endorsement as a 
leader of the revolution cannot be told without considering some of the 
details of her theoretical engagement with Keynes and his work.
Contingencies
Robinson did not return from India with a plan to maneuver herself from 
the margins of Cambridge economics to its center, as if she were Athene 
bursting fully formed from the forehead of Zeus. The skills she acquired 
and the strategies she employed were developed against a background of 
contingencies that proved to be remarkably propitious for the develop­
ment of her professional identity. She had no hand in their production, 
nor were they objects of planning on her part. It could not have been 
otherwise. A plan rests on premises that are not planned. Her strategies 
were based on assumptions without which they would not have been 
possible.
Consider the circumstances under which she began work on a long­ 
period analysis of imperfect competition. Sraffa had published his influen­
tial article in the Economic Journal (1926), spelling out the requirements of 
a theory of value under conditions of imperfect competition. He was also 
lecturing on these issues. Shove, Robertson, and Kahn had defined and 
clarified possible lines of research. the Economic Journal symposium of 
1930 on increasing returns had appeared, and Cambridge economists had 
become acquainted with the marginal revenue curve, a new research tool 
with intriguing possibilities for a diagrammatic analysis. By this point, the 
outlines of a research program were clear enough to allow for the entrance 
of a novice and for the execution of a significant piece of work. Although 
promising terrain and the means for exploring it had been discovered, no 
one had entered the territory. If Sraffa had acted on the suggestions he 
made in 1926, if Shove had been a more nimble thinker, or if Kahn had 
followed Pigou’s advice and published his dissertation in a timely fashion, 
it is unlikely that the conditions under which Robinson took the first steps 
to establish her professional identity would have been in place.
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Robinson in the Foreground
In the received historiography of interwar economics at Cambridge, the 
favored genre is the epic. The master narrative is the story of The Gen-
eral Theory. Its hero is Keynes, the single charismatic economist of the 
time. Other dramatis personae appear in their relations to him—as inter­
locutors, acolytes, or opponents (Ambrosi 2003; Marcuzzo and Rosselli 
2005). The story of the development of imperfect competition is told in 
the same fashion. Piero Sraffa is the principal actor in the drama of reno­
vating economics by abandoning the assumption of competitive markets. 
Others—Shove, Kahn, and Robinson—have their parts to play, but they 
follow in his steps (Cozzi and Marchionatti 2001).12 Both stories are Ho­
meric adventures of ideas. A single theoretician dominates the stage, and 
lesser figures respond to his innovations.
The picture changes markedly if Robinson is moved to the foreground 
from her place in the conventional historiography as either Keynes’s dis­
ciple or Sraffa’s follower. In understanding the Cambridge economics of 
the time, the unit of analysis is no longer the single theoretician but an 
epistemic community: the Marshallian guild. An account of Robinson as 
fledgling economist shifts the perspective from heroic deeds of virtuosi to 
the importance of guild membership. What were the barriers to entry and 
the criteria for admission? What skills were expected of apprentices? How 
was performance judged? Because Robinson introduced new sources of 
conflict into the guild, its social dynamics acquired a new salience. How 
far could an apprentice venture in testing the limits of guild civility? When 
the etiquette of the guild was violated, what were the results and how 
were conflicts adjudicated? In attempting to enter the guild by producing 
work that was recognized as original, Robinson’s priority claims were not 
uncontested. What tactics in defending credit claims were prudent for 
aspirants to guild membership? In Keynes, Robinson sought and even­
tually gained a patron. What effects in the guild did his patronage and 
her clientage produce? Because of the importance of intraguild friendship 
in Robinson’s early career, collegiality intersected with friendship. What 
consequences followed when the lines between the personal and the pro­
fessional were blurred? In sum, the picture of Cambridge economics that 
emerges when Robinson is moved to the foreground is not an imposing 
mural of heroes and their deeds but a series of collages that depict changes 
in the guild as she progresses from novice to master.
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 “I am extremely relieved that the matter of Joan’s lectureship looks like 
being settled.” This was Keynes writing on February 19, 1938, from his 
home in London in response to news from Kahn that Robinson had 
been appointed to a university lectureship in economics at Cambridge 
(jmk/l/k/94–96).1 Although Kahn’s letter ended Keynes’s worries over 
her candidacy, his delight was hardly unqualified. He had neither par­
ticipated in the deliberations of the Faculty Board of Economics and 
Politics that recommended the appointment nor was he consulted. Dur­
ing its meetings on the lectureship in January and February, he was con­
valescing from a heart attack suffered the previous summer. Moreover, 
Kahn—Keynes’s protégé and colleague at King’s College—believed that 
in taking no notice of Robinson’s contributions to economic theory, the 
board had arrived at its decision in a willfully demeaning fashion.2 This 
slight provoked Keynes’s anger. With the exception of Kahn, Robinson’s 
chief supporter on the board, only Pigou, the senior member of the 
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economics faculty, had taken “the right line.” But what of Keynes’s other 
colleagues? “How the other wretches can have failed to recognize that 
outside Cambridge she is unquestionably one of the most distinguished 
members of the staff, without doubt within the first half dozen, I cannot 
imagine.”3
In early 1938, the top five economists at Cambridge were Pigou, 
Keynes himself, Robertson, Sraffa and either Kahn or J. R. Hicks.4 Pigou 
was Marshall’s handpicked successor as Professor of Political Economy. 
He was the founder of welfare economics and arguably the most au­
thoritative voice of neoclassical economics in Britain. Keynes made his 
reputation immediately after the First World War with The Economic Con-
sequences of the Peace (1920), a trenchant critique of the political economy 
of the Treaty of Versailles based on his experience as a member of the 
British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. As the term Keynesian 
revolution suggests, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 
(1936) made him the most influential economist of the 1930s. Robertson 
was a Cambridge pioneer in investigating linkages of money, business 
cycles, economic growth, and government policy. When the faculty board 
recommended his appointment to a university readership, it stressed his 
“exceptional qualifications and world­wide reputation” and his “outstand­
ing distinction as an economist.”5 Sraffa’s article of 1926 in the Economic 
Journal produced a sea change in the understanding of Marshallian value 
theory and marked the beginning of research on imperfect competition at 
Cambridge. In his fellowship dissertation (1929) and his publications of 
the thirties (1931, 1933), Kahn constructed theoretical building blocks that 
were used by Keynes and Robinson.6 He also reinterpreted conclusions 
of Pigouvian welfare theory under conditions of imperfect competition 
(1935) and published innovative work on duopoly (1937). Hicks’s analysis 
of labor markets under long­run competitive conditions developed sev­
eral important tools for microeconomics (1932). Together with R. G. D. 
Allen, he introduced British economists to Vilfredo Pareto’s conception 
of utility theory and achieved a groundbreaking reformulation of the the­
ory of demand (1934). Most famously, he was responsible for a popular 
simplification of Keynes’s new ideas in an is-lm diagram that proved easy 
to understand and enjoyed international appeal only a few months after 
Keynes published his book (Hicks 1937).7 Thus Keynes placed Robinson 
in extraordinarily select company.
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b e c o m i n g  f a m o u s
Keynes’s assessment was not excessively generous, an appreciation of the 
dedication shown by an early and enthusiastic supporter of his work. Only 
three years after beginning serious work on economic theory, Robinson 
published The Economics of Imperfect Competition, which set a new course 
for the theory of price determination—or, in the Cambridge parlance 
of the time, value theory. She claimed that her inspiration was Sraffa’s 
critique of the reigning Cambridge theory of value that descended from 
Marshall, the author of Principles of Economics (1890), the canonical trea­
tise of Victorian economic thought. One of Sraffa’s main objections to 
Marshall’s theory was its assumption of free competition between eco­
nomic actors, a premise he regarded as obviously inconsistent with the 
realities of economic life. Following Sraffa, Robinson analyzed price de­
termination under monopolistic conditions. She also considered the con­
sequences of this analysis for the distribution of income, arguing that 
under imperfect competition workers are paid less than the market value 
of their labor. Thus she revived and refined the Pigouvian concept of ex­
ploitation (Pigou 1920, 511–19).
The book was an immediate succès d’estime, receiving reviews in the 
major British and American journals. The young Nicholas Kaldor was the 
reviewer for Economica (1934). Shove wrote the review for the Economic 
Journal (1933a). Perhaps the most important review was by Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, who contributed an eight­page appreciation for the Journal 
of Political Economy (1934). Widely read on both sides of the Atlantic, the 
book quickly became a standard text in the new research field. A letter of 
November 9, 1937, from Fritz Machlup to Robinson gives a good sense of 
the early excitement her work generated. Machlup was a Viennese econo­
mist trained in a tradition opposed in many respects to Cambridge prin­
ciples. He had emigrated to the United States and was teaching at Cornell 
University. He wrote, “A seminar of eighteen postgraduate students is 
studying your book The Economics of Imperfect Competition and discussing 
it from cover to cover, paragraph after paragraph. In appreciation of your 
most stimulating work, the undersigned wish to thank you and to assure 
you of their admiration.”8
The Economics of Imperfect Competition was reprinted thirteen times 
between 1933 and 1965. The reprint of 1942 appeared when demand for 
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higher education and supply of paper were both quite low owing to the 
war. By the early 1960s, the book had been translated into German, Ital­
ian, Japanese, Portuguese (Brazil), Korean, Polish, and Serbo­Croatian 
(jvr/vii/269). Robinson’s work on price theory did not end with The Eco-
nomics of Imperfect Competition. Her essay “Rising Supply Price” (1941) 
was praised by Samuelson and won the approval even of the “hypercritical 
Jacob Viner” (Samuelson 1989, 126). The long­term impact of this paper 
was surprising and quite remote from her intentions. In 1942, George 
Stigler used her analysis in The Theory of Competitive Price, an immensely 
successful neoclassical textbook studied by thousands of economics stu­
dents over several decades. As a result, her argument was appropriated 
to rescue the theory of price determination under conditions of perfect 
competition, precisely the model she had attacked in 1933 (Aslanbeigui 
and Naples 1997, 527).
During the 1930s, Robinson also became a zealous partisan of Keynes­
ian thinking. The origins of The General Theory lay in dissatisfaction with 
Keynes’s first attempt at a magnum opus in economic theory. This was 
the two­volume A Treatise on Money (1930), a project on which he labored 
fitfully and with many interruptions and distractions for some seven years. 
Its flaws were quickly noticed by both friendly and unsympathetic critics. 
Even as he corrected the final proofs, Keynes was planning a comprehen­
sive revision. On publication of the Treatise, a group of young econo­
mists at Cambridge—Sraffa, Kahn, James Meade, who was visiting from 
Oxford, Robinson, and Austin—began discussions. Although their initial 
intention was to understand the complexities of the book, they quickly 
moved to a consideration of its defects and how they might be repaired. 
This was the fabled Cambridge Circus, which arrived at conclusions that 
eventually moved Keynes to abandon his attempts to revise the Treatise. 
Instead, he would write a quite different book, one that would mark a 
more fundamental break with the Cambridge tradition. In 1932 and 1933, 
Robinson argued that the Treatise entailed a vision of a new world of eco­
nomic theory that Keynes had glimpsed but not clearly comprehended. 
Once he accepted this view, he made the turn from the Treatise to the 
enterprise of developing a theory of monetary production in which ag­
gregate demand played a large role.
In the years of the conception and composition of The General The-
ory, Robinson wrote the first essay on the emerging Keynesian synthesis. 
Her article “The Theory of Money and the Analysis of Output” (1933e) 
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was the earliest signal to economists not closely connected with Cam­
bridge that fundamental changes in Keynes’s thinking were underway. 
Once The General Theory was published, she moved from theory con­
struction to theory translation and extension. Within a year of its appear­
ance, she completed a book that elucidated and refined Keynes’s ideas and 
offered a spirited defense of his methods. Essays in the Theory of Employ-
ment brought to fruition a plan Robinson made in summer 1934. Her idea 
was to write rough sketches on the main themes of Keynes’s new work as 
well as problems she could analyze by employing his methods. When cir­
cumstances seemed opportune, she would prepare them for publication.9 
She also extended the explanatory range of The General Theory by taking 
up problems Keynes did not pursue, applying its short­period framework 
to longer­term economic interactions and opening up its closed economy 
to international trade and finance. Finally, she celebrated the virtues of 
Keynes’s theory by placing it above all competitors. In providing a con­
vincing account of the role of qualitative variables such as expectations 
as well as a rigorous quantitative analysis of employment, output, and 
wages, Keynes’s work superseded all rivals. Most of the papers in the 
Essays were written in 1936. “The Long­Period Theory of Employment” 
was first published in a German journal in March, a month after The Gen-
eral Theory. “Disguised Unemployment” appeared in the Economic Journal 
three months later. This was remarkably fast work. It was possible only 
because Robinson kept up to date with changes in Keynes’s thinking as he 
wrote successive drafts of The General Theory.
Unlike The Economics of Imperfect Competition, the Essays was not an im­
mediate commercial or critical success. The first edition was not reprinted. 
In October 1947, when wartime printing restrictions due to paper short­
ages had been lifted and postwar university enrollments had increased 
dramatically, a second edition was published and reprinted the following 
month. There seems to have been only one early review, published in the 
Economic Journal, where Austin was assistant editor. Robinson’s consola­
tion prize was the reviewer: Roy Harrod, the distinguished Oxford econo­
mist and enthusiast of The General Theory. Harrod praised Robinson for 
contributing “another volume of great distinction to economic studies” 
(Harrod 1937b, 326). He was especially taken by “The Long­Period Theory 
of Unemployment,” in his judgment the “pièce de résistance” of the book 
(Harrod 1937b, 328). However, he raised two intriguing objections to 
Robinson’s project of extending The General Theory to the long run. She 
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made no attempt to tackle the intractable problem of measuring capital. 
In addition, both Keynes and Robinson analyzed problems of economic 
dynamics by employing a static theoretical framework. In Harrod’s view, 
a genuine dynamic analysis was needed, an analysis like the one on which 
he had been working for some time.10
In autumn 1936, Robinson considered writing a more accessible version 
of Keynes’s program for students, who were likely to be bewildered by its 
antiorthodox polemics, formidable organization, and complex analyses. 
She also moved quickly on this project, and within a year her Keynesian 
primer, Introduction to the Theory of Employment, appeared. She con­
ceived the book as an exposition of The General Theory for beginners, in­
cluding students who could not be expected to perform brilliantly on the 
Cambridge Economics Tripos, or honors examination. The Introduction 
is best understood as Robinson’s attempt to revolutionize undergradu­
ate economics in a Keynesian direction, socializing students in the lan­
guage and methods of The General Theory at the outset of their training. 
Robinson understood a basic revolutionary imperative that some of her 
fellow partisans, Keynes among them, did not appreciate: capture the 
next generation. The revolution would be decided not in debates over 
the merits of Keynes’s book by academics of the 1930s but in debates by 
their students. This meant that his adversaries could be vanquished even 
though they were not refuted or fully persuaded. Classicism would be 
destroyed when its adherents retired and a new generation educated on 
Keynesian principles became civil servants, central bankers, and academ­
ics. Demand for her bedtime story or “told to the children” (in Keynes 
1979, 185) version of The General Theory was impressive. The Introduction 
was reprinted twice in 1938, once again in 1939, and several times after the 
Second World War, by which time the victory of the revolution had been 
achieved.
m a k i n g  i t :  h o w  t o  b e c o m e  a  c a m b r i d g e 
e c o n o m i c  t h e o r i s t  c i r c a  1 9 0 0 – 3 0
At the beginning of the 1930s, Robinson possessed no profile as an eco­
nomic theorist, not even in the small Cambridge faculty in which she was 
known. In 1931, Keynes did not recognize her as an economist. In a letter 
of May 4 to Lydia, he identified Robinson solely by her conjugal status, 
as the marital appendage of Austin (jmk/pp/45/190/5).
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What were Robinson’s credentials in 1930? As a student of Girton 
College, Cambridge, Joan Violet Maurice read economics, graduating 
in 1925 with an undistinguished performance on her tripos and receiving 
a disappointing Second Class (Pasinetti 1987, 212). The following year 
she married Austin, and the couple sailed to India, where Austin began a 
two­year appointment as tutor in economics to the young maharajah of 
the Indian state of Gwalior. If Austin’s memory can be trusted, Robinson 
knew little economics when she completed her studies and did not ac­
quire much more during their stay in India. When he returned to Cam­
bridge and she reappeared as Mrs. Robinson, she attended Sraffa’s lec­
tures on advanced theory of value. In Austin’s recollections, she was not 
preparing herself for a career in economic theory but only pursuing cur­
rent work in the field of her studies (Robinson 1994, 7). In 1931, there 
seems to have been no reason Keynes should have regarded her as a bud­
ding theoretician.
When Robinson began supervising students at the couple’s flat, her 
prospects for a Cambridge lectureship were dim. Between the introduc­
tion of the Economics Tripos in 1903 and 1930, there were no official 
standards for university lectureships in economics. However, the faculty 
board, which recommended candidates for lectureships to the general 
board, seems to have employed tacit criteria that functioned as consen­
sual norms for appointment. In 1930, there were five economists at Cam­
bridge who incontestably qualified as theorists. In order of appointment, 
Pigou, Keynes, Shove, Robertson, and Sraffa.11 In considering the obsta­
cles Robinson faced, it is useful to examine their pedigrees, the credentials 
they established as young men prior to their appointments. Then, as now, 
the socioeconomic locus of British economic theory was the university. 
This meant that the career prospects of a theorist were tied to the insti­
tutional imperatives of academia. It was necessary to build an impressive 
curriculum vitae by submitting to critical rites of passage. Examination pa­
pers, prize essays, and dissertations were trials, tests of merit that decided 
the fate of academic apprentices by determining whether they were, if not 
brilliant or original, then at least, in the parlance of the time, sound.
Pigou (b. 1877) was the only member of the economics faculty in 1930 
to have entered Cambridge before the Economic Tripos. Admitted to 
King’s in 1896, he had a brilliant undergraduate career, placing Firsts in 
Part I of the History Tripos and Part II of the Moral Sciences Tripos, 
which at the time included political economy as well as philosophy. His 
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essay in 1902 on changes in agricultural prices, which was awarded the 
Cobden Prize, won him a fellowship at King’s. As a result of Marshall’s 
management of the selection of his successor in 1908, he was elected to the 
Chair of Political Economy.
Keynes (b. 1883) took the Mathematics Tripos in 1905, receiving the 
twelfth highest score in the First Class. After taking his degree, he stud­
ied economics with Marshall for one term. Eighteen months at the India 
Office left him time to work on a fellowship dissertation for King’s, a 
philosophical analysis of probability theory. The examiners rejected the 
dissertation as not up to fellowship standards. However, Pigou’s selec­
tion as Marshall’s successor transformed Keynes’s prospects. Pigou was 
elected on May 30, 1908. Three days later, the faculty board—Keynes’s fa­
ther was its secretary—authorized a lectureship for Keynes, to be funded 
from Pigou’s professorial stipend. It was Pigou who had suggested some 
weeks earlier that Marshall write Keynes about such a possibility. Thus 
Keynes’s first appointment was arranged through the joint intercession 
of Marshall and Pigou and with the assistance of his father. He resubmit­
ted his dissertation in early 1909 and was elected a fellow of King’s in 
March.
Shove (b. 1888) entered King’s in 1907 and received a First with dis­
tinction in the Economics Tripos of 1911. He was a pupil and intimate of 
Keynes. Like Keynes, he was one of the chosen few selected for member­
ship in the Society of Apostles, the secret transgenerational Cambridge 
discussion club that entertained pretensions to the highest levels of intel­
lectuality. Also like Keynes, he was among the Cambridge Bloomsberries, 
bright young men from King’s and Trinity who frequented the salons of 
the Stephen sisters, Vanessa Bell and Virginia Woolf, in London. Shove’s 
fellowship dissertation, submitted to King’s in 1914, failed to win the ap­
proval of the electors. Although Keynes registered a strenuous dissent 
with the electors, the decision stood. When military conscription was in­
troduced in January 1916, Shove gained an exemption based on pacifism 
and conscientious objection. Keynes gave evidence on his behalf. In 1926, 
Keynes finally succeeded in arranging his election as a fellow of King’s.
Robertson (b. 1890) entered Trinity in 1908 and also became a pupil 
of Keynes. He wrote verse not only in English, but also in Greek and 
Latin, winning the Chancellor’s Medal for English Verse three years in 
succession as well as the University Craven Prize. He received a First in 
Part I of the Classics Tripos (1910) and took another First in Part II of 
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the Economics Tripos (1912). Although his fellowship dissertation for 
Trinity was rejected in 1913, it won the Cobden Prize the same year. In 
1914, he renewed his application and was elected to a fellowship on the 
basis of a revision of the dissertation, published in 1915 as A Study of In-
dustrial Fluctuations.
In 1930, Sraffa (b. 1898) was arguably the most brilliant economist 
at Cambridge. In the preface to his Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, not noted for a misplaced sense of intellectual modesty, ac­
knowledged only two debts: Frank Ramsey’s critique of his earlier Trac-
tatus and a larger obligation to the “unremitting” criticisms of Sraffa, to 
whom he credited “the most consequential ideas” of the book.12 Sraffa 
studied economics in the faculty of law at the University of Turin, where 
economists were influenced more by Marshall than by Pareto. In 1925, 
he published a seminal critique of Marshall’s theory of value in an Ital­
ian journal. The following year, Keynes, in his capacity as editor of the 
Economic Journal, published a considerably altered English version. In 
1927, a lectureship for Sraffa was established at Cambridge on Keynes’s 
initiative.
What do these academic profiles of Cambridge economists show? The 
Cambridge products received First Class degrees. Pigou, Keynes, and 
Robertson wrote successful dissertations that won them election to col­
lege fellowships. Four of the five benefited from patronage, resources 
placed at the disposal of a young scholar by a more powerful member 
of the economics faculty. Marshall was Pigou’s patron. Both Shove and 
Sraffa enjoyed Keynes’s patronage. And no fewer than three members 
of the faculty—Pigou, Marshall, and J. N. Keynes—took a hand in ar­
ranging Keynes’s appointment. Finally, all five theorists were men, a fact 
that should not pass without comment in view of the status of women at 
Cambridge before the Second World War.
a  m a n ’ s  w o r l d
By the 1920s, Cambridge had a long and inglorious history of discrim­
ination against women unique among British universities. One product 
of this history was an academic caste system based on sex. In 1881, students 
at Girton and Newnham, the two Cambridge colleges for women, re­
ceived permission to sit for honors examinations and have their papers 
evaluated. Performance on the tripos and satisfaction of the three­and­
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one­half­year residence requirement were the criteria for a Cambridge 
honors degree. However, the faculty senate decreed that regardless of 
their tripos performance and notwithstanding the fact that they wrote 
the same papers set for men, women would not receive degrees. In May 
1897, a “grace,” or proposal, was introduced to grant qualified women the 
title or name of their degree but not the degree itself, an arcane distinc­
tion that seems to have made sense to the members of the university. The 
proposal engaged the passions of both graduates and faculty, especially 
those committed to Victorian conceptions of the natural place of women 
in the social order and the limits of their intellectual faculties. On polling 
day, many nonresident graduates traveled to Cambridge for the vote, and 
the proposal was roundly defeated.13
One of the most able and influential opponents of measures to reform 
women’s education at Cambridge was the teacher of Pigou and Keynes, 
the architect of Cambridge economic pedagogy, and the namesake of the 
Pigouvian dictum, “It’s all in Marshall.” Yet Marshall had been an early 
champion of higher education for women and an ally of Henry Sidgwick 
in the ambitious project to build and staff Newnham College. He donated 
money to its construction fund and even married one of its products, 
his student Mary Paley. In the 1870s, Marshall defended equal education 
for men and women and supported the movement to permit women at 
Cambridge to sit for honors examinations. He was also in the vanguard 
of Cambridge faculty who taught women, lecturing on political econ­
omy and political philosophy and preparing them for examinations. By 
1885, when he became the Professor of Political Economy, he was sing­
ing a song with a more traditional theme. Women’s chief responsibilities 
were by nature domestic. Their education should generally be restricted 
to part­time study at local colleges, such as Bristol University College, 
where he had been principal in 1877–84. Marshall viewed granting degrees 
to women as especially dangerous. It was likely to debase the quality of 
the university since questions of academic policy as well as many routine 
matters were settled by polling graduates.
By the 1890s, Marshall embraced social Darwinist views that would se­
verely limit higher education for women. His earlier alliance with Sidgwick 
and his support for liberal reform were now outweighed by theories of ra­
cial degeneration derived from a tendentious reading of Charles Darwin’s 
The Descent of Man and Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Biology. Education 
would damage women’s health by weakening their reproductive systems.
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It would have a seductively destructive effect on ethics by encouraging 
them to pursue lives that conflicted with marriage and motherhood. 
Marshall envisioned ruinous consequences for the family, which depended 
on the presence of dutiful wives and mothers in the home. If Cambridge 
and other British universities encouraged women to pursue higher edu­
cation, the British “race” would degenerate physically as well as morally. 
Women university graduates would spell doom in the implacable interna­
tional and interracial struggle for survival. Britain would be subjugated by 
other races, which would prove their superiority by confining women to 
their naturally endowed functions. Women in various fields occasionally 
outperformed men in honors examinations. Marshall’s explanation? They 
were diligent by nature and endowed with an innate capability for pro­
ficiency in examinations that was denied men. Because they lacked male 
capacities for creativity and originality, this was the upper limit of their 
intellectual potential. Marshall compared the effects of malperformance 
by women in the household to a draft horse that was not properly cared 
for and a steam engine without a sufficient supply of coal (Groenewegen 
1995, 507). Although a Cambridge education might open up opportuni­
ties for women, the economic value of their domestic functions vastly 
outweighed any contribution they might make as members of the labor 
force.14
When Joan Maurice entered Girton, commitment by the university to 
Marshallian views on the dangers women posed for Cambridge and the 
perils they faced remained largely intact, compromised but not seriously 
weakened by the suffrage movement and the liberalization of relations 
between the sexes that followed the First World War. On October 21, 
1921, a year before Maurice’s matriculation, members of the university 
were asked to vote on whether to award purely titular degrees to quali­
fied women students or to grant them additional rights as well. Thus 
the question posed in 1921 presupposed acceptance of the proposal that 
had been rejected in 1897. Polling day was a volatile event, with elements 
of a class reunion, political convention, pep rally, and small­scale riot. 
Voting by opponents of the more liberal measure was encouraged by a 
wealthy graduate who offered like­minded nonresident alumni vouchers 
for round­trip train tickets between London and Cambridge at reduced 
rates. The views of undergraduate men were canvassed the evening before 
at the Cambridge Union, which debated the proposition that the “house 
did not consider granting a titular degree met the legitimate aspirations 
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of women students.” W. R. Sorley, Professor of Medicine, resurrected 
Victorian arguments for the inferior intellectual status of women and 
suggested a darker motive for the movement to extend women’s rights 
in higher education: mobilization of support for radical positions on the 
woman’s question. The motion before the Union was defeated 375 to 
185. The next day undergraduates chanted, “We won’t have women!” and 
members of the university defeated the more liberal proposal. After the 
vote, a group of students rushed from the Senate House to Newnham 
and attacked the bronze­plated main gate of the college, partially destroy­
ing it—an act of political symbolism since the gate was valued for both 
aesthetic and sentimental reasons. In attempting to invade the college 
grounds by another entry, they were finally subdued by university proc­
tors and local police. No charges were brought and no student was dis­
ciplined (Bradbrook 1969, 165).
The vote of October 21 placed limits on the number of women stu­
dents, denied them entry to men’s colleges, and gave the faculty the free­
dom to use different syllabi for men and women preparing for the same 
examinations. As a result of the vote, Cambridge remained the only Brit­
ish university where women were excluded from university lectureships 
and administrative offices, even at the lowest levels.15 Women attended 
university lectures at the pleasure of the lecturer. Faculty had the right to 
deny women admittance to lectures or segregate them in specially des­
ignated seats. No examiner was obligated to read women’s papers, and 
their tripos performance continued to be reported independently of the 
results of men.
The vote was especially dispiriting for Cambridge women who had 
academic aspirations. Eileen Power, the medievalist and one of the most 
distinguished economic historians of her time, was a graduate of Girton, 
placing Firsts in both Parts of the History Tripos in 1910. After several 
years of lecturing and supervision at Cambridge, she left for a better posi­
tion at the London School of Economics (lse), where the prospects for 
women seemed more promising. On learning the results of the vote of 
October 21, she wrote Bertrand Russell, “Cambridge has really cut our 
throats now: it would have been much better to get nothing than to get 
the titular degree. . . . Our position in the University [is] exactly where 
it was. I have never been so bitter in my life” (quoted with elision in 
Berg 1996, 141). It is not difficult to sympathize with Power’s response, 
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especially in light of the apparent incomprehensibility of the distinctions 
on which the university insisted so strenuously. In 1897, the university 
declared that there was no connection between women’s performance 
on honors examinations and their degree qualifications. But at that time, 
tripos performance was the most important requirement for the Cam­
bridge honors degree. In 1921, the university held that it was sensible to 
grant the name of the degree but withhold the degree itself. Both posi­
tions seem anomalous. In 1897, Cambridge created a right to be examined 
but not a right to university tuition to prepare for the examination; nei­
ther did it guarantee that the examination would be read. In approving 
purely titular degrees for women in 1921, it created “a graduate without 
a degree” (McWilliams Tullberg 1998, 68). Such reasoning exceeded the 
limits of Power’s tolerance.
Restrictions on women during Joan Maurice’s student years were 
not limited to purely academic matters. The institution of chaperonage, 
which required an adult female to accompany women students when they 
left the confines of their college or received extrafamilial male visitors 
within college gates, was not formally abolished at Cambridge until 1936. 
Some chaperonage regulations were relaxed following the First World 
War. For example, unattended women were permitted to meet men in 
local tea shops, and there were circumstances under which a woman was 
even allowed to entertain a male student in her rooms if another woman 
was present. Yet regulations from 1920 governing mixed company in the 
traditional pastime of boating on the Cam illustrate the tortured scholasti­
cism of redefining rules for the surveillance of women: “Parties may with 
leave of the Tutor go on the river in punts or boats but not in canoes. Such 
parties may only take place before dinner (8 p.m. Sundays) and more than 
one student must be present except that a student may go alone with her 
brother or her fiancé. No such parties may include more than one punt or 
boat and no parties may take place on Thursday” (quoted in McWilliams 
Tullberg 1998, 144).
In November 1925, women were finally admitted to university teach­
ing posts and membership on faculty boards that made most decisions 
on curricula, lectureship appointments, and examinations. This was the 
first occasion on which women were allowed to deliver lectures to male 
students. They remained excluded from competitions for fellowships 
in men’s colleges. Women students did not receive the right to attend 
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university lectures until 1926. During Maurice’s student years, this was a 
privilege that might be granted, withheld, or withdrawn at the discretion 
of the lecturer (McWilliams Tullberg 1998, 177–78).16
t h e  “ a n a l y t i c a l  e c o n o m i s t ” :  
g e n e s i s  o f  a  p r o f e s s i o n a l  i d e n t i t y ,  1 9 3 0 – 3 1
From Joan Maurice to Joan Robinson
Women at Cambridge in the early 1920s contended with obstacles im­
posed on them by a sexist academic culture. The university conferred 
on men advantages that women did not enjoy, endowing them with re­
sources to which women had little or no access. Segregation of women 
into separate colleges distributed the goods of the university not only un­
equally but inequitably. What was the significance of these inequities for 
Joan Maurice? After all, the leading economists of her student years seem 
to have taken progressive stances on academic rights for women. The 
question might be posed in another way: in the early 1920s, what were the 
ideal conditions for women undergraduates in economics at Cambridge? 
Untrammeled attendance without invidious treatment in all lectures that 
were listed for men reading for the Economics Tripos, common syllabi 
for men and women, and freedom from chaperonage. Even under these 
circumstances, Maurice would have labored under disadvantages owing 
solely to the fact that she was not a man.
Maurice was not supervised by a high­powered theoretician such 
as Robertson or Keynes. Her first supervisor was probably Marjorie 
Robinson. Entering Newnham as Marjorie Powel in 1912 and taking a 
First in the Economics Tripos during the war, Robinson was a product 
of the pre­1919 regime of women’s education at Cambridge. She had no 
experience of the more liberal, sophisticated academic socialization that 
Robertson and Shove enjoyed as students of Trinity and King’s. Widely 
read in the literature of economics, she was, according to her contempo­
rary Hubert Henderson, “content with her role as a teacher” and made 
“no pretensions to originality or distinction” (Henderson 1940, 162).17 
Marjorie Tappan (later Tappan­Holland), who replaced Robinson as di­
rector of studies of both Girton and Newnham in 1923, was most likely 
Maurice’s second supervisor. A Cambridge outsider, she graduated from 
Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania in 1915 and completed a doctoral de­
gree at Columbia in 1917 (Turner 1989, 252, n. 24). Perhaps because of 
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her positions in the two women’s colleges and her teaching responsibili­
ties—she also became a member of the faculty board in November 1926 
(fb/Min.V. 116)—she had little time for research and publication. Keynes 
seems to have regarded her credentials as pedestrian and in 1932 voted 
against her reappointment to a university lectureship.18
Excluded from the privileged social spheres of men’s colleges, Maurice 
did not have the valuable informal contacts and close personal relations 
with leading economists that were such an important element of a Cam­
bridge education. She was not allowed in the rooms of male students or 
fellows, nor could she dine in the halls of men’s colleges or expect invita­
tions to breakfast on weekends or tea from male faculty. This meant that 
she was barred from sites at which journeymen economists received much 
of their education. Before he became a recluse, Pigou held Sunday break­
fasts for his favored students, some of whom he also invited on mountain­
eering expeditions at his Lake District cottage. When Shove was Keynes’s 
pupil, they vacationed together. In their undergraduate years, both Pigou 
and Robertson had been elected to the presidency of the Cambridge 
Union, the leading university debating society. The Union was a forum 
for self­presentation in an academic culture that stressed verbal facility 
and a glib mastery of rhetoric and sophistry as proofs of merit. Women 
were allowed in the audience but prohibited from engaging in debate. In 
the development of new ideas, lines between the economics faculty and 
their students were not finely drawn. Gifted undergraduates had a role 
in research that is difficult to imagine today. In 1929, Kahn had less than 
a year of training in economics, yet he was assisting Keynes with final 
revisions of the Treatise. In 1930, Austin was introduced to the marginal 
revenue curve by one of his pupils. Following the tradition of Cambridge 
Victorians, who emulated the classical Greek synthesis of strenuous physi­
cal and intellectual pursuits, tripos preparation was often a peripatetic ex­
ercise. Study was conducted on walking tours in the English countryside 
scheduled during interterm vacations. Lecturers or fellows selected their 
favorite students. With books packed, they set out for days or weeks of 
hiking through the southwest counties or the Lake District, attired in plus 
fours and tailored walking jackets complete with soft, collared shirts and 
ties. Reading and discussion took place on breaks from hiking and during 
overnights at country inns. Maurice’s undergraduate life did not include 
these opportunities. In the 1920s, the homegrown theoreticians—Pigou, 
Keynes, Robertson, and Shove—were all products of the castelike cul­
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ture and social organization of Cambridge education. Women were at the 
bottom of the sociointellectual order. From the standpoint of entitle­
ments, privileges, liberties, resources, and assets—including the excel­
lence or contemptibility of the cuisine served by college kitchens—
women lived in the lower depths.19 Moreover, the lifestyles of Cambridge 
economists—Pigou, Keynes (until 1925), Robertson, and Shove (until his 
marriage)—were marked by a pronounced homoerotic complexion. Al­
though it is difficult to characterize with any precision the disadvantages 
this fact entailed for women, some observations can be made with rea­
sonable confidence. Young men were preferred for intimate relationships 
as pupils, disciples, and companions. At best, women were treated with 
diffidence and kept at a respectable distance. In the 1920s, none of the 
Cambridge theoreticians had selected women as their preferred pupils, 
protégés, or professional peers.
When did these disadvantages begin to make a substantial difference 
to Maurice? Not until she returned from India as Mrs. Robinson and be­
gan to take seriously a career as a Cambridge economist. This apparently 
was not her immediate intention when the Robinsons resettled in Cam­
bridge before Austin began teaching in the Easter term of 1929. In July 
1928, Robinson had returned to England from India, while Austin re­
mained there until the end of the year. Her correspondence offers evi­
dence of a reflective, well read, intellectually engaged, and energetic young 
woman with aspirations for economic independence. In a long letter 
written in late September, a month before her twenty­fifth birthday, she 
discussed the social functions and moral virtues of common­law or com­
panionate marriage, the foundations of morality, the relationship between 
tradition, reason, and freedom, and the excesses of the emancipation of 
women in England, which she interpreted as “only a violent reaction 
against Puritanism + the immoral morality” of the Victorian era.20 From 
her standpoint, an ideal society would institutionalize free divorce, an 
equal distribution of wealth, and education and independence for women. 
Thus it is not surprising that she impressed on Austin her personal com­
mitment to self­reliance: “Please I don’t want you to earn money to send 
me round the world. I am a strong believer in the economic independence 
of married women, + only ask to be allowed to earn some myself.”21 
However, she had little conception of her opportunities and ambitions. 
The main object of her energies at the time was her husband’s career. 
Prior to 1930, two episodes show especially clearly how she invested her 
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efforts in his work, serving in a subordinate role as his willing assistant 
and factotum: the report on the princely states of India and the attempt 
to secure a position for Austin at Cambridge.
In spring 1927, the British viceroy of India appointed the Butler Com­
mittee to examine relations between the Indian states—princely territories 
of the Indian subcontinent not under British rule—and the colonial gov­
ernment. The brief of the Butler Committee was to improve economic 
relations between the states and British India. A Standing Committee of 
the Chamber of Princes—officials appointed by the princes to represent 
their collective interest—undertook an independent investigation of two 
main issues: neglect on the part of the British government of rights of the 
states established by treaties and inequities that the British fiscal system 
imposed on the states. The standing committee compiled a substantial 
two­part report: part 1 covered the political relations between the states 
and the Crown, and part 2 surveyed economic matters in dispute between 
the states and the British government of India (The Directorate 1929, 
xiv–xv). In April 1928, Austin prepared a draft on the economics of the 
case for the princely states intended for inclusion in part 2 of the report. 
In late June, his draft was discussed in Delhi by the standing committee. 
Since his tutorial responsibilities in Gwalior limited his freedom to travel, 
Robinson went to Delhi in his stead to help finish the draft. At the invita­
tion of the standing committee, she sailed with the committee members 
to London in order to assist in completing the report and presenting the 
economic brief. On July 20, two days before arriving in London, she noted 
that she had written a preface for the report (eagr/Box 8/2/1/13/13–16).22 
A few days after her arrival, she consulted with William Beveridge, the 
prominent British economist and director of lse, who promised to read 
and comment on the material she gave him (eagr/Box 8/2/1/13/17–21). 
The Butler Committee met on July 25 but accomplished virtually noth­
ing and adjourned until October. In the intervening months, Robinson 
continued her work on part 2. By mid­October, an unidentified note on 
which she had been laboring had become “our note.”23 However, her 
work seems to have ended in disappointment. In the presentation to the 
Butler Committee, the note in question was reduced to a “mangled rem­
nant,” and although she had added notes on railways and salt, she was 
dissatisfied with her results.24
When Robinson returned to London in mid­September 1928 from a 
holiday with her parents in Ireland, a cable from Austin awaited her. His 
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job in India would likely terminate before the end of the year. Could she 
inquire on his behalf concerning academic positions at Cambridge and 
Liverpool? Her response was to make an appointment with Robertson, 
who had visited Austin in India during an Asian tour in 1926–27 (Dennison 
and Presley 1922, 23). “Cambridge full at present but not hopeless” was 
his assessment. At that point there was a small chance of a university lec­
tureship and, in a year or two, an excellent opportunity for a fellowship 
at one of the colleges that would not elect Maurice Dobb because he 
was a communist. Robinson noted that the Cambridge economists were 
“all most delightfully + genuinely excited” at the prospect of Austin’s 
return. In addition, professorships were open at Liverpool and Hull.25 
The following day, she wrote a “more lucid account of our prospects.” 
In her view they were good. “The economists though plentiful are bad.” 
Any of three university lectureships at Cambridge might soon be open. 
Robertson was not happy with Humphrey Mynors because he was lectur­
ing on industry without specialized knowledge of the field. Philip Sargant 
Florence might leave voluntarily or be pushed out because he was liv­
ing in London while lecturing at Cambridge. And Sraffa—“the brilliant 
Italian at King’s”—seemed to be incapacitated by the nervous strain of 
lecturing. She deferred making inquiries at lse until she heard more from 
Robertson, who hoped that Austin could be offered a lectureship effec­
tive October 1929.26 It seemed that the lectureship would concentrate on 
population, an area in which Austin had not lectured. Robinson reacted 
to this news with considerable enthusiasm, treating both the lectureship 
and its probable territory as a joint enterprise: “We can get Population 
well in hand before you have to bother with lectures. It sounds fun. I have 
my heart in it more than Localisation,” on which he had lectured previ­
ously.27 By October 31, she was already working on the literature. “I have 
bought a fountain pen so as to be able to work at l.s.e. but the books I 
want are always out. The India Office library is a good spot” (eagr/Box 
8/2/1/13/74–77).
Through her contacts at Cambridge, Robinson followed the delibera­
tions of the faculty board on Austin’s chances. The board met on No­
vember 6, but no offer was forthcoming.28 On November 26, it decided 
to permit Austin to lecture during the academic year 1929–30 in an ex 
officio fashion, without holding a lectureship (fb/Min. V. 116). On May 
10, 1930, the Appointments Committee of the board agreed to offer him a 
university lectureship, to begin in October (fb/Min. V. 117).
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Shortly before Austin’s appointment was announced, he commis­
erated with his wife, who was searching without success for a job near 
Cambridge: “Yes, you must get a job near Cambridge, + come + keep 
my nose down to localisation [the subject of a course he was teaching at 
the time]. But please don’t worry about jobs. Everybody is in the same 
boat.”29 Everyone was in the same boat because the capitalist economy 
had collapsed.30 Robinson was looking for a job, not necessarily an aca­
demic position. It seems that the only acceptable work she could find was 
in the university as a supervisor of undergraduates in economics. She was 
responsible for holding weekly supervisions of pupils, assigning essays, 
and evaluating the results. There is no reason to suppose that at this point 
she entertained a vision of herself as an academic economist, much less 
as an original theorist.
Robinson’s return to Cambridge as the wife of a fellow and her super­
vision of a few students neither diminished the limitations under which 
she worked as a woman, nor altered her institutional marginality. Lacking 
a college fellowship, she was not entitled to rooms in a college. Super­
vising from the Robinson flat, she enjoyed no unmediated contact with 
Cambridge economists or unfiltered access to theoretical discussions. Yet 
within some two years, she developed a strikingly clear and confident con­
ception of her professional identity. It was articulated but not publicly 
announced in October 1932, with many flourishes of Robinsonian hau­
teur, in a little text that she called “A Passage from the Autobiography of 
an Analytical Economist.”31 What did this new self­identification mean 
to her at the time? What happened between March 1930, when she was 
searching for jobs, and October 1932 that led to this exercise in profes­
sional identity production and self­representation, performed in a “secret 
document” that was not only cheeky but grandiose in its pretensions?
Although records are not at hand, it seems that in 1929–30 Robinson 
attended Sraffa’s lectures.32 What did she make of his article and lectures, 
which dismantled the stately edifice of Marshall’s value theory? Sraffa 
argued that logical problems posed by Marshall’s analysis of value left 
economists with three options. One possibility was to retain the assump­
tion of free competition but abandon Marshall’s supply­demand appa­
ratus in favor of classical theory (Sraffa 1926, 541). At Cambridge, where 
Marshall’s Principles was studied as secular scripture, this seemed not only 
impractical but unthinkable. A second option was to abandon Marshall’s 
partial­equilibrium framework in favor of general equilibrium; however, 
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the state of economic theory at the time would make this effort fruit­
less. The last possibility was to “take the path of imperfect competition”: 
to begin with the premise that markets are not perfectly competitive. 
This was a much more tolerable course, calling for clever retooling of 
Marshall’s machinery. Sraffa himself had sketched the repairs that were 
called for by developing a rough account of an alternative theory of value, 
suggestions that amounted to a map of how the landscape of economics 
would appear when viewed from the perspective of monopoly. This third 
option—renovating Marshallian value theory by developing a theory of 
imperfect competition—was the course Robinson pursued.33
Robinson’s apprenticeship seems to have begun in a fortuitous and 
perhaps even serendipitous fashion. Her work had its origin in an attempt 
to resolve several problems of economic theory by using a new analytical 
tool: the marginal revenue curve, a classic case of simultaneous discovery 
for which several economists had a legitimate claim to credit. The cir­
cumstances that led her to apply the marginal revenue curve to research 
in imperfect competition on the agenda of Cambridge economics are 
revealing.
The Origin of The Economics of Imperfect Competition: 
Austin’s Account
Austin wrote a remarkably comprehensive and detailed answer to this 
question, going so far as to recall the microsocial interactions and the 
constellation of economies of research interests and opportunities that 
came into play (Robinson 1994). It was early 1930, and he was supervising 
Charles Gifford, a mathematics student in Magdalene College who had 
taken up economics and would go on to take a First in Part II of the tripos 
in 1931. Gifford had written an essay replicating the marginal gross rev­
enue curve in Theodore Yntema’s article “The Influence of Dumping on 
Monopoly Price” (1928). On the day he read his essay to Austin, Robinson 
had invited Kahn—who was also attending Sraffa’s lectures—to lunch 
with the couple. Austin appeared, as he recalled, “bubbling with excite­
ment over the new concept” and eager to explain it to them (Robinson 
1994, 7). In his account, this lunch conversation marked the genesis of 
The Economics of Imperfect Competition. The three began to play a game by 
using Yntema’s curve to solve a variety of problems. As they moved from 
one question to another, the game became more complex and ambitious. 
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Ultimately, it centered on a large and fundamental issue: if economists 
replaced the axiom of perfect competition with the assumption of imper­
fect competition, what consequences would follow for theories of value 
and distribution?
The Origin of The Economics of Imperfect Competition: 
Robinson’s Account
In the Autobiography, Robinson’s more succinct account of the genesis 
of her research departs from Austin’s story in several respects. The lunch 
with Kahn disappears. Instead, Austin introduced Robinson to the curve, 
and she was left to ponder its significance. Just as there was no lunch, 
there was no game the three played with the curve and no flash of in­
sight in which its theoretical promise instantly became apparent. Follow­
ing her introduction to the curve, she made no use of it until one day 
Kahn posed a problem to her, and she responded, “Let’s see if Gifford’s 
curve will do it for us. And it did. One problem led to another, and all 
the time Mr. Sraffa’s article of 1926 kept nagging at us:—What about the 
supply curve in an imperfect market?”34 Austin claimed that Robinson 
initiated the work and proposed the research questions. In the Auto­
biography, she and Kahn shared this responsibility: he raised a question, 
and she suggested they try to answer it by using the curve. If it makes 
sense to say that The Economics of Imperfect Competition was born at a cer­
tain point, its birth was in these conversations between Robinson and 
Kahn.
In the foreword to her book, Robinson acknowledged Austin’s contri­
bution on several points. He named the curve, gave her illustrative detail 
drawn from his work The Structure of Competitive Industry, and suggested 
what finally proved to be the book’s title—a matter that was settled quite 
late in the history of the manuscript in discussions that included Austin, 
Kahn, and Keynes.35 However, with the exception of his function as mes­
senger in delivering news of the arrival of the marginal revenue curve at 
Cambridge, he played no role in its genesis. Therefore, she excised her 
husband from the origin of the book.
In view of the discrepancies between these two accounts, what can 
be said with reasonable probability concerning the question of when 
Robinson was introduced to the marginal revenue curve? The Auto­
biography begins with the observation that “three years ago” Austin 
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showed Robinson the curve in Gifford’s essay. Does this mean she first 
learned of it in autumn 1929? This seems unlikely.
Kahn became acquainted with the marginal revenue curve through 
the Robinsons. However, he does not mention it in his fellowship dis­
sertation, submitted in December 1929. In preparing the final draft, he 
surveyed the recent literature on the economics of the short period and 
made appropriate revisions (Kahn 1989, 105–7). This was an exercise 
for which Pigou later chastised him: if he insisted on repeatedly revising 
his text in light of current research, the dissertation would never be pub­
lished.36 If Kahn had seen the marginal revenue curve in 1929, references 
to some of its discoverers would have appeared in his dissertation, and he 
surely would have used the concept. In his analysis of individual firms in 
imperfect markets, the vertical line that determines equilibrium price and 
output traverses the marginal cost curve precisely at the point where it 
would have intersected the marginal revenue curve (Kahn 1989, 119–20). 
The conclusion: he and Robinson had no knowledge of the curve prior 
to 1930.
In view of the fact that the Autobiography was not typed before spring 
1933, this conclusion is supported by Robinson’s claim that she learned 
of the curve three years before: in 1930, three years before her book was 
published; not autumn 1929, three years before October 1932.37 When in 
1930? From the Autobiography, it is clear that her knowledge of the curve 
preceded Harrod’s paper “Notes on Supply,” published in the Economic 
Journal in June 1930.38 Thus it seems that Robinson first saw the marginal 
revenue curve after December 1929, when Kahn submitted his thesis, and 
before June 1930, when Harrod’s article appeared.39
Robinson’s newly minted professional identity was underpinned by 
a carefully crafted personal mythology that told the story of her begin­
nings as an analytical economist by recounting her engagement with three 
books. Their authors, she insisted, were the only men of her time worthy 
of installation in the pantheon of economic genius. The Autobiography 
circumscribed and explored the field of analytical economics by examin­
ing the concept of economic genius, which was understood on the basis 
of a peculiar mode of book composition and reception. Was it an accident 
of history that the three authors she elevated to this status happened to be 
Cambridge economists? Was it nothing more than an interesting coinci­
dence that their books were the most important texts of her apprentice­
ship: Marshall’s Principles (1890), Pigou’s Economics of Welfare (1920), and 
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Keynes’s A Treatise on Money (1930)? In Robinson’s account, her profes­
sional identity was forged in her innovative reading and reconceptualiza­
tion of these books.
An economic genius is born when a thinker of striking originality—“a 
man who thinks of something to think about”—develops a new technique 
and writes a book about it. However, his achievement is diminished by a 
failure to understand the technique and the conditions for its use. The ge­
nius casts his technique in a theoretical language that is inconsistent with 
its application. Because there is a sense in which he does not know what 
he is talking about, he mischaracterizes the technique and gives his book a 
misleading title. The next move is made by an unsympathetic reader, who 
points out the inconsistency between technique and theoretical language. 
As a result, the unsympathetic reader seems to demonstrate that the ge­
nius is “talking nonsense.”40 Although the genius may be incapable of 
breaking this impasse, his technique is more powerful than its creator, 
possessing an immanent logic that speaks to a sympathetic reader. En­
lightened by the critique of the unsympathetic reader, this charitable 
reader sees what the genius did not: the theoretical assumptions needed 
to understand his technique. When the sympathetic reader grasps the in­
nate wisdom of the technique and its theoretical requirements, it becomes 
clear that the genius, after all, “was perfectly right.”41 The economic ge­
nius may be compared to an explorer who discovers a new continent but 
is mistaken in identifying it. The unsympathetic reader points this out. 
The sympathetic reader, following clues in the explorer’s map, corrects 
his errors and redrafts the cartography of the new methodological world.
Marshall understood the subject matter of his Principles as the theory 
of value.42 Sraffa demonstrated that Marshall had committed radical and 
self­destructive logical errors. The sympathetic reader—Robinson (1933d, 
16; 1933e, 26)—set matters aright by following the logic of Marshall’s tech­
nique, which was buried in his footnotes. When Marshallian value theory 
is reconceptualized as the analysis of the output of a single commodity, 
the place of the new Marshallian continent in the universe of analytical 
economics becomes clear.
Pigou wrote a book about resource allocation and committed the co­
lossal error of calling it The Economics of Welfare. Precisely because of the 
magnitude of his mistake, Cambridge supervisors, baffled by his concept 
of human welfare, advised their students not to worry over this matter 
and concentrate on the real subject of the book, the allocation of resources. 
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In the Autobiography, Robinson seemed to have little enthusiasm for ap­
plying the concept of economic genius to Pigou. Who were the unsympa­
thetic and sympathetic readers? And what was the inner logic of Pigou’s 
book that would enable the sympathetic reader to see that, like Marshall, 
he was not writing nonsense? Although these questions are left untouched 
in the Autobiography, a persuasive case can be made that Robinson re­
garded J. H. Clapham as Pigou’s unsympathetic reader and saw herself 
and Kahn as his sympathetic interpreters. Kahn’s article “Some Notes on 
Ideal Output,” an analysis of resource allocation based on part 2 of The 
Economics of Welfare, attempts to dispose of Clapham’s criticisms of Pigou 
(Kahn 1935, 13). In the Cambridge summer vacation of 1934, Robinson 
and Kahn were working on a draft of this article. She answered some of 
his questions, suggested ideas, and urged him not to struggle with the 
more recalcitrant issues until they met again in Cambridge.43 Clapham 
had argued that Pigou’s analysis of the laws of returns is incoherent be­
cause there are no criteria for deciding whether specific industries operate 
under conditions of increasing or diminishing returns (Clapham 1922). 
Kahn claimed it was not difficult to identify industries that produced 
increasing returns. Public utilities and railroads, which have substantial 
fixed costs, are obvious cases. Economists agreed that subsidies for such 
industries were advantageous since they increased the output of industries 
that benefit from lower utility and transportation costs. Because public 
utilities and railways generally succeed in eliminating their competition, 
economists also agreed on the advantages of compelling them to increase 
their output. Thus the issue that Clapham regarded as an irresolvable 
conceptual problem was reduced to “an exercise in the control of public 
utilities.” Kahn concluded that “Dr. Clapham’s economic boxes were full 
all the time, but the economists were looking on the wrong shelf ” (Kahn 
1935, 13). Where were economists looking? On the shelf where they found 
increasing and diminishing returns industries. What was the right shelf ? 
Presumably where they would find public utilities and railways. Where 
did Kahn’s article take the analysis of the allocation of resources? Back to 
Pigou’s Economics of Welfare: “Public Control of Monopoly,” his argu­
ment for state regulation of private monopolies in order to ensure that 
their output approximates the socially optimal level. The genius was right 
after all.
When Robinson turned to Keynes, who mistitled his book on the 
analysis of output as a whole A Treatise on Money, her interest in eco­
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nomic genius was revived. The first unsympathetic reader of the Treatise 
was perhaps the author himself in his “cutting epigrammes about people 
who write books on money.” Although the theoretical implications of 
his technique may not have been immediately apparent to Keynes, they 
were quickly grasped by “two or three hardy, self­conceited young col­
leagues”—members of the Circus. Keynes’s sympathetic readers listened 
to his technique and made the proper inferences. Since the Circus was 
formed immediately following publication of the Treatise, confusion be­
tween the author’s conception of the book and its actual analysis was 
quickly cleared up.44
In “The Theory of Money and the Analysis of Output,” Robinson 
noted that Keynes failed to see he was investigating the analysis of output 
and not money. This is the sense in which he did not understand that 
he had produced “a revolution”: a dramatically new theory of the long­ 
period analysis of output (1933e, 24–25). In redrawing the theoretical map 
of the Treatise, she compared his misconceptions to Marshall’s errors, 
which in her view she had also corrected (1933e, 25–26). Thus in each of 
her three cases, she assumed the role of the sympathetic reader who listens 
to the technique of the confused and misunderstood genius and, follow­
ing its voice, places his analysis on a sound footing.45
The voice of the Autobiography expresses the identity of a writer who 
has no doubts about the theoretical program of economics and how it 
should be executed. Although the style of the text is whimsical, its sub­
stance is pedantic in the extreme, suggesting that the writer possesses a 
Schumpeterian mastery of the entire field of economics. This confident 
self­presentation is surprising on the part of a relative novice. Lecturing 
established economists on the basis of two years of informal postgradu­
ate study and little publication called for formidable self­assurance. The 
presumption of calling to task Marshall, Pigou, and Keynes concerning 
their most fundamental errors and reinterpreting their books in order 
to disclose their true theoretical direction required an extravagant mea­
sure of chutzpah. Comparable considerations hold for Robinson’s short 
methodological pamphlet, in which she summed up what she had gleaned 
from her autobiographical reflections on Cambridge economics. It was 
published by the Cambridge student bookstore Heffer in October 1932, 
the date she placed on the Autobiography and the month she delivered 
the manuscript of her book to Macmillan.46 She gave this fourteen­page 
text the stunningly ambitious title Economics Is a Serious Subject: The 
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Apologia of the Economist to the Mathematician, the Scientist and the Plain 
Man. Her main purpose was to write a crisp, convincing account of her 
ideas on the foundations of economic theory.
The pamphlet was a methodological exercise in the largest sense: a 
statement that put economists on notice as to their proper business and 
how they should go about it. What is the basis of the metatheoretical 
priority of technique or method? How are theoretical assumptions linked 
to technique? What is the significance of the choice between method­
ological optimism and pessimism? The attempt to answer these difficult, 
contentious questions in a short essay was obviously a presumptuous un­
dertaking, not least for a fledgling economist who had published nothing 
beyond a book review.
In the 1920s, the Marshallian guild did not produce a book or even 
an article devoted to methodology. The pamphlet marked a significant 
departure from this practice in several respects. Unlike Robertson and 
generations of tripos students who followed in his footsteps, Robinson 
was not content to treat cursory remarks by the godfathers of the guild 
as the last word on Cambridge metatheory, skipping through the early 
chapters of Marshall’s Principles in order to arrive as effortlessly as possible 
at the analyses that were presumed to constitute the core of the discipline 
(Robertson 1952, 13–14). In publishing the first purely methodological es­
say by an economist trained in the tripos, she also broke with the Mar­
shallian tradition of consigning metatheoretical discussions to prefaces, 
introductions, appendices, and informal observations in correspondence. 
Moreover, the pamphlet repudiated Marshallian doctrine on the subor­
dinate status of economic theory and its relationship to substantive re­
search. Robinson took dead seriously the mechanistic figures of speech 
used by Marshall and Pigou, transposing their metaphorical allusions to 
toolboxes, appliances, and analytical machinery into a methodological 
principle.47 As was her wont, she pushed this principle to its ultimate logi­
cal conclusion, reducing economics to its methods of research: “The sub­
ject matter of economics is neither more nor less than its own technique” 
(Robinson 1932a, 4).48
Robinson maintained that the methods of her time were “only capa­
ble of giving unreal answers to unreal questions” (Robinson 1932a, 5). 
The questions are unreal because they are derived from the logical pos­
sibilities of economic method, which abstracts from the properties of 
economic phenomena. The answers are unreal because their referents 
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are not economic facts but artifacts of method. Any correspondence be­
tween the results of theoretical analysis and actual economies is purely 
fortuitous.
Economic analysis is defined by the position that economists take on 
the assumptions of their investigations. In choosing assumptions, the 
analytical economist employs the criterion of “tractability.” By employ­
ing a given set of assumptions, is it possible to conduct an analysis using 
existing technique? This is the fundamental methodological issue for the 
“optimistic, analytical, English economist,” who regards the empirical 
status of assumptions as irrelevant (Robinson 1932a, 6). The “pessimistic, 
methodological, Continental economist,” faced with a decision between 
assumptions that are tractable but unrealistic and alternative assumptions 
that are realistic but intractable, chooses the latter. Optimists are model 
builders committed to the project of abstract theory construction for its 
own sake. Pessimists believe that only facts are of intrinsic interest: the 
test of a good theory is not methodological tractability but conformity 
to facts.
For the optimist, there is a close correspondence between the problems 
and methods of economics. A method generates the problems for which 
it can provide solutions. What is the basis of this supposition? The cur­
rent set of theoretical problems is the work that can be done with existing 
technique. The possible uses of the existing array of tools determines the 
agenda of theoretical problems. At any given point, there are as many 
different problems as there are unresolved tasks that existing tools can 
be used to perform. The optimist supposes that economic methods bear 
labels that identify their possible uses. In Robinson’s metaphor, which 
ascribes a voice to economic technique, economists pose questions to 
their methods, and the methods reply, revealing the problems they can be 
used to investigate and how to conduct the investigation. If an optimistic 
English economist fails to state his assumptions clearly, the solution is 
not to ask him for a more exact account of his premises but to “go be­
hind his back and ask his technique” (Robinson 1932a, 8–9). This is the 
ultimate basis of the claim that economics is neither more nor less than its 
technique. On this strict instrumentalist position, economics is reduced 
to making and applying tools that speak when they are spoken to. Or, in 
more banal terms, a method entails its applications, in which case the uses 
of a method can be derived from the method itself. The decisive consider­
ation in economic theory is not economic phenomena and the problems 
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they pose. It is economic method, which constitutes its own objects of 
investigation, determines how they can be analyzed, and places limits on 
the conclusions that can be drawn. Just as the tools at the disposal of car­
penters determine the materials they can work on and what can be made 
with them, so the tools of economic analysis define the problems of eco­
nomic theory and the constraints imposed on their solution.
Because pessimists are not of one mind concerning their doubts about 
the validity of analytical economics, they are divided into many tribes. 
Writing as if she were an anthropologist constructing kinship taxonomies 
of an exotic culture, Robinson sketched a brief typology of pessimists. 
Methodological pessimists are motivated by precision, eliminating from 
the analytical toolbox all techniques “which appear to involve concep­
tions that are not capable of measurement” (Robinson 1932a, 11). They are 
distinguished from fundamental pessimists, on whom she did not com­
ment.49 Pessimists, we learn, are not confined to the Continent.50 English 
pessimists are classified as either pure or logical. Logical English pessi­
mists prevent the ossification of analytical economics into a dogma by 
proposing problems that exceed the limits of current technique by a small 
margin, challenging optimists to extend and refine their methods.
The analytical response to the pessimist is essentially a confession of 
faith based on a vision: to exploit the limits of existing technique in a 
piecemeal fashion, moving from one abstract problem to another and 
solving each by adopting the most exacting standards of current meth­
odology. Analytical economists work in the belief that this program will 
gradually evolve a method sufficiently complex to take the measure of real 
economies (Robinson 1932a, 11–12). In this program, technique is the un­
moved mover: it answers all questions that are answerable, solves all prob­
lems that are resolvable, and produces all explanations that are possible. 
But there is no explanation of technique. Any putative explanation could 
be produced only by technique itself. Because the explanans could not be 
distinguished from the explanandum, any attempt to produce such an ex­
planation would be tautological. The same holds for questions about the 
validity of technique. How could they be addressed? Only by technique, 
the validity of which is presupposed and thus lies beyond question.
The Economics of Imperfect Competition rests on this conception of 
method, employing assumptions that, “in all their naked unreality,” are 
detached from the facts of real economies (Robinson 1933d, 8). Borrow­
ing the mountaineering metaphors favored by Marshall and Pigou, both 
t h e  i m p r o b a b l e  t h e o r e t i c i a n  `   45
devoted Alpinists, Robinson issued a warning that the reader who fol­
lows her path “will quickly find himself in a mountainous and inhospi­
table territory” that is “nur für Schwindelfreie”: heights of analysis reserved 
for economists who are not intimidated by the possibility of theoretical 
vertigo. Work at the highest levels of theoretical abstraction is essential to 
the progress of economic analysis, the objective of which is not knowl­
edge of the real world but the production of tools to build a “working 
model” of the world (Robinson 1933d, 1).51
Truth as conformity to facts is irrelevant to this project. Faced with 
an inconsistency between a “charming diagram” and the facts, Robinson 
of course refused to sacrifice the diagram. Acting on an “unscrupulous 
resolve,” she used her technique to “trick” pessimists, convincing them 
that the deviation of the diagram from the facts it represents was within 
acceptable limits.52 Truth in economics has a purely formal sense. An ac­
count is true when a given technique is correctly applied to the analysis 
of facts that are presumed as given. The relation between the presump­
tive facts of analytical economics and the facts of the empirical world is 
indeterminate. Because analytical economics brackets empirical reality 
in order to exploit all the possibilities of technique, its conclusions are 
purely hypothetical. Should they happen to have empirical value, this is 
a matter of pure chance. Is this a scientific defect? The merit of analytical 
economics, Robinson claimed, “lies in its charm.” In language that recalls 
the self­referential aesthetics of Gertrude Stein: “For people who like this 
kind of thing, this is the kind of thing they like.”53
The Origin of The Economics of Imperfect Competition:  
The Epistolary Account
Although the accounts by Austin and Robinson shed light on the gen­
esis of her book and the circumstances under which it was conceived, 
her correspondence with Austin and Kahn is more enlightening on these 
matters. In her earliest observations on the book, the question of whether 
she regarded it as a collaborative work or a solo enterprise does not have 
an unambiguous answer. By October 1932, any hesitation on her part had 
disappeared. It was her book. The belated Cambridge discovery of the 
marginal revenue curve, the origins of the book, and the formation of her 
professional identity intersected in her consciousness. Work on the mar­
ginal revenue curve led to the book, and it was her understanding of what 
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she had achieved in writing it that gave her an assured sense of herself 
as an analytical economist—the successor of Marshall, Pigou, and Keynes 
who would consummate their theoretical work.
Did the game that Austin recalled actually take place? At the end of 
July 1930, Kahn and Robinson, the latter with Austin’s help, began to 
exchange notes concerning Hubert Henderson’s ideas on products that 
are jointly produced (wool and mutton, for example) and the effects of 
changes in the demand for one on the demand for the other.54 Between 
November 1930 and March 1931, these notes became increasingly sophis­
ticated, centering on the diagrammatic and mathematical analysis of para­
doxes that Kahn posed concerning monopoly output, returns to scale, 
concavity of demand curves, and price discrimination.55 It also quickly 
became a two­person exercise, bearing out Austin’s recollections many 
decades later (Robinson 1994, 8). The idea of writing a book on the mate­
rial of their exchanges did not occur to Robinson until the end of March: 
“I am now toying with the idea of producing a complete book of all this 
stuff.”56 She envisioned a tripartite collaboration of Austin, Kahn, and 
herself: “It is not I who am bringing out this book. It is a syndicate of 
you A[ustin] + me.”57 Austin’s role would be limited to writing an intro­
duction and adding economic data in order to give the book “a realistic 
flavour, + give the reader a rest between theorems.”58 Kahn’s part would 
be more substantial. He would contribute a “mathematical appendix” 
and pose “difficult problems” for her to solve.59 The drafting would be 
Robinson’s responsibility, a task on which she moved swiftly. By April 1, 
she had a “rough version of Chapter II of our book.” A day later, she an­
nounced she would “get on with Chap III.”60
If Robinson took the initiative in drafting, the reasons are not difficult 
to fathom. Kahn’s work in winter and spring 1931 included lecturing on 
the economics of the short period, revising his dissertation for publica­
tion, playing the role of messenger angel fluttering between Keynes and 
meetings of the Circus (Moggridge 1992, 532), and writing an article for 
the Economic Journal.61 Austin had more than a full schedule of lectur­
ing and supervision and had been elected secretary of the faculty board 
in January 1931. As Robinson told Kahn, he was also “grinding out his 
stuff ” on the structure of competitive industry, which would shortly be 
published in the Cambridge Economic Handbooks series.62 This left 
Robinson a freelance supervisor without a university appointment or 
other formal connection to Cambridge economics. With domestic help 
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and no children, her chief responsibility lay in household management 
as performed by an upper­middle­class English matron of the time. Thus 
the economies of research time operated in her favor. And unlike Austin 
and Kahn, she had an incentive to pursue a new and promising line of in­
vestigation. Without other academic assets, she could achieve distinction 
at Cambridge only by publishing an impressive original work.
Robinson began to regard the book as her individual project between 
late March 1931, when she conceived the idea of writing a book on the 
problems she and Kahn were exploring, and mid­September of the same 
year, when she asked Robertson to write a preface. She told Robertson 
she had drafted five chapters and sketched out another ten. She was clearly 
planning to publish under her name alone:
I feel rather shy about saying so, but I would very much like to ask you to do 
me a Preface. I hope to get the Prof. [Pigou] to read the stuff + tell us if we have 
dropped any bricks, but I would rather have you as my Godfather than anyone. 
You will see from Chap I my general idea (1) on how analysis ought to be done. 
(2) The importance of monopoly. If you have any sympathy with that point of 
view perhaps you could make some remarks about it. If you don’t feel inclined 
to do that, but would write a few words giving me your blessing I should value 
it very much.
But altho’ I should have asked you in any case for my private satisfaction I 
am also actuated by the sordid view that I might find it easier to get a publisher 
if I appeared under your wing, so you mustn’t have anything to do with it if you 
feel any hesitation at giving the countenance of your name to this stuff. Anyway 
it won’t be finished at best before next term so there is no hurry from your point 
of view.63
In September 1931, Kahn was laboring on two fronts: assisting Robinson 
on the relationship between a firm’s demand for factors of production 
and productivity and reworking his dissertation. Although their research 
intersected, there is no doubt they both saw the book as Robinson’s.64
Robinson and Kahn worked intensively on the book until October 
1932, when the manuscript was nearly complete. Not until this point 
did she understand that she had written a major theoretical work. At the 
same time, she grasped what the achievement meant to her. Although 
“literally sick with exhaustion,” as she wrote Austin, who was in Africa 
at the time, she was also quite pleased with herself, sending him a series 
of observations on the personal and professional transformation she had 
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experienced.65 Why the robust sense of self­satisfaction? Because she had 
written “a Damn Good Book,” one that had recast the theory of value and 
placed it on a new footing.66 “I have found out what my book is about,” 
she wrote Austin. “It was quite a sudden revelation which I only had yes­
terday. What I have been + gone + done is what Piero [Sraffa] said must 
be done, in his famous article. I have rewritten the whole theory of value 
beginning with the firm as a monopolist. I used to think I was providing 
tools for some genius in the future to use, + all the time I have done the 
job myself.”67
Robinson’s new understanding of the relationship between writing an 
important book and establishing a professional identity gave her a sense 
of self­confidence and an appreciation of her intellectual worth that she 
had never enjoyed. The Michaelmas term was under way, and as she be­
gan to supervise students she discovered that her attitude and approach 
to teaching had undergone a sea change: “I used to feel ‘I must tell these 
people what economists think’—now I really feel I am an economist + I 
can tell them what I think myself.”68 She anticipated criticism of the book, 
but she was not apprehensive. Convinced that her analyses were sound 
and that she had succeeded in specifying the limits within which they ap­
plied, she welcomed critics, who would have much to say about her basic 
concepts and assumptions.69
In summing up these shifts in the conception of herself as an econo­
mist, Robinson wrote her husband on October 16 that she had experi­
enced “a violent revolution” in her view of economics. On his return, 
he would find “a Changed Woman.” She had become a superb teacher. 
She had also achieved a deep, discriminating respect for Marshall’s 
work: “I have learned to feel the real reverence for Marshall that Dennis 
[Robertson] feels, without losing any of my disapproval of his deliberate 
cheating.” The new world of Robinsonian economics was so engrossing 
that she was determined to postpone having children in order to advance 
her researches. Finally, she had found the moral courage, or perhaps the 
presumption, to take credit for a work that was a product of collabora­
tion: “I have recovered my self­respect about the book. You + Kahn + 
I have been teaching each other economics intensively these two years 
but it was I who saw the great light + it is my book” (eagr/Box 8/2/1/13/ 
124–26).
Robinson also made the point that she had arrived at “an absolutely 
clear feeling about how the curvists and the turnipists can work together 
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instead of getting on each other’s nerves.”70 Curvists were methodo­
logical optimists, economic model builders who employed diagrams in 
order to achieve maximum theoretical precision. Turnipists were meth­
odological pessimists, economic empiricists who placed the primacy of 
data collection and the accumulation of facts—or turnips—over theory. 
This dichotomy was an important theme of her methodological pam­
phlet, which she completed and sent to Austin by October 20: “I must 
tell you some more of what I have been up to. I went into a trance (it was 
almost automatic­writing) + produced a brilliant essay in 3,000 words 
called ‘Economics is a Serious Subject’ (in the sense that Mathematics + 
Physics are serious).”71 She had already shown it to “the grown ups”—
Claude Guillebaud, Shove, Robertson, Keynes, and Sraffa—and in five 
days, she had found a publisher.72 The positive reception it received from 
colleagues convinced her that “it needed saying out loud + not just tak­
ing for granted.”73 With the completion of her book and the breathless 
composition of the methodological pamphlet, Robinson was convinced, 
for the first time, that she had achieved the status of a serious economic 
theorist.
s t r a t e g i s t  o f  a c a d e m i c  
c a r e e r  p r o d u c t i o n
The Autobiography documents Robinson’s conception of her new pro­
fessional identity. However, it articulates her aspirations in a “secret doc­
ument”—entrusted, it seems, only to Austin and Kahn. The project of 
achieving these aspirations required resources of academic career produc­
tion that would reposition her from the periphery to the center of Cam­
bridge economics. When she began serious work in economics, she had 
few such resources. Her chief problem was marginality, both intellectual 
and social. She was a faculty wife who did occasional supervision and 
a barely visible figure, even in the small world of Cambridge econom­
ics. Without a First Class degree, a respectable fellowship dissertation, or 
publications of signal originality, intellectual marginality was inevitable. 
She also lacked the academic social standing that would enable her to 
acquire the appropriate credentials. When Joan Maurice of Girton Col­
lege became Joan Robinson on Trumpington Street, she did not enjoy 
easy access to the social spaces of collective theory production, the sites 
that gave senior economic theorists unencumbered opportunities for 
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discussion during term time. Nor could she expect from them invita­
tions unaccompanied by her husband to off­term vacation visits, reading 
parties, mountaineering expeditions, or walking tours—the occasions 
that formed and strengthened ties among Cambridge economists.
Intellectual and social marginality were linked. Without social re­
sources, Robinson could not expect to achieve intellectual visibility. 
Without intellectual credentials, she lacked the qualifications to acquire a 
professional standing. Robinson solved these problems in the 1930s. This 
book is an investigation of the circumstances under which she achieved 
recognition as an innovative thinker and became a leading figure in the 
most exciting theoretical movement of the time. How did this happen? 
In part 2, we consider how she began to establish social and intellectual 
bases of career production by developing her first research program and 
recruiting support to execute it. There is an essential preliminary to this ac­
count. At this point, we consider a relationship that above all others made 
Robinson’s career at Cambridge possible: her friendship with Kahn.
e x c u r s u s
`
Robinson and  
Kahn
f r i e n d s h i p  a n d  c a r e e r  p r o d u c t i o n
Robinson’s career in the 1930s was a work of many hands. However, 
none of its artificers was more engaged, committed, or consequential 
than Kahn. Her formation as an economist cannot be detached from their 
friendship, nor can her progress from the margins of Cambridge eco-
nomics to its center be understood without considering his efforts on her 
behalf.
In 1930, Robinson and Kahn began by sharing ideas. By spring 1931, 
they had become intimate, each giving the other entry to the privileged 
and private spheres of personal life. By 1932, their relationship was a love 
affair. Archival material currently available, which does not exhaust extant 
sources, suggests that it was not consummated earlier than autumn 1938, 
when Robinson suffered a severe psychiatric breakdown. For much of the 
period 1932–38, they managed their passions, attempting to arrive at an 
equilibrium that was unobjectionable in Cambridge and at the same time 
emotionally tolerable.
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In comparison with Kahn, Robinson was the more untutored in 
economic theory and technique. However, she was the more complete 
human being, with a capacity for dispassionate self-scrutiny that he did 
not seem to possess. In December 1932, when their four-month separation 
occasioned by his visit to the United States began, she was twenty-nine 
and he was twenty-seven. His adolescent expressions of self-absorption 
and egocentricity do not stand up well against her understanding of the 
dangers their relationship posed and the constraints they faced. However, 
these differences cut in more than one direction. If Kahn’s letters are more 
self-indulgent, they are also more revelatory. As expressions of his day-to-
day states of mind, they are not generally products of Cambridge affecta-
tion or efforts at cleverness. With a few exceptions, Robinson’s letters 
have a reportorial and breezy tone. She sends Kahn the latest news on 
their small circle at Cambridge and presents herself as an aspiring member 
of an exclusive self-selecting elite, dispensing cutting witticisms and cast-
ing outsiders into utter darkness.
The history of the friendship between Kahn and Robinson in the 
1930s is not a story of smooth transitions along a continuum that be-
gan with emotionally colorless exchanges on imperfect competition and 
ended in bed. It was marked by episodes of doubt, irresolution, and 
backtracking as well as false decisiveness and confusion as they weighed 
personal and professional risks. Both had much to lose by giving their 
passions free play. They were not prepared to ignore the problems their 
conduct might create for her marriage and uncertain prospects at Cam-
bridge, nor were they willing to compromise the Cambridge careers of 
Kahn and Austin. The correspondence of early 1933 makes it clear they 
had decided to subject their erotic relationship to instrumental controls 
by weighing the costs of acting on their feelings. This decision called for 
compromises they found difficult. Both partners were sometimes misera-
ble even as they remained intent on convincing themselves that they were, 
or might be, happy. Above all, it seemed necessary to sustain the illusion 
that they had found a solution to their most intractable difficulty: how 
could a space be created for the breakthrough of their erotic desires in a 
social world in which it had no legitimate place?
Although historians of economic thought have taken note of the friend-
ship between Robinson and Kahn, little detail has been forthcoming, and 
some accounts are mistaken or misleading. Marcuzzo writes that they met 
when he was working on his dissertation, following which a friendship 
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developed that “shaped their intellectual and emotional lives” for more 
than fifty years (Marcuzzo 2003, 545). Her only hint at the character of 
the friendship is an excerpt from a letter Kahn wrote after Robinson’s 
death: “I first got to know Joan in 1928 and ever since then we have both 
enjoyed life in various aspects of that word.”1 Annalisa Rosselli’s essay 
on Robinson and Kahn gives no indication that they had an erotic rela-
tionship before he left for the United States. Her examination of their 
early correspondence details Robinson’s preoccupations with her career 
at Cambridge, her revisions of The Economics of Imperfect Competition, and 
Kahn’s views on social and academic life in America. Although he had 
“very strong feelings towards Robinson at the time,” she responded to 
his “amorous sentiments” with “fond, humorous indulgence.” Rosselli 
claims that the American correspondence is of interest because of “the 
points” that brought them together at this time. Readers are left to specu-
late on what these points might be. Their letters from 1934 to 1939 receive 
little attention since they are said to concern only family life and Cam-
bridge. There is no mention of the breakup between Robinson and Austin 
following her psychiatric illness in 1938–39. Instead, readers are told that 
Austin drew away as his absences became longer and more frequent (Ros-
selli 2005a, 263–68). Austin’s biographer Alec Cairncross claims that Aus-
tin and Robinson did not drift apart until the end of the Second World 
War. Kahn is mentioned in passing as a friend, like Nicholas Kaldor, with 
whom she enjoyed postwar vacations (Cairncross 1993, 172).
In their friendship, Robinson and Kahn did not distinguish personal 
and professional considerations. With the exception of the beginning of 
their acquaintance, when they were classmates but not yet friends, work 
on economic theory penetrated personal life, and friendship was inter-
woven with science. Although the formation of their friendship seems 
to have been independent of Robinson’s ambitions, its consequences for 
her career at Cambridge would be difficult to exaggerate. Kahn, a po-
tential competitor in developing a new theory of imperfect competition, 
became the selfless helpmate—dependable, loyal, devoted, and ideally 
placed to give her access to Cambridge economic theoreticians. In her 
efforts to gain proximity to Keynes and win his confidence, it was Kahn 
who used his close relationship to Keynes to smooth her path. Although 
their friendship was not instrumentally grounded, it produced benefits, 
not least in Robinson’s project of career production. Thus the significance 
of this excursus for an account of Robinson’s early career.
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The beginnings of the friendship between Robinson and Kahn intersect 
with the genesis of her professional identity, the period between March 
1930 and April 1931. In the first piece of correspondence between the 
two—March 15, 1930—she congratulated him on his election as a fel-
low of King’s. The letter was addressed to “My dear Kahn” and included 
a footnote: “Excuse this form of address. I cannot deal with any more 
Richards” (rfk/13/90/1/1–2).2 To name is to place in a social category. 
Robinson did not yet have a settled place for Kahn in her social frame-
work. However, “Kahn,” with variations, he would remain through the 
1930s. She also signed herself in full formal fashion:
Yours with the best of wishes
Joan Robinson
In letters to friends, she was “Joan” or “J.” However, she also noted when 
she expected to return to Cambridge from vacation, which indicated she 
might not remain “Joan Robinson” for long. A few days later, she sent 
him more specific information about her travel arrangements and pro-
posed a meeting in London, where both their parents had homes. She 
planned to visit her family during the first week of April. Would he be in 
London then as well? Her postscript—“N.B. Please refer to us as Joan + 
Austin”—suggests that Kahn had addressed the couple as Mr. and Mrs. 
Robinson.3 Although Robinson’s Autobiography shows that they became 
acquainted with the marginal revenue curve between December 1929 and 
June 1930, it seems that they did little work together with the curve be-
fore summer 1930 (see Rosselli 2005a, 260). When Keynes’s Treatise was 
published at the end of October, they became members of the Circus. Re-
search with the marginal revenue curve and the elucidation and critique 
of the Treatise are evidence of more frequent contacts. The character of 
these contacts was friendly but not intimate.
On March 30, 1931, Robinson wrote Kahn that she was considering writ-
ing a book on the problems they had been discussing (rfk/16/1/59–62), 
and in early April she sent him a draft of a chapter.4 Kahn’s response on 
April 10 shows that the complexion of their exchanges had changed.
My dear Joan,
I have not time now to get into detailed criticism, and neither of us, I imagine, 
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will have much time for that for some days now. But I feel that I must write at 
once and congratulate you on making such a firm beginning—and also to thank 
you. For it is tremendously pleasant to see it all rolling off—or at least beginning 
to roll off (it is going to be quite a big work)—so beautifully. I am so very pleased 
it has begun.
I shall have a good deal to say about individual passages when I think that 
there is undue compression or that the exposition might be made clearer in some 
other way. Except for these occasions, when you appear—quite occasionally—to 
be taking rather a lot for granted in regard to the responsiveness of the reader, the 
general effect I felt was very pleasing indeed.
I was awfully glad to see you yesterday—thanks so much.
Yours
r.f.k. (jvr/vii/228/1/13–14)
Kahn declared his delight with Robinson, his pleasure in her work, and 
his gratitude, even if it is not clear exactly what he was grateful for. That 
she had begun the book superlatively? That he had seen her the previous 
day? No matter. He and Robinson were together, they were working to-
gether, and Kahn was happy.
This new turn in the relationship did not escape the attention of their 
immediate social circle. Keynes’s letters to Lydia illuminate the impres-
sion the two made on a discerning observer. Keynes was generally alert to 
forces that might dislodge Kahn from the career path he had envisioned 
for his protégé. Infatuation with a woman was not what Keynes had in 
mind, especially not a liaison with the wife of a Cambridge colleague. In 
a letter to Lydia on November 21, 1931, he referred with some asperity to 
Robinson as Kahn’s “beloved Joan.” Expecting Kahn to bring her to a 
social occasion that Sunday, he noted pointedly that he had invited Kahn 
but not Robinson to supper (jmk/pp/45/190/5). On January 17, 1932, he 
wrote that he planned to attend “one of Kahn’s high dinner parties” that 
evening. Sraffa and Colin Clark were among the announced guests. But: 
“I expect to find Joan, not yet mentioned, as well” (jmk/pp/45/190/5). 
Only two weeks later, he gave a more alarming account of developments. 
That evening after tea he had gone into Kahn’s rooms for paper: “His 
outer room was in darkness, but there closeted in his inner room were 
he and Joan alone, she reclining on the floor on cushions. We were all 
embarrassed—they were so much like lovers surprised, though I expect 
the conversation was only The Pure Theory of Monopoly.5 I wish I knew 
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how open of their feelings they are to one another. But it seems to me a 
desperate affair, and how is it to end?”6 Were Robinson and Kahn dis-
cussing her book? or were they enmeshed in a “desperate affair” that 
could only end disastrously? Keynes was unsure and troubled. Formally, 
Robinson and Kahn were not violating university regulations. But, as 
Keynes saw, their conduct might provide grounds for suspicion, com-
promising them as well as Austin.7 On February 19, he gave Lydia a sense 
of the tensions in the sociodrama played out by Kahn, Robinson, and 
Austin. The occasion was a small party, again given by Kahn, after one 
of Keynes’s evening lectures. “Joan and Austin were there. Joan rather 
white, silent and sad, I thought. Austin went away early, without even 
asking Joan to come with him. Joan stayed until late, and I am sure Kahn 
was going to walk home with her. I feel it is a drama, but a concealed one, 
and having (has it?) no solution” (jmk/ pp/45/190/5).
By early 1932, expressions of anxiety over their future appear frequently 
in the correspondence of Robinson and Kahn. Although unwilling to of-
fer any assurances about their immediate future, she urged him not to 
take a “dramatic view” of their circumstances, especially since there was 
no possibility of “drastic” measures the next term.8 What did she mean by 
drastic measures? What were they contemplating? A declaration to Aus-
tin? Was she considering divorce? These possibilities hardly seem likely. 
An open affair would jeopardize the careers of Kahn and Austin and end 
Robinson’s hopes of establishing herself at Cambridge. Also unlikely was 
divorce, which would have been ruinous for all parties.9 The issue quickly 
became moot. On receiving a Rockefeller Foundation grant for study in 
the United States, Kahn made plans to take leave during the Michaelmas 
term 1932—thus Robinson’s reference to “next term.” Moreover, their 
worries about the future were quickly suspended owing to a serendipi-
tous appointment that called Austin to Africa for some six months. In 
early 1932, the archbishop of York asked Pigou to recommend a candidate 
for membership on a commission of enquiry sponsored by the Interna-
tional Missionary Council, one of the many religious agents of the British 
empire in Africa. The brief of the commission was to examine the impact 
of copper mining on local African life and the work of Christian missions 
in the copper belt of the British territory that is now Zambia. Pigou nomi-
nated Austin, who took leave for the Michaelmas term and sailed for Cape 
Town on July 1 (Cairncross 1993, 51). Since Austin’s work in Africa would 
coincide with Kahn’s visit to the United States, he and Robinson would 
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lose an opportunity to have more than five months of relative freedom. 
Kahn quickly decided to postpone use of the Rockefeller grant to the end 
of 1932 in order to take advantage of Austin’s absence. Keynes captured 
the significance of this episode quite nicely in a letter to Lydia:
You know that Kahn is supposed to be going on his travels to America next [aca-
demic] year. But two days ago he rang me up to say he thought he would like to 
stay at Cambridge next term to finish some theory he is at, and go to America after 
Christmas. When I get back I hear that Austin is to go to Africa on a mission for 
five months and will be away from Cambridge all next term. The human heart! 
To finish something he is at! However it is very dangerous. If Austin is away for 
several months, what will happen do you think?10
Robinson and Kahn made good use of Austin’s absence. In correspon-
dence they exchanged information about their respective schedules in 
order to determine when they would both be in Cambridge or London. 
At Cambridge there was also the new asset of Austin’s unoccupied rooms 
in Sidney Sussex College, where they could enjoy uninterrupted privacy. 
In an undated note following a vacation with relatives after Austin’s de-
parture, Robinson wrote, “Here I am back again + all well. Come round 
after lunch to A’s [Austin’s] room in S[idney] S[ussex]” (rfk/13/90/2 
/134). The pair indulged in fantasies of perfect freedom, envisioning what 
they might do and where they might live if circumstances permitted. In 
playfully imagining their life together, Robinson suggested that “Copen-
hagen would suit us better than Oxford when we decide to emigrate.”11 
The following week, she pictured Kahn teaching her calculus on a hillside 
in Austria, where they vacationed together in August and September.12 
There were also lovers’ quarrels characteristic of a highly eroticized friend-
ship. Apparently they had discussed the relative merits of eighteenth- 
century English poetry and Shakespeare’s sonnets, Robinson contending 
for Shakespeare and Kahn exhibiting questionable aesthetic judgment in 
speaking for the later poetry. “I am not annoyed,” she insisted. “But it 
is absurd to prefer the 18th Century to Shakespeare’s sonnets. A penny 
whistle has more clarity and perhaps more charms than an orchestra it’s 
true—but still. Would you send a kind word to Margaret [Braithwaite]—
it’s a shame to visit my sins on her head. ‘Do not remember evil against 
me.’ ”13
The amusements of a fantasy life and inconsequential lovers’ spats 
aside, Robinson did not stray far from the realities of career production. 
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By summer 1932, they included her efforts to court Keynes through in-
gratiating herself with Lydia. Two days before she asked Kahn not to re-
member evil against her, she reminded him that she intended to write 
Lydia shortly with an invitation to a performance of a Greek play. He was 
instructed to mention the play in conversation with the Keyneses in order 
to “prepare the way.”14 During Austin’s absence, Robinson wrote and 
published Economics Is a Serious Subject as well as “Imperfect Competition 
and Falling Supply Price.” Most important, she completed a draft of The 
Economics of Imperfect Competition. Austin disembarked at Southampton 
on December 19, 1932. Two days later, Kahn sailed from the same port to 
the United States, where he remained until mid-April 1933.
Robinson’s papers include an undated outline for a novel that was 
never written. In view of her relationship with Kahn during the 1930s, 
its theme is of some interest. A young woman, working at a monotonous 
office job and renting a grubby room, feels that her life is empty and won-
ders what she is living for. Her few moments of pleasure are limited to 
occasions on which a fatherly boss praises her work or compliments her 
on a new hat. Without enthusiasm, she allows herself to drift into a sex-
less friendship with a young man—“a sweet tormented idealistic youth” 
who, for reasons that are not made clear, is not an appropriate candidate 
for marriage. Is he half Indian? Is his mother mad? Because he is devoted 
to the young woman and completely undemanding, she finds it easy to 
respond to him even though he seems to hold no attraction for her. Then 
she meets a conventionally acceptable young man with a good job and 
the promise of security, a home, and a conventional middle-class life. A 
worldly wise sister or girlfriend advises her to take the opportunity and 
marry. Although the heroine attempts to find the prospects of marriage 
desirable, she is troubled by the scene she must enact: ending her rela-
tionship with the “half caste” and “throwing him back into his tormented 
loneliness.” She sees that it would be folly to allow a momentary episode 
of painful leave-taking to jeopardize a solution to the problem of her life. 
And yet it does. The problem of the novel revolves around what happens 
next and how the characters act out the denouement. The point of the 
story, Robinson notes, “is to show the importance of a feeling which is 
not ‘in the proper’—which does not fit into a pigeon hole of accepted no-
tions” (jvr/vii/424/17–18).
Although Robinson and Kahn shared feelings that did not fit the pi-
geonholes of Cambridge conventions, she was determined to achieve 
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academic success within their boundaries. The correspondence between 
Robinson and Kahn during his American visit is an especially rich source 
of clues to the ways in which she resolved, or at least managed, this di-
lemma. The lovers decided to ratchet down expressions of their erotic 
feelings in order to bring their emotional life under control. They would 
share their hopes and desires. But in the main, erotic emotions would be 
closeted. They followed this regimen of dispassion within quite different 
degrees of latitude. Kahn was the more expressive correspondent. Like the 
romantic, emotionally tormented youth of Robinson’s unwritten novel, 
he seems to have been very lonely, and his dependence on Robinson was 
pathetic and extravagant. Her letters, while not devoid of sentiment, are 
much more businesslike and journalistic. Robinson’s reserve may have 
been due in part to her reluctance to broach delicate private matters in 
correspondence.15 Several features of the changing emotional quality of 
their relationship appear in the American letters.
(1) The decision to subject their passions to self-conscious and selective 
disattention was made before Kahn sailed for the United States. It was 
a relief to them both and seemed to ease their anxieties. In January 1933, 
Kahn was living at the International House at the University of Chicago, 
a hotel-like apartment building for foreign graduate students and visiting 
scholars. Between January 20 and 24, he wrote one of his characteristi-
cally effusive letters. His purpose was to reassure Robinson that he had 
achieved a new and more healthy perspective on their relationship. She 
should not worry because he had finally succeeded in placing her in “the 
right setting”:
We spend a great deal of the time talking about you. My dear, you must not 
mind that. I hope at least you won’t. It is such a great pleasure. But it is not a case 
of wicked indulgence—it is inevitable. When I am feeling gloomy it cheers me up, 
and above all gives me strength, and when I am cheerful I feel that I am giving 
expression to my good spirits. Bless you for being such a comfort. I do hope you 
don’t mind. There is nothing to fear. I am almost certain that I have now got you 
in the right setting, and when I look at the future my heart does not shrink. The 
more I meet people the more (this sounds like economics) difficult I find it to 
believe that I can claim to know anybody like you. But it is true, isn’t it, not just 
a mistake? The fact is true; but it is the future as well that helps me along (you do 
know, don’t you? That when I talk about the future I am being sensible); and as a 
result the present isn’t at all bad. (rfk/13/90/1/67–72)
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These remarks presuppose a background of conversations on a future de-
fined by restrictive options that neither found tolerable. They escaped this 
future by fabricating an illusion they could believe in. They had not been 
expelled from the paradise of Venusberg because they had not entered 
it. Could they create a demiparadise of their own? Kahn seems to have 
thought so. Erotic salvation within the mundane world of Cambridge 
would be achieved by heroic efforts of emotional honesty: an intellectual 
performance in which they took cognizance of their passions but also put 
them in “the right setting”—a perspective from which they would not be-
come dangerous by violating Cambridge norms. It was necessary to feel 
the power of erotic love and yet deny its force, to admit their passions but 
refuse to act on them. Robinson and Kahn seem to have contrived a solu-
tion to their problem on terms later made famous by F. Scott Fitzgerald. 
It required that they “hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same 
time, and still retain the ability to function” (Fitzgerald 1956, 69).
A month later, Kahn was at Harvard, happily observing that he was 
no longer anxious or nostalgic for the halcyon days of Michaelmas, when 
Austin was in Africa: “I can’t help it if my feelings about you only grow 
stronger. You must not let it upset you. I could do everything for you but 
I cannot accomplish the impossible. And I realize it is no use concealing 
it from you: if I thought it would help I would try; but I am right surely? 
The important thing is that, though stronger my feelings are different. 
That restlessness has gone, and everything is going to be lovely. And I 
do so want to get on with my work. I shall be very busy.”16 If his feel-
ings for Robinson had grown stronger, why was he no longer plagued 
by anxieties over the future? On Kahn’s interpretation of his own paci-
fication, it was because he had accepted resignation. He and Robinson 
would not become Tristan and Isolde, embracing a cosmic passion with 
all the risks it entailed. They settled for a more banal solution: compro-
mise with the requirements of careerism and a surrender to the conven-
tions of Cambridge. Robinson encouraged this compromise. She had 
been more responsive to the dangers of erotic transgression and urged 
him not to enter the magic garden of his dreams in which she became an 
imaginary demigoddess and not a flesh-and-blood, all-too-human being. 
If he embraced the Robinson of Trumpington Street in Cambridge and 
not the “wraith” of his hyperactive imagination, she agreed that they had 
no reason to worry.17
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(2) Robinson was sensitive to Kahn’s worries, mood swings, homesick-
ness, and extravagant distaste for the United States. From the beginning 
of his visit, she advised him on how to handle himself as well as American 
“grubbiness.” In making her presence felt even at a great distance, she 
was able to ease his daily confrontations with unhappiness. Kahn, on the 
other hand, was much more self-absorbed. In some letters he seems fas-
cinated by the experience of inspecting his ephemeral emotional states. 
He left Cambridge confused, ambivalent, deeply troubled by the prospect 
of a long separation from Robinson, and unbalanced by loss of the insti-
tutional underpinnings that made his life as a fellow of King’s so agree-
able. How did he overcome the disturbing moments of depression and 
emotional volatility? He addressed this question in a revealing letter writ-
ten only a few days after he arrived in Chicago:
Isn’t it lovely that everything is going so well? I could not believe it was true 
that I was being so cheerful when we parted in town. I thought at least it must be 
because I had not taken in that I was going. I had not taken it in, but now I have 
and I continue in an angelic frame of mind. In fact in a curious kind of way I am 
enjoying it and quite often I feel that it would have been a pity not to have come. 
You must not mind that it is thinking about you that helps me such a lot to do so 
well. Not that I think about you all the time. But it is an enormous comfort to be 
able to do so whenever I want to. Please may I go on? I am so grateful to you for 
being such that it is a pleasure. It is turning out so much better than I expected and 
I know that you are the reason. You are a dear. I have my bad moments, of course, 
but they amount to far less, and are far less frequent than one could possibly have 
foretold. In fact it is my firm belief that I would suffer far more from exasperation, 
annoyance, and despair as a result of living in this impossibly inhuman country if I 
had not this to fall back on. Moreover, your advice to regard it as a visit to the Zoo 
was more practical than I imagined at the time. But you must not mind if I tell 
you something about the animals—monstrosities most of them, a few exotic, and 
some almost human to a degree that, as a human being myself, I find disquieting. 
Disquieting but not upsetting. For the extraordinary thing is that most of the time 
I do not feel anything to regret for having come.18
(3) Because Robinson and Kahn could remain in touch only through 
correspondence, they were understandably delighted when letters arrived 
and upset when the post was delayed.19 Before moving on to Harvard, 
Kahn made arrangements to use Schumpeter’s residence as his mailing 
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address. Since they were both acquainted with Schumpeter from his vis-
its to Cambridge, Kahn was concerned that Robinson would not write 
as frequently as she had done during his Chicago stay. He explained his 
arrangements and appealed for understanding: “Please don’t be bashful 
about writing to me c/o Schumpeter. All my other letters are going there 
too, so no matter how many you write they won’t be noticed. In any case, 
he doesn’t know your writing: and I shall probably let him know I am 
looking at your proofs. It was only after great hesitation I decided to adopt 
his address; so I should be terribly anguished if I had made an unfortunate 
decision. So please.”20 Kahn understood that their relationship could be 
misinterpreted—or, more dangerously, correctly interpreted—by third 
persons. But it was not his use of Schumpeter’s address that troubled 
Robinson, as her reply of February 3 shows: “It is very encouraging to 
hear that you are doing so well. Bless you—+ please don’t apologise. I am 
certainly not put off writing by the idea of Schumpeter. That isn’t the kind 
of thing that worries me” (rfk/13/90/1/88–93). Presumably the source of 
her concern was the possibility that her letters were an insecure repository 
of secrets that might be revealed by unreliable or malicious readers. This 
consideration would explain her cool, composed tone in correspondence. 
It would also explain why she did not harbor the same worries about the 
overheated emotional temper of Kahn’s side of the correspondence. His 
letters were addressed to her at Trumpington Street, where her post was 
not subject to surveillance.
(4) Despite their preoccupations with research and one another, 
Robinson and Kahn did not forget Austin. He was kept clearly in focus, 
if not in the foreground of their attentions at least close by. As early as 
Christmas day, only four days after Kahn had sailed, Robinson was al-
ready relaying news of Austin, his health, and their conversations about 
his African assignment (rfk/13/90/1/22–23). In a postscript to her letter 
of January 18, 1933, she told Kahn that Lionel Robbins was scheduled to 
speak to the Marshall Society and relayed Austin’s comments: “What a 
pity Kahn won’t be here—But it is a good thing he should go away, then 
everybody finds out how much they miss him” (rfk/13/90/1/57–58). On 
February 11, she wrote that Austin had read Kahn’s paper for the Harvard 
Economics Club and was “very keen it should be published as the first 
manifesto of the Trumpington Street School” (rfk/13/90/1/115–18).
In response, Kahn expressed interest and delight in all things Austin-
ian. He recalled seeing Austin at the Southampton docks on the day of 
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his embarkation: “I was thrown into a terrific state of excitement when 
I heard that Austin was coming down to the docks. And I was awfully 
pleased to see him. I am so much looking forward to hearing him in Cam-
bridge when I get back.”21 A few days later, he pumped Robinson with 
a litany of questions about Austin. What of his paper for the Marshall 
Society and the progress of his lectures for ordinary degree students? Had 
he bought a car? Had he completed his paper on imperfect competition? 22 
“Give him my affectionate love,” Kahn wrote.23 Quite understandably, 
Robinson had remained silent on these matters. In a relationship that was 
“beyond time, place and all mortality,” Kahn’s queries seemed contrived 
and inconsequential in the extreme.24
h o m e c o m i n g ?
The tensions created by efforts on the part of Kahn and Robinson to 
conventionalize their erotic life are nicely documented by a misunder-
standing over the date of his return to England. On January 31, 1933, 
Robinson said she had seen one of Kahn’s friends, who asked “anxiously” 
when he was expected back. This question was on Robinson’s mind as 
well. Although she wondered whether he had begun to think about it, 
she urged him to consider only his own “financial + psychological con-
venience” in setting the date of his voyage. “We can easily be perfectly 
all right as far as I can see. I must say I miss you horribly but I feel quite 
equal to coping” (rfk/13/90/1/84–87). Kahn was annoyed by her ques-
tion, which he regarded as “superfluous”: “Have I begun to think about 
coming back? What do you take me for?” Yet he was coy and noncom-
mittal. The winged chariot of time, which he had cursed on so many oc-
casions, no longer troubled him. He was pleased with the final stage of 
his American visit, in a “beautiful frame of mind,” and “not particularly 
restless.” A decision about his voyage did not seem pressing. Should he 
sail immediately after Passover, which ended April 18? In that case, he 
would appear in Cambridge some two weeks after the beginning of the 
Easter term. Kahn, whose emotional well-being at Chicago and Harvard 
had depended on Robinson and the space she filled in his active romantic 
imagination, found it impossible to make up his mind. “I suppose,” he 
wrote, “I shall get back sooner or later.”25
Robinson’s response to Kahn’s blasé attitude toward their reunion was 
a studied silence. However, he seems to have been determined to extract 
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a reaction and raised the issue again in mid-March when he was in New 
York. Although he was considering sailing late in the third week of April, 
he had made no decision.26 She would not be drawn. In a third letter at 
the end of March, he returned to the question. Keynes was contemplating 
a holiday at the beginning of May. In that case, Kahn would be expected 
to lecture in his place, which would call for an earlier arrival. He found the 
uncertainty over what the faculty might expect of him “horribly perplex-
ing.” Yet he still did not settle a date for his return.27 Robinson’s apparent 
lack of interest in Kahn’s return caused an angry response. Although his 
letter is not extant, the two radiograms she sent him in New York are evi-
dence that he had become sufficiently overwrought for her to telegraph 
twice. The first telegram, on April 16, read, “Dont Be Hysterical Every-
one Expecting You By Majestic All Well Love, Joan” (rfk/13/90/1/227). 
Two days later, she wrote, “Joan expects you sail eighteenth Don’t worry” 
(rfk/13/90/1/228). Her letter of April 19, presumably written the day after 
he sailed, gives an account of what transpired prior to his departure. A 
misunderstanding over small matters had become magnified:
My dear I am so sorry to have caused you so much distress. I thought that my 
line was to be perfectly natural and simply to accept your plans. When I wrote 
some time ago that you had only to consult your own convenience I regarded it as 
a final pronouncement. You really ought to have learned by now that when I seem 
to you to be hyper-subtle it is just that I am not attending. But I ought to have 
known how you would be feeling, and I am most sincerely penitent at giving you 
such trouble. If you will forgive me for being dense I will forgive you for being 
hysterical. I fear my cable was not very well thought out—I was hurrying to catch 
a train at the time. (rfk/13/90/1/235–36)
Robinson was in London to see Lydia perform in a play at the Old 
Vic on April 24 and attend a lecture by Hawtrey at the Royal Statistical 
Society the next day. Because Austin had decided not to come to London, 
she had an extra ticket for the performance that she hoped Kahn would 
use, a fact she mentioned as evidence that his impression of her indiffer-
ence was groundless.28 She had called Kahn’s family, hoping to find him 
there. When she learned that he had not yet arrived, she asked him to let 
her know when he planned to come up to Cambridge should they fail 
to connect in London. Robinson was struggling to find the terms that 
would reestablish their intimacy: “Please don’t see any hidden meaning in 
this remark for there is none.”29 On April 24, before seeing the play, she 
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closed her letter with a plea: “Love to you my dear. Don’t be any crosser 
with me than you can help for being so dense” (rfk/13/90/1/230–32). By 
May 1, she was back in Cambridge with a letter from Kahn, now in Lon-
don. Harmony had been reestablished in their little universe. Robinson 
was relieved that she had been forgiven. There was “nothing further to 
explain so we needn’t wrangle when we meet” (rfk/13/90/1/233–34). On 
May 7, Keynes, Kahn, and the Robinsons lunched in Cambridge. After-
ward, Keynes offered Lydia the following observation: “I had a slight 
feeling that Joan and Alexander, though thick friends, were just a little less 
intimate than before the long interval” (jmk/pp/45/190/5).
t h e  m u n d a n e  l i f e ,  1 9 3 3 – 3 7
Keynes’s perception was perhaps not mistaken. Kahn’s return marked the 
beginning of a long period of intimate friendship and collaboration. Its 
temper was more serene than the turbulent, sharpened feelings of 1932–
33. Robinson’s letters revolved around work, family life, friends, and the 
prospect of spending time alone with Kahn. When either of the two was 
not in Cambridge—generally during university vacations—she coordi-
nated their respective itineraries and forwarding addresses so that they 
could correspond and arrange meetings, either in London or on returning 
to Cambridge. Although his letters from June 1933 through September 
1938 are not extant, their content can occasionally be gleaned from her 
replies.
It is evident from Robinson’s side of the correspondence that neither 
of the lovers was restless in the sense of Kahn’s American letters. Even 
Keynes was relaxed about the liaison and regarded the following episode 
as innocent: “I went to see Alexander this morning and found him lying 
on the floor of his inner room with Joan—no socks on and unshaven. But 
you mustn’t suppose wrongly. They were on the floor because that is the 
only convenient way of examining mathematical diagrams, and there is a 
Jewish Feast on to-day during which to wear socks or to shave is against 
the law of Moses.”30 In fact, they were doing theoretical work together. 
She was preparing a paper to read at Keynes’s Political Economy Club the 
following year—either “Euler’s Theorem and the Problem of Distribu-
tion” (1934a) or “What Is Perfect Competition?” (1934b). And for some 
time they had been engaged in a dialogue about duopoly, on which Kahn 
was working.31
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When Keynes found Robinson on the floor in Kahn’s rooms, he did 
not know she was pregnant with her first child.32 Her pregnancy did not 
seem to change their relationship. They remained affectionate, discussed 
their work, planned meetings around Austin’s absences, and stayed con-
nected during vacations. Austin remained a presence in the background as 
she tried to juggle the various professional and domestic demands on her 
time so that she and Kahn could meet privately.
On March 26, 1934, Robinson informed Keynes that she was expect-
ing a baby, news that she had earlier confided to Kahn and Sraffa (jmk/
ua/5/3/124–30). On March 29, while on Easter holiday in Essex, she won-
dered about his reaction: “I haven’t had Maynard’s reaction to my letter 
even if he has written as the forwarding arrangements are a bit weak. I 
am staying here over Easter + will come to town on Tuesday. Austin 
continues to be vague about his movements so I can’t say beyond that” 
(rfk/13/90/2/1–2). She went into labor on May 27, updating Kahn about 
her condition the same day: “I have been put to bed + the nurse sent for 
but nothing has happened so far. It may be a false alarm. I don’t think it 
would do any harm if you rang up in the morning for news. There seems 
to be a provision of nature that one’s not alarmed—like being eaten by a 
tiger” (rfk/13/90/2/12–15). On the same day, a note from Austin notified 
Kahn of Ann’s birth: “Ann appeared, with a slight excess of punctuality in 
the course of my college meeting this afternoon. Joan is, I am told, quite 
fit. I have seen her for a moment + she was still drowsy but quite cheerful. 
Ann (at the moment) is best regarded as taking after her father + when her 
time comes to lecture she will certainly not be inaudible. I am backing her 
against all comers for the Economics Tripos of 1956” (rfk/13/90/2/14–15). 
Austin was not on the scene for Ann’s arrival, and his information about 
his wife’s condition was sketchy and indirect. Two days later Robinson 
herself wrote Kahn, “while nibbling your delicious grapes + feeling very 
well.” She ruled out a visit since it was regarded as unorthodox for the 
new mother to see friends.33
Between 1934 and 1937, the form and substance of the friendship seem 
to have remained settled. With a probationary lectureship, an ambitious 
publishing program, a new course of lectures on applications of monetary 
theory, a baby, and success in gaining Keynes’s endorsement as a leader in 
the Keynesian revolution, Robinson was a busy woman. By the beginning 
of 1937, she was pregnant with her second child, Barbara, who was born 
on October 9, 1937. Robinson was on leave during the Michaelmas term 
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but taught her normal academic load during Lent and Easter. On Decem-
ber 8, 1937, she wrote Kahn a characteristic letter. Although she knew little 
about Austin’s schedule, he was generally at his college in any case. She 
intended to write her mother about spending a week or so with her family 
in London beginning on December 23 and asked Kahn for a note on his 
holiday plans so that they could arrange to meet (rfk/13/90/2/194–95).
t h e  b r e a k d o w n
During Robinson’s pregnancies and her introduction to motherhood, 
she attempted to balance the imperatives imposed by the production and 
management of her career against the values of what Tolstoy called “real 
life”—the intimate world of friends, a husband, a lover, and children. 
Motherhood obviously imposed professional limitations. On August 30, 
1934, she noted that she would not read a paper at Oxford because of her 
“young suckling child” (rfk/13/90/2/64–71). However, she also shared 
with Kahn the witticism that on showing Ann, age three months, her arti-
cle on Euler’s Theorem, “she didn’t remember much about it”—evidence 
that she was working on this paper during her pregnancy.34
The first nine months of 1938 must have been especially hectic. In addi-
tion to managing a household, Robinson gave three sets of lectures over 
the Lent and Easter terms and published two articles and a book review. As 
she vacationed with her relatives in August, however, her letters showed 
no signs of fatigue or stress. “Time here floats sweetly by,” she observed 
on August 18 (rfk/13/90/3/10–11). No longer troubled by doubts about 
her ability to resume original theoretical work after returning from life as 
a mother, she was content with an intellectually vacuous existence, at least 
for an interval. Moreover, she was relaxed about the immediate future. 
Although her plans for September were uncertain, she asked Kahn to keep 
his calendar open for the end of the month.35 And yet on the weekend 
of October 1–3, Robinson suffered a catastrophic psychiatric breakdown, 
causing her to be hospitalized in a nursing home for a few months. What 
happened between early September, when she was enjoying her children 
and a soft life of idleness, and the beginning of October? The first sign of 
distress was a letter of September 11 to Kahn about her travel plans:
We are now all set to return to Cambridge arriving Friday 16 [September]. Austin 
is driving taking 2 days + Ann + I are going by train + spending Thursday night 
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at K.P.G.36 I shall have to spend the time there with the family. If I get in before 
the car party I will ring up—if not see you sometime on Saturday. But perhaps 
you could send a word to catch me at K.P.G. saying where you are. Future plans 
are quite vague—but any way it’s not much good making our plans till Hitler has 
made his. I am still expecting another May 21 but it’s really not much good think-
ing about it. (rfk/13/90/3/26–27)
What happened on May 21? Why did Robinson suppose that Hitler’s 
plans in September might have a substantial bearing on her own? May 20–
22, 1938, was the weekend of the May Crisis, when war between Germany 
and Czechoslovakia seemed imminent. On Friday, May 20, the Czech 
government recalled its army reservists to active duty, fearing a German 
attack amidst rumors of German troop movements along the Czech- 
German border. Tensions were magnified by an incident in which Czech 
police shot dead two Sudetens—Czech ethnic Germans. The rumors of 
German troop movements were never confirmed, the Germans insisted 
they had no plans to invade, and the sense of crisis dissolved by Saturday 
evening.37
Hitler’s plans for Czechoslovakia seemed to have been made no later 
than November 1937, when he delivered one of his monologues on Ger-
man destiny, international affairs, and military strategy to his senior 
generals. Germany faced a historic choice between vitality and impo-
tence. The critical issue was not to redress national boundaries as they 
were defined by the Treaty of Versailles that ended the First World War 
but Lebensraum, the problem of national living space. Within its post- 
Versailles frontiers, Germany could not achieve its destiny. New natural 
resources were indispensable. Britain’s domination of the high seas ruled 
out overseas colonies. Germany’s fate lay in the east, which meant that a 
move against Czechoslovakia was inevitable. Hitler reportedly claimed 
that British and French leaders did not take the existence of Czechoslo-
vakia seriously. It was merely an artifact of the Treaty of Versailles, which 
dismantled the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The fate of the unsustain-
able multiethnic Czech nation, with its large German population in the 
northwestern provinces, would be settled by the chief central European 
power: Germany. Hitler had his eye on both Austria and Czechoslovakia, 
the annexation of which would enable Germany to feed an additional five 
to six million people (Robbins 1968, 171–72). Although the Sudeten Ger-
mans were not critical to his calculations, their aspirations for inclusion 
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in the new German empire and the agitation of the Sudeten German 
Party had significant propaganda value. In summer and early autumn 
1938, the European press and foreign ministries in Prague, London, and 
Paris did not see the Czech crisis in terms of Hitler’s political metaphys-
ics. It was understood as a set of issues that revolved around the interests 
of Sudeten Germans. Would home rule within the limits of a Czech na-
tion meet their legitimate aspirations? Was secession, the formation of a 
Sudeten German nation state, called for? Or should the Sudeten regions 
of Czechoslovakia be annexed by Germany? How should these determi-
nations be made: by a plebiscite conducted in Sudeten areas? And irre-
spective of questions of political process, what response to the demands 
of the Sudeten separatist movement was consistent with the existence of 
an independent Czech state sufficiently powerful to defend itself against 
Germany?
Robinson’s observations were made on September 11. Hitler was 
scheduled to give a much-anticipated address on the Czech crisis the 
following evening. In this speech, he declared that the status quo in 
Czechoslovakia, where he claimed that 3.5 million Germans were denied 
self-determination, was insupportable. Germany would not abandon its 
compatriots, and he refused to accept anything less than full rights. Al-
though this was not a new position, in London the tone of the speech 
was regarded as ominous. It seemed that Hitler’s patience was exhausted, 
and Germany might strike soon. But instead of announcing a decision 
to attack, he made the vague suggestion that the Czech government had 
an obligation “to discuss matters with the representatives of the Sudeten 
Germans and in one way or another to bring about an understanding” 
(quoted in Robbins 1968, 262–63).38
The offer of negotiation was music to the ears of the British prime 
minister, Neville Chamberlain, whose policy toward Germany was ap-
propriately called appeasement. It was an equivocal position, perhaps not 
internally consistent, and based on the following assumptions: (1) Like 
all British interwar foreign policy, appeasement rested on two political 
axioms: the sanctity of the empire and the avoidance of general war. Both 
were unquestioned even as British power waned, severely damaged by 
the human and economic losses of 1914–18 and eroded by the failure of 
the economy to achieve robust levels of investment and employment in 
the 1920s and 1930s. (2) Because of the excesses of the Treaty of Versailles, 
Germany had legitimate complaints. They should be addressed—but 
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prudently and without encouraging the Nazis’ appetite for territorial ex-
pansion. (3) As a great power, Germany deserved what German politi-
cians and journalists of the time called its place in the sun. This meant 
that Germany should enjoy a relatively free hand in central Europe, its 
major sphere of influence, where it would also serve as a bulwark against 
Soviet communism. (4) Rapprochement with Germany was high on the 
foreign policy agenda of Chamberlain’s government. It called for resolu-
tion of political and economic conflicts that had placed the two nations at 
loggerheads for almost half a century. In the interest of achieving this ob-
jective, British policy in Europe should not antagonize Germany. (5) The 
territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia should be defended. For Britain 
this was not a matter of treaty obligations but democratic principles and 
its own political prestige as the most powerful democratic nation in Eu-
rope. In light of the dramatically successful German annexation of Austria 
in March—achieved without firing a shot and consummated by Hitler’s 
triumphal entry into Vienna—Britain’s failure to enforce its traditional 
principles would encourage the conclusion that it was finished as a great 
power. This meant that Britain was compelled to assert its support for 
Czechoslovakian independence even though it lacked the military re-
sources and the will to make good on this claim. (6) Germany also had 
legitimate interests in Czechoslovakia. They should be addressed in nego-
tiations that would not threaten war, damage relations between Germany 
and Britain, lead the Czechs to believe they had been abandoned, or en-
courage them to suppose they enjoyed unconditional British support.
It was in the context of this policy that Chamberlain wrote the king 
the day after Hitler’s speech. He proposed a dramatic personal visit to 
Germany, during which he and Hitler would resolve the Czechoslovakian 
problem and arrive at a British-German understanding. The cabinet ap-
proved Chamberlain’s visit on September 14, and the request for an invi-
tation to meet Hitler was received in Berlin the same day. The following 
afternoon Chamberlain was greeted by Hitler at his Berchtesgaden villa 
in the Bavarian Alps. Annexation, which was proposed by Chamberlain, 
dominated the discussion: the inclusion of some three million Sudeten 
Germans in the Reich. Sudeten autonomy or home rule within current 
territorial boundaries was no longer considered viable. Although the lo-
gistical and human difficulties of transferring populations into and out of 
Sudeten territories were thorny, Hitler seemed to accept the idea in prin-
ciple. Chamberlain agreed to discuss the matter with his cabinet.
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When Chamberlain returned to London on September 16, he received 
a hero’s welcome and a letter from a grateful king. After discussions with 
the full cabinet, Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, the foreign minister, met 
in London with their French counterparts on September 18. They hoped 
to finesse a general principle of self-determination for Czech ethnic mi-
norities and the possibility of a plebiscite by securing the agreement of 
the Czech government to an ad hoc solution: rectification of Czech fron-
tiers with Germany, secession of Sudeten territory, and transfer of Czechs 
out of Sudeten areas into other parts of Czechoslovakia. The Czech gov-
ernment was persuaded to accept the British-French proposal. On the 
afternoon of September 22, Chamberlain met Hitler again, this time at 
Bad Godesberg on the Rhine. Chamberlain proposed methods for imple-
menting the plans they had discussed in Berchtesgaden. Hitler responded 
by performing one of his more risky, audacious, and, in the end, suc-
cessful diplomatic maneuvers. He rejected Chamberlain’s proposals and 
made demands that exceeded the Berchtesgaden agreement, assuming 
the improbable role of representing the interests of Polish, Hungarian, 
and Slovak minorities in Czechoslovakia, all of whose claims, he insisted, 
were no less compelling than those raised by the Sudetens. The British 
delegation was confused and disappointed. Chamberlain had taken great 
political risks in proposing a revision to the Treaty of Versailles in order to 
meet Hitler’s demands. Now Hitler wanted more. What would the out-
come be? Hitler was ready with an answer to this question. His staff had 
prepared a map that had redrawn Czech-German national frontiers based 
on language. By October 1, Czech administrative and military person-
nel would withdraw behind these new borders and be replaced by Ger-
mans. A plebiscite would be held in the Sudeten areas by November 25. It 
would include all Sudetens who had left the country and disqualify 
all Czechs who had relocated there since 1918. When Chamberlain de-
murred, Hitler repeated his familiar threat that there were two ways to 
settle the Czech question: a peaceful solution based on his new map or 
a military solution, which the western democracies would find intoler-
able. The Godesberg meeting ended in an apparent impasse at 1:45 am on 
September 24.
After Chamberlain returned to London to meet with the cabinet and 
the French on the Godesberg proposals, Hitler flew to Berlin, where 
the stage was set for another major address on Czechoslovakia, sched-
uled for the evening of Monday, September 26. Although he expressed 
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appreciation for Chamberlain’s efforts to resolve the crisis, his peroration 
was chilling. Unless the Czech government agreed by Wednesday at 2:00 
pm to carry out his terms for the evacuation of Sudeten areas by Octo-
ber 1, Germany would declare war on Czechoslovakia. The British public 
and its government concluded that this was tantamount to a declaration 
of general war. As in 1914, Germany would attack the western democra-
cies. Londoners anticipated German air attacks and the use of poison gas. 
The response was mass distribution and fitting of gas masks. Men worked 
day and night digging defensive trenches in public parks, and hospitals 
prepared for heavy civilian casualties. Londoners with cars drove their 
children to the safety of the country. In order to check a panic in ticket res-
ervations and overuse of the railway system, the bbc broadcast an official 
denial that the government intended to nationalize the railways. Because 
of the large volume of calls, the British telephone system malfunctioned. 
The number of marriages at registry offices increased by 500 percent. 
There was also a large increase in sales of forms for preparing wills, metal 
boxes for deeds and cash, and one-way bus tickets out of London. Panic 
buying of provisions occurred at groceries (Madge and Harrison 1939, 
94–96).
At 8:00 pm Wednesday evening, Chamberlain delivered a radio ad-
dress to the nation. Finding the Czech refusal to accept German terms 
baffling and Hitler’s timetable unreasonable, the prime minister expressed 
the incomprehension of much of the British public: “How horrible, fan-
tastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on 
gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people 
of whom we know nothing. It seems still more impossible that a quarrel 
that has already been settled in principle should be the subject of war” 
(quoted in Robbins 1968, 306).
This was the political background of an uncharacteristically hysterical 
letter Robinson sent Sraffa that same evening. She did not write as a social 
scientist or as an actor in the political drama but as a spectator who saw 
the demonstrations in London for and against a more aggressive response 
to Germany as political theater played on a world-historic stage: “I wrote 
you a long letter and then stupidly posted it by ground instead of air. I was 
imploring you to come here as fast as you can + not miss the most amaz-
ing spectacle of centuries. I also urged that this is definitely the place you 
will find most interesting if the war starts.”39 That afternoon she had been 
in Whitehall, where she saw “an immense procession of Communists and 
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the League of Nations Union demanding (in effect) an ultimatum to Ger-
many.” The demonstrators were surrounded by sympathetic crowds and 
pitted against a smaller contingent of British fascists, some of whom she 
believed were political mercenaries hired for the occasion by the British 
Fascist Party. The socialists demanded immediate conscription. “Simple 
minded” Tories were puzzled. In considering the response of the British 
public to the crisis, Robinson saw “a united nation—in a sense which does 
mean something—demanding war + the Premier making desperate effort 
after desperate effort to save himself from being pushed into it. Does this 
sample whet your appetite?”40
The Czech crisis was resolved, at least for the time, by the Munich 
conference of September 29–30. The heads of government and foreign 
ministries of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy agreed to German an-
nexation of all Sudeten territory. Evacuation of Czech populations would 
begin October 1 and be completed by October 10. German military oc-
cupation of Sudeten areas would begin the day after the agreement was 
signed, October 1. Final frontiers would be resolved by a plebiscite. The 
Munich agreement seems to have marked the beginning of Robinson’s 
acute psychiatric disintegration. As her correspondence shows, she was in 
London at the peak of the panic over the imminence of war. Shortly after 
Wednesday, September 28, she returned to Cambridge. The only archival 
details currently available on her breakdown are letters from Kahn and 
Austin, both of whom wrote Keynes independently and confidentially as 
close friends and colleagues, giving him early reports of the bare facts. 
On returning to Cambridge, Robinson was obsessed by the Czech crisis, 
about which she talked incessantly. As the week passed, “all her emotional 
problems boiled up + entered into her outpourings.” She was unable to 
sleep—Austin claimed that by Monday, October 3, she had not slept for 
more than a week. By this point, “the continued strain resulted in storms 
that were too violent for us to allow her to endure.”41
Austin and Kahn had both been in touch with Karin Stephen, a close 
friend of Robinson, a physician, and a Freudian psychoanalyst trained 
in Britain and the United States. Her husband, Adrian, was also a psy-
choanalyst and the brother of Virginia Woolf and Vanessa Bell. Adrian 
(b. 1883) had been a contemporary of Keynes at Cambridge. Karin 
(b. 1889), a student and fellow of Newnham, had studied philosophy with 
Bertrand Russell, her uncle by marriage.42 These connections made the 
Stephens members of the Cambridge-Bloomsbury aristocracy. Before her 
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psychiatric problems became severe, Robinson had written Karin a letter 
as a pretext to encourage the offer of a professional consultation. Kahn 
claimed that Robinson would have rejected such an offer from any other 
psychiatrist. The pretext was apparently too heavily veiled, and no con-
sultation took place.43 On the basis of telephone reports from Austin and 
Kahn, the Stephens compared Robinson’s symptoms to those of Woolf. 
On arriving in Cambridge on Sunday, October 2, they “insisted that she 
had reached a state at which she must be under expert + continuous super-
vision + restraint.”44 On Monday, she was given a sedative injection and 
driven to Brooke House, a clinic and nursing home for mental patients at 
Clapham in London. Her initial treatment was ten to twelve days of “nar-
cosis”—a continuous regime of drugs intended to induce sleep and break 
the pattern of behavior that Austin described as “distraught + stormy.”45
e x p l a n a t i o n s  a n d  r e e x a m i n a t i o n s
Shortly after Robinson’s breakdown, Kahn, Austin, and Keynes all ven-
tured explanations. In Kahn’s view, the Czech crisis was responsible. The 
Munich agreement, he thought, made war with Germany inevitable. One 
casualty, Robinson herself, was a victim of the “state of acute neurosis 
into which the whole country was driven” by the horror of another war.46 
At the same time, she experienced “an exultation at the prospect of the 
downfall of Fascism.” These emotions drove her into a “frenzy,” a con-
dition exacerbated by the result of the Munich conference, which made 
it clear that “the Fascists and Neville Chamberlain were after all going 
to triumph.” But by that point she would not relinquish her conviction 
that democratic forces would finally prevail, presumably through a British 
and French guarantee of military support for Czechoslovakia. In response 
to the Munich agreement, she refused to read the newspapers.47
Keynes, who had not seen Robinson in the weeks preceding the break-
down, replied to Kahn’s unsettling news on October 10. He provided a 
more ambitious analysis, not only a diagnosis but a therapeutic program 
and a prognosis as well.
My dear Alexander,
I am frightfully sorry to hear your news. I thought Joan’s letters excited and rather 
incoherent and one passage in the last one unintelligible, but not such as to arouse 
in me any suspicions. The strain of combining babies with so much intellectual 
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work is at the bottom of it. I have often in recent times thought that her mind 
was racing. But rest will do wonders. In Virginia’s case the symptoms were bad 
headaches, an unwillingness to take nourishment and delusions which were (ex-
cept one, so far as I remember) quite mild. 48 The mental specialists never did 
anything for her, neither the old-fashioned nor the new-fashioned. I should say 
that complete rest, good nourishment, the avoidance of seeing people and excit-
ing conversations (Leonard has always attached prime importance to the last) is 
what is wanted.
You must have had a frightful time one way and another. But be of good cour-
age. I should say, from what you tell me, that the prognosis for Joan is good.
Lydia sends her love.
Yours
jmk
We expect to return to London next Sunday and to Cambridge later in the week.
The conflict between the desire to avoid war and the desire to defeat Fascism 
has run many people’s feelings to pieces. (rfk/13/90/3/101–102)
If Keynes had recently noticed that Robinson’s mind was often “racing,” 
if he found her letters not only excited but somewhat incoherent and in at 
least one case unintelligible, it is surprising that these aberrations failed to 
arouse his suspicions. His explanation is more remarkable. The arch anti-
Victorian appealed to a conventional late nineteenth-century cliché, di-
agnosing Robinson’s problems as a result of strain. Women did not have 
the resources required for the physiological effort to bear children and the 
intellectual effort to write books on economic theory.49 Or did they? In 
his afterthought, Keynes seemed to dispose of the “not both books and 
babies” nostrum of his father’s generation and embrace Kahn’s view of the 
prospect of war as the real explanation. Like many of her British contem-
poraries, Robinson went to pieces over a political or moral dilemma: the 
conflicting imperatives of preserving peace and defeating fascism.
Austin gave a more detailed and nuanced explanation in his letter 
of October 4 to Keynes, notifying him of the breakdown the day after 
Robinson was taken to London. His account began with the Czech cri-
sis, the minor roles played by Robinson’s father and her sister Nancy in 
events of September, and the impact of family conflicts over appeasement. 
General Sir Frederick Barton Maurice, who had been a senior staff officer 
in the First World War, was a leading figure in the efforts of the Brit-
ish Legion to assist the Chamberlain government in resolving the Czech 
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crisis.50 The legion, an organization of British ex-servicemen founded in 
1919 under royal patronage, offered to place ten thousand legionnaires at 
the disposal of the German government as neutral observers and super-
visors of the transfer of Sudeten territory. The offer was made to Hitler 
with the knowledge of the Chamberlain government. Although the entire 
contingent of legionnaires was apparently prepared to sail for Germany 
after the Godesberg talks, the Munich agreement made the offer moot.51 
Nancy Maurice was the private secretary, aide, and confidante of Major 
General Sir Edward Spears. As a member of Parliament in the 1930s, 
Spears was a leading figure in the Conservative opposition to Chamber-
lain’s policy of appeasement.52 Robinson seems to have labored under an 
illusion of personal political responsibility and power. She thought it was 
her task to resolve conflicts over foreign affairs in her family and acted on 
the fanciful belief that her domestic contributions to political clarification 
would make a difference to the outcome of the Czech crisis. In Austin’s 
view, Robinson’s obsession with the Czech crisis intersected with “all her 
emotional problems.” The political events of September were a cause in 
the sense of a catalyst, a contingent factor lighting the fires that caused 
her emotional problems to “boil up” in an uncontrollable fashion: “To 
the world I am merely saying that she had a severe nervous breakdown 
brought on by the political crisis.”53 This is what Austin was saying, but 
he knew better. The real story of her breakdown was more obscure and 
also more disturbing. What were the emotional problems to which he al-
luded but did not identify in his letter to Keynes?
This question is answered in a strained and guarded exchange of letters 
between Austin and Kahn, initiated by Austin the day he wrote Keynes. 
In the exchange, it is clear that the Cambridge commitment to rigor, 
lucidity, and unsparing honesty could not withstand Robinson’s break-
down. The event portended a crisis in the relationship between her hus-
band, to whom she did not want to remain married, and her lover, with 
whom she enjoyed a liaison fraught with danger. Austin and Kahn strug-
gled to reexamine their lives in the wake of her collapse, trying to reestab-
lish their little world of intimacy and conviviality on more stable ground.
Austin’s first letter broached—obliquely, with some fastidiousness, but 
unequivocally—Kahn’s friendship with his wife: “There are some things 
that I think that it is rather easier to write than to say. So please forgive me 
writing this. I think we must all feel that when we get Joan back again to 
normal, everything must be done not to put her in the position of strain 
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in which any further breakdown is to be feared.” He did not expect “vio-
lent upheavals” in their lives or “drastic measures of any sort,” and he 
did not encourage them. Instead he proposed a therapeutic reconsidera-
tion of their relationships, a two-track, quasi-psychoanalytic dialogue that 
he and Kahn would conduct with Stephen independent of one another. 
They would each write Stephen in complete candor and be prepared to 
accept her counsel: “I am going myself to try to put down on paper for 
Karin everything that seems to me relevant + my own feelings + thoughts 
about them. Do you feel at all inclined to do the same? With her help I 
have great hope that we can find a way out that will bring happiness to us 
all.”54
Why did Austin find it difficult to speak with Kahn, his close colleague, 
professional ally, and friend of some eight years? Why did he make an 
effort to establish emotional distance between them by putting in a let-
ter what could have been said in conversation? What was his reason for 
avoiding a face-to-face talk? These questions can be posed from another 
perspective. What did Kahn and Robinson share that might threaten an-
other breakdown after the Robinson-Kahn-Austin triadic relationship 
was steered back to normal? Austin’s letter seemed to imply that Kahn’s 
friendship with Robinson was objectionable because it was dangerous 
ground for conversation and hazardous to her health. If it was necessary 
to eliminate all threats of subsequent breakdowns and if Austin regarded 
the friendship as one of these threats, his letter can be understood as an 
attempt to alter its course by pushing it to the margins of her life.
Kahn responded on October 6. He too hoped to avoid disruptive 
changes in their lives. Above all, he wanted no part in “melodramatic ac-
tion merely for its own sake.” At the same time, he saw that circumstances 
could not remain as they were.
If we can arrange matters to the true interests of Joan’s peace of mind, I should 
certainly not want to leave the place where I have friends and a way of life, though 
it is obvious that, so far as I am concerned things would have to be different from 
what they have been.
But Joan’s peace of mind, as you say, must be the criterion. Your suggestion 
about Karin is excellent and I will certainly do as you suggest. I take it that your 
idea is that our reflective comments should be for Karin’s private eyes and not 
for yours or mine. I feel, at the same time, that, perhaps at some later stage, we 
ought to aim at a candid discussion between ourselves, difficult though it may be. 
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I blame myself now that I have never in the past given you an opportunity for such 
a discussion. (eagr/Box 9/2/1/17/66–67)
Austin had ended his letter in the hope that, with the help of Stephen, 
the three would find a “way out.” Out of what? Presumably the subterra-
nean conflicts and the repressed emotional turmoil that had ended in the 
breakdown. Once this solution was found, what would happen? Although 
the seemingly prelapsarian innocence of the 1930s might be beyond re-
covery, they would arrive at an arrangement that would make them all 
happy. Kahn stressed the sincerity with which he shared Austin’s faith in 
their collective happiness and added some striking assurances: “There is 
one thing to be remembered. I have always found a great feeling of fond-
ness for you, and now I always shall. And another thing is that Joan has 
always been faithful to you, and has never, as far as I know, felt tempted 
to be otherwise” (eagr/Box 9/2/1/17/66–67).
Why did Kahn think he and Austin should have a candid discussion? 
Why would such a discussion between old friends prove difficult? What 
delicate matters called for uncommon candor? And why did Kahn hold 
himself responsible for failing to provide an opportunity for this conver-
sation? Was there some piece of dangerous interpersonal knowledge criti-
cal to their relationship that Kahn possessed but Austin did not? Why was 
Kahn reluctant to share his private reflections with Austin, with whom he 
was on close terms, but prepared to reveal himself to Stephen? Consider 
also the several items Kahn said he remembered. Why would he find it 
necessary to reassure Austin of his feelings for him and insist that they 
were not in jeopardy? Only if there were facts that might place their rela-
tionship in doubt. Why did he believe it was important for him to provide 
guarantees of Robinson’s fidelity to her husband? Only if there were some 
reason to suppose guarantees were needed. How could Kahn presume to 
know that Robinson had always been faithful? Only if he knew Robinson 
better than her husband knew her. How could his knowledge of Robinson 
extend to her beliefs about her marital fidelity? Only if he knew that he 
was the only person who might cause her to become unfaithful.
When Austin replied to Kahn, the exchange had reached a critical junc-
ture. Austin’s first letter disclosed his sense that Kahn’s friendship with 
his wife was suspicious and possibly objectionable. Kahn’s letter made it 
clear that he understood how Austin saw the friendship. By that point, 
most of the cards were on the table. The next move was Austin’s. Would 
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he make it by pursuing the dialogue into more perilous territory? Would 
he speak or at least write to Kahn in a more straightforward fashion about 
the friendship and the changes he expected? He would not. Further dis-
closures on Kahn’s part were emphatically discouraged. Standing on the 
brink of a full exposé of the friendship, its extent and intensity, and what 
might be done about it, Austin stepped back. Their mutual understanding 
was left as it stood at this point. The fundamentals were clearly avowed. 
Other admissions were either made tacitly or couched as studied ambigui-
ties. Details were neither offered nor expected.
Austin also stepped back from the view that the trauma of Robinson’s 
marriage with him and her friendship with Kahn was the decisive fac-
tor in the breakdown. Instead he moved in the direction of Kahn’s more 
comfortable explanation, the Czech crisis and “Joan’s thoughts about the 
war.”55 Were Austin’s position on the Czech crisis and his support for 
appeasement a source of Robinson’s obsession over the political devel-
opments of late September? In that event, the emotional problems that 
boiled up during the weekend might have included a conflict between 
Robinson and her husband over European politics. Austin explained him-
self to Kahn in a letter of October 6. After noting that the personal memo-
randa he and Kahn were writing were intended for Stephen alone—he 
would let her “judge whether there is anything we ought to have out 
together”—he turned to the explanation Kahn preferred.
I hope that you may be right, + believe that there is a considerable probability 
that you are, in thinking that it was the strain of deciding one’s attitude to war, + 
not other underlying matters which brought Joan to this state. I think I probably 
tend to exaggerate the things which happened to be on the top of her mind during 
the stress of last Sunday night. I had been feeling that it was not only the facts of 
war, but also the contrast between her own brave attitude and my very cowardly 
one which had contributed to her distraction, + I had been led to ask myself why 
I had thought + felt what I did. I think the fact it is incredible that [illegible] of 
my generation shall feel that there can be nothing for which it is justifiable again to 
reinforce upon us the strains of 1914–8, and that we have tended to deny ourselves 
the strong principles which could lead us to say again “I would rather die than 
submit to this.” (rfk/13/90/3/107–13)
Austin understood his position on the issue of war as an unseemly read-
iness to compromise principles in order to escape painful consequences, 
even though he believed that the principles in question were fundamental 
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imperatives on which no compromise could be justified. During the Mu-
nich conference, Harold Nicolson, former diplomat and current National 
Labour Party mp, wrote H. A. L. Fisher, the historian and warden of 
New College Oxford. Nicolson described the confused national response 
to Chamberlain’s resolution of the Czech crisis: “I have a nasty feeling 
that I shall not approve of the results of the Munich conference. People 
seem unable to differentiate between physical relief and moral satisfac-
tion” (quoted in Gilbert and Gott 1963, 80). Austin was one of these 
people. In his diagnosis of his own thinking, he had confused relief from 
the stress of enduring the prospect of another war with the conviction 
that the Munich agreement was ethically acceptable. In his conversations 
with Robinson during the weekend of her breakdown, he had assumed 
that in order to avoid war with Germany in autumn 1938, any measure 
that promised success was morally tolerable. As he perhaps understood 
later, some measures might be contemptible and cowardly if they sacri-
ficed the Czechs. Measures might also be politically self-defeating if they 
increased the chances of a later and more disastrous war by strengthening 
Germany’s resources and rewarding its aggressive behavior. This meant 
that certain policies to avoid war, such as appeasement, might be more 
objectionable on both moral and political grounds than war itself. Austin 
felt, somewhat obscurely, that his misjudgments during the Czech cri-
sis were anchored in deeper moral weaknesses in his character, which he 
regarded as grounds for more shame and self-reproach than his morally 
flaccid position on the war: “I had been wondering how far Joan was 
feeling acutely conscious of this, + how far that contributed to her wor-
ries.”56 If Austin’s fears were justified, his moral failings may have troubled 
Robinson more deeply than the compromises entailed by his apparent be-
lief in appeasement at any ethical price. A comparison with her principled 
antiappeasement stance would have been devastating. There was a more 
serious worry. These considerations might have forced her to the conclu-
sion that her husband was a morally contemptible human being.
These unsettling reflections notwithstanding, Austin invited no dia-
logue with Kahn, either on appeasement and war or on any aspect of 
Kahn’s friendship with Robinson. “Please don’t answer this,” he wrote. 
“I think we shall make it difficult for both of us to be natural again + to 
be real and follow normally. I feel sure that we are good enough friends 
to work out a way to our own joint happiness + to Joan’s. Never at any 
time, even when I have been worried + unhappy about our own relation 
e x c u r s u s :  r o b i n s o n  a n d  k a h n  `   81
to Joan, have I really wavered in heart + affection towards you.”57 Were 
candid conversations with Kahn important to Robinson’s recovery, the 
prevention of subsequent breakdowns, or the reestablishment of a sta-
tus quo between Kahn and himself ? Austin had no interest in pursuing 
these questions. He would leave to Stephen, the impartial professional 
therapist, the question of whether there were matters that they “ought to 
have out together.” An exchange of hard, unpleasant truths was likely to 
complicate efforts to reestablish interpersonal conditions approximating 
normality. Even though they were good friends and would find a path 
to their collective happiness, certain matters were best left unexpressed. 
Comity and truthfulness, it seems, were conflicting values.58
The perspective and emotional tone of the letters on Robinson’s break-
down written by Austin and Kahn, both to Keynes and to one another, 
are quite different. Robinson’s illness left Kahn in a desperate state, and 
he made no effort to conceal this. His concern was for Robinson, not 
for the impact of her breakdown on him. Austin’s letters are emotion-
ally more detached. His account to Keynes is clinical and dispassionate. 
In writing to Kahn, he presumed that Robinson’s drive to London was 
quiet and comfortable; under sedation, she slept most of the way and was 
now safely in the hands of medical specialists. Although he was not under 
medical care, he apparently thought he should have been: “I do feel that it 
is rather important that Karin should help me tidy myself up,” he wrote, 
and he anxiously awaited her arrival in Cambridge. Austin was struggling 
to create an appearance of normality in his professional life at Cambridge 
that would make it unnecessary to reveal the truth to his colleagues. He 
was chiefly concerned to show that he was “behaving with decency” even 
though he suffered from lack of sleep as well as “nerves + hysteria.”59 His 
main task seems to have been self-maintenance and rehabilitation. As he 
assured Keynes, “I am here in Cambridge, + prefer to remain here, where 
I have Piero + Kahn when I want them, + an utterly normal College 
knowing nothing of my problems.” He was certain Keynes would under-
stand if the Economic Journal, which required no urgent business, was left 
dormant for a few days.60
In his letter of October 6 to Kahn, Austin set out his protocol for con-
tact with Robinson: none. For the present, friends and colleagues could 
do nothing useful and should not attempt to get in touch with the patient. 
“In fact,” he claimed, “I gather that the removal of all outside associa-
tions is rather desirable” (rfk/13/90/3/107–13). Notwithstanding Austin’s 
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instruction, Kahn quickly took matters in hand. Very shortly after Austin 
ended their exchange, he composed his memorandum for Stephen, wrote 
her, and met with her as well in order to learn whether he could be of 
help through letters or visits. He also raised with Stephen the question of 
whether he might help pay for Robinson’s medical care. Stephen assured 
Kahn that Austin would not be told about her contact with him or his 
offer of financial assistance. If at some point Robinson would benefit 
from correspondence or visits, he would be informed. 61
Like the barking dog in the Sherlock Holmes story, Stephen’s letter 
is perhaps most illuminating in what it does not contain. Although she 
considered the Austin-Kahn-Robinson triad in discussing the sources of 
Robinson’s problems, there is nothing about her political passions or her 
reaction to the Czech crisis. Stephen made it clear that once Robinson 
began to recover, she would advise her on what to do about Austin and 
Kahn. There is no indication that she proposed to consult with her pa-
tient on how to think about a European war. From Stephen’s profes-
sional standpoint, the significant source of Robinson’s problems was her 
relationships with her husband and her lover.62
Kahn was determined to cover some of Robinson’s medical expenses 
or at least assure himself that the burden would not fall solely on Austin. 
His discussion with Stephen on this matter produced no results. Austin 
had told Kahn that he had no financial difficulties for the present.63 How-
ever, Kahn was troubled. Although he had no specific knowledge of Aus-
tin’s resources, he supposed they would be quickly exhausted by the cost 
of Robinson’s care. His solution was a clumsy effort to interest Keynes 
in becoming Austin’s lender, but without seeming to make this sugges-
tion. He had an outstanding loan of £500 from Keynes, which he had 
invested. The day after he received Stephen’s letter, he repaid £250, hop-
ing to return the balance soon. The prospect of war had encouraged him 
to liquidate some of his investments, which explains the availability of the 
£250. He noted that he had intended to make this repayment during the 
Michaelmas term in any case. “I mention that I am merely carrying out 
an old intention because I do not want you to feel that I am asking you to 
turn your attention to needs much more pressing than mine. It may be, 
however, that you might, at some time, feel inclined to offer Austin some 
assistance.”64 In suggesting this possibility, Kahn framed the matter of 
financing Robinson’s care in purely economic terms. Expenses should be 
regarded as a “capital expenditure”—presumably an investment in human 
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capital that would prevent loss of value in a significant university resource. 
In view of the intellectual capital that Robinson represented, it was neces-
sary to finance its upkeep, “if necessary, by special measures.” Thus the 
rationale for a loan to Austin, which Kahn quite implausibly said he was 
not proposing.65
t h e  d e a t h  o f  a l e x a n d e r
Robinson’s recovery was slow. A month after her hospitalization, she 
asked the medical staff of Brooke House to reestablish her connection 
with Kahn. Ilene Chennell, her physician and the assistant medical of-
ficer of the clinic, wrote him that although her condition had improved 
considerably, she understood that she was not yet well enough to receive 
letters. However, she worried about Kahn and was eager to receive news 
from him. Chennell asked for a “reassuring line,” which she would pass 
on to Robinson.66 By the following month, Robinson was well enough 
to write Kahn a note and to keep in touch through either her aunt Francis 
or Chennell, with whom she encouraged him to speak freely. Robinson 
and her physician had reached an understanding on matters that should 
be held in absolute confidence; Chennell was “perfectly reliable in every 
respect.”67
The medical staff of the clinic offered no explanation for Robinson’s 
breakdown. She was not interested in explanations or arriving at her own 
theory, unlike Keynes, Austin, and Kahn. She believed that the most intel-
ligent course was to dismiss the matter: “I think it is best to write off alto-
gether the queer week end of Oct.1–3rd—but in dreams I have cleared out 
what ever grit there was in the masking so no one need worry about how 
or what or why this sad accident occurred.”68 Robinson was convinced 
she could recover without considering exactly what this “sad accident” 
was and how and why it happend. Instead of an explanation, she shared 
a metaphorical account of her dreams with Kahn. Although her frictional 
metaphor of grit and masking tape did not identify the source of her dif-
ficulties, it presumably resolved them to her satisfaction. If the events of 
October 1–3 were an imponderable mystery, they were not open to the 
simple explanation of political hysteria. Neither Robinson nor Chennell 
seems to have had a word to say about her reaction to the Czech crisis. 
In her correspondence from the clinic with Kahn, however, Robinson 
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connected the breakdown with her marriage to Austin and the difficulties 
it created for her friendship with him. “Please give my love to Piero,” she 
wrote in concluding her note, without a word of greeting for Austin.69
Cairncross mentions that Robinson’s physician advised Austin not to 
see his wife until six months after the breakdown (1993, 171). The first 
substantial communications from Robinson to Kahn, two long letters 
written between January 2 and 18, 1939, show that the physician’s rec-
ommendation reflected the patient’s wishes. By this point Robinson was 
convinced that her marriage had ended, in spirit and in the flesh, if not 
in law: “I have put it frankly to the Dr that it is better for me not to see 
Austin except for a few ‘token’ meetings at a superficial level, until the 
Easter vac (I am day-dreaming already of a family party in the Lakes with 
me stepping over the pass for a few days climbing with you + Piero—but 
it [is] naughty to look so far ahead).”70
Chennell’s position was that Austin should not visit her patient at all 
during the Lent term. Robinson was less stringent. In view of what she 
had “stood up to,” a few inconsequential visits would make no differ-
ence. In addition, she anticipated a long separation from Austin as he was 
to depart on another African assignment. As she wrote Kahn, “Francie 
[Francis], understanding my position very well, used all her influence to 
persuade him from scrapping it.”71 After she became acquainted with 
Kahn, Robinson seems to have seen her life with Austin as poisoned by 
insincerity, dishonesty, and deception. She was deeply troubled by the 
fact that she was obliged to pretend to be what she was not. Although she 
did not put the matter in these terms, her profound dissatisfaction in the 
marriage lay in the fact that she could not follow the Goethean maxim, 
Become the person you are. As she wrote, “And these years it has never 
been Austin[’s] sulking fits that have made me unhappy—it has been my 
own bitterness + self-pity. When I can lie him into superficial happiness I 
am more tempted to bitter hateful evil thoughts than when he is behaving 
badly.”72
Robinson’s more forthright assertions about Austin and her marriage 
were tied to an aspect of her personality that she cultivated and prized. 
She felt herself inhabited, and in her best moments inspired, by a being 
she called the imp. The Robinsonian imp was feisty, presumptuous, devil-
ish, and above all impudent. In her scientific persona, the imp appeared 
in her contentious disposition and was perhaps most conspicuous in her 
polemical ruthlessness. The impish Robinson had a robust sense of her 
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extraordinary singularity and intellectual superiority. In January 1939, 
the imp seems to have risen unimpaired and undaunted from the trauma 
of early October. It symbolized what freedom meant to Robinson—“to 
think + write + feel without fear.” It was a freedom she believed she had 
lost in her complex relationship with Austin and Kahn. During her recov-
ery, she regained it. As she wrote Kahn on January 2, “I have never felt the 
sweet sane calm delight of the imp so smoothly running thro’ my veins 
as now” (rff/13/90/1/210–15).
Just as Robinson behaved as if she were inhabited by a mischievous 
imp, so she ascribed a quite different persona to Kahn: a well-intentioned 
but ultimately destructive figure whom, perhaps following Lydia’s name 
for Kahn, she called Alexander. In the course of their relationship during 
the 1930s, Robinson found Alexander endearing at first, then tiresome, 
and in the end intolerable. She was convinced that her freedom depended 
upon freeing Kahn, or perhaps persuading him to free himself, from 
Alexander. This called for the death of Alexander, in effect his murder 
at the hands of Kahn. Alexander represented a moralism that Robinson 
could no longer endure, an ill-defined collection of “old foolish irrelevant 
ideas that what is sweet to you must be a wicked crime against some one 
else.” This someone else was Austin. Alexander’s moralism lay in mis-
placed scruples, the mistaken belief that by enjoying Robinson he was 
depriving Austin of something that was rightfully his. Robinson uncon-
ditionally rejected this view of herself and her relationship with both men. 
She asked Kahn to “scatter Alexander’s dust to the winds.”73
Alexander was confused by the moral status of his desires. Since 
Robinson had written off her marriage, his scruples were based on a false 
assumption. They represented “fake soft pity and over-anxious protective-
ness” of Austin, the “unworthy survivals” of a past that Robinson believed 
they had transcended.74 This was 1932–38, a period in which their erotic 
life was governed by an Austinian creed: a belief that their feelings should 
not be consummated and Austin should be an unwitting partner in their 
relationship—a constant subject of interest, concern, and conversation. If 
Robinson had a tacit explanation of her breakdown, it lay in her inability 
to continue on these terms. By some point in autumn 1938, and certainly 
by the weekend of the breakdown, she and Kahn had abandoned the Aus-
tinian creed in favor of a new post-Alexandrian principle. Austin would 
be expelled from their relationship. His sentinel and champion Alexander 
would be dispatched and cast to the winds. On January 2, Robinson 
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summed up her commitment to this new principle in the melodramatic 
and literary terms she sometimes favored:
As for the “flesh + the devil” what we so easily instinctively knew all along is now 
my complete conviction—it is only raw material, + the only wrong we ever did 
each other was to doubt that we had chosen the right way to deal with it. We’ve 
turned the flank of nature’s messy mechanical contrivances, and felt the deep 
sweet poetry of the flesh. The fact that we had already got the problem solved that 
weekend [October 1–3] has done more to help me to survive these months than 
anything else. (rfk/13/90/3/210–15)
The world of the flesh and the devil was the erotic life. The post- 
Alexandrian principle dictated that Austin not only be dismissed from 
their lives but, to the extent possible, excised from their conversation. 
They would tolerate occasional references to him on Robinson’s part 
since conventions required that they remain married. However, she 
chided Kahn for resurrecting “Alexander’s ghost” and his “silly scruples” 
by indulging in pointless conversation about Austin, which she regarded 
as morally dishonest and an obstacle to her recovery. “One thing I must 
beg of you—spare me as much as you can talking about Austin. I will talk 
if I must for nothing is so important to me now as to have freedom + 
I can only free myself by freeing you. But if you can free yourself how 
much better.” It was, she suggested, merely an intelligent application of 
the Benthamite calculus: “I will tell you what I must + you must spare me 
what you can.”75
On January 19, Robinson saw two possibilities for Kahn’s liberation 
from Alexander. Either she would free him from Alexander’s scruples—
presumably by persuading him that they were dishonest, silly, and an ar-
tifact of morally antiquated conventions. Or he would liberate himself, 
perhaps by arriving at the same conclusions. On January 2, however, she 
insisted that since Alexander was nothing more than an artifact of Kahn’s 
mistaken sense that he had betrayed Austin, the question of how to elimi-
nate Alexander was his problem. Apparently she had the same feelings the 
Thursday before her breakdown. As she wrote on January 2, 1939: “That 
scrap of paper I wrote you on Thursday ‘that is your affair—do not ask me 
to solve your problem’ still governs my attitude” (rfk/13/90/3/210–15).
Robinson resumed teaching in the Easter term of 1939. She and Aus-
tin continued to live together. At the beginning of September, Britain 
declared war on Germany, and in November Austin began war work in 
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Whitehall. She was not displeased by his absence, which was broken only 
by occasional weekends in Cambridge.76 In November 1940, she wrote a 
more straightforward account of her erotic relationship with Kahn, who 
was also posted in London for war work. He had visited her on a Sunday 
in Cambridge:
Your letter did not come till this morning. No, my dear, you don’t cause me to 
suffer. I was put out on Sunday because it is annoying always having to have a 
committee meeting beforehand + I thought just for once we had an unexpected 
stroke of luck. But, as you say, we do very well on the whole. I expected a great 
deal more trouble. My difficulty is that when I start persuading you I cease to 
want it—not out of female pride, but because one has to switch on to a different 
level—at least I do owing to not being able to behave like a bitch. The first time I 
was completely fed up by the time I had got your consent—but it doesn’t matter 
because it all comes out in the wash. Anyway my dear all this is to me just as it 
were raw material for the really important thing—our confidence [in] each other. 
You know my slogan—friendship is more important than love. A friendship that 
can digest such episodes without a strain is something worth having. I am very 




The Making of The Economics  
of Imperfect Competition
t h e  m a r s h a l l i a n  g u i l d
When Robinson began lecturing, her apprenticeship was formed by a 
culture that defined, in large measure, what it meant to be a Cambridge 
economist. More than twenty years after she began the long march to 
establish herself at Cambridge, she made the following observation: 
“When I came up to Cambridge, in 1922, and started reading economics, 
Marshall’s Principles was the bible, and we knew little beyond it. [Stanley] 
Jevons, [Antoine Augustine] Cournot, even [David] Ricardo, were figures 
in the footnotes. We heard of ‘Pareto’s Law,’ but nothing of the general 
equilibrium system. Sweden was represented by Cassel, America by Irving 
Fisher, Austria and Germany were scarcely known. Marshall was econom-
ics” (Robinson 1951, vii).
Although Robinson’s reputation rested not least on a penchant for 
rhetorical excess, she cannot be faulted for exaggeration on this point. 
Marshall’s teaching and writings dominated Cambridge economics dur-
ing her undergraduate years and for more than a half century, from his 
appointment to the chair of political economy in 1885 through the civil 
wars of the Keynesian revolution in the 1930s.1
The Cambridge economics faculty of the 1920s and early 1930s can be 
understood as a guild, a network of professional and personal relations 
formed by intellectual, organizational, and proximal ties. Intellectual 
ties were based on the common Marshallian research tradition. Orga-
nizational ties that constituted the faculty as a self-governing collegium 
were established by membership on the Faculty Board of Economics and 
Politics and its various committees, which recommended appointments 
to lectureships, revised the curriculum, and evaluated the candidates for 
honors degrees who would reproduce the ethos of the guild. The secu-
larized monastic residential college system, the distinctive social space of 
the ancient universities placed colleagues in close proximity during term 
time. The emoluments of a college fellowship included a small apartment 
or set of rooms, meals in the college dining hall, and the shared space of 
a clublike common room. All the men’s colleges of this era were within a 
short walk of one another. Fellows met and entertained lecturers and fel-
lows from other colleges in their rooms and at the college high table. The 
logistics of entertainment were managed by an elaborate staff of college 
servants who also operated an intercollege mail service. Messages circu-
lated by servants, and the thrice-daily deliveries of the British post made 
it easy for the four academic generations of epistolary economists in resi-
dence at the beginning of the 1930s to correspond daily, often through 
several exchanges.
The basic structural component of this network was a set of intersect-
ing and intergenerational master-apprentice relations. Pigou and Keynes, 
who learned their economics from Marshall, were the senior masters. 
Robertson and Shove attended Pigou’s lectures on the principles of eco-
nomics before the First World War. Keynes supervised both Robertson 
and Shove. Although Kahn was Keynes’s protégé, he also attended Pigou’s 
lectures on fundamentals. He heard Robertson on money, from whom 
he claimed to have gleaned little, and Shove on production, value, and 
distribution, from whom he drew ideas and lines of inquiry that were em-
ployed in his fellowship dissertation. Only Sraffa, an exceptional figure in 
many respects, stood outside this pedagogical lineage, in which everyone 
at Cambridge doing theoretical work was connected with everyone else.
The result was a pronounced exclusivity: restrictive, hermetic, and in-
cestuous. Cambridge economists studied Marshall and Pigou. They read 
one another as well as the articles that appeared in the Economic Journal, 
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edited by Keynes. By the standards of a cosmopolitan science, however, 
their training and theoretical perspectives were decidedly narrow. As 
Kahn observed with a mixture of incredulity and asperity, Shove went so 
far as to discourage his students from reading Harrod.2 Kahn’s tenden-
tious reports on the state of economics at Chicago and Harvard marked 
him as a highly refined product of Cambridge arrogance. Outside opin-
ions that failed to embrace Cambridge positions made little impact. Wan-
derjahre for Cambridge apprentices were neither expected nor encour-
aged. Students from the peripheries of the academic economic universe 
might spend a term or two at Cambridge to receive illumination; Harrod, 
Meade, and Abba Lerner spring to mind. However, the masters were in 
residence at King’s and Trinity.
The masters of the guild were guardians of a culture of craftsmanship, 
the proper name for which is unquestionably Marshallian. As a rule, it 
may be an error to suppose that the origins of intellectual cultures lie in 
acts of foundation performed by dominant figures (Baehr 2002). If this 
supposition is indeed mistaken, Cambridge economics between the wars 
marks a significant exception. It cannot be detached from Marshall’s am-
bitions, efforts, and scientific personality. The work that won Robinson 
recognition as a bona fide member of the Marshallian guild was The Eco-
nomics of Imperfect Competition, a critique of Marshall’s value theory that 
undertook to place its superstructure on new foundations. It was possible 
only on the basis of the institutional and theoretical transformations of 
Marshallian culture in the 1920s. Thus some remarks on what Marshall’s 
followers at Cambridge made of his program for a science of economics 
are in order.
The Ethos of Discipleship
Marshall’s Principles, lectures, and personal example were the objects of an 
ethos of discipleship at Cambridge that began before the First World War 
and was sustained into the 1920s. Its ultimate premise was piety: belief 
in his incontestable authority as the foremost economist of his time and 
a respect for his work that approximated veneration. In the early 1920s, 
Pigou, Keynes, and their students wrote as if Marshall had solved the 
basic problems of economic theory.3 If further discussion of fundamen-
tals was pointless, the only scientifically sensible course was to refine and 
extend his work.4
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Pigou—“Marshall’s favourite pupil” (Keynes 1951, 186)—was the high 
priest of the Marshallian brotherhood. In his presidential address to the 
Royal Economic Society in 1939, he recalled Marshall’s august position 
in British economics: “Forty years ago, indeed down to the catastrophe 
of the War, economic thought in this country was dominated to a quite 
extraordinary degree by one man—Marshall. He was our leader, practi-
cally unchallenged. Edgeworth from Oxford explicitly acclaimed him as 
such. Not only for his former pupils in places of authority, but for the 
general body of economists in England he was ‘the master’ ” (Pigou 1939, 
219–20). In Pigou’s view, Marshall’s “moral dictatorship” produced im-
mense benefits for students. Because he was acknowledged as the supreme 
grand theoretician, they were not tempted to begin their careers in vain 
attempts to “rebuild economic science from basement to roof.” Instead 
they confined their efforts to issues more narrowly defined by Marshall’s 
theoretical apparatus. The result was “a training which from tasks beyond 
our power we could not have obtained” (Pigou 1939, 219–20). The conse-
quences of his dominance for economists who had completed their train-
ing were not so benign. Recognition of his preeminence as the artificer of 
a peerless engine of discovery condemned Marshall’s followers to the con-
dition of epigones, whose fate was to labor in the shadow of a great man. 
Pigou expressed this sense of inadequacy in comparing his own abilities 
with the theoretical powers he saw in Marshall. What was the point of 
beginning research in a new area if one knew that “in his head, if not his 
drawer, there was an analysis enormously superior to anything we could 
hope to accomplish?” (Pigou 1939, 220). Pigou had learned this lesson 
the hard way: “I remember, not once but many times, getting hold of 
some problem, and, after labouring over it with toil and pain, imagining 
proudly that I had made an original contribution to economic thought. 
I then turned to Marshall’s Principles, and almost invariably in some ob-
scure footnote there was half a clause, inside a parenthesis perhaps, which 
made it obvious that Marshall had solved this problem long ago but had 
not thought it worth while to write the answer down” (Pigou 1925, 85).
In the 1920s, Keynes also seems to have believed in Pigou’s mantra that, 
in some sense, it’s all in Marshall. In his long, masterful essay on Marshall, 
the centerpiece of his Essays in Biography, he made the following obser-
vation: “How often has it not happened even to those who have been 
brought up on the Principles, lighting upon what seems a new problem 
or a new solution, to go back to it and to find, after all, that the problem 
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and a better solution have been always there, yet quite escaping notice! 
It needs much study and independent thought on the reader’s own part 
before he can know the half of what is contained in the concealed crevices 
of that rounded globe of knowledge which is Marshall’s Principles of Eco-
nomics” (Keynes 1951, 190–92). Harrod, who spent a year at Cambridge in 
1925–26, recalled that in the 1920s Keynes’s Marshallian credentials were 
impeccable. Because Marshall had settled the major theoretical problems, 
progress in economics could be achieved only by applying the existing 
body of theory. “His recipe for the young economist,” Harrod wrote, 
“was to know Marshall thoroughly and read his Times every day carefully, 
and without bothering too much about the large mass of contemporary 
publication in book form. He was careful to add that one must read one’s 
Pigou and anything that came from the pens of the chosen few. His own 
reading after 1914 was probably not much more extensive” (Harrod 1951, 
324). In the 1920s, Keynes identified the chosen few as “orthodox mem-
bers of the Cambridge School of Economics”: students of Marshall to-
gether with their students (Robertson 1952, vi).
The Radicalization of Immanent Critique:  
Parameters of Criticism in the 1920s
In light of Marshall’s Olympian status, it is not surprising that public 
criticism of his thought was slow to develop at Cambridge. However, 
the guild was not oblivious to weaknesses in the Principles. As Keynes 
observed in 1924, its analysis of time, although innovative, was a source 
of serious problems (in Keynes 1951, 185). One aspect of this analysis, Mar-
shall’s discussion of the laws of returns, was precisely the point at which 
immanent critique—criticism of Marshall within the limits of his own 
theoretical framework—entered the guild. Cambridge economists who 
had reached a dead end in applying Marshall’s theories to solve empirical 
problems concluded that his methods were defective. Marshallian phi-
lology and exegesis—the practice of studying, teaching, and discussing 
the Principles down to the arcana of its footnotes—revealed logical and 
conceptual difficulties in Marshall’s formulation of the laws of returns. 
Remapping the Principles by excavating and reexcavating the text exposed 
its limits.5
Although Cambridge economists had discovered conceptual difficul-
ties in the laws of returns as early as Pigou’s undergraduate years around 
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the turn of the century (Pigou 1922, 458), they rarely challenged Marshall 
in print. The silence at Cambridge on the merits of Marshall’s analysis 
of the laws of returns was decisively broken in 1922 by Clapham. In his 
article “Of Empty Economic Boxes,” he argued that the Pigouvian re-
statement of the laws of returns was defective. A box on the shelves of 
a hat shop contains concrete items: hats or socks. The theoretical box of 
the laws of returns in the economist’s mind, on the other hand, is empty 
because Marshall provided no criteria for identifying a unit of a resource, 
a commodity, or an industry. Even if the requisite criteria were at hand 
and the box could be filled, it would be useless for devising policy because 
the contents are inconsistent with the facts of economic life.
Clapham’s critique marked a turn in the development of the guild, 
and the public airing of lapses or fallacies in Marshall’s thought became 
a legitimate and standard guild practice.6 It was also the beginning of 
the twilight of the idols. In 1925, Sraffa published a seminal critique of 
Marshall in Italian that attacked the foundations of his theory of value. 
Francis Edgeworth, Keynes’s coeditor at the Economic Journal, was much 
impressed. On his recommendation, Keynes invited Sraffa to write a ver-
sion of his paper in English for the journal. “The Laws of Returns under 
Competitive Conditions,” published in December 1926, radicalized the 
Cambridge critique of Marshall.7 Sraffa argued that Marshall’s attempt 
to imbed the classical laws of returns in his neoclassical theory of value 
was a failure, producing an internal theoretical inconsistency. In order to 
analyze the equilibrium price of a single commodity, Marshall assumed 
ceteris paribus conditions: the demand for a commodity and its supply 
were independent of one another and also independent of demand and 
supply conditions for all other commodities. Sraffa demonstrated that 
these conditions are met only under constant returns to scale. The conse-
quence for Marshall’s position was devastating: demand plays no role in 
determining the equilibrium value of a particular commodity. Sraffa sug-
gested some alternatives: “A simple way of approaching the problem of 
competitive value” was to use the “old and now obsolete” classical theory, 
which neglected the role of demand in price determination. As a first ap-
proximation to reality, this approach was “as important as it is useful.” 
However, Sraffa did not seem interested in first approximations. In order 
to improve the empirical accuracy of a theory of competitive value, it was 
necessary to abandon the partial-equilibrium assumption. In principle, 
interdependence among industries could be analyzed by employing a sys-
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tem of simultaneous equations. However, the complexity of a general-
equilibrium approach made it barren, “at least in the present state of our 
knowledge” (Sraffa 1926, 541).
There was a more attractive theoretical alternative that could rescue the 
long-period theory of value if economists were willing “to abandon the 
path of free competition” in favor of monopoly. Sraffa offered a rough 
outline of an alternative—later called imperfect competition at Cam-
bridge—that took into account important realities. Because many firms 
operate under conditions of increasing returns that result from internal 
economies, a realistic theory of value would begin by treating increasing 
returns as a matter of fact. Such economies do not lead to monopoly. A 
firm’s capacity for expansion is limited by its ability to sell increased out-
put without lowering its price. It suspends production of additional out-
put whenever a price reduction is no longer profitable. Firm size, Sraffa 
argued, is limited by demand, not costs (Sraffa 1926, 542–43).
Why is the market for a product segmented into smaller markets, each 
firm exercising monopoly power in its own submarket? Consumers prefer 
the product of a particular firm because of brand consciousness, custom, 
personal relations with the seller, product quality and design, familiarity 
with the product, or the ability to purchase on credit. These grounds of 
preference allow firms to sell their products at higher prices. Although 
each firm can dominate its own segment, attempts to extend opera-
tions beyond this sphere entail heavy marketing expenses (Sraffa 1926, 
544–45).
In 1926, the Cambridge theory of monopoly was used only to analyze 
firms that enjoyed exceptional and incontestable market power, such as 
public utilities and railroad companies. Sraffa’s challenge to abandon free 
competition and turn to monopoly was a potentially revolutionary pro-
posal. On January 25, 1927, Keynes sent Sraffa his congratulations: “Your 
article in the December Journal has been very much liked over here. Ev-
eryone I have spoken to agrees that it puts you in the front rank of the 
younger economists” (quoted in Potier 1987, 30). That same year, Sraffa 
accepted a lectureship at Cambridge, and between 1928 and 1930 he lec-
tured for five terms on the advanced theory of value (Marcuzzo 2001). 
Recall Harrod’s remarks on Keynes’s judgment concerning the state of 
Cambridge economics in the mid-1920s: members of the guild could be 
confident of the professional quality of their work if they studied Marshall 
with care, devoted the same attention to the daily Times, and stayed up 
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to date on the work of his disciples. By 1929, when Kahn was writing his 
fellowship dissertation, this judgment was dead.
As a consequence of Sraffa’s apparent demolition of Marshall’s theory 
of value, the critique of Marshall by Cambridge economists was regarded 
as indispensable to the development of economic theory. This shift in the 
parameters of acceptable criticism proved to be a crucial factor at the be-
ginning of Robinson’s career. By 1930, institutionalization of immanent 
criticism had intersected with the recognition that a theory of imperfect 
competition in the long period was an important lacuna in Cambridge 
economics, an embarrassment that had been acknowledged but not ad-
dressed. Several economists at Cambridge were eminently qualified to 
develop such a theory. For a variety of reasons, none of them did so.
Although Pigou reconsidered his position in two articles (Pigou 1927, 
1928), he did not follow the path Sraffa suggested. Instead, he modified 
the theory of competitive value so that it would no longer be vulnerable 
to the charge of internal inconsistency. Subsequently, he did not tackle 
imperfect competition beyond the occasional article. In the reprint of his 
Economics of Welfare (1952), he noted that the first comprehensive investi-
gation of imperfect competition had been undertaken by Robinson and 
Chamberlin in the early 1930s. He understood that their work called for re-
visions in his arguments: “But Mrs. Robinson and Professor Chamberlin 
came on the scene too late to help me and I had not the vision to help 
myself ” (Pigou 1952, 833).
Despite his criticisms of the Marshallian laws of returns in 1924, 
Robertson had no intention of abandoning Marshall’s theory of value. 
His contribution to the symposium of 1930 on increasing returns in the 
Economic Journal was an unsuccessful attempt to retain some of Marshall’s 
concepts as both “fruitful” and “indispensable” (Robertson 1930, 80). A 
loyal student of Marshall, he regarded the competitive theory of value as 
the main weapon in the arsenal of economics (Robertson 1930, 87). In 
light of his position, it is not surprising that he showed little interest in 
developing a theory of imperfect competition.8
Shove believed that free competition did not exist outside the imagi-
nation of Cambridge economists. This made him a good prospect for 
writing a book on imperfect competition. As he told his readers in 1930, 
he had been “engaged for some years” in writing an “unpublished study 
of the relations between cost and output” (Shove 1930, 94). At the time, 
however, it was not clear to his Cambridge colleagues or to Shove him-
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self whether he would complete this manuscript. He was slow to publish, 
in some measure because of his reluctance to abstract from the empirical 
complexity of real economic life.
Although capable, Austin was not a plausible contender to fill the 
theoretical space created by Sraffa. In the first few years after his return 
from India, he was occupied with lecturing and supervision, teaching 
more than a standard lecturer’s load. In addition, he had an “immensely 
industrious devotion to administration” (Cairncross 1993, 166). In 1931, 
he published The Structure of Competitive Industry, which demonstrated 
his sympathies with Sraffa’s conception of competition. Although he an-
nounced an intention to publish a “volume dealing with the problem of 
Monopoly” (Robinson 1931, 6), his book Monopoly did not appear un-
til ten years later. Letters from Robinson to Kahn show that theoretical 
work was not Austin’s chief priority.9
Kahn had stellar qualifications for writing a book on imperfect com-
petition. He had done a superb fellowship thesis with a solid basis in the 
subject, and he was well trained in mathematics. He also enjoyed the sup-
port of senior members of the guild: Keynes, Sraffa, Pigou, and Shove. 
And yet, he seems to have taken no interest in pursuing the project. After 
his election to King’s, he began to revise his dissertation for publication, a 
task on which he worked fitfully for several years before finally abandon-
ing it. When he began to replace Robertson as Keynes’s chief theoretical 
interlocutor, his research time was often at Keynes’s disposal. As Keynes 
began work on the ideas that became The General Theory, Kahn became 
his indispensable assistant.10 And even if Keynes had not made extrava-
gant demands on his energies, it is clear that Kahn would not have stood 
in Robinson’s way. Once she decided to write her book, he was dedicated 
to her success.
Sraffa had discovered fatal defects in Marshall’s theory of value and 
sketched an alternative approach. Why did he not exploit his own ideas? 
The answer lies in the rapid changes in his thinking on imperfect competi-
tion. In his Italian article of 1925, he demonstrated that the Marshallian 
premises of competition and partial equilibrium were compatible only 
on the assumption of constant returns to scale. By June 1926, he had out-
lined a theory of imperfect competition, which he preferred to both clas-
sical theory and a general-equilibrium framework. By late 1927, however, 
he had lost interest in imperfect competition (Cavalieri 2001, 102). At 
a time when neither Kahn’s dissertation nor Robinson’s book had even 
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been imagined, Sraffa was at work on the outlines of a multisector model 
of the economy in which relative prices are determined independently of 
demand or changes in the volume of production. By 1930, when he was 
firing salvos at Robertson for clinging to the Marshallian representative 
firm, his rejection of Marshall’s framework was complete: “In the circum-
stances, I think it is Marshall’s theory that should be discarded” (Sraffa 
1930b, 93).11
To establish herself in the Marshallian guild, Robinson had to prove 
her qualifications to the economic theorists at Cambridge. In view of her 
record as an undergraduate and the barriers to entry faced by women at 
Cambridge, at a minimum she needed to publish an ambitious piece of 
research that would serve in place of a successful fellowship dissertation. 
The Economics of Imperfect Competition was this work.
The chief credential that the guild required of apprentices was a capac-
ity for temperate innovation: originality within the limits of theoretical 
soundness. Kahn’s dissertation is a good example of the kind of perfor-
mance that was called for. A standard practice for a young economist at 
Cambridge was to write a fellowship thesis that demonstrated mastery of 
preferred tools and analyses as well as an appropriate level of originality. 
Kahn explained what was required in the preface to his dissertation by 
citing the regulations of King’s College: “The Candidate has to provide 
a general statement of ‘the sources from which his information is taken, 
the extent to which he has availed himself of the work of others, and the 
portions of the dissertation which he claims to be original’ ” (Kahn 1989, 
viii). The expectations that the guild imposed on apprentices were not un-
reasonably taxing: mastery of the fundamentals of Marshallian economics 
and evidence of promise in advancing its theoretical program—either by 
building on its foundations, refining its apparatus, or discovering weak-
nesses in Marshall’s analysis and showing how they could be corrected. 
Work at this level by younger economists would strengthen Cambridge 
orthodoxy by demonstrating that it was not a collection of rigid dogmas 
but a progressive and self-correcting research tradition.
Robinson’s initiation into Cambridge economics occurred at a preg-
nant moment in the development of Marshallian culture. By 1930, the year 
she began work on the theory of value, Cambridge economists had made 
various attempts to come to terms with Sraffa’s critique. For the reasons 
sketched above, no one followed Sraffa into the theoretical space he had 
opened and mapped out. How could a long-period analysis of value be 
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developed along his proposed lines? This question remained largely un-
touched. It would have been risky for a novice to enter territory that an 
established member of the guild claimed as his special preserve, as Robin-
son later discovered when her lectures on applications of monetary theory 
led to internecine disputes and bitterness. In accepting Sraffa’s challenge, 
she entered an open field with no significant competition. How did she 
pursue this opportunity?
r e s e a r c h  a s  d i a l o g u e
By the late 1920s, research in conversation or correspondence with other 
members of the guild was a standard practice at Cambridge.12 Suitable 
occasions for research were decided informally and sometimes serendipi-
tously. There was no clear or hard distinction between the times and sites 
of academic and personal life. A research opportunity was any place or 
time at which dialogues on the problems of economics might be held. 
Participation and status as an interlocutor were independent of academic 
rank as well as disciplinary power and prestige. Interlocutors included 
both colleagues and pupils. The result was a pronounced, spirited sociabil-
ity of research that moved easily from lecture halls, the Marshall Society, 
and Keynes’s Monday Night Club to college high tables and common 
rooms, the rooms of fellows, walks in Cambridge, and correspondence.
Dialogue was a research tool, a way to achieve work of high quality, 
a convention of academic interaction, and a collegial ritual that had its 
own intrinsic value. For all these reasons, it was a mode of the conduct of 
life in Cambridge economics and a distinctive practice of the Marshallian 
guild.13 Research as dialogue was grounded in the Cambridge pedagogy 
of tutorial supervisions and a common body of disciplinary skills and as-
sumptions. Cambridge economists had been trained in the conversational 
pedagogy of the supervision, both as pupils and as supervisors. They also 
shared a broad theoretical and methodological background. As a result, 
guild members could generally exchange views on complex research prob-
lems without confusion or the risk of creating deeper, more intractable 
disagreements over fundamentals. Colleagues shared their ideas and drafts 
with interlocutors, who might enter a conversation in various ways: sug-
gesting minor revisions, proposing alternative ideas or methods, develop-
ing counterarguments, or even drafting full-scale analyses and in effect 
becoming joint authors. Roles as commentators and authors were freely 
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exchanged. In the 1920s, Robertson assisted Keynes with his work in 
progress, and Keynes returned the favor. In 1935, Robinson gave Keynes 
her comments on the proofs of The General Theory. The following year 
they switched roles as Keynes worked on the proofs of her Essays in the 
Theory of Employment. For various reasons, the Cambridge dialogue was 
not essentially Socratic. It was not typically agonistic, a contest in which 
the objective of one participant was to defeat the other by refuting his po-
sitions and analyses. The Marshallian heritage of the guild limited conflicts 
on theoretical grounds and its craft etiquette of intraguild civility subli-
mated them on cultural grounds. More often than not, dialogues were co-
operative or collaborative ventures. Interlocutors worked together, even 
as they might disagree, with the joint aim of solving a problem or securing 
a draft from damaging objections. Participants did not invariably change 
their positions in view of what they learned from one another. Dialogues 
might harden all positions by achieving higher levels of clarity, precision, 
and technical refinement. In debates, interlocutors might discover new 
and more powerful arguments that had previously eluded them, strength-
ening their own positions or revealing weaknesses in counterpositions.
Perhaps the significance of dialogues in the production of Cambridge 
economics can best be appreciated by examining the experience of Kahn, 
who in early 1933 visited academic sites where he did not enjoy the soci-
ality of the Marshallian guild. At that point, he was in the United States, 
chiefly at Chicago and Harvard. In struggling to enter the life of the eco-
nomics departments at both universities, he was disillusioned—or was he 
delighted?—to discover that the intellectual life he knew at Cambridge 
did not exist there.
Kahn found academic life at Chicago hectic. Relations among col-
leagues seemed to reproduce the commercialism of American culture. He 
saw no informal exchanges of work in progress or a sense of their impor-
tance. The organizational basis of intellectual exchange was also primitive. 
He attended no departmental seminars comparable to the Marshall Soci-
ety or the Keynes Club, only tea parties and informal meetings on mon-
etary questions for graduate students and junior lecturers.14 Instead of the 
easy informality between senior and junior colleagues that made Kahn so 
comfortable at Cambridge, he found a repressive academic regime im-
posed by two senior professors: Henry Schultz and Jacob Viner. The ba-
sis of their power was control over the stipends of graduate students, who 
worked as their menials—performing staff work, drawing charts, and do-
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ing calculations. Advanced students who demonstrated evidence of in-
dependent thought placed themselves in jeopardy. Undergraduates were 
regarded with contempt, and there were no close relations between fac-
ulty and undergraduates, a tradition at Cambridge. Kahn found virtually 
no one who could explain to him how undergraduates at Chicago were 
educated. “The pundits” taught only graduate students, and “the idea of 
explaining what marginal cost means to an undergraduate is regarded 
with scorn.”15
Kahn found conditions only marginally better at Harvard, where he 
attended Schumpeter’s seminar and lunched with colleagues at the faculty 
club. Chamberlin was a young member of the faculty about to publish 
a substantial revision of his doctoral dissertation. This was The Theory 
of Monopolistic Competition, which appeared some three months before 
Robinson’s book. Although Chamberlin had been at work on this project 
for years, neither his colleagues nor his research assistants had any idea of 
what it might contain. Kahn saw this indifference as evidence of an abys-
mal scientific culture. “The pursuit of learning,” he wrote, “is regarded as 
a business, to be discussed with underlings at ‘conferences,’ rather than 
a social act which pervades one’s whole life.”16 As a result, he found it 
difficult to take Schumpeter seriously. He was “the main character in a 
musical comedy,” a clown or a con man “sitting at his desk, with his legs 
up just like a big business man, having a ‘conference’ with his two research 
assistants.”17 If science was conducted as a business, it is understandable 
that Kahn did not have the relaxed, extended conversations with Schultz, 
Viner, or Schumpeter that he enjoyed with senior fellows at King’s. At 
Cambridge, senior economists followed his work with paternal care and 
enthusiasm, offering suggestions and encouragement. At Chicago and 
Harvard, the economics establishment seemed to show little interest in 
what he was doing.
Kahn believed that three factors were paramount in discouraging a 
spontaneous exchange of ideas. The “grubbiness” of academic existence 
was pervasive. The pace was furious and inhospitable. Common meals, 
the place of so many Cambridge dialogues, were revolting. Reporting on 
a weekly dinner party at a Harvard dining hall, he found the meal “foul 
and hurried.” His companions had the appearance of “shop assistants.” 
The speaker for the evening “looked like a pork butcher.” “As I swallow 
the revolting food that is served up in their halls and clubs,” Kahn mused, 
“my mind turns insistently to the theme of A Room of One’s Own. Even 
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Schumpeter’s light is very definitely dimmed by the conditions in which 
he has to live.” Schumpeter’s Viennese sophistication could not overcome 
the social banality and gastronomic poverty of lunch at the Harvard fac-
ulty club: “The squalid conditions are too much for him.”18 The theme 
of A Room of One’s Own to which Kahn alluded is Woolf ’s idea that the 
“rich yellow flame of rational intercourse” rests on gastronomic presup-
positions. The quality of food, talk, and thought are integrated. Because 
“a good dinner is of great importance to good talk,” one cannot think 
well unless one has dined well. Nor can one love or sleep well. The qual-
ity of dinner, it seems, is a measure of the value of all things.19 Dinners at 
Harvard were “foul” and “revolting.” Therefore the quality of intellectual 
exchange could be no better.
American competitiveness, the necessity of making a career by honing 
skills of self-presentation and impression management, was also an ob-
stacle to dialogue. The imperatives of producing oneself as a commodity 
for sale on the academic market—“the terrible business of career hunt-
ing”—encouraged not only professional jealousy but also “the fear of say-
ing the wrong thing (even though genuinely believed).” 20
Finally, any intellectual culture produces a type of humanity: a spe-
cific sensibility characterized by a receptivity to its values. For Kahn, this 
was the fundamental consideration. The species of Homo academicus he 
found at Chicago and Harvard did not measure up to the moral, aes-
thetic, and intellectual expectations of Cantabrigian discursive culture. 
“These people,” Kahn pronounced, “are incapable of the kind of social 
life we value.”21 At Harvard there was “an almost complete absence of 
talent.” The undergraduates were “poor, mealy-mouthed, pimply (yeast 
tablets appear regularly on the menu), scraggy, hobbledehoys, extremely 
uncouth and uncertain of themselves.” As for the faculty: “The senior 
people are not much better. (You ought to see their taste in ties.)”22
Kahn, miserable at Chicago, languishing at Harvard, and contemptu-
ous of the United States and its denizens—“If I stayed here very much 
longer I should completely lose faith in myself ”—longed to return to his 
rooms at King’s. The easy civility among colleagues, the cuisine and wines 
of the King’s high table, the pleasures of informal conversazione—all this, 
it seems, was best appreciated at a great distance, in the Cambridge of the 
west: “After watching the struggles of these wretched people I shall for the 
first time realize my good fortune in being a member of the King’s High 
Table, and take more pleasure in its society than I have in the past.”23
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Research as dialogue was a practice of Cambridge economics that 
Robinson embraced with considerable enthusiasm and mastered quickly. 
It was critical to the development of her first research program and a re-
source without which she could not have written The Economics of Imper-
fect Competition. In the end, Robinson’s book was a product of several 
intersecting dialogues. We turn to some of their key episodes.
Dialogues with Kahn
the ardent tutor  In Austin’s recollections of the origins of The 
Economics of Imperfect Competition, Kahn’s role was modest, limited to ex-
amining and correcting Robinson’s “bright ideas.” She framed the ques-
tions and took the initiatives in answering them (Robinson 1994, 8). In 
Robinson’s assessment, Kahn had a more substantial role. The foreword 
to The Economics of Imperfect Competition begins and ends with “Mr R. F. 
Kahn,” on whom the author relied for “constant assistance” and whose 
criticism entered “at every stage of the work from its inception,” saving 
her from “innumerable errors” (1933d, v, viii). Kahn thought this appre-
ciation excessive. On finishing the first complete set of proofs of the book 
in February 1933, he summed up his sense of Robinson’s achievement as 
follows: “I have finished your book, and feel that I might be allowed to 
write to you. . . . It is an engaging piece of work. I find that I usually take 
it for granted, but whenever I stop to think about it I just can’t believe 
it’s true. Do you by any chance realise what you have done? in the course 
of two years of your long life?”24 On March 30, he scolded Robinson 
for including in the foreword an appreciation of his contributions that 
he regarded as unreasonable and embarrassing. In his view, he had done 
little more than read her drafts. In addition, most of his ideas on theoreti-
cal problems had led to dead ends, which left Robinson to work out her 
own solutions. He pressed her to reconsider: “I suppose I ought to feel 
touched—and it is very sweet of you—but I only feel angry. Why must 
you take advantage of my absence to go on in this kind of way? You are 
saying very much more than would be justifiable on any kind of basis, and 
it just looks foolish. Please be reasonable and tone it down.”25
Modesty, friendship, or affection may explain Kahn’s self-deprecatory 
assessment of his role in The Economics of Imperfect Competition. However, 
both archival and published sources demonstrate that his contributions 
were more significant than Austin, Robinson, or Kahn acknowledged. 
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From late July 1930, months before Robinson considered writing a 
book, until April 1933, a few weeks before it was published, Kahn advised 
Robinson on what to read and how to understand it. He constructed par-
adoxes that he often solved himself or worked out with the help of other 
Cambridge economists.26 He developed critical mathematical analyses 
and proofs that she employed. And he provided data from his own un-
published work for a book that, by Cambridge standards, was written on 
an uncommonly high level of abstraction: “I should rather like to suggest 
that you put in a spot of realism—just to show that it is not all a parlour 
game and nothing more.”27
For Robinson, the months between autumn 1930 and spring 1931 were 
a period of intensive postgraduate education in theory and technique. 
Kahn was her tutor and set the agenda for their work: how does monop-
oly output compare to output produced in competitive markets? She was 
able to arrive at a diagrammatic answer to this question under a highly 
restrictive set of conditions that assumed linear demand curves and con-
stant costs. Additional complexity exceeded her competence. Consider 
Kahn’s long, two-part mathematical appendix of March 1931, in which 
he used elementary trigonometry to show that in more complex cases 
the answer to this question depends on a ratio—he called it “adjusted 
concavity”—that measures the curvature of demand and cost functions.28 
His reasoning was clear and methodical—moving from the general to the 
particular, breaking down the longer problem into several simpler parts, 
and explaining every step of his analysis. Yet Robinson found the appen-
dix daunting: “I don’t understand a good deal of it, but I will try to learn 
some trigonometry so as to master it.”29 As late as April, she was still 
trying to make sense of the appendix and sent him “a number of ques-
tions which I am too stupid to answer for myself.” These questions had 
a common thread. Mathematically, she could grasp linear functions and 
graphs but not much else. “If you know a marginal curve,” she wrote, 
“is there anything you can say about the average curve? If it is a straight 
line you can draw it at once. Is there any law connecting the concavity 
of the marginal curve with the average curve?” And what did “the mar-
ginal curve to a constant elasticity curve look like?” Robinson suspected 
that the answer to this question would enable her to derive average util-
ity from the demand curve, which could have important applications in 
welfare economics.30 Kahn was patient in educating Robinson on these 
t h e  e c o n o m i c s  o f  i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n  `   105
matters and much more: “To know the height of the average curve at any 
point it is, as we know, necessary to know the whole of the marginal curve 
up to that point.” However, he was doubtful about the theoretical pay-
off of establishing a relationship between the concavities of average and 
marginal curves. Instead of worrying over average and marginal utilities, 
Robinson would be better advised to consider Pigou’s concept of average 
productivity. The relationship between a marginal curve and a constant 
elasticity curve was “another constant elasticity curve of the same elastic-
ity.” The relationship of average value, marginal value, and elasticity (e) 
could be stated in the following formula:
Average value / Marginal value = e/(e−1).
Given any two variables, the third could easily be calculated.31 Kahn was 
not always ready with answers to her questions. In their discussions of 
1930–31, however, it was generally Kahn who detected errors and refined 
concepts.32
The correspondence between Robinson and Kahn documents the 
time, effort, and theoretical powers he devoted to her work. The letter 
from Keynes to Lydia on February 1, 1932, quoted above shows that even 
before Austin left for Africa, the two were meeting in Kahn’s rooms at 
King’s (jmk/pp/45/190/5). There were long sessions at the Robinsons’ 
flat as well: “Can you spare me the whole of Tuesday? Come here in the 
morning and have lunch here anyway.”33 Problems raised by marginal cost 
curves under monopsony were worked out in part on a long rainy day. 
Kahn to Robinson: “You will remember that we read through [Erich] 
Schneider’s solution while it was raining all day and decided that though 
he had done it all wrong, it was an important problem to be attacked.”34
The correspondence also documents Robinson’s increasing proficiency 
in economic theory. By September 1931, Kahn was no longer devising 
problems for her to solve. Although he remained her indispensable help-
mate, their paths had diverged. Robinson was developing analyses for 
her book and had definite ideas concerning its structure and substance. 
Kahn was reworking his thesis. He became less certain about his grasp 
of their joint problems at the same time that she became a much more 
confident interlocutor. Because she refused to learn more mathematics, 
he continued to derive mathematical relations on which her analyses de-
pended. By this point, however, she was requesting solutions to specific 
106 `  t h e  e c o n o m i c s  o f  i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n
problems entailed by her work on the book.35 Robinson’s progressive 
facility in solving economic problems independently can be credited in 
part to Kahn, who devised technical exercises for her instruction, requiring 
her to disentangle kinks in arguments he had generally unraveled himself. 
His letter to her circa September 17 is quite telling in this regard. “I think 
now I can see my way through this tangle, but I leave what I have written 
as I think it is an instructive muddle to have been in” (rfk/16/1/116–20).
By the end of March 1932, Robinson had substantially drafted the 
book. In rewriting her chapters on the demand and physical productivity 
of labor, the comparative analysis of demand for labor under monopolis-
tic and competitive conditions, and the relationship between monopoly 
and the exploitation of labor, she reported her progress to Kahn, thank-
ing him on March 31 for his help with the analysis of physical productiv-
ity (rfk/13/90/1/7–8). Writing again the same day, she claimed that she 
now understood the functional relationship between imperfect markets 
and exploitation (rfk/13/90/1/9–10). There is a break in the correspon-
dence—the period of Austin’s work in Africa—that includes only one 
letter. With Austin out of residence, it is reasonable to suppose that face-
to-face conversation replaced correspondence. However, there is some 
evidence on the collaboration between the two in Robinson’s letters to 
her husband. In August 1932, she was working with Kahn on price dis-
crimination.36 The manuscript accompanied Robinson to Austria, where 
she enjoyed a mountaineering vacation with Kahn and Guillebaud. Max 
Newman was also mountaineering in Austria and was drafted to help 
with the mathematics of price discrimination. As a result, “I have at last 
got that awful chapter done,” she wrote on August 25. “It is full of very 
high class results, that no one will be able to understand” (eagr/Box 
9/2/1/17/276–77). Robinson persevered with revisions until the end of 
October. On November 7, she wrote her husband that she had “dumped 
the mss on Macmillans after ten days of working like an ox to get it re-
vised” (eagr/Box 9/2/1/17/289–92).
By late December, Robinson was at work on galleys, and Kahn had 
sailed for the United States, and their dialogue continued in correspon-
dence. On Christmas Day, she sent him the first batch of corrected gal-
leys, comprising chapters 1 and 2, for his suggestions (rfk/13/90/1/22–
23). Five days later, she sent more proofs, noting that she was especially 
interested in his views on the organization of Book III on competitive 
equilibrium.37 Kahn had set an ambitious schedule for his American visit: 
t h e  e c o n o m i c s  o f  i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n  `   107
meetings with leading figures in the business and financial establishment 
in New York, Chicago, and Washington for which Keynes had liberally 
supplied him with letters of introduction, discussions with academic econ-
omists at several universities, lectures, and revision of his fellowship disser-
tation. In spite of this demanding agenda, he spent considerable time on 
Robinson’s proofs and was delighted to do so. He seems to have worked 
on her material whenever the opportunity arose, using his free hours or 
occasional days without appointments. After receiving two packages of 
proofs, he wrote on January 24, 1933, “I will get onto Books IV, V, VI (the 
rest of the earlier books go off with this letter) but I can’t quite say when 
they will be done. . . . I was fortunately able to make most of the day free 
and had a perfectly lovely time. I hope I got enough diagrams done to give 
you something to go on and that the cable was intelligible. I feel so much 
better after then. I think the pictures [diagrams] look splendid. They seem 
beautifully clear.”38
On February 18, Robinson wrote that she was sending the last batch of 
her first set of corrected proofs to Macmillan and put Kahn on notice that 
he could expect the second set soon. The urgency of her note is evidence 
of the importance she ascribed to his work on the book. Could he send 
his corrections to the second set in time to meet Macmillan’s produc-
tion schedule? If not, she would insert his revisions directly into the page 
proofs. In addition, she wanted him to review the changes she had made 
in Book III (rfk/13/90/1/123–26). Kahn was apparently able to correct 
the second set in spite of the constraints of his schedule. On February 
23, she thanked him for changes he had suggested to her footnote on 
the falling supply curve of labor, which she inserted in place of her own 
remarks. Although she now saw her error in analyzing a reduction in av-
erage productivity—she had confused daily wages with piece rates—she 
was convinced this matter called for further investigation and encouraged 
Kahn to clear up the chief issues in his own book (rfk/13/90/1/139–46). 
Robinson, therefore, saw her book and his as-yet-unwritten manuscript 
as companion volumes, contributions to the same research program and 
analyses based on the same ideas and methods.
In her foreword, Robinson made note of her debt to Marshall and 
Pigou; they had laid the foundations for her arguments (1933d, v.). Austin’s 
work on the optimum firm was acknowledged as the basis of her account 
of competitive equilibrium and an influence on the discussion of increas-
ing and diminishing returns in the appendix. Shove received a generous 
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appreciation, and Sraffa was named as the intellectual godfather of the 
book (Robinson 1933d, v). However, she did not mention Kahn’s dis-
sertation. This seems anomalous. In order to execute the conceptual 
transition from competitive to imperfect markets, she required a manual 
to translate the Marshallian language of free competition into the new 
theoretical language that would be indispensable to her book. Kahn’s 
thesis was her translation manual, the map that led her from Marshall 
and Pigou to The Economics of Imperfect Competition. Several explanations 
for her failure to mention his work come to mind. Most obviously, she 
may not have read it by that point. This is immaterial. There is more than 
one way to learn a text, one of which is to converse with its author. Rob-
inson’s dialogues with Kahn in correspondence as well as much of her 
book presuppose her knowledge of his dissertation. Perhaps she believed 
that his thesis was largely irrelevant to her work. If so, she was mistaken. 
At this point, it will be useful to survey several of Kahn’s contributions 
that are not acknowledged by either Robinson or the secondary literature 
on The Economics of Imperfect Competition. This discussion also offers evi-
dence that Robinson was engaged in an unacknowledged dialogue with 
Kahn’s dissertation.
scholarship  In order to pass muster as a serious piece of scholarship, 
a book is generally expected to exhibit certain features that profession-
als in the field will recognize as marks of expertise. One such feature is 
documentation that the author has covered the pertinent literature in the 
area of her work. In 1930–32, Robinson was not a professional scholar. 
Her knowledge of academic literature in economics was cursory at best 
and often superficial. It was also limited to sources then under discus-
sion at Cambridge, where a myopic view of the scope of the discipline 
prevailed: economics was what Cambridge economists did. Her under-
standing of the theory of value was based on a quite narrow collection of 
sources—chiefly Marshall’s Principles, Pigou’s The Economics of Welfare, 
Sraffa’s article of 1926, the symposium in 1930, and Austin’s book, The 
Structure of Competitive Industry (1931). The references in The Economics of 
Imperfect Competition, however, extend beyond the confines of Cambridge 
or even Oxford and London, lending it a patina of scholarly sophistica-
tion. Consider her references to various independent discoverers of the 
marginal revenue curve. She owed many of these references to Kahn, 
whose scholarly skills and knowledge of the literature in the area of her 
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research far exceeded her own. Writing on January 15, 1933, he noted that 
the curve had been introduced into Chicago economics some years earlier 
by “a young man called Yntema (see Journal of Pol. Econ., Dec. 1928) in a 
paper on dumping.”39 Viner was also acquainted with both the geometric 
and analytical relations between average and marginal curves: “He made 
out that he had discovered it [the marginal revenue curve] but I have since 
had reason to suspect that he got it from a young research student called 
Coe.”40 On reading Yntema’s paper, Robinson concluded that footnotes 
to his work were called for as was an explanation of why his essay had 
been neglected in the recent literature. She also introduced a question 
on the ethics of footnoting, asking Kahn whether Yntema was “a nice 
man who ought to be flattered or the reverse.” Based on his account of 
Yntema, she concluded that he was not “a nice man” and decided to be 
“a bit spiteful.”41 On February 17, Kahn wrote that he identified two ad-
ditional discoverers of the curve: “Chamberlin I have already mentioned; 
and now I find that your Oxford man, [Arthur] Smithies, must be added 
to the list (unpublished, like Gifford and [P. A.] Sloan). I am including 
both these in the complete list I shall give in my article.”42 Robinson used 
Kahn’s sources in her book (1933d, vi–vii).43
market structure and long-period equilibrium  Kahn was 
the first economist at Cambridge to spell out the definitive conditions 
of perfect competition.44 He argued that simple or perfect competition 
required the satisfaction of three independent conditions (it is not clear 
whether he regarded these conditions as necessary, sufficient, or both): 
(1) The number of firms in an industry is large enough to render each firm’s 
output small compared to the total output of the industry. (2) Firms do 
not act collusively to control the size of aggregate output.(3) The market 
in which industry output is sold is perfect in the sense that differences in 
prices for the same product are ephemeral; if one firm increases the price 
of a good, either its sales drop to zero or other firms increase their prices 
for this good to the same level (Kahn 1989, 12–13). Robinson appropriated 
Kahn’s analysis without revision (1933d 18, 89).
Kahn also classified market imperfections under the headings of pref-
erence and transport imperfections (Kahn 1989, 90), anticipating Shove 
(1930) by a few months. In deleting marketing costs from his analysis, he 
finessed Sraffa’s argument that these costs make supply and demand inter-
dependent (see Marcuzzo 2001, 91). Robinson followed him on this point 
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as well, adding the stipulation that marketing costs incurred to increase 
sales are analytically equivalent to a price reduction that has the same ef-
fect (Robinson 1933d, 21, 89–90).
Kahn’s dissertation did not address the conditions for long-period 
equilibrium in imperfectly competitive industries. In her article of De-
cember 1932, a response to the symposium, Robinson published the first 
Cambridge analysis of long-period equilibrium in such industries. She 
argued that equilibrium requires satisfaction of a “double condition”: 
“Marginal revenue must be equal to marginal cost, and price must be 
equal to average cost” (Robinson 1932b, 547). As she informed the reader 
in a footnote, she owed this analysis to Kahn, “who, in turn, derived it by 
pursuing Mr. Sraffa’s argument to its necessary conclusion” (Robinson 
1932b, 547, n. 2). The double condition argument reappears in her book 
without attribution (1933d, 94).
the irrelevance of fixed costs In his dissertation, Kahn repeat-
edly stressed that fixed costs were irrelevant to short-period equilibrium, 
and he occasionally chastised businessmen who failed to grasp this point.45 
The Economics of Imperfect Competition treats the irrelevance of fixed or 
overhead costs as a general rule, a point Robinson made in discussing mo-
nopoly equilibrium and the shape of the marginal cost curve. She rejected 
as a “false deduction” the position that a fall in average cost necessarily 
reduces prices: If average cost falls, it does not follow that marginal cost 
also falls. In any economic exchange, it is marginal cost that determines 
output and price (1933d, 49). Her evidence for the empirical validity of 
a constant marginal cost was also drawn from Kahn’s work, again with-
out attribution. His dissertation was based on an empirical investigation 
of the British cotton industry and included a detailed account of various 
ways of accommodating a decline in demand. For example, all machin-
ery can be operated for fewer hours throughout the entire workweek, or 
some machinery can be operated full time but only on a few days of the 
workweek (Kahn 1989, 46). In her book, Robinson used Kahn’s ideas and 
empirical work to argue that in the short period the marginal cost of plant 
operation at less than full capacity is often constant. Although she had 
done no research on the British cotton industry, she considered a cotton 
mill working with idle capacity because of a decline in demand, repeating 
the main lines of Kahn’s analysis. Either all machinery in a mill may be 
operated for part of the workweek, in which case an increase in output is 
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not followed by an increase in marginal cost; or some machines may be 
employed full time while others are left idle. Assuming uniform quality 
of machinery, an increase in output produces no increase in marginal cost 
(Robinson 1933d, 49).
the kinked demand curve The discovery of the kinked demand 
curve is generally attributed to Robert Hall and C. J. Hitch (1939) and 
Paul M. Sweezy (1939). Kahn anticipated their work by ten years. His 
dissertation describes a possible market composed of more than two firms 
producing the same item at the same price, which is higher than each 
firm’s cost of production. Under what conditions could the price of the 
item rise or fall? If a firm cuts its price, its competitors will respond by tak-
ing the same measure, thereby reducing the firm’s revenue. And if the firm 
increases its price, its output will fall to zero. Because the firm knows what 
its marketing practices are, both an increase and a decrease in price seem 
to be out of the question: “But if the price can move neither downwards 
nor upwards, it must remain where it is. The equilibrium price is any and 
every price; and the price is where it is for no other reason than it happens 
to be so” (Kahn 1989, 103). This is the kinked demand curve, which he 
later characterized as a “quandary” and a “terrible tangle.” Although he 
could see that it would not pay either to raise or lower prices, he had no 
idea how the position of the kink on the curve was determined. Could 
Robinson devote some thought to these difficulties?46 Although she did 
not answer Kahn’s question, Robinson introduced his idea of the kinked 
demand curve in considering whether a tax will increase a firm’s prices. In 
what she called the extreme case—a firm with a kinked demand curve—she 
claimed that a tax might leave prices unchanged: “If the change in slope of 
the demand curve is so rapid that it contains a kink, there will be a discon-
tinuity in the marginal revenue curve; and if the old and new marginal cost 
curves both cut the marginal revenue curve vertically below the kink in the 
demand curve, there will be no change in price” (Robinson 1933d, 81). As 
an example of such a demand curve, she considered the relationship be-
tween a monopolistic firm and its potential competitors. Although rivals 
operate with higher costs, this disadvantage might vanish if the monopoly 
increases its price above a certain level. Once the monopolist exceeds this 
critical price level, above which other firms can compete at a profit, poten-
tial rivals will enter the market as real competitors. It follows that the de-
mand curve of the monopolist becomes quite elastic once the critical price 
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is exceeded; and “even when his costs are augmented by the tax he will not 
find it worth while to raise his price above this critical level, provided that 
his rivals are not also subject to the tax” (Robinson 1933d, 81).
Although Kahn persevered for several years in preparing his disserta-
tion for publication, he eventually abandoned the effort. It was finally 
published as a historical artifact more than fifty years after he submitted it 
to King’s.47 Within three years of Kahn’s appointment to his fellowship, 
Robinson had produced a book based in large measure on his unpub-
lished work. Thus she received credit for some of his original research.
Dialogues with Pigou
In her article of December 1932, Robinson took an important step in vali-
dating her credentials at Cambridge. Imperfect competition was regarded 
as an exciting new field and appeared to hold the promise of a significant 
research program. Equally important, it had stimulated path-breaking 
work by three members of the guild: Sraffa, Shove, and Kahn. In refining 
some of the arguments presented in the symposium, she demonstrated 
her sophistication in teasing out nuances of Marshallian value theory. She 
also called into question received wisdom of the guild on a significant 
theoretical issue. Finally, she offered a preview of the analyses that would 
shortly appear in The Economics of Imperfect Competition.
After explaining how market imperfections are created, Robinson 
considered the circumstances under which a firm could arrive at profit- 
maximizing levels of output and price in the long period. Firms could 
achieve this maximum if marginal revenue would equal marginal cost, 
and the price would just cover the cost of producing the average unit. 
The latter requirement is called the “tangency condition.” The equality 
of price and average cost ensures that existing firms make normal profits, 
eliminating incentives for other firms to enter their market.
An increase in demand for a product enables existing firms to charge 
higher prices and reap above-normal profits. But abnormal profits are 
ephemeral; finding this market attractive, other firms enter, thereby re-
ducing an individual firm’s demand and profits. Entry ceases at a new 
equilibrium, where demand and cost curves are tangent once again. At the 
new equilibrium, costs lie below their old equilibrium levels. According to 
Robinson, the symposiasts assumed that the cost savings would be passed 
on to consumers as lower prices. She argued otherwise: in imperfect mar-
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kets, there is no theoretically determinate connection between an increase 
in demand for a product and its price. Depending on how demand curves 
change, the new equilibrium price might exceed the old price, fall below 
it, or remain unchanged: “Some kinds of increase in demand will lower 
price, and some will not” (Robinson 1932b, 552).
Pigou was quite impressed by Robinson’s article, judging it “extremely 
good and ingenious.” In an undated letter written in early December 1932, 
he told her, “Besides having got some very good stuff, you’ve made it most 
uncommonly lucid and readable” (jvr/vii/347/16). However, he believed 
that revisions were needed if she intended to incorporate the paper into 
her book. Why, for example, did she assume that an increase in demand 
for a product would be followed by entry of new firms into the market? 
He asked her to consider a single grain monopoly that experiences in-
creased demand. If the monopolist can meet the new demand, there is no 
basis for the entry of new firms. Why should the same conditions not hold 
in imperfectly competitive markets? Like the single monopolist, each pro-
ducer—a local monopoly—would satisfy the new demand in its own mar-
ket. Increased demand was more likely to stimulate entry in areas remote 
from local monopolies. Robinson’s paper included no discussion of the 
conditions under which entry of new firms takes place. In Pigou’s view, 
the mere fact that an industry is controlled by a plurality of monopolies 
and not one was not a satisfactory basis for her position. Robinson seems 
to have acted on Pigou’s criticism. The Economics of Imperfect Competition 
identifies circumstances under which his supposition holds. Increased de-
mand is not followed by entry of new firms. Existing firms enjoy abnormal 
profits because they sell patented products or hold a restricted number of 
licenses granted by a public agency (Robinson 1933d, 93).
On the same day, Pigou raised a more serious objection.48 Suppose 
that the demand for a product increases. Firms begin to charge higher 
prices and make above-normal profits. According to Robinson, higher 
profits enjoyed by existing firms should lure other firms to the market. 
Entry continues until a new equilibrium is reached—the point of tan-
gency between demand and average cost curves. Pigou maintained that 
the new Robinsonian equilibrium might be nothing more than a random 
and theoretically meaningless event. Suppose that the number of new 
firms necessary for equilibrium is N. Pigou held that Robinson’s argu-
ment lacked a mathematical proof that tangency of the two curves would 
invariably be established by N, and only N, number of firms.
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The dialogue on this issue began in a telephone call from Pigou to 
Robinson on January 13. He had discovered a fundamental weakness in 
her article. Would she like to hear it without delay so that she could make 
the appropriate revisions in her book? When she and Austin met him for 
tea the same day, he raised his objection by posing the following question: 
How could she demonstrate tangency in view of the fact that her analysis 
was based on two independent equations and only one unknown? Since 
her argument was mathematically overdetermined, a proof of her posi-
tion was impossible on purely formal grounds. Robinson, who had only 
an elementary understanding of mathematics, was initially upset by this 
conversation and bewildered by the formal simplicity with which Pigou 
framed his objection. As she complained in a letter to Kahn—who was in 
Chicago and unavailable for tutorials on the problems her article had cre-
ated—Pigou had a very “stilted” way of making his point. However, she 
quickly convinced herself that she grasped his objection and its source. 
On her interpretation, his criticism conveniently entailed no damaging 
consequences for her analysis. Although her response to Pigou does not 
seem to be extant, she gave Kahn an account. Pigou, she supposed, imag-
ined a market with a small number of firms. Entry of one new firm would 
significantly reduce demand for existing ones. As she put it, demand would 
“jump down.” If the entry or exit of a single firm substantially affected 
demand, equilibrium would become an incalculable and theoretically in-
determinate event, a “fluke.” She acknowledged that this was “a curious + 
interesting point” but believed it was irrelevant to her article, presumably 
because she assumed a market with a large number of firms.49
Pigou’s reply convinced Robinson that her benign interpretation of 
his objection was erroneous. She assumed that the demand curve would 
shift continuously as the cost curve remained stable. Eventually the two 
curves would have to become tangent, establishing a new equilibrium. 
Pigou noted that on her assumption, the demand curve was free to move 
in all possible positions: “Because the curve moves about by continu-
ous motion, it must, in one of its positions, become tangential.” She was 
mistaken. “My point,” Pigou stressed, “is that, since each of its possible 
positions is determined by the number of firms, it is not free to move 
about like that.” In which case, how could the demand curve ever become 
tangent to the cost curve? On the assumptions of Robinson’s analysis, 
this possibility seemed to be a theoretically insignificant and contingent 
event. Firms entering the market shift individual demand curves down-
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ward, making their slopes flatter. Robinson had no proof that there is 
some number of entrée firms—n—that produces tangency. A proof was 
necessary, he argued, in order to defeat the “adverse presumption” against 
tangency. Without it, her analysis was not merely incomplete but intui-
tively implausible and formally invalid.50
Robinson’s report to Kahn on the above exchange, written on Janu-
ary 16, shows that she still did not see the point of Pigou’s objection. “I 
think,” she wrote, “it is all a fuss about nothing.” Instead of coming to 
terms with Pigou’s argument, she introduced the surprising speculation 
that his real worry was the “ragged-edge” problem. Entry of each addi-
tional firm into an imperfect market depresses individual demand curves 
by a discrete amount: “Therefore if you have one firm too few the demand 
curve may be a bit above the cost curve,—if one too many it may be a 
bit below, + never exactly tangential.” Although price may be incremen-
tally higher or lower than average cost, the two values would be equal 
only by chance. This was Pigou’s fluke, a theoretically inexplicable event. 
Robinson told Kahn she had sent Pigou the following solution: add to 
the normal profit the above-normal profit that results when there is one 
firm too few. Then the two curves will be tangent.51
Although Robinson found her exchanges with Pigou stimulating, 
they were an occasion for some anxiety on her part. She hoped he would 
be convinced by her solution, not least because he had begun to use the 
mathematics employed in her article in his own work. As she wrote Kahn, 
“I want to restore his confidence.”52 Since Pigou’s intervention held the 
promise of both risks and rewards, her anxiety was not misplaced. En-
dorsement of her work by the Professor would qualify her as a bona fide 
member of the guild by its most senior gatekeeper, arguably one of two 
Cambridge economists whose judgment carried substantial weight with 
all other members of the guild. He was charmed by her article. If his en-
thusiasm could be sustained, she would enjoy an advantage in competing 
for the next lectureship.
But what could Robinson expect if she failed to persuade Pigou? He 
now had insight into the quality of her thinking that he could not easily 
achieve independent of their dialogue. If his understanding of the logic 
underpinning her article persuaded him of fundamental weaknesses that 
otherwise would have escaped him, this deeper knowledge of her research 
would work to her disadvantage, perhaps convincing him that it did 
not, after all, measure up to Cambridge standards. Dialogue gave senior 
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Cambridge economists a means of tracking the work and assessing the 
merit of their apprentices. Thus it had an institutional function in the 
Marshallian guild that was independent of its uses as a tool for research. 
In January 1933, it was not clear what results her dialogue with Pigou 
would achieve for Robinson’s career chances. She knew she was on dan-
gerous ground. In prodding her to develop a mathematical proof of the 
conditions under which the tangency requirement could be satisfied, he 
had unwittingly posed precisely the sort of challenge she was least able to 
meet. In view of her deficiencies in mathematics, her complaint to Kahn 
is not surprising: Pigou was “nice to argue with,” but he had “such a pe-
culiar formal way of looking at things” that it was difficult “to meet him 
on his own ground.”53
Pigou was not satisfied with Robinson’s ad hoc solution to his prob-
lem. After making the obvious mathematical point that the ragged-edge 
problem was not peculiar to imperfectly competitive markets but arose 
whenever calculus was used to analyze finite changes, he repeated that the 
issue at stake concerned a formal flaw in her argument. What he wanted 
was a “proof that the number of equations in the problem was equal to the 
number of unknowns. Unless this can be proved the thing’s not math-
ematically watertight.”54
Robinson was in luck. Musing over the problem in bed one night, 
Pigou himself discovered a method for producing a proof. Moreover 
his formal solution was perfectly general, valid not only for the special 
case she had considered in her article—entry into markets of equal-size 
firms—but for all possible cases. He promised to send her his solution, 
which he claimed would include many equations, when he had written 
it out. The position she had taken on the tangency condition, he found, 
was correct. But it was far from obvious, and she had not proven it. In 
view of his bedtime discovery, he urged her to formalize her argument 
in a mathematically acceptable fashion by including a proof—he did not 
insist on his own announced but thus far unwritten demonstration—of 
how tangency could be met.55
Pigou’s news left Robinson confused but also relieved and ultimately 
triumphant. She finally grasped what Pigou found objectionable in her 
article, although she still did not understand the objection itself or its 
importance. “It was,” she wrote Kahn, “just the formal difficulty” of two 
equations and one unknown. She found this circumstance “quite fantas-
tic” and proposed to consult Newman, the mathematician at St. John’s 
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College who was her other tutor on mathematical problems. Although the 
discovery that her position was sound was due to Pigou, she celebrated 
the result somewhat surprisingly as her own victory. Claiming that “the 
day is won” in her exchange with Pigou over the ragged-edge problem, 
she paradoxically congratulated herself on the fact that she had “driven 
him to admit that there is no difference in this respect between perfect + 
imperfect competition, which is a great advance.”56 But it was Pigou who 
had pointed out to her that the ragged-edge problem was irrelevant to de-
grees of competition. Therefore her indulgence in one-upmanship seems 
peculiar.
Robinson consulted Newman, and his advice was blunt and unsparing:
I must confess I don’t blame the professor for not following. Why don’t you 
learn some mathematics? The professor + I + everyone who will read your book 
will have to spend a lot of time disentangling what you really mean because you 
won’t learn the language, on which a lot of thought has been spent, if you place 
it end to end, + which really contains fewer unnecessary frills than you think. 
You could learn all you want in two months (now your book is finished). I can’t 
understand how you like to remain in a state where [a] 2nd year math[ematica]l. 
undergraduate can say in a superior tone that your analysis is rather shaky, + you 
will have to take it sitting, knowing that he knows nothing about it.57
Newman’s vision of a Robinson minimally competent in the mathemat-
ics employed in the economics curricula of the time was not to be. She 
persisted in writing unregenerate nonmathematical economics, turn-
ing to others for help when she could not escape problems of formal 
analysis.
After two days elapsed without news from Pigou, Robinson concluded 
that no proof would be forthcoming. The Professor, she wrote Kahn, 
“was just being incredibly silly.”58 When his mathematical analysis arrived 
on January 23, 1933, however, she was singing a new song: “I take it all 
back about the Professor. After going thro’ all these contortions he has 
ended by producing a very elegant algebraical version of my article, which 
is to appear as a note in the E[conomic] J[ournal] of March. It doesn’t 
add anything, but it is very beautiful. I can put a footnote referring to it + 
that’s that.”59 Kahn was pleased to learn that Pigou had placed himself at 
Robinson’s disposal: “It is very good to hear the Professor acting as your 
mathematical handyman. It is magnificent how he has taken to you.”60 By 
February 20, Robinson had a copy of Pigou’s note, which would appear 
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in the Economic Journal for March. As she wrote Kahn, “The Prof ’s algebra 
is introduced by a most touching tribute ending ‘This note attempts only 
the subordinate task of imposing, on a rather bleak ice-wall, a staircase 
which has already been made + ascended.’ So that I don’t do so badly on 
the whole.”61
Pigou’s characteristically self-effacing style and his understatement of 
the significance of his contribution to Robinson’s analysis were marks of 
an older mode of intellectual self-presentation at Cambridge that had per-
haps become archaic. In the Edwardian intellectual culture that prevailed 
before the First World War, academic rhetoric of self-promotion was bad 
form. On one important point his mountaineering metaphor was quite 
misleading, suggesting that in her article Robinson had achieved more 
than she had in fact done. The bleak ice wall was her account of imperfect 
competition, demand, average cost, and price. The staircase was his alge-
braic formalization of this account. The claim that she had already built 
and ascended the staircase, leaving Pigou with the purely menial function 
of placing it against the bleak ice wall, implied that Robinson herself had 
produced his proof and used it in order to arrive at her conclusions. He 
had merely clarified the mathematical analysis of the tangency problem 
that she had developed and used in her article. But of course Robinson 
had not performed Pigou’s mathematical analysis, a task that exceeded her 
competence. In fact she seemed unable to understand the importance of 
the problem that moved him to devise a formal demonstration of her con-
ditions for equilibrium. Pigou’s metaphor seemed to confirm Robinson’s 
self-congratulatory comment to Kahn: although his proof was an elegant 
translation of her account into algebra, it added nothing to her paper. 
Most important, the proof and the modest scientific rhetoric in which 
it was cast provided a happy solution to the difficulty that his original 
objection created. And they did so without suggesting that her paper was 
deficient in any respect. Thus Robinson had good reason to celebrate 
the results of her dialogues with Pigou. In responding to her letter of 
February 20, Kahn gave her additional reasons to be inordinately pleased 
with herself. He interpreted Pigou’s introductory note—which Robinson 
characterized as a tribute—by inflating the importance of her work and 
the status Pigou ascribed to her. His metaphor “really does endorse his 
admiration, particularly when one reflects on such a metaphor being ap-
plied to a woman—by the Professor of all people.”62 “You are now defi-
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nitely in the Marshall-Edgeworth class, or rather superior to them both 
for though you use all the latest gadgets, like Edgeworth, you reach your 
goal, like Marshall, with hands untorn and regularly debonair (only the 
loss of a button or two testifying to the difficulties of the ascent.).”63
Kahn’s elevation of the twenty-nine-year-old author of a brief article 
to the pantheon of Edgeworth and Marshall was excessive. However, he 
did not exaggerate the importance of Pigou’s endorsement. Publication 
of a paper that won the admiration of the most senior and prolific scholar 
of the guild was an important step toward accumulating credentials that 
would enable her to compete for a lectureship on the same level as candi-
dates with conventional qualifications.
Robinson’s circumstances called for a careful weighing of tactics, above 
all in her choice of research projects and the manner of their execution. 
“Imperfect Competition and Falling Supply Price” proved to be an in-
spired choice. The article entered the Cambridge debate on value theory, 
the theory of the firm, and imperfectly competitive markets that had en-
gaged the guild since the reception of Sraffa’s paper in 1926. It consid-
ered an issue in this complex of problems that the guild had treated as 
uncontroversial and settled: the relationship between increased demand 
and price. In assuming a variable relationship between the two, Robinson 
took a position designed to correct the thinking of the guild. The mode 
of analysis she employed demonstrated theoretical creativity on an impor-
tant issue, but within acceptable limits. Since it was a variation on meth-
ods currently under discussion at Cambridge, it could hardly be regarded 
as a heretical or otherwise dangerous innovation. Finally, it was set out in 
a lucid, facile, and unornamented prose, economic writing of a clarity and 
simplicity unmatched by that of any member of the guild, including the 
author of The Economic Consequences of the Peace.
The article was a success at Cambridge, winning over Pigou as a de 
facto collaborator who was inspired to investigate formal problems it cre-
ated but did not consider. This was an ironic reversal of the usual division 
of labor between junior and senior scientists, which called for the junior 
scholar to assume the subordinate role of performing mathematical analy-
ses needed to formalize the theories of the more senior scholar. Robinson 
could not claim she had produced a “mathematically watertight” analysis. 
But she could claim that Pigou had performed this service for her. Since 
his note was published before her book, she was able to add the following 
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footnote to her analysis of increasing demand and price in The Economics of 
Imperfect Competition: “Professor Pigou has published a confirmation and 
generalization of these results, in analytical form, in the Economics Journal 
[sic], March 1933 (pp. 108–112)” (Robinson 1933d, 110, n. 1).
From the standpoint of career production at Cambridge, Robinson’s 
dialogues with Pigou achieved impressive results. A renowned economist 
who would later judge her qualifications for a lectureship published a for-
mal proof and generalization of a thesis in her book some three months 
before it appeared. Her efforts to restore Pigou’s confidence in her had 
clearly paid off, even if in an unintended fashion. If his confidence in her 
analysis was at stake, it was reestablished not through Robinson’s labors 
but by the Professor himself. In a letter to Robinson after the publication 
of her book, he praised it as “a very fine effort,” noting that it “should give 
you a very strong claim to the next lectureship that we have going.”64 Al-
though she was not appointed to the next lectureship—Hicks was the suc-
cessful candidate—Pigou played an important role in the eventual award 
of her lectureship in 1938.
k a h n  a n d  r o b i n s o n  i n  a m e r i c a
An Outpost of Civilization
Kahn, anointed as Keynes’s favorite pupil, took a First in Part II of the 
Economics Tripos after only one year of study. Following an additional 
year of research and writing, he completed an exceptionally successful 
book-length fellowship dissertation. Robertson declared it path-breaking. 
Pigou judged it quite astonishing and encouraged early publication.65 
Even before Kahn finished his dissertation, Keynes treated him as a theo-
retically sophisticated younger colleague. As early as summer 1929, he gave 
Kahn proofs of the Treatise for his suggestions (Marcuzzo 2002, 425, n. 7). 
When the Circus began to dissect the Treatise, Kahn was selected as the 
“messenger angel,” ascending to Keynes with explanations and returning 
with his responses.66 Thus when he sailed for the United States on De-
cember 21, 1932, he had abundant reasons for professional satisfaction and 
was confident that he had mastered Cambridge economics. At the time 
of his departure, Cambridge economists were engaged in research that 
he believed would produce exciting breakthroughs: the theory of imper-
fect competition and Keynes’s post-Treatise work. Kahn himself had made 
original contributions in both areas. Rockefeller Foundation fellowships 
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funded studies by foreign scholars in the United States. Kahn had a larger 
conception of his American visit. Important truths had recently been dis-
covered at Cambridge, the center of the universe in economics. He would 
bring them to the periphery, where American economists—badly trained, 
intellectually shallow, and comparatively illiterate—labored in darkness. 
Kahn was largely ignorant of American economic theory. But why should 
he not have been? To know what was worth knowing in economics, it was 
hardly necessary to leave the precincts of Cambridge or even the grounds 
of King’s and Trinity. As events quickly proved, his conception of his 
American visit was naïve and presumptuous in the extreme.
Kahn’s first stop was Cincinnati, where the annual meeting of the 
American Statistical Association was held. On December 30, he presented 
a version of his article of 1931 on the multiplier under a new title, “Public 
Works and Inflation.”67 Although the paper was well received, he was 
astonished to discover that Americans had little interest in the progress 
Keynes had made since the Treatise. They were still committed to “the 
most doctrinaire sort of nonsense,” such as the quantity theory of money, 
which Keynes and his followers had recently discarded. A “young mon-
etary theorist” had not even heard of Keynes. Kahn’s observations in Cin-
cinnati left him with the impression that American economists “live in the 
Dark Ages.”68 More troubling surprises awaited him at the University of 
Chicago, where he spent the month of January.
Arrogance at Chicago:  
The Problem of Schultz and Viner
Kahn’s first discussions at Chicago were with the resident theoreticians 
Henry Schultz, for whom he had a letter of introduction from Keynes, 
and Jacob Viner. The results could hardly have been more demoralizing. 
“At the very outset,” he wrote Robinson, “they made it clear to me that 
nothing being done at Cambridge would be of any interest to them.” He 
encountered “a peculiarly self-satisfying kind of deceit”—a contempt for 
Cambridge economists and their works. Viner claimed he never allowed 
himself more than an hour to read the Economic Journal. Schultz main-
tained that he never read it. Indeed, he seemed to regard it as a mark of 
scientific connoisseurship that he had only glanced at the Treatise. Viner 
also feigned pride in claiming only a passing knowledge of a few pages 
of the book.69 And what of the theory of imperfect competition? It was 
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derivative and passé. Either it had been worked out by Cournot or others 
decades earlier, or Chicago people “had done it all themselves long ago.” 
Viner claimed he had discovered the relationships between average and 
marginal cost curves that Kahn used in his dissertation, the same appa-
ratus that would bear much analytical weight in Robinson’s book. And 
the symposium of 1930 on increasing returns celebrated at Cambridge as 
a major event in research on imperfect competition? Viner had not both-
ered to finish it.70 As a result, Kahn’s conception of his role as emissary 
of Cambridge theoretical culture to the territory of the barbarians was 
quickly punctured. If Schultz and Viner regarded Keynes as a figure of mi-
nor importance and refused to take his work seriously, Kahn would have 
no success enlightening them about the advances made in the proto–Gen-
eral Theory. If they had already developed methods for analyzing imper-
fect competition that he and his Cambridge colleagues believed they had 
discovered, he would have nothing of originality to offer them.
With his initial vision of his American mission in shambles, Kahn began 
to improvise in an effort to fashion a more credible role for himself. His 
problem was to devise tactics to fight a battle he had not anticipated—to 
make a case for the importance of Cambridge economics against the view 
that it was outdated and irrelevant. In making this case, Kahn employed 
several tactics. He attempted to outflank Schultz and Viner by enrolling 
support from graduate students in economics, from whom the next gen-
eration of American theorists would be recruited. He also targeted fac-
ulty in the graduate school of business, who trained students in practical 
problems of managing businesses. And he took Chicago economists by 
surprise, defending Cambridge by using research that was new to them. 
The Cambridge artifacts that were at his disposal for this purpose were 
Robinson’s work on imperfect competition: her article of December 1932 
and the proofs of her book. Thus Kahn’s support for Cambridge at Chi-
cago intersected with advance marketing of her book. If he could con-
vince graduate students in the economics department and faculty in the 
business school that her work on imperfect competition was important, 
his visit to Chicago would be a success.
Writing to Robinson shortly after his dispiriting talks with Schultz and 
Viner, Kahn discussed her place in his new plan: “It suddenly came home 
to me a couple of days ago that if it were not for your book Cambridge 
would be making a pretty bad showing and my position here would be 
untenable.” After learning that several Chicago economists were pleased 
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with her article, he asked Robinson for reprints, which he intended to cir-
culate, also suggesting she send one to Viner with her “personal compli-
ments.”71 Further conversations convinced him that, with the exception 
of Schultz and Viner, all the Chicago readers of her article who had an 
interest in imperfect competition were “highly impressed.” Her method-
ological pamphlet was also being read, and there was some discussion of 
ordering copies for the university bookstore. Although Kahn found the 
intransigence of Schultz and Viner an obstacle, he was confident that her 
book would be a great success at Chicago.72
In defending Cambridge by promoting Robinson, Kahn found a recep-
tive ear in V. F. Coe, a research student in economics who was supported 
by a fellowship renewable on a quarterly basis at the discretion of Schultz 
and Viner. After working for roughly a year in Schultz’s statistics labora-
tory, he was studying cost curves and had made considerable progress 
analyzing average and marginal relationships. Kahn claimed he had “quite 
fired” Coe’s imagination: “[Coe] went to Viner to suggest that somebody 
here ought to work on imperfect competition. (He meant that he would 
like to take it up himself but research students are not supposed to show 
signs of getting out of hand.) Viner made it pretty clear that it was a silly 
idea. The problem was of no particular interest, it all depended on what 
assumptions you made, and (I suspect) if he couldn’t do it nobody else 
could. Coe did not improve his case by revealing that his mind had been 
stirred by talking to me about the work being done at Cambridge.”73
By January 20, Coe was spreading the news of Robinson’s work in the 
business school. This is surely not an idea that would have occurred to 
Kahn, who had no experience of graduate schools of business. He gave 
Robinson the following report on the efforts of his new recruit:
There is a man called [Simon H.] Nerlove in the Business School here who thinks 
that this kind of thing is the most important thing that has happened to econom-
ics in the last 40 years. And all that is derived from reading your article, reading 
your pamphlet (Coe showed it to him) and hearing Coe speak about his conversa-
tions with me and about your proofs (I hope you don’t mind. I am allowing Coe 
to see your proofs. It seems such shocking waste to keep him waiting until pub-
lication and the book will be out in plenty of time to enable him to make proper 
acknowledgment.)74 This kind of source—actually engaged in teaching men how 
to rear businesses—is worth a dozen Schultzes and Viners. And there are several 
others like him (I am talking of Nerlove, not Coe). (rfk/13/90/1/67–72)
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Kahn later added that Coe anticipated “a great future” for Robinson’s 
book at Chicago. The economics students would see to that: “He thinks 
that Viner will be forced to take it up by his lecture class, just as their 
money man was forced to read the Treatise.”75
Robinson was pleased with the exposure she was receiving at Chi-
cago.76 She was also unimpressed by the dismissive response of Schultz 
and Viner to the belated Cambridge discovery of the marginal revenue 
curve and the promise she and Kahn saw in the possibilities of a marginal 
analysis of imperfect competition. Answering Kahn, she suggested that if 
there was some sense in which Chicago economists had anticipated mar-
ginal revenue before it was known at Cambridge, this might be “an amus-
ing point” that he could include in the historical account of discoverers of 
the curve he was preparing for his Harvard paper. However, the matter of 
genuine importance was not mere acquaintance with the curve but a dem-
onstration of how to use it in solving theoretical problems: “If Viner + 
Co[mpany] boast of knowing it all along they are giving themselves away 
badly for they ought to have produced my book in 1930.”77
As Kahn explained to her, Coe was finishing his doctoral dissertation. 
With the help of Robinson’s proofs, his analysis could be pushed in the 
direction she and Kahn were taking. Coe would be “eternally grateful.” 
More important, his thesis would become “an instrument for approaching 
Viner and others at Chicago.”78 Robinson sent Coe a complete set of page 
proofs around March 25.79 His belated letter of thanks, dated April 22, 
suggests that Kahn’s revised Chicago strategy had met with some success. 
Coe was persuaded that her book would receive a warm reception in the 
United States. Viner would “make much use of it in his Theory courses,” 
and Coe had learned it would be adopted as a text in the business school. 
Since the book was unpublished, this decision was certainly due to Kahn’s 
campaign. Although Coe found her article brilliant, on a first reading he 
could not accept her unorthodox and surprising conclusion concerning 
decreasing costs. But in studying the essay more carefully, he discovered 
a footnote that exposed his own error, “for which there was of course no 
basis, except that it crept into my head to help and resist a new conclu-
sion.” Before Kahn’s visit to Chicago, Coe had completed an analysis of 
the relations of cost curves, at least part of which he believed was new. On 
reading Robinson’s proofs, he saw that she had “done the thing better 
and pushed the analysis much further.”80 Coe was singing from a score 
composed by Kahn for a chorus of male voices, his hymn to Robinson 
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and the glories of Cambridge economics to be performed by University 
of Chicago economists.
Harvard
After his reception at Chicago, Kahn’s spirit of Cambridge triumphalism 
was much dampened. His Chicago strategy would also be called for at 
Harvard. Instead of proclaiming the magnificence of Cambridge econom-
ics, he would defend it against skeptics and adversaries. And he would 
mount this defense not by an appeal to Keynes’s new ideas but by pro-
moting Robinson’s recent and forthcoming work. The circumstances at 
Harvard that dictated this strategy differed from those he faced at Chi-
cago. The strategic field on which he operated was defined chiefly by the 
presence of two men. Schumpeter had been persuaded to leave his pro-
fessorship at Bonn and join the Harvard faculty in autumn 1932. In 1927, 
Chamberlin had defended his Harvard doctoral dissertation on monopo-
listic competition. After some six years of further work, publication of his 
book on the subject was imminent.
the schumpeter seminar In October 1931, Schumpeter delivered 
three lectures at Cambridge, the occasion on which he met Kahn and 
Robinson (Allen 1994a, 280). When Keynes wrote letters of introduc-
tion for Kahn to open doors in the United States, he included no let-
ters for Harvard because Kahn and Schumpeter were already acquainted. 
Schumpeter’s correspondence shows that he was quite impressed with 
both Kahn and Robinson. On February 25, 1933, he wrote Ragnar Frisch, 
“We have now the visit of Richard Kahn of King’s College, Cambridge, 
the favorite pupil of Keynes, who is a very good man. In fact when his 
book comes out I do think he will prove another candidate for Fellow-
ship [in the newly established Econometrics Society, in which Frisch and 
Schumpeter played leading roles]” (rf/nbo Brevs. 761a). In a conversa-
tion during Kahn’s visit, Schumpeter expressed “the profoundest admira-
tion” for Robinson, calling her “one of our best men.”81
None of these predilections disposed Schumpeter in favor of a Keynes-
ian gospel, old or new. In his most famous anecdote, he claimed he had 
three ambitions in life: to become the world’s greatest economist, lover, 
and horseman. Keynes did not compete in the last sphere. From Schum-
peter’s perspective, Keynes’s ambivalent sexuality would disqualify him 
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in the second. However, he stood in the path of Schumpeter’s first ambi-
tion.82 On Kahn’s arrival at Harvard, he attended a party for Schumpeter’s 
fiftieth birthday. Shortly thereafter, he wrote Robinson: “I fully realised 
the terrible depths of darkness in which he, and far more the others, are 
thinking on these questions. He is on the point of finishing a book all 
about velocities of circulation, and just can’t see my point. The conversa-
tion turned to inflation. It was terrible—all about inactive deposits and 
increasing the circulation. I felt an awful chill of isolation.” In Schum-
peter’s lectures, Kahn watched him tear to bits one of Keynes’s analyses 
in the Treatise, passages of which he quoted “in a slightly mocking tone.” 
To Kahn, Schumpeter’s critique was a violation of “rudimentary canons 
of commonsense” and an “intellectually abominable performance.” Al-
though he contained himself during the lecture, his response to Robinson 
was livid.83 Kahn’s sense of his marginal status and alienation, first at Chi-
cago and then at Harvard, led him to a characteristically extravagant con-
clusion: “I am now fully aware that there is not a single person on this 
continent with whom I could carry on a reasonably intelligent conversa-
tion on these matters.”84
How could Kahn defend Cambridge at Harvard? Keynes’s post- 
Treatise work remained unpublished and had been shared only with a 
select few. As he revised the proofs of The General Theory, Keynes was re-
luctant to discuss his new ideas with Cambridge outsiders. In September 
1935, he received a request from Frisch, who was preparing his lectures on 
monetary theory for the upcoming Oslo term. Frisch had read the Treatise 
and was aware that Keynes was writing a new book on monetary theory. 
Uncertain as to whether it had been published, he asked Keynes for a few 
remarks on the evolution of his thinking in order to bring his lectures up 
to date. Keynes demurred: “I would very much rather, if it is possible, 
that you should wait until my new book is out before you inflict my opin-
ions on your students. The new book makes a considerable difference, 
and I think they might lose their time if they were to go in any great detail 
into my previously published theory.”85 At Cambridge, the Treatise had 
been analyzed, criticized, and incorporated into the theoretical tradition 
that descended from Marshall. Locally, there is a sense in which it was a 
part of the theoretical canon. In the United States, it apparently remained 
“new and unexplored territory.”86
In spite of Kahn’s unhappy introduction to Harvard monetary theory, 
he was generally pleased with his circumstances at the university, at least 
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early in his visit. There was “an air of real grace about the place,” quite 
unlike the ambience at Chicago. His accommodations were “a very good 
imitation of College”—with the exception of a “horrible thing, a shower 
instead of a bath.” Two young instructors attended to his needs, and he 
participated in Schumpeter’s seminar, where he defended Cambridge eco-
nomics by introducing Robinson’s work. In celebrating the virtues of her 
research, he argued that Cambridge was in the forefront of innovation 
and rigorous analysis. If Schumpeter could be persuaded that her work 
was important, he would discuss it in his lectures and seminars. Harvard 
graduate students and instructors would follow the lead of their new prin-
cipal theoretician. Cambridge ideas would be exported to Harvard, where 
they might take root. Theoretical tools forged at Cambridge would also 
be used at Harvard. In this manner the dominance of Cambridge eco-
nomics, at least as Kahn understood it, would be extended to one of the 
most prestigious centers of American research and graduate study.87
Pleading the case for Cambridge by making use of Robinson was an 
intelligent move on Kahn’s part. In Schumpeter, he found a receptive lis-
tener. Robinson was an attractive young woman—“the Beautiful Mrs. R.” 
as Pigou called her—not one of the men of Schumpeter’s generation, with 
whom he sometimes had diffident or competitive relations. Schumpeter 
took an active and generous interest in younger economists that seems to 
have been genuinely collegial. He also presented himself as a bon vivant 
and connoisseur of women. Although he could not match the conquests 
of Don Giovanni that Leporello recited to Donna Elvira, like the Don 
he boasted of his success in several countries—not in Italy or Spain but 
in Austria, Germany, England, and the United States.88 But what did he 
know of Robinson’s work before Kahn arrived at Harvard? Apparently 
very little. After she sent him an offprint of her article, he responded po-
litely but without reference to its content or to her pamphlet, which she 
had also sent. Either it was misplaced or it never arrived. As Schumpeter 
wrote her, he hoped to become acquainted with the details of her work 
through Kahn.89 Within a few days of Kahn’s arrival, Schumpeter had 
read her article, and they were discussing it. Shortly after one of their first 
conversations, Kahn reported to Robinson: “He was effusive in prais-
ing the lucidity of your article, and gave me to understand that you are 
one of the best of the younger economists. He did not omit to men-
tion some of your more unprofessional traits that make you so likeable. 
I was pleased—he was being quite sincere, so far as one can tell—but 
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I succeeded in maintaining a sober demeanor.”90 These conversations 
spilled into Schumpeter’s seminar. Near the end of one session, he asked 
Kahn to reproduce the diagram of the kinked demand curve, which 
would shortly appear in Robinson’s book. Schumpeter was “most im-
pressed” and asked when publication could be expected.91 He was also 
“very struck” with the average productivity curve, another tool Kahn and 
Robinson had developed: “We spent a good part of the hour at his semi-
nar discussing it this morning. He told his class that they must familiarize 
themselves with it. ‘It is not a question of believing it: it is a new tool 
capable of doing very useful work.’ ”92
the chamberlin incident From the standpoint of Robinson’s 
interests, Kahn arrived at Harvard at an opportune moment—just a few 
days before Chamberlin’s book appeared.93 Because Chamberlin and 
Robinson were covering the same ground and he was publishing first, 
Kahn quickly began to work on her behalf. In his discussions with 
Schumpeter as well as graduate students and younger economists, his 
objective was to make a preemptive case that her research was more so-
phisticated methodologically and promised more significant theoretical 
payoffs. As Kahn and Robinson understood, these efforts were important 
in supporting her claims to credit. If it were generally acknowledged that 
much of her analysis had been published by Chamberlin, her book might 
fall stillborn from the press. And if her work were not recognized as origi-
nal, it would have little value in establishing her professional identity at 
Cambridge. Kahn’s task was to make a plausible argument in a difficult 
situation. The obstinate and disagreeable fact was that Chamberlin’s book 
would be read as the first attempt to develop a theory of monopolistic 
competition at a time when Robinson was correcting proofs. Although 
he enjoyed the conventional advantage of prior publication, was there an 
unconventional but overriding sense in which she could claim priority? In 
her competition with Chamberlin, the gods that decide success in scientific 
careers smiled on Robinson. At least three factors worked in her favor:
(1) Chamberlin claimed he had begun serious work on his doctoral 
dissertation in 1924 (Chamberlin 1961, 520).94 Thus his research had been 
under way for some six years before Robinson’s. However, she enjoyed 
a signal advantage. Her article was an early sketch of the basic argu-
ments of her book. Chamberlin had no comparable preliminary publica-
tions. His article from 1929 “Duopoly: Value Where Sellers Are Few” 
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announced his forthcoming book on monopolistic competition; the ar-
ticle, he claimed, was only a fragment of this more ambitious study. But 
“Duopoly” merely synthesized and refined traditional literature on the 
subject: Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Marshall, and Pigou.95 On this 
score, Chamberlin made a serious tactical error. By reserving his novel 
analysis for the book, he gave his competition opportunity to anticipate 
him and achieve priority. In the institutional allocation of credit, this 
was the significance of Robinson’s article. Because Chamberlin lingered, 
she was able to exploit an opening he had left undefended. He did not 
understand that he was creating an opportunity for competitors. She did 
not know that publication of her article would give her an advantage. 
However, the absence of intentions and knowledge does not alter the 
outcome of the distribution of credit.
(2) Imperfect competition was high on the research agenda at Cam-
bridge in the early 1930s. By March 1933, Sraffa, Shove, Robertson, 
Kahn, and Pigou had all published in the area. Not so at Harvard, where 
Chamberlin wrote in theoretical isolation. Robinson quickly mastered 
the Cambridge practice of collective research production. Kahn, Austin, 
Sraffa, Guillebaud, Newman, and even Keynes—whose work was quite 
remote from imperfect competition—all took a hand in her book. Only a 
few days before Chamberlin’s book appeared, no one at Harvard seemed 
able to give an account of it.96
(3) Although Chamberlin was one of several independent discoverers 
of marginal revenue, he had little confidence in its analytical power, pre-
ferring instead Marshallian aggregate measures of revenues and costs. Ex-
cept for a passing reference to marginal demand price, the concept of mar-
ginal revenue did not appear in his thesis (Reinwald 1977, 527). Although 
his book introduced the idea under the category of marginal receipts, he 
used it on only three occasions.97 He also wrote at some length to impress 
upon readers his sense of the modest explanatory value of the curve.98 
Robinson’s knowledge of marginal revenue was acquired by accident and 
through no effort on her part. However, she used the curve systematically 
as her most important methodological tool. In the disciplinary assessment 
of the two books during the 1930s, Robinson’s innovative work in explor-
ing a new technique and examining its implications gave her a signifi-
cant advantage she would not have enjoyed had Chamberlin exploited his 
discovery.
In the final days before Chamberlin’s book appeared, Kahn read a 
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paper to a meeting of the Graduate Economics Club, an organization of 
lecturers and graduate students. His subject: new Cambridge techniques 
in the analysis of imperfect competition. From the standpoint of priority 
claims, Robinson and Chamberlin had approximately the same status on 
the day of his lecture: they were both authors of forthcoming books in 
the same area. By his account, Kahn lectured to an audience of more than 
one hundred. He was in an excellent position to advance an argument 
for Robinson’s originality and the superiority of Cambridge methods. In 
Kahn’s report, the event began in an auspicious fashion; the chairman 
opened the meeting by quoting Robinson’s doctrine that economics is 
neither more nor less than its technique. Discussion of his lecture led 
to what Kahn called “a rather tragic scene.” Debate was dominated by 
Chamberlin’s objections to the marginal revenue curve. Kahn raised sev-
eral counterarguments but to no effect. Because Chamberlin could not be 
moved, Kahn wrote, “rather cruelly I flung down a challenge.” If the elas-
ticity of demand remains constant, how can the effect of a change in de-
mand or price be expressed in terms of average cost? He gave Robinson’s 
solution to Chamberlin and asked him to translate it into his analytical 
language. “It was then,” he wrote, “that the awful fact transpired that 
Chamberlin was unaware that an increase in demand could under any cir-
cumstances lead to a fall in price.” The audience grasped the consequence. 
Chamberlin was refuted on the basis of his own premises. Or, in Kahn’s 
more colorful language, he “stood competed out of his own mouth.” 
Marshall did not apply marginal analysis to monopolistic markets. In his 
confrontation with Kahn in February 1933, Chamberlin remained true to 
the older Cambridge method. Kahn believed that this exchange settled 
any contest over priority in Robinson’s favor. In light of Chamberlin’s 
failure to meet his challenge, it was abundantly clear that Robinson had 
nothing to fear. More than one hundred young Harvard economists had 
taken in the result: Chamberlin had assisted Kahn in demonstrating the 
superiority of Robinson’s new Cambridge method of analysis.99
Robinson’s article on imperfect competition and falling supply price, 
which Chamberlin had not read until Kahn brought it to his attention, 
played a significant role in the above incident. In this paper, as we noted, 
Robinson had argued that under conditions of imperfect competition an 
increase in demand would lower costs but not necessarily prices. This was 
the result that left Chamberlin baffled and embarrassed. The argument of 
her article—obviously not mentioned in Chamberlin’s book because he 
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had not read it—was employed in The Economics of Imperfect Competition. 
In Kahn’s view, this consideration was sufficient to give her what he called 
“technical priority” over Chamberlin, and she could “ignore him with an 
easy conscience.”100 Even though Chamberlin’s book would be published 
first, The Economics of Imperfect Competition was based on an article from 
1932. In judging priority technically—on the basis of first publication of 
the original elements of the theory of imperfect competition—Robinson 
would take precedence.
Because Chamberlin had told Kahn he intended to send Robinson a 
copy of his book, the question of how she should handle it in the revi-
sion of her proofs remained. Kahn coached her on tactics. If she did not 
have the book before she delivered her final set of revised page proofs 
to Macmillan, a studied silence was the best course. But if she received 
a copy in a timely fashion, a brief disclaimer was in order: the book had 
arrived too late for comment. In either case, readers of the two books 
would see them as instances of independent and simultaneous discovery. 
Thus Kahn was pleased that the problems created by Chamberlin’s book 
would be easily resolved in Robinson’s favor. Because Chamberlin had 
failed to take advantage of the theoretical potential of the marginal rev-
enue curve, the outlines of which she had already published, her claim to 
priority could not be compromised by his book. Although comparisons 
and joint reviews of the two books were inevitable, they would work to 
her advantage. Robinson was quite happy with Kahn’s conclusions. But 
in spite of his advice that she abstain from provoking premature contro-
versy by maintaining a judicious silence until her book was published, she 
seemed ready for combat. As she wrote on March 2, 1933, “I feel a viscious 
[sic] pleasure at hearing that Chamberlin is no good. I should just put in 
a note that I had not read him until my stuff was completed. I might get 
[D. H.] Macgregor [assistant editor of the Economic Journal at the time] 
to let me review him—no on second thought that would be bad. But I can 
deal with him sometime after I am out” (rfk/13/90/1/155–61).
In early March, Robinson received a complimentary copy of The 
Theory of Monopolistic Competition and compared the extent of overlap with 
her work. The larger the overlap, the greater the difficulty in sustaining a 
claim for the originality of her book. If the overlap was modest, her pros-
pects would be better. In her estimate, roughly one-third of his book cov-
ered territory she had explored. Only one-fourth of her book overlapped 
with his.101 If Chamberlin had used the marginal revenue curve, the 
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overlap would have been much greater, weakening her claims to origi-
nality. However, the temptation to do battle with Chamberlin, even if 
vicariously, and to demonstrate that she had bested him was too great. 
The following week, she suggested that Kahn introduce criticism of 
Chamberlin into his book: “I think you ought to put in some references 
to Chamberlin—and you might take the opportunity to criticise his idi-
otic way of talking about the ‘elements of monopoly + competition’ in a 
situation. It is only a verbal point but I have a suspicion that it leads him 
into actual error at times. He had so nearly got there—it seems queer that 
he should not have seen the proper way of looking at it.”102 This sugges-
tion does not seem to have been an offhand remark but rather a calculated 
move by Robinson to weaken Chamberlin’s position and strengthen her 
own in a potential competition for priority and credit. On March 30, she 
returned to the critique of Chamberlin: “Tell me if you have read Cham-
berlin. If so I will send you some comments” (rfk/13/90/1/215–16).
As Kahn predicted, the two books were widely compared and reviewed 
together. A roundtable organized for the American Economic Association 
meeting on December 27, 1933, was a telling indication of the early disci-
plinary consensus on their comparative merits (Schumpeter et al. 1934). 
The title of the roundtable was “Imperfect Competition.” The gatekeep-
ers of American economic theory adopted Robinson’s concept and not 
Chamberlin’s to identify the new research area. Although Robinson was 
not present at the roundtable, The Economics of Imperfect Competition was. 
The discussants were Chamberlin himself and A. J. Nichol. The chair was 
Schumpeter, who wrote a long, generally laudatory review of Robinson’s 
book for the Journal of Political Economy.103
In December 1933, Schumpeter advised Kahn on German economics 
journals that might review The Economics of Imperfect Competition (Schum-
peter 2000, 260). In May 1934, he wrote Abraham Flexner, director of the 
Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, recommending Robinson for 
an appointment: “I rate her very high and if you plan to have, say, yearly 
guests, I strongly plead to invite her for a year at least in order to look at 
her” (Schumpeter 2000, 262). In December 1936, Schumpeter responded 
to a request from the president of Harvard, James B. Conant, asking for 
recommendations regarding “Promising Young Men to be Called to 
Harvard from Outside.” After recommending Oskar Lange, Nicholas 
Gerogescu-Roegen, and Arthur Smithies, he noted that in making these 
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suggestions he had “submitted to the apparently invincible Harvard prej-
udice against women.” But: “Mrs. Joan Robinson of Cambridge, En-
gland, an economist of international fame, would be an extremely good 
acquisition and could be had for $4000 or a little more. I may add that 
if there were any wish to break that anti-feminist tradition, which to me 
seems, frankly, to be somewhat reactionary, her appointment would af-
ford an excellent opportunity” (Schumpeter 2000, 287–88).
At the meeting of the American Economic Association in January 
1944, Schumpeter chaired the committee formed to recommend foreign 
economists for honorary membership. Among others, the committee 
proposed Frisch, F. A. Hayek, Hicks, Gunnar Myrdal, Bertil Ohlin, Rob-
bins, and Robinson. Schumpeter seems to have been the prime mover 
behind the choice of Robinson. In his report to the association as chair 
of the committee, he wrote the following: “I know I shall be considered 
out of order if in this anti-feminist country, I suggest honoring a woman, 
but Mrs. Joan Robinson had a well-earned international success with her 
book on the Economics of Imperfect Competition in 1933. By virtue of it she 
holds a leading position in one of the most popular lines of advance [of 
economic theory]” (quoted in Allen 1994b, 149).
Career Production at a Distance
Kahn’s visit to the United States afforded Robinson an extraordinary op-
portunity to enhance her professional identity by proxy. Both she and 
Kahn took advantage of the possibilities, placing in circulation claims to 
the merits of her work in progress that he was able to substantiate. At 
Chicago, he distributed her article and the proofs of her book to good 
effect. At Harvard, he discussed the article with Schumpeter and his stu-
dents, and in his lecture he was able to face down Chamberlin by using an 
analysis drawn from her book. When Kahn arrived in the United States, 
Robinson was a professional novice. Yet at both Chicago and Harvard, he 
was able to celebrate her research as the next big thing in economics. Ini-
tially thrown off balance when his early conception of his American visit 
as a mission of enlightenment to an academic backwater was shattered, 
he quickly found a new strategy. In defending Cambridge economics by 
means of Robinson’s work, he assisted in the promotion of her nascent 
reputation, at that point barely visible outside a small circle of English 
economists.
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The Cambridge Ethos
In one of the more arresting footnotes to his History of Economic Analysis, 
Schumpeter considered Kahn and Shove as exemplars of the cultural dis-
tinctiveness of Cambridge economics. He wrote, “Both are scholars of a 
type that Cambridge produces much more readily than do other centers 
of scientific economics or rather of science in general. They throw their 
ideas into a common pool. By critical and positive suggestion they help 
other people’s ideas into definite existence. And they exert anonymous 
influence—influence as leaders—far beyond anything that can be credited 
to them from their publications” (Schumpeter 1954, 1152). Economists 
who cast their ideas into a common pool of artifacts that are undifferenti-
ated as to their provenance make no claim to proprietary rights over what 
they produce. Schumpeter’s scholars of anonymous influence are compa-
rable to writers and masters of the European Middle Ages, known only by 
what they made or where they made it. Producing works that they did not 
sign and for which they expected no mundane credit, they made no claims 
to ownership. Schumpeter’s metaphor detached Cambridge economics 
from the world of scientific careerism, where methods for distinguishing 
contributions according to authorship are indispensable because of the 
importance of bases for allocating rewards and markers for determining 
success. In the Cambridge of the Schumpeterian imagination, the ques-
tion of who developed an idea is irrelevant, and the concept of the owner-
ship of ideas makes no sense. It follows that claims to priority for scientific 
work, competition for credit, and conflicts over their attribution are not 
to be expected; these practices presuppose proprietary rights in ideas and 
an interest in asserting them, conditions that his account rules out.
Schumpeter’s metaphor is worth taking seriously if for no other rea-
son than the fact that Cambridge was its source. Kahn subscribed to this 
conception of Cambridge economics in his scathing observations on con-
ditions at Chicago and Harvard. He attributed the intellectual emptiness 
he experienced there to the pursuit of higher learning as a business. Be-
cause of the ethics of “the terrible business of career hunting,” his hosts 
at both universities were “incapable of the kind of social life we value.” 
The scientific life of the Cambridge economist was a higher conversation, 
“a social act which pervades one’s whole life,” not a series of commercial 
ventures in which dialogue has no role and research is undertaken for its 
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payoff in an academic career strategy.104 In 1930, Goldsworthy Lowes 
Dickinson, the generalist in the moral sciences at King’s, suggested that 
scholarship as the selfless and disinterested quest for knowledge, remote 
from the calculations and compromises of a career, was a distinctive fea-
ture of Cambridge intellectuality generally. The Cambridge man was 
unworldly and unambitious but not lacking in energy and initiative: 
“Through good reports and ill such men work on, following the light of 
truth as they see it” (in Keynes 1951, 245).105 Did Schumpeter light upon 
a happy metaphor? What conclusions can be drawn from the making of 
The Economics of Imperfect Competition concerning the appositeness of his 
image of the common pool? Does research on imperfect competition at 
Cambridge during the early 1930s suggest that the Marshallian guild was 
a community of scientists committed to the investigation of the truth, 
irrespective of priority and credit?
At Harvard, Kahn was aggressive in pressing for recognition of the 
priority, originality, and superior analytical power of Robinson’s work 
over Chamberlin’s. The two books were in competition and would be 
read and reviewed accordingly. This meant there were rewards to com-
pete over, scarce scientific goods the distribution of which would depend 
on judgments of priority. Robinson’s concerns about overlaps and her 
encouragement of Kahn to attack Chamberlin on the basis of arguments 
she was assembling show that she saw their books in the same terms: she 
and Chamberlin were engaged in an unanticipated contest that she was 
determined to win. However, it was a competition between Robinson 
and Chamberlin, not between two members of the Marshallian guild. 
From Kahn’s perspective, it was also a rivalry between Cambridge and 
Harvard—and American economics generally—for ascendancy in con-
temporary economic theory. Perhaps the common pool did not extend 
across the Atlantic? Were conditions more placid and companionable on 
the banks of the Cam? Although Cambridge economists competed for 
credit with outsiders, did competition have no place in the practice of 
economic science within the walls at Cambridge?
At the time of the gestation of The Economics of Imperfect Competition, 
two other Cambridge economists had a substantial investment in the field 
of imperfect competition. They were Schumpeter’s paradigm cases of dis-
interested, collaborative research: Kahn and Shove, the models of a Cam-
bridge culture in which the struggle for priority and credit had no place. 
It was clear to Kahn that he and Robinson had competing priority claims. 
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They were settled amicably if somewhat disingenuously by employing a 
tactic of selective disattention. There was a pretense not to notice cer-
tain issues, candid discussion of which might prove embarrassing or divi-
sive. Shove seems to have been traumatized by anxieties over the damage 
that early publication of Robinson’s book would inflict on his work in 
progress. The tensions and the conflicts they caused were worrisome to 
Robinson, relatively intractable, and the subject of tedious and inconclu-
sive negotiations over credit claims.
Robinson and Kahn:  
The Consensual Determination of Priority
Robinson and Kahn were intimate friends, whose research cannot eas-
ily be disentangled from their personal lives. They enjoyed a remarkably 
close working relationship, routinely sharing ideas and producing joint 
solutions to theoretical problems. However, they published no formally 
coauthored papers, and credit was assumed and claimed individually. 
This arrangement called for nice distinctions and a careful management of 
credit attribution, not least because a paper begun by Kahn was finished 
by Robinson.106 It is not surprising that intimate collaboration without 
joint publication led to problems of credit allocation.
Consider Kahn’s paper “Imperfect Competition and the Marginal 
Principle,” written as a lecture for delivery at Harvard and then submitted 
to the Quarterly Journal of Economics. The paper drew on his fellowship 
dissertation and discussions with Robinson. Although he supposed it 
would be accepted, publication could not be expected before May, when 
the next issue of the journal was scheduled to appear. This was a generous 
estimate of the paper’s importance: the editor of the journal would not 
only accept it but publish it as soon as possible. At this point, Kahn was 
under the impression that Robinson’s book would appear before May. 
They had collaborated closely for more than three years. They shared a 
background in Marshallian economics and the lessons on its limits that 
they had learned from Sraffa and Shove. They employed the same theo-
retical premises and modes of economic analysis, which in some measure 
they developed together. Unsurprisingly, parts of Kahn’s article inter-
sected with arguments of Robinson’s book. It was under these circum-
stances that he wrote Robinson about the paper on February 20, raising 
“a rather thorny problem of precedence”:
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I think you will agree that it would be rather stupid to make the thing appear 
as though it had been written after your book has appeared. The time would be 
all wrong and it would be necessary to show a lot of references. What I want to 
try to do, if Taussig is willing,107 is to make clear that it was written as a lecture, 
delivered before your book had appeared, and just to insert in square brackets in 
the footnote that the book has since appeared. What do you think? Please let me 
know as I may be getting embroiled with Taussig over the matter, for all I know. 
The best thing would be if he refused to accept. I don’t feel it ought to be pub-
lished. And let me know the name of your book, so that I can refer to it correctly. 
(rfk/13/90/1/131–38)
Kahn’s letter raises several questions. In view of his friendship with 
Robinson, it does so in a remarkably oblique fashion.
What was his chief worry? It was not the impression that his article had 
been written after her book appeared. Suppose that an article by one au-
thor was published shortly after a book by another author written along 
the same lines. This supposition provides no basis for inferences concern-
ing which manuscript was written first. Kahn’s article could have been 
written years before Robinson’s book or, on the other hand, after its pub-
lication. Thus the “stupid” appearance that troubled him vanishes. His 
real difficulty was quite simple. Her book would be published before his 
paper. Unless he could claim that his article had been delivered as a lecture 
before the publication of her book, he would have no basis for a priority 
claim. His article would be perceived as a derivative artifact of question-
able value, especially in comparison with her much more elaborate book.
In what sense was the problem thorny? Was it challenging or uncom-
monly difficult to resolve? Hardly. Kahn himself proposed a simple solu-
tion. The difficulty was not so much thorny as urgent. He expected the 
May issue of the journal to include his article. If the problem was not ad-
dressed before the issue went to press, any priority claim made on behalf 
of his article would be difficult to sustain.
What did it mean to say that “the time would be all wrong”? It would 
be wrong for Kahn because the impression that his paper was written after 
her book was published would make it difficult for him to claim credit for 
any argument in her book.
Finally, why would inclusion of numerous references to Robinson’s 
book be so laborious? If she enjoyed legitimate priority because she was 
first in publishing arguments that they both employed, this would seem 
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to be the only honest course. Considered purely as a matter of proper 
scholarly form, it would be obligatory. Kahn’s other articles of the time 
were richly embellished with references and footnotes. Why were full 
references in this case so awkward? Again the answer turns on priority. 
Given their respective publication schedules as he understood them at 
that juncture, complete references to sources would substantially weaken 
any claim for the priority of his paper.
On March 2, Robinson informed Kahn that there was a good chance 
her book would not be out as early as she had anticipated. If it were pub-
lished by May, she proposed that he employ his simple solution to the 
problem of priority: “You must just put in a footnote saying that your ar-
ticle was a lecture given at such + such a date” (rfk/13/90/1/155–61). Would 
a note that did not mention her book but merely stated that his article 
was delivered as a lecture in February settle all questions about priority? 
Robinson seemed to think so. Was it necessary for Kahn to include refer-
ences to her book? She seemed to think it was not and gave him no help 
with the problem of the extent to which he should cite her forthcoming 
work. In handling the matter of citations, he employed a method of im-
provisatory and selective footnoting, omitting references to her book at 
points where they were called for. “I fear I sadly overdid the causal touch,” 
he wrote. “I was so afraid of the opposite. It is very difficult to hit it off 
right. It would be so much easier to tell the truth, but I fear your academic 
reputation has to suffer in the interests of polite lying. But I feel I was too 
ruthless, and might have been more truthful.”108
The exchange between Robinson and Kahn on the ethics of footnot-
ing shows that they subordinated the question of proper scientific and 
scholarly practice in crediting sources to tactical calculations.109 Robinson 
agreed that Kahn’s tactic was a good one but also pointed out a potentially 
embarrassing oversight: his disposition to use her phrasing and diction: 
“You certainly don’t need to say anymore about me than you do. The 
only point that I think is too much of a good thing is the verbal similarity 
between your monopoly tucked way in a watertight section of the text 
book + the corresponding passage in my introduction” (rfk/13/90/1/173–
79).110 Kahn agreed that this sort of unconscious plagiarism was danger-
ous: “I see that I shall have to be very careful about this sort of thing when 
I come to my book.”111
In the end, Kahn’s thorny problem disappeared, although not in a way 
he anticipated. He had suggested that the matter would best be resolved if 
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the journal rejected his paper, a peculiar observation in view of his efforts 
to secure publication and credit.112 On March 3, his wish was granted. His 
submission was rejected, another sharp and unexpected blow to his sense 
of preeminence over the Americans. Kahn’s paper included ideas he had 
developed independently as well as results of his work with Robinson. 
Her book was based on ideas she had taken from Kahn and products of 
their collaborative efforts. Because of the rejection of his paper and publi-
cation of her book, from the standpoint of the allocation of credit his es-
say had become a scientific nullity. The Economics of Imperfect Competition 
would credit Robinson for her own work, their joint efforts, and some 
of Kahn’s ideas. In employing parts of his unpublished article, her book 
deprived them of originality, rendering them unpublishable elsewhere. In 
working with Robinson, therefore, Kahn lost credit for some of the work 
for which he was responsible.
Although Robinson did not seem unduly distressed by Kahn’s rejection 
notice, she attempted to console him with suggestions designed to make 
the best of a disappointing result. He could elaborate on his discussions 
of the irrelevance of overhead costs by including cases in which business-
men did not take them into account in setting prices. Although his paper 
discussed the latter point, he had interviewed a few more businessmen in 
the United States and intended to incorporate the results into his revised 
manuscript. This material could be published independently. “The rest of 
the article,” she wrote, “will not be very pointful when I am out.” How-
ever, it might be broken down into a few publishable notes. His history 
of independent discoveries of the marginal revenue curve could also be 
published, but not until “after I have been reviewed”; otherwise it might 
create an impression in the minds of reviewers that her book had not cov-
ered the relevant professional literature.113 In sum: she offered advice on 
how to extract residual credit from his rejected article in ways that would 
not jeopardize her claims to precedence.
Robinson and Shove: Negotiating Credit Claims
In summer 1931, Robinson was working on her book and her first series of 
lectures, a short course on the pure theory of monopoly scheduled for the 
coming Michaelmas term. Both the lectures and the book would intersect 
with Shove’s lectures on production, values, and distribution as well as a 
book he was planning on the subject. In Shove’s mind this intersection 
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portended a conflict over credit.114 If he had published his lectures of the 
late 1920s, when Robinson was beginning her informal postgraduate 
studies, she could not have posed a threat. However, he was not quick to 
commit his work to the finality of print, a diffidence nicely captured more 
than a half century later in Kahn’s eulogy of Shove: “He wrote much but 
published little. It is a great misfortune that in his Will he left instructions 
that all his manuscripts were to be destroyed. His determination not to 
publish anything until it seemed to say exactly what he meant—just that, 
and not another thing—sprang ultimately from a deep, indeed religious, 
fealty to truth” (Kahn 1987, 327–28).
Because Shove was hardly indifferent to recognition by the scientific 
community, his reluctance to publish was inconvenient. A ludicrous inci-
dent in 1933 makes this clear. When he saw Robinson’s article in the Eco-
nomic Journal of December 1932—a discussion that commented on some 
of his ideas—he decided to respond by writing a note (1933b). Keynes 
allowed Robinson a brief reply and sent her Shove’s note. At this point, 
Shove seriously considered withdrawing from publication. On Febru-
ary 18, Robinson wrote Kahn, “I went to chat with Maynard about it + 
he was very amiable. He says Gerald has been giving him an awful time 
over it, + m finally got it out of him by saying that if he withdrew it he 
would encourage everyone to pinch all Gerald’s ideas + never make any 
acknowledgement” (rfk/13/90/1/123–26). Keynes’s clever manipulation 
of Shove’s proprietary interest in his ideas settled the matter, and the note 
was published in March 1933.
As she was writing in summer 1931, Robinson “pinched” several Sho-
vian ideas that were critical to her research at the time—above all his anal-
ysis of diminishing and increasing returns, cost curves, and rent. Shove 
received news of this fact somewhat awkwardly—not from Robinson her-
self but from Kahn, the “messenger angel” with whom he shared the high 
table at King’s. On October 24, shortly after she had begun to lecture 
on the theory of monopoly, Shove wrote a preemptive note designed to 
ensure that any use she made of his work would receive proper acknowl-
edgment: “I am delighted that any of my ideas or methods of exposition 
should bear fruit in this way, but may I say that I think some acknowl-
edgement should be made of their source? I am sure that you will agree 
with me; but past experience has taught me that it is best to make one’s 
feelings on these matters quite plain from the first—so I hope you will 
forgive me for writing” (jvr/vii/412/3–4).
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Robinson was not revising the proofs of a book. She did not even 
have a text. She was writing the first draft of a manuscript Shove had 
not seen, and his information was based on conversations with a third 
person. How did he know that Kahn’s account was accurate? How did 
he know that he had understood Kahn correctly? Even if Robinson’s 
current draft employed some of his ideas, how did he know they would 
survive successive revisions? Shove’s letter exhibits remarkable audac-
ity and impertinence. It presumes that if he did not instruct Robinson 
on how to meet her scholarly obligations—or if Kahn had not played 
his role as Shove’s informant—Robinson would publish his work as her 
own.
Robinson’s letters to Shove have not survived. However, his letter 
of October 22 shows that she responded with uncharacteristic restraint, 
assuring him that she intended to make the conventional acknowledg-
ments. He now claimed to be ashamed he had raised the matter at all: “I 
really felt sure all along that you intended to acknowledge anything you 
might owe to me.” Really? In that case, why did he inquire into Robinson’s 
lectures and the extent to which they might draw on his work? Shove’s 
letters are calculated to give the impression that his chief worry was a 
matter of pedagogy: he had been “feeling a little uneasy about the pos-
sible overlap” in their lectures on the analysis of increasing and decreasing 
returns. However, he failed badly in sustaining this impression, unwit-
tingly translating the issue of overlap between their lectures into a quite 
different and darker concern: her appropriation of his work. Again basing 
his speculations on conversations with Kahn, who had not given him a 
full account of the matter, he supposed that Robinson’s lectures might 
follow the line he had already taken. Because her lectures were a book 
in progress, he concluded that they would appear in her book in some 
fashion. In documenting his priority in the investigation of diminishing 
and increasing returns, he mentioned his publications, Cambridge lec-
tures, and even his supervisions as possible sources from which she might 
have drawn ideas. In view of these possibilities, which seemed to cover 
all conceivable intellectual performances with the exception of informal 
conversations, he proposed to send her “some short notes” on how he in-
tended to begin his Michaelmas lectures. He suggested that if she advised 
him on the extent of similar or parallel treatments of common problems 
in their courses, he would revise his material in order to eliminate any 
redundancies.115
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More than a month passed, and Shove did not send his short notes. 
However, he remained persistent in trying to discover how much of his 
work Robinson was using in her course. In writing her on December 2, his 
explanation was still the apparently innocent pedagogical concern. Unlike 
Robinson, he lectured on the theory of value over all three terms of the 
academic year. For this reason, he claimed, it would be “a great help to me 
in preparing my course for next term to know how much of my stuff you 
have covered in your lectures.” Instead of sending her his lecture notes, 
he listed some of the topics he intended to cover during the following 
term, asking her to write yes or no beside each to indicate whether she had 
lectured on that issue. He added that he had not attempted to frame his 
various points “fully or accurately,” informing Robinson only concerning 
the areas he proposed to discuss but not what he would say about them. 
“All I want to know,” he reiterated, “is how much of the field I intended 
to cover you have covered already + how far you have dealt with it on the 
lines which I have been accustomed to follow” (jvr/vii/412/8–9).
This explanation is difficult to credit. Consider the fact that Shove lec-
tured on the theory of value for three terms, Robinson only for one. Sup-
pose there was a one-to-one correspondence in the topics they covered 
and the mode of analysis they employed. Even if this were the case, it is 
not reasonable to assume that the analysis of rent, for example, on which 
Robinson might lecture for a week would reproduce an analysis to which 
he would devote some three weeks. If his real worry was pedagogical re-
dundancy, why did he fail to mention other areas in which their lectures 
were likely to overlap: their common background in Marshall’s theory of 
value, Sraffa’s critique, or the symposium? Shove was concerned with the 
extent to which she had taken his work and made it her own. If he did 
not want to lose proprietary control over his ideas, it makes sense that his 
résumé did not give a full account of the territory of his lectures.
Shove wrote again six days later. Robinson had complied with his re-
quest, and he appears to have been satisfied with the result. There was lit-
tle indication she was using his work. Did this end his worries? Robinson 
had apparently mentioned that her lectures included a typology of four 
cost curves. In a pedantically detailed exegesis of one of his essays, Shove 
tried to make the case that he had already developed the theoretical 
concept on which three of her curves were based. In this letter, Shove 
abandoned even a feigned interest in the subject matter of lectures and 
addressed the issue of priority directly and unequivocally:
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As regards the cost-curves, may I point out that in my first article in the [Eco-
nomic] Journal (June 1928 p 264), I distinguish between
(1) average cost including rent
(2) average cost excluding rent
(3) final trade cost (there defined as the increase in aggregate cost, other than 
rent, accompanying a unit increase in output, or more properly, the ratio of this 
increase to the increase in output): (+ in the footnote 4) on page 259, I indicated 
the treatment of cost + rent which I proposed to substitute for Marshall[’]s. I also 
allude on p 264 to the variation of these 3 costs with variations in output.
So far as I can understand, these are 3 of your 4 curves (I didn’t know the curves, 
but that is simply a mechanical process when once the concepts are defined).
Shove added that two of Robinson’s cost curves seem to have been taken 
from Kahn’s work. From the standpoint of the distribution of credit, 
therefore, what was the result? “I don’t want to claim more than I have 
contributed to the common pool, + perhaps I have misunderstood the 
nature of Kahn’s curves. I certainly thought from what he said to me 
that they were based on the various senses of ‘cost’ which I distinguish in 
the passage I have referred to. But perhaps I was mistaken.”116 Although 
the rhetoric of Shove’s letter was polite and reserved, its implications for 
Robinson’s typology were devastating. She had employed four curves. 
Three of them, Shove claimed, could be found in his article from 1928. 
Thus her typology disappeared, leaving her with only one curve for 
which she could claim credit. Although the curves themselves were new 
to Shove, he regarded this fact as insignificant. He had developed the 
concepts without drawing the diagrams. Once the concepts were in place 
and clarified, producing the diagrams was a mechanical and intellectually 
trivial exercise. Robinson had merely drawn the diagrams, performing a 
useful but menial piece of scientific labor.
Shove’s metaphor of the common pool is quite remote from Schum-
peter’s. Ideas cast into a Shovian pool are labeled with the names of their 
contributors, to be used only with appropriate attributions. Ideas cast 
into a Schumpeterian pool have no names attached; because ideas are not 
private property, the obligation—or even the practice—of crediting in-
novators has no place. Thus Shove was hardly a paragon of a putative 
Cambridge indifference to credit and priority.
Seemingly consumed by worries that Robinson might be gaining 
control over his unpublished but easily accessible work, Shove read for a 
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second time her response to his request for yes and no answers and wrote 
her again the next day. “This really shall be the last time,” he incautiously 
apologized. Perhaps there were other areas in which she had drawn on 
his work. For example, did she, following Shove, assume that factors of 
production were heterogeneous: some workers are more productive than 
others, some parcels of land more fertile than others, and so on? Shove 
wrote, “It would help me very much in thinking how full to make my 
treatment if you would tell me whether you did this in my way.” Again, 
he ignored a wide range of possible overlaps in their lectures. What mat-
tered was only what she might have taken from him. In spite of repeated 
queries and what appeared to be decidedly uncollegial insinuations of sci-
entific theft, Shove stressed that he was “most anxious that this business 
should not cause any misunderstanding between us.” In order to arrive at 
a mutual understanding on “the whole thing” without exchanging long 
explanations, he suggested they meet at King’s for tea and conversation 
at an early date.117 But if “this business” extended no further than a com-
parison of lecture notes, what was the cause for anxiety? In his vague but 
illuminating reference to “the whole thing,” Shove again revealed that 
his worries were not over pedagogical minutiae. He and Robinson met 
sometime before December 19. By this point it was clear that his game of 
questioning a potential intellectual felon who was expected to respond 
to his interrogatories had become something quite different. Each party 
was now engaged in a contest with the other, attempting to preemptively 
establish priority for specific ideas and deprive the opponent of credit. 
Robinson had developed an analysis of exploitation under conditions of 
imperfect competition. She apparently knew that Shove had done no sig-
nificant work on this issue. This was an opportunity to confirm her own 
originality. She succeeded: He admitted that he had done no work on this 
subject meriting recognition.118
Shove became quiescent for almost six months. However, in June 1932, 
with the tripos season ending and the long reprieve from lecturing and 
supervision in sight, he was ready to resume work on his book. Perhaps 
more important, he had new information from Kahn that Robinson was 
undertaking an extensive revision of her manuscript. What did her revi-
sions entail for differences between their analyses of diminishing returns 
on which she had reported in December? Her book would certainly be 
published before his. If her account now approximated his more closely, 
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his priority on a major theoretical problem would be threatened. Shove 
returned to the field in a letter of June 9, noting that he was making plans 
to revise his work on value and distribution. In order to eliminate material 
that would be covered in her book, he needed an account of her revisions. 
Although he wanted to know whether she had changed her position on 
the question of the homogeneity of factors of production, he also raised 
a much more general consideration: “I am assuming that you have not 
altered your treatment so as to make it still more like mine either in these 
matters or as regards the various elaborations I have been putting into my 
lectures. Is this all right?” (jvr/vii/412/20–21). On this occasion, Shove put 
the question not in his usual oblique fashion but directly: had Robinson 
appropriated his work on any of the points covered in his lectures? This 
letter ended Robinson’s season of forbearance. She replied with some as-
perity, writing Shove twice before he finally responded on June 21. She was 
not pleased with his suggestion that she would—in language he quoted 
from one of her replies—“cross-examine young men” who had attended 
his lectures in order to get ideas for her book. When Shove finally an-
swered, he made a desperate effort at damage control. He began badly, in-
sisting that he was not opposed to Robinson’s use of his work “with such 
acknowledgement as you think suitable.” At the same time, he registered 
a complaint he had harbored for almost a year without mentioning: her 
failure to inform him during the previous summer that she was writing 
a manuscript on diminishing returns that was very similar to his ideas, a 
text intended not only for her lectures but for publication. He pummeled 
her alternately with an iron fist and a velvet glove: “But that is all past 
and done with + I did not, + do not, intend to say anymore about it.”119
Shove found Robinson’s silence concerning her invasion of what he 
clearly regarded as his privileged domain quite galling, “especially after 
you [Robinson] had Dennis’ letter.” Was this a letter from Robertson 
instructing her on proper conduct in such a case? or perhaps informing 
her of Shove’s unhappiness and suggesting how it might be alleviated? 
Regardless of Shove’s view of its contents, the letter did not exist, as he 
admitted a few days later. It seems there was some conversation between 
Robinson and Robertson on intersecting research plans at Cambridge.120 
Shove’s remark suggests that messages concerning research transmitted 
between members of the guild were sometimes filtered through hints, in-
nuendos, and fragments of conversation with third persons.
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Although Shove denied that he had accused Robinson of using su-
pervisions to appropriate his ideas, his explanation was weak, seeming to 
confirm that this is precisely what he suspected. Kahn again entered the 
drama as his source of information about the progress of Robinson’s work: 
“Kahn told me some time ago that he had heard that you were revising 
your work a good deal + I thought you might be able to tell me, from what 
you had gathered in the ordinary way in supervision or from [illegible 
names]’s notes or from the sketch I sent you of my proposed treatment 
of rent in the individual firm + D[iminishing] R[eturns] whether your 
revision was along the same lines as my further elaborations.”121 It was 
not clear to Robinson how she could have drawn any conclusions “in the 
ordinary way in supervision” without steering her supervisory sessions to 
Shove’s lectures and posing questions to students in order to learn more 
about his most recent work. In this exchange, Robinson offered to delay 
publication of her book until Shove’s work had appeared. This would al-
lay his concerns over credit by ceding priority to him. Shove responded, 
“It’s very kind and generous of you to offer to postpone publication, but 
please don’t. I shall probably never publish + anyhow I should have to 
keep you back.”122 This does not seem to have been a genuine offer of 
heroic generosity but rather a pseudo-magnanimous gesture made on the 
assumption that it would not, and perhaps could not, be accepted.
It is true that Shove did not relish the prospect of seeing Robinson 
grind his ideas into fertilizer for her publications. His response to Eco-
nomics Is a Serious Subject made this quite clear. When Shove received his 
copy, he discovered that he had made an appearance in the text. Following 
Robinson’s classification of economists as either optimistic and analytical 
or pessimistic and methodological, she further distinguished the pessi-
mists as fundamental, methodological, or English—all this without fur-
ther explanation. English pessimists were said to be pure or logical, and 
Shove fell under this heading. She even designated him as the leading fig-
ure in this group, which “challenged the optimists by proposing new sets 
of assumptions just too hard for the existing technique and meanwhile, by 
their own methods, prospects for more complicated techniques adapted 
to realistic problems” (Robinson 1932a, 12). Shove was not amused. He 
was irritated to find himself relegated to an inferior status, a subaltern 
figure in the economic establishment who generated problems but not 
solutions. As he wrote her on October 19, 1932, “I can’t help feeling a 
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little—shall I say hurt at being publicly relegated to the duty of suggest-
ing ‘fresh problems’ for you to solve” (jvr/vii/412/30–31). However, ac-
ceptance of Robinson’s offer to defer publication would have been an act 
of reputational suicide on Shove’s part. By mid-1932, it was known in the 
small research community of the Marshallian guild that she was an ambi-
tious and aggressive scholar, just as it was known that he was not. Shove 
did not want to discourage Robinson from publishing. But he insisted 
that she credit him for unpublished work he regarded as his property. In 
this way, he would achieve quasi-priority through her references to his 
ideas. Even if he published little, he would still be read in her book as an 
innovator in the theory of value. Shove understood that in science a claim 
to credit is a claim to precedence, institutionally determined by priority 
of publication. He also understood that he would be defeated in a short-
term priority contest with Robinson, a race for precedence in publishing 
a post-Sraffian Cambridge analysis of price theory. But could he win a 
longer-term contest by imposing restrictions on her book? Could he ex-
tract concessions by persuading her to acknowledge use of ideas for which 
he claimed proprietary rights even though they were not published? If he 
was successful, he might win priority by proxy.
Although proof of precedence may have been irrelevant to the value of 
Shove’s ideas and the extent to which they were used by other economists, 
it was decisive in allocating credit.123 If the number of problems recognized 
as significant issues in a scientific discipline is smaller than the number of 
researchers at work on these problems, competition is inevitable. Produc-
tion of ideas that the scientific establishment certifies as meritorious may 
be somewhat loosely connected to recognition, reputation, and success in 
a scientific career. The development of original scientific ideas and the vali-
dation of claims to credit for these ideas are independent projects. There 
seems to be no essential connection between the skills needed to do origi-
nal thinking in science and those required for success in validating claims 
to credit for original thinking. Economists like Shove, who are gifted in 
developing new ideas, might fail miserably in producing accounts of their 
ideas that establish claims to priority. If Kahn’s judgment on Shove was 
sound—he would not publish a text until it seemed to say precisely what 
he meant to say—this placed him at a disadvantage to Robinson: a quick 
thinker, an astute scientific networker, and a nimble writer. The question 
of whether the originality and depth of her ideas matched his played no 
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role in the validation of claims to credit for these ideas. Shove seems to 
have grasped an important consequence of these considerations: scientists 
may do work for which they receive little or no credit.
The vision of the Cambridge economics faculty that emerges from 
Shove’s interrogations of Robinson is not attractive. The Marshallian 
guild of the Shovian imagination was driven by an obsession over intel-
lectual property rights. Cambridge economists were operators of small-
scale intelligence networks that exercised surveillance over colleagues and 
extracted intellectual resources that could be employed to advantage. It 
was an intensely competitive little world in which members could be ex-
pected to use all means at their disposal to acquire intellectual capital: lec-
tures of colleagues, third-person reports or rumors about the contents of 
these lectures, and conversations with third persons about other conversa-
tions. Students who appeared for supervision might also be useful sources 
of intelligence for adroit economists who knew how to pose clever ques-
tions that would elicit information about new ideas on which their col-
leagues were lecturing. In order to survive in this world, constant vigilance 
was called for and a readiness to take measures that might be required to 
deter theft of intellectual property. The tone of intraguild interactions was 
thus defined by jealousy, envy, spite, suspicion, anxiety, and mistrust.
The Cambridge Ethos Reconsidered
So much for Schumpeter’s metaphor of the common pool. Shove, Kahn, 
and Robinson, the Cambridge economists working in the area of price 
theory and imperfect competition, were hardly indifferent to proprietary 
rights in ideas. The making of The Economics of Imperfect Competition offers 
no support for the view of the guild as a secular knighthood of the grail of 
science, a collectivity committed to the disinterested pursuit of truth.
In “Science as a Vocation,” a classic examination of the cultural signifi-
cance of scientific and scholarly work, Max Weber distinguishes science 
as a career from science as a calling. Institutionally, science is grounded 
in the economic conditions of academic life, the division of labor in uni-
versity faculties, and the social organization of teaching and research. The 
institutions of science operate as social selection mechanisms that recruit 
candidates for scientific work and place some of them in career paths of 
varying promise and prestige; others it eliminates. Ethically, science is a 
set of values commitment to which differentiates candidates who have a 
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genuine calling for science from those who, as Weber puts it, “should do 
something else.” Conceived as a vocation, science is defined by the cat-
egorical imperatives of the scientific calling: clarity, intellectual integrity, 
and the project of fashioning the world as a “cosmos of truths” based on 
empirical and logical reasoning (Weber 1946, 129–56). Science as a voca-
tion is about research. The question of who is credited for a discovery is 
of no importance. Science as a career is about priority for research. The 
question of who is credited for a discovery is more important than the 
discovery itself. To pursue science as a vocation is to live for science. To 
pursue science as a career is to live off science. The Cambridge Apostles 
of the early twentieth century wrote as if an unconditional commitment 
to intellectual integrity and the pursuit of truth for its own sake were ul-
timate axioms of the higher culture their little society embodied. Lowes 
Dickinson, Bertrand Russell, Leonard Woolf, and their friends generalized 
these axioms as a Cambridge ethos. Schumpeter regarded it as a distinc-
tive feature of Cambridge economics. During the years of the inception of 
The Economics of Imperfect Competition, Robinson, her indispensable col-
laborator Kahn, and her chief irritant, Shove, may have been convinced 
that as intellectuals they lived exclusively for science. As the above account 
shows, they also lived off science, using their research and its artifacts to 
establish proprietary rights over ideas.124
Postscript—Kahn and Shove:  
Forestalling a Credit Conflict
In September 1934, when Kahn was drafting his article on ideal output, 
he began to worry over what he perceived as an impending conflict over 
precedence with Shove. David Champernowne, a student of King’s, had 
discussed with Shove some ideas in this area that he had heard in Kahn’s 
lectures. Following this discussion, Shove sent Kahn a set of notes on the 
same subject. Instead of reading them, Kahn wrote Keynes: “I find that 
Gerald has been striving to write something on the question of whether 
there are too many entrepreneurs. I feel rather dismayed, as I do not want 
to aggravate his persecution complex, though I felt I had to tell him that 
in my article I was leading up to the same topic (I have not quite got there 
yet).” Kahn’s letter posed a problem of precedence. If both he and Shove 
wrote articles for the Economic Journal along the same lines and at the same 
time, his claim to priority would be weakened. However, he did not want 
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to discourage Shove from publishing, especially since “he had obviously 
got quite thrilled about it.”125 In that event, how could the allocation of 
credit be managed? Kahn’s solution was to share credit with Shove. In an 
effort to arrange publication of articles on the same questions by himself 
and Shove—at the time Kahn raised these concerns, neither he nor Shove 
had submitted or even drafted an article—he suggested to Keynes that 
both pieces be published as independent contributions in the same issue 
of the journal. The result would be understood as a case of simultaneous 
discovery. With Keynes’s agreement, he left Shove’s notes unread until his 
article was finished. It appeared in the March issue of the journal (Kahn 
1935). He finally read Shove’s notes late that month with results he found 
“rather horrifying.” As he reported to Keynes, “There is very little of the 
latter part of my article which Gerald has not got hold of, and indicated in 
these notes, and in some respects he has gone far further than I have. In 
some ways the resemblance between our works is overwhelming.”126
At this point Kahn’s concerns shifted from protecting his credit 
claims—now guaranteed by publication—to the question of how Shove 
might receive credit for his article, which remained unwritten. He had 
advised Shove either to submit the current version of his notes with an 
addendum stating that they had been written long before Kahn’s article 
was published, or to begin where Kahn’s article ended and develop his 
own position. He also asked Keynes to support this suggestion by offer-
ing Shove an editorial invitation for a contribution on ideal output.127 
Kahn’s plan assumed that neither he nor Shove was motivated by a pure 
passion for discovery irrespective of distribution of credit. Neither would 
anonymously cast his ideas into a Schumpeterian research pool of ideas 
undifferentiated by their provenance. Kahn’s proposal was an arrange-
ment to divide credit. In the end his concerns proved to be misplaced. 
Shove, it seems, had no plans for an early publication on ideal output. 
As Kahn wrote Keynes shortly after corresponding with Shove about his 
notes, the March article had caused no conflict over credit, and an edito-
rial invitation to submit an article was now moot: “I have received an ex-
tremely kindly letter from Gerald replying to my comments on his notes. 
My article has done no harm. If it should provoke him into print, so much 
the better; but he expresses admiration rather than criticism, and I do not 
regard it now as important that he should be urged to publish something 
as I did when I wrote to you about it.”128
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a d d e n d u m — r o b i n s o n i a :  
i t s  p o l i t y  a n d  e c o n o m y
Science and scholarship rest on economic presuppositions. On the whole, 
as Weber put it, the academic career is based on “plutocratic prerequi-
sites”: “It is extremely hazardous for a young scholar without funds to 
expose himself to the conditions of the academic career. He must be able 
to endure this condition for at least a number of years without knowing 
whether he will have the opportunity to move into a position that pays 
well enough for maintenance” (Weber 1946, 129–30). Robinson was not 
subject to the economic hazards of becoming a Cambridge economist. 
She lived an upper-middle-class life in Cambridge. Like the lilies of the 
field in the Gospels, she did not sow nor did she reap. But in the absence 
of a regular stipend, how was it possible for her to consume without pro-
ducing and at the same time write her book? The answer is simple. She 
married Austin Robinson, who earned the income required for her life 
as an apprentice academic intellectual and liberally endowed her with the 
financial resources on which her early success rested. In the Robinsonian 
domestic polity and economy, three factors were especially important:
(1) As a young member of the Marshallian guild, Austin was a suc-
cess. He had a stellar record as an undergraduate, moving from one prize 
and honor to another.129 In 1916, he was awarded a scholarship in classics 
by Christ’s College. Following two years in the Royal Naval Air Service 
during the First World War, he placed in the First Class in 1920. On the 
advice of his supervisor, Fay, and apparently after attending a lecture by 
Keynes on the economics of the Treaty of the Versailles, he switched to 
economics and took another First in Part II of the tripos in 1922. He won 
the Wrenbury scholarship and, on the advice of Keynes, sat for and won 
the Almeric Paget Studentship. With these credentials and funding to do 
postgraduate work, he was elected a fellow of Corpus Christi in 1923.
(2) As noted earlier, shortly after their marriage in summer 1926 the 
Robinsons sailed to India, where Austin had accepted a position as tu-
tor to the ten-year-old maharajah of the State of Gwalior. The appoint-
ment seems to have been arranged through personal connections. One of 
Robinson’s friends, Dorothea, was the daughter of Sir Theodore Mori-
son, a former head of Osmania University in India with close contacts 
among officials of the State of Gwalior. When they approached him for 
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advice on an appropriate tutor for the maharajah, he interviewed Austin 
at his daughter’s suggestion. It appears that Robinson brokered the ap-
pointment, a job for which, as Austin later put it, he received a “tax-free 
stipend higher than I have ever earned since” (in Cairncross 1993, 20). In 
India, the Robinsons occupied a villa staffed by fifteen servants, including 
kitchen help, housekeepers, maids, gardeners, and chauffeurs. Notwith-
standing this style of life, Austin was able to save some £100 a month dur-
ing their years in India. After his return to Cambridge as a fellow of Syd-
ney Sussex College in 1929, he wrote The Structure of Competitive Industry 
(1931), a highly successful book based on his fellowship dissertation. His 
only other book was Monopoly (1941). Robinson doubted it would ever 
be completed. In early 1933, she wrote Kahn that Austin never mentioned 
it and suggested that it had “better be quietly forgotten.”130 In Cairn-
cross’s judgment, the book, unlike its predecessor, was derivative and ap-
peared too late in the development of research on monopoly to achieve 
prominence.
On returning to Cambridge, Austin found his true academic vocation, 
which lay in administration. His “addiction to administration,” according 
to his biographer, was perhaps the most striking feature of his career, and 
he was a model of a type of British academic that Annan has called “the 
don as administrator.”131 From May 1930 to February 1934, he was secre-
tary of the faculty board. Pigou, chairman of the board at the time, had a 
pronounced distaste for administration and delegated many of his duties 
to Austin. During the 1930s, Austin was also an important contributor 
to the reform of the Economics Tripos and, at Pigou’s request, assumed 
responsibility for creating and planning the Marshall Library as well as 
managing its relocation. Austin stepped down as secretary of the board in 
order to accept Keynes’s offer of the assistant editorship of the Economic 
Journal. A letter to Lydia on February 11, 1934, shows that Keynes knew 
his man: “This afternoon I have been round to Austin Robinson to talk 
about his being assistant editor of the Economic Journal. He jumps at it 
gladly as I thought he would” (jmk/pp/45/190/5). Austin’s responsibilities 
were to proofread galleys for all issues, serve as book review editor, and 
write short notes on new books (Robinson 1990, 166). He was compen-
sated for all this work. Austin’s letter of appointment from Keynes placed 
his annual stipend at £225 for the period June 1934 to June 1937 (eagr/
Box 9/2/1/17/73). His income also increased when he consulted on British 
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economic affairs in Africa. In addition to his six-month research contract 
in 1933, he participated in the massive Africa Survey, produced under the 
direction of Lord Hailey. His chapter on labor and economic develop-
ment consumed much of his Cambridge summer vacations in 1934–37.
(3) Although Austin could not be described as a feminist, from the 
perspective of his times, the academic culture in which he moved, and 
his position in it, he was a liberal and enlightened husband. Because his 
academic interests were more bureaucratic than theoretical, he did not 
compete with his wife for domestic research resources. There seems to 
have been no professional competitiveness or jealousy. Austin was proud 
of his wife’s work, encouraged her to pursue it, helped her improve it, 
and disposed of marital assets that gave her the leisure she needed to do 
it. The table on the next page documents annual lecture loads and com-
pensation figures for the Robinsons in 1930–39. In the years she worked 
on The Economics of Imperfect Competition, Robinson earned little and had 
no private income from her family. In 1918, her father had been dismissed 
from the British army during a widely publicized conflict with Prime 
Minister Lloyd George.132 Aside from the meager £25 she received for 
a short course of lectures in Michaelmas 1932, her only source of income 
was student supervision. However, she had a reputation for insisting 
on choosing her own pupils. As Austin observed much later, it was not 
her intention to make a “heavy commitment to doing college teaching” 
(quoted in Turner 1989, 21).
Without a fellowship or lectureship, Robinson lacked the resources re-
quired for scientific production. Robinson had no room of her own in the 
expansive Virginia Woolfian sense—no control over the production and 
disposition of the necessities of life at Cambridge. The lease on the flat 
at 3 Trumpington Street, where she did her writing and which was only 
a short walk from the university library and the men’s colleges, was paid 
from Austin’s salary. His income also covered the wages of a housekeeper 
who performed chores, prepared meals, and even collected mail and de-
livered it to Robinson’s room. She timed her first pregnancy to mini-
mize interference with research, another decision supported by Austin.133 
After her first daughter was born, a nurse was added to the household 
staff. Even in later life it was said that Robinson was completely depen-
dent on domestic help.134 Perhaps these stories are not entirely apocry-
phal. In February 1933, she wrote Kahn that Robbins, who was visiting 
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l e c t u r e s  d e l i v e r e d  b y  a u s t i n  a n d  j o a n  r o b i n s o n  
a n d  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  s t i p e n d s ,  1 9 3 0 – 3 9
academic 
year austin robinson stipends
1930–31 Economic Structure (ma,  l b) 
Power Transport and  
Localization (m , l ) 
Money, Banking, and  
International Trade (ec) 
None Austin, £408
Robinson, 0
1931–32 Economic Structure (m , l )
Current Economic  
Problems (l )
Money, Banking, and  
International Trade (e )
Pure Theory of 
Monopoly (m )
A short course at  




1932–33 Economic Structure (l , e )
Money, Banking, and  




1933–34 Economic Structure  
(m , l , e )
Elementary Economic  
Theory (l )
Economics of Imperfect  




1934–35 Economic Structure  
(m , l , e )
The Coalmining Industry  
(m , l )
Economics of Imperfect  
Competition (m )
Applications of  




1935–36 Economic Structure  
(m , l , e )
The Coalmining Industry  
(m , l )
Applications of  
Monetary Theory (m , l )
Some Problems of  




1936–37 Economic Structure  
(m , l , e )
The Coalmining Industry  
(m , l )
Applications of  
Monetary Theory (m , l )
Some Problems of  




1937–38 Economic Structure  
(m , l , e )
The Coalmining Industry  
(m , l )
Applications of  
Monetary Theory (l , e )
Some Problems of  




1938–39 Economic Structure  
(m , l , e )
The Coalmining Industry  
(m , l )
Applications of  
Monetary Theory (e )
Some Problems of  
Economic Theory (e )




a m  = Michaelmas (autumn), b l  = Lent (winter), c e  = Easter (spring)
sources:  Compiled from the Minutes of the Meetings of the Faculty Board of Economics 
and Politics and Cambridge University Reporter, various years.
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Cambridge to deliver a lecture to the Marshall Society, would spend the 
night with the Robinsons. But “owing to my excellent Mary [the maid] 
being ill, we shall have to dine at the Union.”135
In sum, during the critical years of her apprenticeship and early scien-
tific production, Robinson had no financial responsibilities. She was not 
obliged to devote her time continuously or even intermittently to gain-
ful employment. Free of the burden of making a living and the toils of 
housekeeping and child care, she spent much of her day on creative work. 
After her first child was born, her practice was to write from nine until 
noon each weekday (Turner 1989, 20), a schedule made possible by the 
household organization that Austin’s income supported. Work during va-
cations and family holidays was part of her routine. On a family holiday 
in August 1936, Robinson—mother of a three-year-old child and hostess 
to relatives and friends—wrote Kahn of her success at maintaining a full 
work schedule. Perhaps unnecessarily she added, “I find intensive family 
life quite amusing, but I can see it wouldn’t suit me for an occupation.”136 
The occupation she chose rested on opportunities and economic under-
pinnings secured by her husband’s position at Cambridge.
Joan Robinson. By permission of The Cambridgeshire Collection, Cambridge Central Library.
Austin Robinson. By permission of The Cambridgeshire Collection, Cambridge Central Library.
Richard Kahn. By permission of The Cambridgeshire Collection, Cambridge Central Library.
Arthur Cecil Pigou. By permission of The Cambridgeshire Collection, Cambridge Central Library.
John Maynard Keynes. By permission of The Cambridgeshire Collection, Cambridge Central Library.
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`
Becoming a  
Keynesian
p r o t é g é  w i t h o u t  a  p a t r o n
Academic patronage—the investment of personal and institutional pres­
tige, power, and intellectual capital in the career of a protégé—was one of 
the methods Cambridge economists used to produce and reproduce the 
culture of Marshallian economics. Perhaps it could be said that the guild 
began with an act of patronage. Pigou’s patron was Marshall himself. The 
master of the guild managed the selection of his successor as Professor of 
Political Economy by lobbying the electors to support his choice. Pigou, 
then only thirty, was chosen over three more experienced men, including 
Marshall’s old friend H. S. Foxwell, who had a reasonable expectation for 
the chair.1 When Keynes’s dissertation on the theory of probability was 
rejected for a prize fellowship at King’s, Pigou and Marshall cooperated 
to arrange his appointment to a lectureship. Keynes in turn was Shove’s 
patron. His tenacious support for the election of his former student to a 
fellowship at King’s, notwithstanding a failed dissertation and a modest 
record of publication, finally succeeded in 1926.2
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Patronage lowered barriers of entry to the guild for protégés, en­
dowing them with resources not available to other candidates. It eased 
the path to lectureships and fellowships for the favored few, at the same 
time enabling the guild to control access to membership on the basis of 
close personal acquaintance with aspirants for entry. The acquisition of 
a patron was more often than not a significant step in advancing the ca­
reers of Cambridge theoreticians in residence in 1930. As protégés, Pigou, 
Keynes, Shove, Sraffa, and Kahn all benefited from the power, generosity, 
and largesse of savvy patrons. In principle, the patron­protégé relation­
ship could be initiated by either party. Patrons could choose promising 
students as protégés, or aspirants could make the first move in attempting 
to attract a patron. In fact, all Cambridge theoreticians of the 1920s who 
were beneficiaries of patronage had been among the chosen.
In 1930, no Cambridge economist had chosen Robinson as his pro­
tégé. Because she was not an attractive investment, she would have to 
take the initiative. What were her options? In the 1920s, no women had 
entered the circle of Cambridge theoreticians. Pigou was notorious for 
his reserve toward women. Although only fifty­three in 1930, he was re­
garded as being old by the younger fellows. Shove was moody, volatile, 
and uncertain of his abilities. Sraffa was not a political force on the faculty 
and by 1931 had withdrawn from lecturing (Marcuzzo 2005). Robertson 
was attempting to maintain his status as Keynes’s most trusted client, a 
position he would soon lose to Kahn. If patronage requires a sure and 
confident hand in deploying valuable resources in the interest of a cli­
ent, it is not surprising that Robinson chose Keynes. Among the senior 
economists at Cambridge, his skills in the arts of patronage were the most 
polished and practiced. Shove, Robertson, Sraffa, and Kahn as well as 
several Cambridge academics who were not economists had been his bene­
ficiaries. However, Robinson faced daunting obstacles. Her early contacts 
with Keynes as Austin’s wife and then as Kahn’s special friend were not 
to her advantage. The first left her invisible.3 The second represented her 
as a source of conflict and high risks, a party to a dangerous liaison with 
the protégé in whom Keynes had invested most and for whom he had the 
highest expectations. To acquire Keynes as a patron, she would develop 
new terms of engagement and give him reasons to accept her on these 
terms. One of her tactics was to define roles for herself that he found 
congenial and perform them to his satisfaction. Robinson would become 
the expositor, propagator, and propagandist of the Keynesian revolution, 
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defending the hero of the new science against the slings and arrows of his 
adversaries and explaining and extending his doctrines. Several incidents 
gave Robinson opportunities to move in this direction and at the same 
time to move Keynes, first to qualified support and finally to active pa­
tronage. The results she achieved by managing these opportunities were 
dramatic. However, they were not produced quickly or without careful 
planning and laborious efforts on her part.4
t h e  h a y e k  c o n t r o v e r s y
Robinson’s first successful attempt to refashion herself as a protégé of 
Keynes began in early 1932. The occasion was his controversy with Hayek: 
the gifted young Viennese economist, recently appointed professor at 
lse, and author of a faultlessly civil but devastating review of the Treatise, 
an autopsy in vivo of its logical and conceptual weaknesses.5 Hayek’s at­
tack left Keynes uncharacteristically stunned, bewildered, and resentful. 
Robinson was able to use the Hayek affair in order to make herself service­
able to Keynes in a matter to which he ascribed considerable importance. 
After her interventions on his behalf, he had reason to see her as one of the 
brighter young Cambridge economists whose services he might employ 
to good advantage. Robinson courted Keynes by volunteering to translate 
and refine the ideas he called his intuitions into theoretical models that 
could be expected to sustain criticism without suffering undue damage. 
Because the Hayek controversy proved to be a critical rite of passage in 
her efforts to acquire Keynes’s patronage, some observations on Hayek’s 
critique and Keynes’s response are in order.
In his lengthy review, published in two parts in Economica (1931b, 1932), 
Hayek tossed Keynes bland compliments as he dismantled the underpin­
nings of the Treatise and cut its main ideas to shreds. He began with a 
telling observation: “The appearance of any work by Mr. J. M. Keynes 
must always be a matter of importance: and the publication of the Treatise 
on Money has long been awaited with intent interest by all economists” 
(Hayek 1931b, 270). Keynes had indeed announced publication of his 
theory of money with considerable fanfare. Seven years in the making, it 
was his first systematic effort at economic theory, a book that could be ex­
pected to establish his reputation as a grand theorist. It was not to be. The 
work was bound to disappoint, Hayek claimed, because the unfinished 
and experimental quality of the exposition made it painfully obvious that 
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Keynes’s new line of analysis—based on the premise that the main prob­
lem of monetary theory was the rate of interest and its relation to saving 
and investment—was also new to him. The Treatise bore all too clearly 
the marks of a first draft, an initial attempt to integrate the analytical meth­
ods entailed by this premise into the traditional conceptual apparatus of 
Cambridge economics (Hayek 1931b, 270). However, what was new to 
Keynes was well­trodden ground to continental economists, who had 
been thoroughly trained in the works of Knut Wicksell and Eugen Böhm­
Bawerk, the chief architects of the methodological strategy that he had 
recently and unwittingly rediscovered. Keynes assumed the improbable 
guise of the muddled pedant Mr. Casaubon in George Eliot’s Middlemarch: 
vainly ambitious, self­important, and hopelessly confused, he labored for 
years and wrote at great length on problems that had been solved long 
before by continental scholars whose work he had either failed to read 
or misunderstood. Hayek pronounced the Treatise obscure and unsyste­
matic, not only unfinished but “unintelligible” (Hayek 1931b, 271).
Hayek undermined Keynes’s theoretical structure at several signifi­
cant points. Unaccountably, Keynes’s concept of money income did not 
include the profits of entrepreneurs. He assumed that total profits can 
increase only if the amount of money in circulation increases. He failed 
to recognize that output can be increased by changes in relative sectoral 
profits. His analysis of investment was weak since it included no account 
of the conditions under which it becomes more or less attractive, and 
his concept of investment seemed to be intolerably vague, varying from 
case to case as he moved from one problem to another. He attempted to 
analyze complex dynamic processes without providing an adequate static 
foundation. He failed to develop a comparative statics that would specify 
the requirements for maintaining capital intact or defining equilibrium 
conditions that obtained at specific savings rates. He appropriated the 
ideas of other economists, misinterpreted them, and built the miscon­
ceived ideas into his own theory. Perhaps most egregiously, he employed 
Wicksell’s theory of interest rates but changed his definition of what the 
interest rate is. He also seemed to be ignorant of the basis of Wicksell’s 
position in Böhm­Bawerk’s theory of capital (Hayek 1931b, 273–80).6
In a brief rejoinder to the first part of the review, Keynes attempted 
to blunt the force of Hayek’s criticisms by means of various denials and 
explanations. The results were not persuasive, betraying uncertainty on 
Keynes’s part over what he had actually written in the Treatise. He denied 
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that he subscribed to the view that the amount of money in circulation 
is the only factor that alters the balance between saving and investment. 
However, he acknowledged that he might be responsible for this confu­
sion since other economists shared Hayek’s impression. Some of Hayek’s 
misinterpretations, he admitted, were a result of ill­formed analyses in the 
Treatise, produced by the circumstances in which the book was written. 
As he wrote the final two­volume version of the book, his thinking on the 
theory of money was in flux, a point Hayek had made at the beginning 
of his review. In the Treatise, Keynes finally abandoned his long­standing 
commitment to the quantity theory of money and embraced a new view. 
But he was unsure about the exact relation between his old and new posi­
tions and not altogether clear concerning which view he had defended 
(Keynes 1931, 389–90).
Were these concessions damaging? Remarkably, Keynes claimed they 
were not, although in making this assertion his usual sense of certitude 
was missing: “I think I can show that most of my alleged terminological 
inconsistencies are either non­existent or irrelevant to my central theme” 
(Keynes 1931, 391). This was a lame response. Hayek was not chiefly inter­
ested in terminological niceties. He argued that many of Keynes’s most 
important positions were mistaken and his analyses of these positions in­
valid. He also questioned Keynes’s standards of intellectual craftsmanship, 
suggesting that the Treatise was a product of shallow thinking and shoddy 
scholarship. And even if Keynes thought he could finesse Hayek’s criti­
cisms with cosmetic rhetorical concessions and debating tactics, what was 
the point? After all, he contended that Hayek’s objections did not depend 
on questions of terminology at all. They were a consequence of irrec­
oncilable worldviews. This meant that Hayek was “looking for trouble” 
(Keynes 1931, 388). As Keynes understood their differences, Hayek be­
lieved that an increase in voluntary saving would invariably be followed 
by higher rates of investment unless the banking system intervened with 
measures that distorted the quantitative equivalence of saving and invest­
ment. Keynes, on the other hand, argued that changes in the rate of saving 
or investment did not depend solely on monetary authorities. Decisions 
taken by economic actors could change these rates and create an imbal­
ance between the two values. In the Treatise, there was no self­regulating 
mechanism that could reestablish the balance between saving and invest­
ment (Keynes 1931, 393).
Hayek addressed the decoupling of saving and investment in a reply 
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to Keynes’s rejoinder and also in the second part of his review (Hayek 
1931c, 1932). He argued that Keynes’s position was based on the pecu­
liar and insupportable assumption that output in both consumption and 
investment goods sectors remains constant under all conditions. In fact, 
he claimed, an increase in discretionary or voluntary saving reduces the 
demand for consumption goods, making that sector less profitable and 
investment goods relatively more attractive. As a result, entrepreneurs in 
the consumption goods sector reduce their output, releasing factors of 
production that are then used to increase the output of investment goods. 
Keynes’s assumption of fixed output in both sectors entailed that the 
quantity of factors of production in consumption goods remains constant 
notwithstanding steep declines in profitability. Hayek maintained that on 
this premise, new investment was impossible in principle. He charged 
Keynes with circular reasoning: “The most curious fact is that, from the 
outset, all of Mr Keynes’s reasoning which aims at proving that an in­
crease in savings will not lead to an increase in investment is based on the 
assumption that, in spite of the decrease in the demand for consumption 
goods, the available output is not reduced; this means, simply, that he as­
sumes from the outset what he wants to prove” (Hayek 1932, 31).
Hayek had drawn blood, and Keynes knew he had been wounded, 
as his first lecture of the Easter term in 1932 shows. Entitled “Notes on 
Fundamental Terminology,” it was defensive and at some points tart and 
captious. This was not the standard Keynes, who had a reputation for 
dazzling brilliance, logical virtuosity, and near invincibility in disputa­
tion. Bertrand Russell judged his mind “the sharpest and clearest that 
I have ever known. When I argued with him, I felt that I took my life in 
my hands, and I seldom emerged without feeling something of a fool” 
(Russell 1967, 88). The petulant tone of this first lecture makes sense 
only if it is read as a veiled rebuke of Hayek, who is not mentioned even 
though the second part of his review had appeared in February. The lec­
ture considers three main issues: the logical status of theoretical defini­
tions, the importance of precision in framing theories, and the extent to 
which theorists should anticipate and answer objections that might be 
raised by obtuse or unreasonable critics.
Keynes’s discussion of the first issue was surprisingly perfunctory. Af­
ter all, he had just been treated quite roughly by a critic whose objections, 
as Keynes represented them, were based on presumptive logical defects in 
his theoretical framework. He instructed his audience that if definitions 
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are followed consistently, no set of theoretical concepts is logically prefer­
able to any other. The choice between alternative definitions should be 
made on purely pragmatic grounds, by considering their utility for theory 
construction. He did not consider the possibility that a set of theoreti­
cal definitions might be internally inconsistent or that a single definition 
could be self­contradictory. In either case, definitions are incoherent on 
logical grounds alone and independent of pragmatic considerations. Al­
though Keynes’s discussion of the second issue was more extensive, his 
main point concerned not precision but a principle of scientific ethics that 
supports a high tolerance for vagueness. All definitions are vague in some 
respects, and it would be futile to strive for an unattainable ideal of pre­
cision. Such an attempt would be self­defeating since the author “may 
never perhaps reach the matter at hand and the reader certainly will not” 
(Keynes 1979, 36). He stressed that his method was based on a legitimate 
expectation of “intelligence and good will” on the part of professional 
readers of scientific works. Readers could not be taken seriously if they 
pursued the scientific enterprise in a morally perverse fashion, insisting on 
criteria for precision that do not apply to relevant theoretical issues and 
may even be unsatisfiable in principle. The theoretician who did not act 
on Keynes’s expectation would quickly reach a dead end, finding himself 
compelled to “concoct a legal document which he is prepared to stand by 
literally and to suffer deprivation of rights if any case or contingency can 
be discovered for which he has failed to provide strictly and explicitly be­
forehand” (Keynes 1979, 37). In discussing the third issue, Keynes argued 
that economic theory is based on moral foundations. Theoretical work is 
possible only if economists act on a principle of charity that requires read­
ers to follow arguments and understand them as they were intended. In 
the language of contemporary analytical historiography, economists have 
an obligation to grasp the illocutionary force of a theory—what the theo­
retician intended to do in taking the positions articulated in the theory. As 
Keynes put it, readers have an obligation “to catch the substance, what the 
writer is at” (Keynes 1979, 37). Self­indulgent quibbling over definitions 
that are largely arbitrary or an insistence on logical strictures and other 
purely formal requirements that have no place in economics violates this 
ethic. This is why it is pointless to anticipate and answer the objections of 
an irresponsible critic—“someone who has not really followed the argu­
ment or taken in the point,” the reader “whose mind is really running on 
another track” (Keynes 1979, 37).
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Who was the unnamed target of Keynes’s lecture, the critic whose 
mind was “running on another track”? Who had violated the ethic of char­
ity by withholding the good will required to understand Keynes’s ideas 
on their own terms and as he intended them, thereby failing to grasp the 
substance of his arguments? It was Hayek, as Keynes made clear in notes 
he wrote on the first installment of Hayek’s review: “Hayek has not read 
my book with that measure of ‘goodwill’ which an author is entitled to 
expect of a reader. Until he can do so, he will not see what I mean or know 
whether I am right. He evidently has a passion which leads him to pick on 
me, but I am left wondering what this passion is” (Keynes 1973a, 243).
Robinson saw the Keynes­Hayek controversy as an opportunity to 
change the basis of her relationship with Keynes. She had read Hayek’s 
review and his exchange with Keynes, and she was in close contact with 
Kahn, on whose judgment Keynes relied in responding to Hayek.7 It is 
reasonable to suppose that she knew Keynes had asked Sraffa to review 
Hayek’s book Prices and Production (Hayek 1931a)—a crushing logical at­
tack on its theoretical structure, the very point on which Hayek had ham­
mered Keynes mercilessly (Sraffa 1932). Although Keynes’s lectures in 1932 
did not begin until April 25, he was discussing them with Kahn as early as 
February 11 (Moggridge in Keynes 1979, 35). It is likely that Robinson be­
came acquainted with the lectures as he discussed them with Kahn. When 
Kahn was not on hand in the days immediately before the first lecture, 
the Robinsons seem to have taken his place. As Keynes noted to Lydia on 
April 24, “Yesterday I went to tea with Joan and Austin (Kahn is away at 
Passover) to talk high economics” (jmk/pp/45/190/5).
Thus as Keynes was writing his lectures for the Easter term, Robinson 
had an insider’s perspective on the damage Hayek’s review had inflicted. 
Her essay “A Parable on Saving and Investment”—which she playfully 
dubbed “Peas and Gold”—was redrafted against this background. An at­
tempt to clarify and support the basic position Keynes had taken against 
Hayek, it was a résumé of some of the work done by the Circus in 1930–31 
and represented her first published effort to establish her credentials as a 
Keynesian.8 She was reworking the paper by March 31, 1932, when she 
asked Kahn for his comments before sending it to Keynes for his approval 
(rfk/13/90/1/9–10). As another letter to Kahn the same day shows, she 
was keen to share her examination of the Hayek matter with Keynes: “I 
have written to him [Keynes] mentioning the peas. I quite agree they 
must be reboiled before he sees them, but I thought I should open ne­
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gociations [sic]. Also I have offered him the Nightmare for the Club” 
(rfk/13/90/1/7–8).9
Why the urgency to begin negotiations? And what was there to nego­
tiate? Not the possibility of publishing her essay in the Economic Journal. 
Robinson had already decided on Economica, where Hayek’s review and 
the Keynes­Hayek exchange had appeared. Could she have been anxious 
to gain Keynes’s agreement to her decision? Hardly. As she wrote Kahn 
on May 6, “I can’t get Miss Lane [typist] till tomorrow so the peas are 
delayed. I fear I may miss jmk. I will write to Economica and ask for space 
without sending the ms” (rfk/13/90/1/11–12). What about a discussion 
with Keynes on her exposition and critique of the Treatise? This explana­
tion is also ruled out; at this point she intended only to inform him of the 
essay, not send a copy. Another possibility remains: Robinson’s purpose 
was to transact an informal exchange, offering to perform a service for 
him, in return for which she would receive something she wanted. What 
could Robinson give Keynes at this point that he did not have? A more 
lucid analysis of the relations between changes in demand and prices in 
the consumer and investment goods industries than his account in the 
Treatise. More important, she would show that in spite of his various 
blunders, Keynes’s views on the fundamental theoretical questions in his 
dispute with Hayek were sound. What did Robinson want from Keynes? 
Most immediately, acceptance of her offer to read a paper at his Monday 
Night Club. At this point in her development as an economist, when she 
was an occasional supervisor and lecturer with no scientific credentials, 
the Monday Night Club was an ideal forum for her work. Keynes selected 
speakers for this informal seminar, which met in his rooms at King’s. Pre­
sentation of a paper was a mark of prestige at Cambridge. Although there 
is no reason to suspect that he intended such a move, acceptance of her 
offer would be tantamount to use of his power in breaking a barrier to her 
entry into this all­male gathering of the guild, where members established 
their credentials and gained recognition of their status. A chance to read 
her work in this setting would give Robinson a first public opportunity 
to demonstrate her theoretical strengths to Keynes in the company of 
other members of the economics faculty and a select audience of brighter 
undergraduates. Prima facie this speculation may seem improbable, not 
least because it presumes a rather crude quid pro quo tactical calculation 
on Robinson’s part. However, it is the only explanation of her remark 
to Kahn on negotiations that is consistent with the facts; it is reasonable 
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given her efforts to gain access to Keynes at this time; and, as the fol­
lowing account shows, it conforms to her career management program 
between 1932 and 1938: to achieve success at Cambridge by succeeding 
with Keynes.
By April 6, Robinson had Kahn’s notes. Three days later she was as­
sessing the paper in light of his comments: “Thanks so much for saving 
me from my headlong errors. But except for profits on gold I am pre­
pared to defend myself. We must leave the other points until you come 
up [to Cambridge]. Meanwhile I will send this to jmk” (rfk/13/90/1/17–
18). The same day, she sent the paper to Keynes with the following note:
I hope you will like my green peas. If you have any suggestions perhaps you 
could send this back with notes. If not send me a post card saying O.K. and I will 
send another copy which I have by me to Economica.
The argument is a bit thin in places as I have tried to make it extremely simple. 
In its present form I don’t think it could stand up to cross examination by hostile 
counsel. But I didn’t want to sacrifice the clarity of the outline by guarding myself 
at all points against crabbed objections. It’s intended for people who don’t know 
what to think, not for the ones who have their own answer for everything. (In 
Keynes 1973a, 268–69)
In the article, Robinson called her ideal reader the “ordinary muddle­
headed reader of economics,” to whom she addressed one central point 
in the controversy between Keynes and Hayek. Hayek maintained that 
increased voluntary saving necessarily led to increased investment. Keynes 
held that there was no mechanism that brought these two values to equal­
ity. Which position was correct? Robinson proposed to prove that not­
withstanding Keynes’s error of assuming that the total quantity of output 
in the consumption and capital goods industries was fixed, he was right 
on the essential issue of the dispute.
Suppose that voluntary saving increases, thereby reducing the demand 
for consumption goods. Suppose also that there is no hoarding, in which 
case additional savings cannot remain idle. Based on the discussions of 
the Circus, Robinson attempted to explain Keynes’s argument in her par­
able of peas, or consumption goods, and gold, investment goods. Because 
consumption goods can be stored only briefly, their inventories are small. 
Increased demand for peas will quickly exhaust inventories and increase 
prices; in a period of declining demand, prices will drop because entre­
preneurs cannot maintain larger inventories of peas. The capital goods 
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industry follows a different economic logic. Compared to current output, 
inventories of gold are large. The pivotal role in the market is played by 
speculators, not producers. Suppose that voluntary saving increases and 
the demand for peas drops. In that case, the demand for securities—invest­
ment goods, or titles to the existing stock of gold—will increase. Given 
the absence of hoarding, if economic actors are not buying consumption 
goods, they must be buying investment goods. On Keynes’s assumption 
that entrepreneurs in the consumption goods sector continue to produce 
the same level of output, they will begin to sell their inventories of gold 
to cover their losses. In that event, the increased demand for investment 
goods will be met by a larger supply of gold from existing inventories. 
What follows from these considerations is that neither the price nor the 
output of investment goods can be expected to increase.
On one point Robinson agreed with Hayek. In the face of losses, it 
was unrealistic to assume that the output of peas would remain constant. 
This is why the “simple minded reader” of the Treatise found it difficult to 
imagine “an acute slump with full employment, and a trade boom with­
out any increase in output” (Robinson 1933a, 84). However, introduction 
of realistic premises into Keynes’s arguments did not affect his conclu­
sions. Faced with losses, producers of peas would lay off workers and 
reduce output rather than sell gold. At that point, unemployed workers 
would have two options. They might draw on their savings, expenditures 
that would offset the increased voluntary saving that initiated the process 
of unemployment. Or they might go on the dole, financed by a govern­
ment issuing additional securities. In neither case would greater saving 
increase investment.
What did Keynes make of all this? As he wrote Robinson on April 
14, the paper was excellent. Although he suggested minor revisions to 
some of her arguments and noted that she had perhaps treated him a bit 
roughly over the assumption of constant output, he speculated that read­
ers would find her parable helpful in understanding the Treatise and the 
issues at stake in his dispute with Hayek. He was especially pleased by 
the fact that she had made a case for the main lines of his analysis: “My 
own general reaction to criticisms always is that of course my treatment 
is obscure and sometimes inaccurate, and always incomplete, since I was 
tackling completely unfamiliar ground, and had not got my own mind by 
any means clear on all sorts of points. But the real point is not whether 
all this is so, as of course it is, but whether this sort of way of thinking 
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and arguing about the subject is right. And that is what I am grateful to 
you for defending and expounding” (Keynes 1973a, 270). Keynes did not 
grasp the importance of Robinson’s major tactical initiative: the attempt 
to recruit allies among undecided or confused readers and people who 
did not know what to think. Keynes was intent on persuading his adver­
saries, who were generally established economists. Robinson was con­
vinced that success depended on converting the uninitiated.
t h e  m a n i f e s t o  o f  t h e  t r u m p i n g t o n 
s t r e e t  s c h o o l
Although “A Parable on Saving and Investment” put Robinson on 
Keynes’s map of Cambridge economists, it was not a piece of original 
thinking. Borrowing heavily from the work of the Circus as well as from 
Kahn’s article “The Relation of Home Investment to Unemployment” 
(1931), its derivative character could hardly have escaped his notice. In 
spring 1932, The Economics of Imperfect Competition was still an incom­
plete manuscript. Even if the book were finished, there is no reason to 
suppose it would have made Robinson more appealing to Keynes. As 
editor, he published articles on imperfect competition in the Economic 
Journal because the idea had stimulated new theoretical work, not least 
at Cambridge. But as Robinson observed many years later, he did not 
take an active interest in this new research program (Robinson 1979, 5). 
She could expect to engage his attention only by moving into an area 
that attracted him—research that promised contributions to his current 
thinking. Although she would continue to work on her book for another 
year, Keynes’s Easter term lectures in 1932 provided an occasion for this 
sort of reorientation on her part—an opportunity to present herself as a 
junior colleague he would find useful, someone who not only grasped 
his theoretical intuitions but was prepared to recast them in the technical 
language of economic analysis.
After his first lecture on April 25, Keynes wrote Lydia that Kahn, 
the Robinsons, and Sraffa had been on hand “to spy on me” (jmk/
pp/45/190/5). Although he was pleased with this lecture, his second effort 
on May 2 left him annoyed and vexed with himself. Writing Lydia again: 
“I’ve moved into a cycle today; stammered at my lecture and gave a bad 
one (as Kahn agreed)” (jmk/pp/45/190/5). Why was Keynes displeased? 
In his second lecture, he attempted to construct a proof that an increase 
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in investment also increases output. This correlation became an important 
step in the evolution of his thinking about the relationship between aggre­
gate demand and employment, a central theme of The General Theory. But 
the proof was unsatisfactory. He was able to make only an empirical case 
that investment, output, and employment move in the same direction. 
A logically tight demonstration was beyond his reach, and in the lecture 
he made a point of considering exceptions that show they can move in 
opposite directions (Keynes 1979,41). Following this exposition, he chal­
lenged his audience to find other exceptions he might have overlooked. 
Kahn and the Robinsons took up this challenge with much enthusiasm 
and ingenuity. The result was “The Manifesto of the Trumpington Street 
School.” This text responded to Keynes’s charge by identifying counter­
examples to his position that had escaped him. It also pursued a more 
ambitious course by reconstructing the logic on which the lecture of 
May 2 was based. The manifesto argued that although Keynes’s conclu­
sions were sound, his “method of formal logic” was unduly restrictive, 
and his proof was fallacious. Although Kahn, Austin, and Robinson all 
signed the manifesto, she assumed the role of correspondent with Keynes. 
This is not surprising in light of her interest in beginning a serious theo­
retical conversation in order to establish her credentials with him. The de­
tails of their exchanges need not be considered here (see Aslanbeigui and 
Oakes 2002). Their ceremonial qualities are significant in documenting 
the modest success she achieved in reducing the distance between them.
Robinson’s exchange with Keynes over “A Parable on Saving and In­
vestment” was essentially a petition for his endorsement followed by a 
gracious reply on his part. The manifesto gave her more proximate ac­
cess for a brief but intensive dialogue that took place in early May. As 
correspondence shows, she used the manifesto to propose face­to­face 
conversations. After receiving his reply to the text, she apologized for its 
lack of clarity and added, “Could we have another word, perhaps during 
the weekend?” Among other matters, she hoped to persuade him that 
he had misunderstood his own argument in the second lecture: “I will 
leave that point in the hope of seeing you and having it out by word 
of mouth” (in Keynes 1979, 47).10 In attempting to show Keynes that 
she could work on his level, Robinson experienced difficulties in self­ 
presentation that became especially pronounced when she took issue with 
his views. In criticizing his thinking, she became tentative, apologetic, 
self­deprecatory, and deferential. In early May, she asked, “Please why 
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are you allowed to talk about prime cost but we are not allowed to talk 
about short period supply price?”11 In an undated letter in early May, she 
asked Keynes to forgive her if she seemed “pig­headed.”12 On May 10, she 
apologized for her “rough manners in controversy.”13 Finally on May 11, 
she felt “very much ashamed” that she had failed to spell out in exact 
detail the differences between the methodological strategies of the mani­
festo and Keynes’s second lecture, a matter that he could presumably be 
left to resolve without instructions on her part. She closed “with apolo­
gies” (quoted in Keynes 1973a, 379).
In corresponding with Keynes, Robinson was trying to demonstrate 
her competence in an area of theoretical analysis that was important to 
him. However, she was uneasy about how to conduct herself. Did she 
have good grounds for uneasiness? If he took umbrage at her manners, 
she risked losing the ideal patron, who had much to offer or withhold. 
Robinson had good reasons to be apprehensive over engaging Keynes in 
debate. Although she was determined to prove her merits, she seems to 
have had little grasp of Keynes’s conception of the etiquette appropriate to 
scientific controversy. Prior to publication of The General Theory, Keynes­
ian scientific controversy was not primarily a contest in which dominance 
was demonstrated by destroying the position of an opponent. Although 
a serious theoretical exchange called for unsparing criticism, it was re­
strained by a highly refined civility that ruled out ad hominem attacks 
as vulgar and intellectually shallow. These standards were not idiosyn­
cratically Keynesian. They were the norms of intellectual exchange that 
prevailed in the Society of the Apostles when he was an undergraduate 
and a young fellow of King’s. As noted above, they were also the norms 
of the Marshallian guild. An etiquette that ritualizes a sphere of conduct 
also creates possibilities of transgressions within that sphere—violations 
that span the space between poor taste or bad form at one extreme and 
ceremonial profanations at the other. Was Robinson guilty of unintended 
lapses from the required ceremonial idiom? Had she perhaps commit­
ted acts of “ritual contempt” (Goffman 1956, 493–95), insulting Keynes 
and profaning the guild at the same time? She did not know, which was 
the source of her worries. Troubled by her ignorance, she feared she had 
carelessly stigmatized herself by failing to demonstrate the expected pro­
prieties in debate. Thus her apologies for any unwitting infractions she 
might have committed. Robinson’s role as rapporteur for the Trumping­
ton Street School shows that her socialization as a Cambridge economist 
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was deficient. Her exchanges with Keynes on the manifesto formed a 
chapter in her apprenticeship, an opportunity to acquire both intellectual 
and social skills.
Although the manifesto gave Robinson new access to Keynes, it seems 
that their exchanges brought her no closer to him. The manifesto was a 
collaboration. Keynes’s letter of May 8 to Lydia is a telling indication of 
his judgment on her status in the Trumpington Street School: “Oh! I’m 
so tired—I’ve been arguing nearly all day on a theoretical­didactical point 
with Kahn and then with Kahn and his Joan. However we came to an 
amicable conclusion in the end” (jmk/pp/45/190/5). In Keynes’s phrase, 
“his Joan” was not an independent thinker but Kahn’s trinket and at best 
an emissary. Had he believed that she met his standards, no protracted 
discussions with Kahn would have been called for. And when Keynes did 
talk with Robinson, Kahn was on hand as well. In spring 1932, Keynes’s 
view of Robinson was largely determined by his worries over her relation­
ship with Kahn. Any move on his part that suggested encouragement of 
her efforts to establish herself at Cambridge was out of the question at 
this point.
t h e  s e c t a r i a n
With “A Parable on Saving and Investment,” Robinson began her long 
career as an advocate of Keynes’s ideas. As a supervisor, she was also a 
committed Keynesian—passionate, obstinate, and with a pronounced 
tendency to dogmatism. From the beginning, her conduct in this regard 
was an occasion for remark at Cambridge. As early as October 16, 1932, 
Tappan­Holland chided Robinson for her methods in supervising first­
year students. Robinson, it seems, introduced freshmen to economics by 
employing Keynes’s post­Treatise ideas as the theoretical basis of the sci­
ence, arguing that this was the only acceptable alternative to feeding them 
“spoonfuls of the stuff in the books” (jvr/vii/208/12). Tappan­Holland 
reminded her that this practice contravened a ruling of the faculty board: 
serious study of economic principles should not begin until the second 
year. Robinson’s supervisory approach also penalized weaker students—
many of whom, Tappan­Holland claimed, were “well below the average 
of ability”—by compelling them to struggle with theory too early in their 
curriculum.14 Finally, Keynes’s most recent lectures on monetary the­
ory were hardly the only alternative to teaching from textbooks. These 
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objections did not move Robinson. Her pedagogical strategy was to 
teach the “freshers” Keynes’s new ideas as if they constituted an exhaustive 
conception of the discipline, and to do so before they were exposed to al­
ternative positions. Her objective was to ground economics in Keynesian 
thinking, making it difficult for students to distinguish economic theory 
from Keynesian theory. If her methods were successful, students would be 
able to understand alternative views only by translating them into Keyne­
sian language. Robinson had no interest in weaker students. The future of 
economic theory and policy would be decided by students reading for the 
tripos. Her aim was to ensure that they believed in the new ideas.
Tappan­Holland was also unhappy with Robinson’s assumption that 
Keynes’s post­Treatise thinking constituted a “self­consistent system based 
on common sense.” His ideas were new, largely untested, and a matter 
of controversy even at Cambridge. They were also in flux, with Keynes 
“constantly rebutting his own views and making new excursions.” Under 
these circumstances, it was rash to suppose that his current work was sys­
tematic or internally consistent. Thus Tappan­Holland found Robinson’s 
confident display of certitude misplaced. It was especially objectionable 
in propagating a “gospel view of economics.” Robinson seemed to think 
that there was a single body of economic truth and a one­to­one cor­
respondence between this system and economic reality. Keynes’s recent 
lectures had the status of sacred texts. Any deviation from his position 
was not only mistaken but heretical. And who was the Messiah proclaim­
ing the new gospel? Tappan­Holland had the impression that it was none 
other than Robinson herself, whom she compared to Robbins as “one 
awful example of the result of despising what has gone before and taking 
upon oneself the role of Messiah.”15
Keynes saw his Cambridge lectures as instrumental, transitional perfor­
mances. Their purpose was to solidify and clarify his thinking, providing 
material for discussion that would lead to better ideas. As he explained to 
Robinson, the real point was not whether he was right about details—he 
knew he was not—but whether his “way of thinking and arguing about 
the subject” was sound (Keynes 1973a, 270). However, Tappan­Holland 
seems to have been correct in thinking that Robinson treated his recent 
lectures as established theoretical wisdom. In January 1933, some three 
months after Tappan­Holland’s admonitions, Robinson was considering 
how to incorporate into her book Keynes’s arguments that there is no 
self­adjusting economic mechanism that reestablishes states of equilib­
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rium at which labor is fully employed. By this point, he had concluded 
that even in a conceptually ideal state of competition, employment is a 
function of saving and investment. Should she cite the proto–General 
Theory as the source of this idea? She thought not. It would not be a good 
tactical move, as she wrote Kahn on January 18, 1933: “Ought I to men­
tion j.m.k.? I think myself that it is smarter to regard it as the accepted 
theory” (rfk/13/90/1/57–58). Kahn agreed: “The right touch is attained 
by not mentioning j.m.k.”16 The relevant text in The Economics of Imperfect 
Competition includes no reference to Keynes. It states his speculative theo­
retical views as if they were facts: “It is not our present purpose to discuss 
how equilibrium would be attained. There is no natural tendency even 
under competition to maintain full employment, which depends upon 
the levels of saving and investment” (Robinson 1933d, 310).
Tappan­Holland was mistaken in thinking that Robinson had 
anointed herself the Messiah of the new gospel. Although she may have 
taken a messianic view of economics, in her eschatology the Anointed 
One was Keynes. Cambridge insiders characterized the local response to 
his new ideas in evangelical metaphors—some playfully, others with omi­
nous seriousness. His new thinking was a gospel. Economists who were 
convinced that he had superseded the old dispensation of Marshallian 
thought had seen the light. Those who were not convinced remained chil­
dren of darkness (Robinson 1947, 56–57; see also Robinson 1985). In this 
quasi­biblical interpretation of post­Treatise developments at Cambridge, 
Robinson played two roles. Like John the Baptist, she proclaimed the 
coming of the Messiah: the Word was indeed made flesh and dwelt among 
Cambridge economists in his rooms at King’s. And like the Apostle Paul, 
she propagated the teachings of the Messiah to the uninitiated.
Although Robinson’s response to Tappan­Holland is not known, it 
undoubtedly magnified her worries over Robinson’s use of supervisory 
sessions as opportunities for proselytizing. Tappan­Holland also found 
Robinson’s self­confessed zealotry quite troubling. She was “very much 
concerned that you shouldn’t ‘seriously’ become the ‘fanatic’ you so lightly 
label yourself.” She defended the guild etiquette of controversy as a frank 
but civil airing of views against the position she ascribed to Robinson—
controversy as a struggle between a new and an old dispensation, the 
forces of light and the forces of darkness. She also switched metaphors, 
exchanging the rhetoric of salvation religion for that of armed combat: 
“Do the more recent developments of Cambridge economics require 
178 `  b e c o m i n g  a  k e y n e s i a n
flag­waving or battle cries for those who are responsible for them to be 
assigned the role of gladiators?”17 In October 1932, Tappan­Holland saw 
Robinson as a sectarian warrior, mounting the barricades or suiting up 
for a struggle to the death. More than three years before Keynes published 
The General Theory, she was identified as an intransigent propagandist 
for his ideas at a time when it was not clear even to Keynes himself pre­
cisely what these ideas were. What was his response to her enthusiasm for 
his work?
t h e  m a c m i l l a n  r e v i e w
In late October 1932, Robinson handed the manuscript of her book to 
Harold Macmillan, the Conservative mp and head of the family pub­
lishing house. Pigou seems to have been the source of the recommen­
dation that she submit her book to Macmillan. As she wrote Austin on 
October 4, “The Prof via Kahn strongly advised me to offer my book 
to Macmillan. I will talk to Maynard about it” (eagr/Box 8/1/13/117–
19). Macmillan was Keynes’s publisher, and on November 16 he asked 
Keynes for an opinion, albeit with some reluctance since he had doubts 
about the importance of the work. However, Macmillan had his reasons 
for publishing Robinson’s book: General Maurice, her father, was a 
friend of the Macmillan family (jvr/vii/298).
In November, Keynes wrote an oddly dismissive endorsement of the 
manuscript. His recommendation—“I have no doubt that you ought to 
accept this book”—was followed by numerous caveats and qualifications. 
Keynes seemed to damn the book with the faintest of praise. Although he 
acknowledged that Robinson had made significant contributions to the 
theory of value, he was silent about what they were. The book included 
material that was “more or less new.” But in the main it was a derivative 
and summary account of ideas that had been developed by other econo­
mists, work that by that point was “widely current not only for learned 
articles but in oral discussion at Cambridge and Oxford” (Keynes 1983, 
866). Robinson had read the recent literature on the theory of value, lis­
tened to what her colleagues at Cambridge and Oxford were saying, and 
written a compendious exposition of these developments. This was her 
chief contribution. Because of the clarity of Robinson’s writing, Keynes 
found the book easier to read than much of the literature on imperfect 
competition. Yet he admitted that he had not undertaken a critical assess­
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ment, a task which he claimed would be formidable. Why did he think 
he was justified in sparing himself this responsibility, which would seem 
indispensable in rendering an informed opinion? It was because Kahn had 
already performed it. As Robinson noted in her preface, Kahn had given 
her detailed and comprehensive criticism. Because of his contribution, 
Keynes was confident that the book would be reasonably free of errors. 
His review was a spirited encomium to “the most careful and accurate of 
all the younger economists” and “a long way the ablest and most reliable 
critic of this type of work now to be found” (Keynes 1983, 867). Robinson 
largely disappeared from his report. Had she not enjoyed Kahn’s services 
as critic and editor or had his contribution been more peripheral, Keynes’s 
confidence in the quality of the book would have been much diminished. 
This was not the strongest endorsement of its author. Keynes closed with 
a backhanded recommendation: “If, therefore, you are predisposed to ac­
cept the book through your old­established relations with the Maurice 
family, I think you should certainly not hesitate to accept this, which is 
a serious and valuable work” (Keynes 1983, 867).18 If Macmillan had an 
interest in publishing the book based on the extrascientific motive of old 
family ties, Keynes assured him there were no grounds for worry over its 
quality, which Kahn had guaranteed. This conclusion twisted the knife. 
If the book was a genuinely “serious and valuable work,” why base a rec­
ommendation on nepotistic connections between families of the British 
upper classes? In this manner Robinson’s manuscript appeared between 
the covers of a book.19
In November 1932, Keynes represented Robinson as a clever textbook 
writer with a gift for exposition and synthesis, but not a thinker of the 
first class with important original ideas. The use he could make of her or 
the value she might have for his projects was not yet clear to him. Until 
he discovered these virtues, she would remain an anxious, determined 
petitioner for his attentions.
c r e a t i n g  a c c e s s
Between 1932 and 1935, Robinson’s identity was transformed several times 
in Keynes’s imagination: from the wife of a junior fellow and Kahn’s in­
amorata to a competent if not brilliant Cambridge economist, and finally 
to a theoretical confidante on whose judgment he depended. Was there 
a point at which the terms of engagement that governed Robinson’s 
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relationship with Keynes took a pronounced turn, even if this occurred 
with reservations on his part? If so, when did this change take place? And 
what was the microsocial dynamic—the pattern of interpersonal and col­
legial interaction—that intersected with a shift in relations? Although 
the literature on Cambridge economics in the 1930s considers the first 
issue, it seems that the second and more interesting question has not been 
addressed.
Cristina Marcuzzo has considered the relations between Keynes and 
Robinson in the early 1930s—her participation in the Circus, their ex­
changes on the manifesto, his response to her early essays, and his report 
to Macmillan. She concludes that by spring 1932 they had developed a 
“warm relationship” (Marcuzzo 2003, 551). Are these episodes evidence 
of personal warmth on Keynes’s part? Although Robinson was a member 
of the Circus, it is not clear what she contributed to its work.20 When 
the Circus began to meet in autumn 1930, she was still a relative novice 
in economics. She had attended Sraffa’s lectures and had begun work on 
imperfect competition but had made no serious study of other areas of 
economics since her undergraduate years. As her correspondence with 
Kahn shows, the Treatise was largely terra incognita to her until four years 
later, when she read the book carefully during the summer vacation of 
1934. Under these circumstances, it is not apparent what she could have 
brought to an original analysis of a new, massive, and confusing book on 
monetary theory. Nor is there reason to suppose that Keynes credited 
her with any of the ideas generated by the Circus. We have considered 
Keynes’s reaction to Robinson’s work on the manifesto and his bland, 
equivocal report on her book. It is true he responded with enthusiasm to 
her two articles. In the case of “A Parable on Saving and Investment,” her 
critique of Hayek, this was to be expected. The paper was an attempt to 
strengthen Keynes’s position in a contest he seemed to be losing badly. 
Although “Imperfect Competition and Falling Supply Price” may have 
been a “most beautiful and lucid” essay, it was quite remote from his in­
terests.21 There is no evidence that his response to these articles demon­
strated personal engagement or even a disposition to engage in theoretical 
dialogue.
As the above account shows, there was no close relationship between 
Keynes and Robinson in 1932. In view of his worries over her friendship 
with Kahn, there could not have been. Did he ever form a personal rela­
tionship with Robinson? It seems that Keynes did not allow their relation­
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ship to extend beyond joint scientific and professional interests. Above 
all it revolved around research—chiefly his own, which in some fashion 
or other was the subject of most of their correspondence. Robinson did 
not share the details of her life with Keynes. In her letters to him, there 
are no observations about family, vacations, entertainment, ambitions, or 
political views; no gossip about colleagues; no candid judgments about 
any extrascientific or nonacademic matters; no accounts of her emotional 
life—none of the personalia that filled her letters to Kahn and that she 
generally shared with friends. When she notified him of her first preg­
nancy in March 1934, she delivered the news in a cool and nonchalant 
fashion in a letter chiefly concerned with her lectures for the following 
year. She briefly mentioned that she was about to “produce” a baby, as if 
she were contemplating a new industrial enterprise.22 Since she sought his 
approval, she delivered this news with some trepidation. Keynes did not 
reply. In view of these considerations, it seems more promising to analyze 
how the relationship between Keynes and Robinson actually developed. 
Robinson became a client of Keynes in the course of the 1930s. How was 
the tie between client and patron formed? Here the issue is not a hypo­
thetical transformation from casual acquaintanceship to some version of 
intimacy but a change in Robinson’s social status.
If there was a defining moment that marked Robinson’s arrival in the 
Keynesian social firmament, it came not in spring 1932 but some three 
years later, in June 1935, when Keynes asked her to comment on the 
galleys of The General Theory. Yet Robinson had carefully laid the ground­
work for this event in more than three years of effort to change his con­
ception of her as an economist and reduce the socioprofessional distance 
between them. In 1932–34, expertise in Keynes’s post­Treatise thinking 
was a very scarce commodity. Robinson trained herself in the new ideas 
and created and exploited opportunities to gain access to Keynes. Pro­
fessional expertise and personal access were interdependent. Discussions 
with Keynes would give her insight into the development of his ideas, 
which were evolving rapidly. And a more sophisticated understanding 
of his thinking would improve her chances of access. These efforts were 
designed to convince Keynes that she was a valuable asset, ensuring that 
when he was finally ready to call on her, he would not be disappointed.
The distance Robinson had to traverse is nicely illustrated by two ac­
counts of conversation over tea with Keynes at 3 Trumpington Street on 
January 23, 1933, while Kahn was in the United States. As Robinson wrote 
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Kahn, he “wanted to hear all about you, who you had met + so forth.” 
A title for her book was also discussed. Keynes was not happy with her 
original choice. Austin proposed “The Economics of Imperfect Competi­
tion.” Although this suggestion made little sense to Robinson, she acqui­
esced. Her preference was to retain the original title, “but Maynard won’t 
let me.”23 Since the title was decided that afternoon, it was presumably 
an occasion of some significance for Robinson. What was Keynes’s ac­
count of the same event? Why was he visiting the Robinsons? As he wrote 
Lydia, to “hear news of Kahn,” who was then in Chicago and had had “a 
good success in Cincinnati where he read a paper to assembled econo­
mists” (jmk/pp/45/190/4). Robinson’s success in finishing her book and 
their selection of its title were not mentioned.24
Robinson had an acute sense of the distance between herself and 
Keynes. She was also quite savvy at taking advantage of opportunities 
to reduce it by changing the tenor of their relationship. On occasion this 
called for measures to arrange an audience with Keynes that otherwise 
would not have taken place. Consider the brief furor over Shove’s note 
on her article “Imperfect Competition and Falling Supply Price” (1932b). 
In part, this article was a critique of Shove’s views. On February 15, 1933, 
an excited Robinson reported to Kahn that Shove had written a note for 
the Economic Journal (1933b) in response to her essay and had sent her the 
substance of his comments the previous day. Not disposed to place her 
teaching obligations above the imperatives of publication, she turned her 
“pupils from the door + told them to come another day” in order to com­
pose a quick reply. She described her predicament to Kahn:
I had a hectic day yesterday. Gerald sent me the proof of his note (except for 
the constructive suggestions at the end) by the first post. I rang up Maynard and 
asked if I was to reply. He said No, the E[conomic] J[ournal] was all standing in 
page champing its bit waiting for Gerald, was anyway too long already. Then he 
rang up again + said if I would decide there and then to do no more + no less 
than one page he would wire + keep a page for me. So I rashly agreed. You can 
imagine the horror of trying to reply to Gerald in 400 words + no time. You will 
see the prints of all this in the E[conomic] J[ournal]. I hope I haven’t dropped any 
bricks. (rfk/13/90/1/119–22)
After she had written her one page, it was quickly typeset, and the galley 
was sent to Shove. On Sunday at 6:30, while Robinson was entertain­
ing her “grand grown up relations”—a dinner party for her father and an 
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aunt and uncle from India—Keynes telephoned. A bizarre episode en­
sued. Shove was in Keynes’s rooms claiming that Robinson’s reply mis­
represented his note, and he insisted on writing an additional note to 
this effect. Although Keynes agreed with Robinson that Shove’s conduct 
was “frightfully tiresome,” a lengthy argument on the telephone between 
Robinson and Shove followed, punctuated on her end by questions from 
the dinner guests. Keynes finally cut in, reminding both authors that 
as editor he needed to know what to publish in the journal. Unable to 
reach agreement on the phone, she abandoned her guests and repaired 
to Keynes’s rooms, where the three would decide what steps to take. On 
her arrival, arguments with Shove continued. In the end, as she wrote 
Kahn, “I had to sit in a corner + draft my version while G + M chattered 
away—and Gerald complains of the nervous strain.”25
The flippant pose Robinson struck for Kahn in ridiculing “poor old 
Gerald, who takes it all so much to heart when it only makes me laugh,” 
was not a position she could afford to act on.26 In writing a reply to her 
article, Shove gave Robinson opportunities she would not otherwise 
have enjoyed. She used them cleverly. His response to her article increased 
its value by demonstrating that it merited comment from a senior mem­
ber of the guild. As a result, she could exercise her right to respond and 
exhibit her skills at intellectual combat in print, gaining further exposure 
in the journal. In appealing to Keynes, Shove made it necessary for him 
to discuss the matter with Robinson, unwittingly giving her the proxi­
mity she hoped to achieve. His use of Keynes’s willingness to intercede on 
his behalf made it possible for Robinson to gain an audience with Keynes, 
moving her, at least for the moment, from the periphery to the center of 
his attention. This was an opportunity for her to give a performance dem­
onstrating the qualities he valued in an interlocutor: intellectual acuity 
and agility, candor and determination in controversy, and the ability and 
willingness to grasp adversarial positions as their authors intended them 
to be understood. Robinson seems to have understood all this quite well. 
As she wrote Kahn, “I think Gerald has made a fool of me, but it is all in 
a good cause.” At the discussion in Keynes’s rooms, she made conces­
sions to Shove in the interest of maintaining comity. This gave the more 
obstreperous Shove certain advantages. In Robinson’s view, her concilia­
tory position was a prudent move. It was “a triumph to have drawn him 
[Shove] into print at all.” And she thought the incident moved her closer 
to Keynes, who was “an angel [calming] Gerald to prevent him from 
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getting hysterical, + and telling me that anyway I ought to be pleased to 
get so much ‘reaction’ to my article.”27
On February 18, Robinson used the occasion of the delivery of her 
reply to Shove to meet with Keynes again. Why meet? There were no 
further problems to resolve and her four­hundred­word note could easily 
have been posted. As an aspiring client, Robinson had few opportunities 
for face­to­face contact with Keynes. Their conversations were infrequent, 
significant events during which she could present herself as a promising 
theoretician and also learn in some detail exactly what problems Keynes 
was working on, how he understood them, and the difficulties he con­
fronted. From this latter perspective, a meeting with Keynes was a fact­
finding expedition, an opportunity to gather information on his research 
with a view to making herself useful. If he could be convinced that she 
could help solve his problems, he might begin to see her as a potentially 
valuable asset. The functions of face­to­face meetings as fact­finding mis­
sions and opportunities for self­presentation were linked. By using her 
meetings with Keynes as tutorials on his research, she could reorient her 
work in the same direction, making his problems her problems. This was 
the method she had used in writing “A Parable on Saving and Invest­
ment” during his controversy with Hayek. If she could persuade him of 
her value, her chances of representing herself as an attractive investment 
would be substantially improved. In the conversation of February 18, 
Robinson’s intelligence­gathering tactic worked reasonably well. As she 
reported to Kahn, “Maynard has been trying to find out what the mar­
ginal productivity of capital means. He says no reputable writer ever uses 
it. But he hasn’t made much progress with defining it as far as I can make 
out from his conversation.” Once Robinson had this information, she ap­
parently could make little use of it. Keynes showed no inclination to share 
his work with her, much less ask for her help in advancing it.28 In view of 
Robinson’s modest professional qualifications, she was in no position to 
propose herself as his critic or muse, a point Kahn impressed on her. But 
if he made an offer, he urged her to accept it: “If Maynard hints that he 
would like you to look at his stuff I do wish you would. I must confess I 
am a bit appalled at the prospect of having the sole responsibility thrust 
on to me after my return.”29
In spite of Keynes’s indifference to her attentions, Robinson contin­
ued to pursue opportunities that might enable her to prove herself as 
a disciple worthy of the master. On February 24, 1933, Robbins gave 
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a lecture to the Marshall Society entitled “Some Addenda to the Cost 
Controversy.” Shove and Sraffa, two of the 1930 symposiasts, both at­
tended, and Robinson listened carefully. She was especially interested 
in an exchange between Robbins and Sraffa on increasing returns and 
roundaboutness.30 Although we have not located a copy of Robbins’s lec­
ture, it is reasonable to suppose that he discussed roundaboutness along 
Austrian lines. Production technologies that rely on capital—roundabout 
methods of production—are more effective than alternatives. They are 
also more time­consuming, requiring a longer average period of pro­
duction. Further extensions of this period, or roundaboutness, increase 
productivity at a diminishing rate. This is the phenomenon of the dimi­
nishing marginal productivity of capital, which was closely tied to Keynes’s 
research problems at the time.
Since Robinson had no understanding of roundaboutness, how could 
she turn this knowledge to her advantage? By seeking illumination from 
Sraffa. Robinson wrote Kahn on March 3, “Piero came this afternoon (at 
my request of course) to take me for a walk + talk about Roundabout­
ness. I cleared up my ideas a lot” (rfk/13/90/1/168–72). The chief motive 
behind the walk with Sraffa and her new interest in roundaboutness was 
simple: the chance to contribute to Keynes’s work should the occasion 
arise, even though this seemed improbable at the time: “Of course I should 
jump at an offer from Maynard to look at his stuff but he shows no signs 
of suggesting it. I embarked on my roundabout walk with Piero partly 
with a view of butting in on Maynard.”31 Two years and three months 
later, Robinson’s roundabout tactic paid off. In June 1935, while assisting 
Keynes with revisions of The General Theory, she was able to put her mod­
est education in the Austrian theory of capital to work, instructing him 
on the concept of roundaboutness and explaining Marshall’s criticism of 
Böhm­Bawerk’s theory of capital.32
t h e  a n o n y m o u s  r e v i e w  o f  p i g o u ’ s 
t h e o r y  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t
When Kahn returned to Cambridge from the United States in May 1933, 
he was again at Keynes’s disposal and prepared to resume work on the 
proto–General Theory. At that point, Keynes had no incentive to include 
Robinson in his theoretical dialogues. A few months later, he showered 
extravagant praise on Kahn as a critic: “There was never anyone in the 
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history of the world to whom it was so helpful to submit one’s stuff.” 
The recipient of this remark was Robinson.33 However, Kahn’s return did 
not mean Robinson’s access to Keynes was terminated. On the contrary, 
her information about his intentions and the progress of his work was 
much improved. What Keynes discussed with Kahn was also a subject 
of conversation between Kahn and Robinson. As a result, she became a 
vicarious participant in the dialogues that produced The General Theory. 
Just as Keynes had renewed access to Kahn, so did Robinson. She used 
it in part to relay her suggestions to Keynes—presumptuous though they 
may have been—on how to construct The General Theory. Through Kahn, 
therefore, she attempted to gain a voice in producing Keynes’s work.
In summer 1933, moreover, Robinson performed a task for Keynes 
that required considerable delicacy: she wrote a review of Pigou’s new 
book, The Theory of Unemployment (1933). At the time, Keynes regarded 
“the classics” as the most important readers of his work in progress. They 
were established economists, mostly trained before the First World War, 
steeped in classical doctrine, and committed to its basic premises. Theo­
reticians such as Hawtrey, Pigou, and Robertson were the masters of the 
classical citadel Keynes had recently abandoned and was attempting to 
destroy. His earliest rhetorical strategy in planning The General Theory 
was to persuade classical economists by engaging them in controversy. It 
was a minimalist strategy designed to narrow the concessions the classics 
would have to make in acknowledging his victory. The bloodless revo­
lution would succeed if the classics agreed to two propositions: (1) the 
assumptions of classical economics were special cases, confusingly or mis­
takenly stated, of Keynes’s more general assumptions, in much the same 
sense that Newton’s laws of motion were special cases of Einsteinian me­
chanics; (2) public works projects supported by economists such as Pigou 
had no basis in classical theory, which held that the free play of supply and 
demand would eliminate involuntary unemployment; this meant that ef­
forts by the state to erase unemployment were unnecessary, perhaps even 
pernicious. Keynes’s post­Treatise thinking rejected the view that self­ 
correcting market mechanisms would restore full employment. Thus it 
provided a coherent theoretical basis for state intervention in markets.
In her review of Pigou’s book for the New Statesman and Nation of Au­
gust 26, 1933, Robinson employed Keynes’s rhetorical strategy. This op­
eration required some tact. Pigou was an early and generous supporter of 
her work on imperfect competition. She had just received a note of warm 
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congratulations from him, suggesting that publication of her work would 
place her in a strong position for the next university lectureship in eco­
nomics.34 Pigou’s support was freely given; Robinson had not attempted 
to recruit him as an advocate. Unlike Keynes, Pigou took an active inter­
est in her work. Also unlike Keynes, he did not have to be courted. A 
review that moved Pigou into the camp of the anti­Robinsonians would 
be foolhardy. However, Robinson had tied her interests and ambitions to 
Keynes and his new theoretical program. Thus her problem in the review 
was apparent: how should she employ Keynes’s rhetorical strategy in dis­
cussing the work of the most distinguished and powerful classical econo­
mist at Cambridge without compromising his support? Tactically, this 
was a problem of determining how to maintain that Keynes was right and 
Pigou was wrong without giving offense and blocking her chances for a 
lectureship. Robinson developed a low­risk, high­reward solution to her 
problem. Employing arguments drawn from Economics Is a Serious Subject, 
she defended technical economic analysis conducted in a specialized theo­
retical language against public expectations that economic writing should 
be easy to understand. The review began and ended with a celebration 
of Pigou’s virtues as a professional economist: the rigor and austerity of 
his work, its reliance on technical terminology, and its concentration on 
theory at the expense of questions of policy. If The Theory of Unemploy-
ment represented a serious challenge even to “the hardened students of 
economics,” the lay reader was likely to be defeated by a text that made no 
concessions to nonspecialists.
Robinson had nothing to say about the main theses and analyses of the 
book, not even by way of summary. Instead, she made several points that 
followed Keynes’s current line on how to convert the classics to his way of 
thinking. He had adopted and renamed Kahn’s concept of the multiplier, 
arguing that expenditures on public works created both primary and 
secondary employment. In The Theory of Unemployment, Pigou seemed 
to reject the multiplier effect. Robinson argued that this was merely ap­
pearance. When the differences in how Keynes and Pigou conceived real 
wages and money wages were properly understood, the contradiction 
disappeared, and Pigou’s position became a special case of Keynes’s more 
general thesis. Although Robinson did not stress this point, she noted 
that both Keynes and Pigou advocated public borrowing to support pub­
lic works in periods of high unemployment and had written to this effect 
in the pages of the New Statesman and Nation. Keynes had a theoretical 
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rationale for this policy. Pigou did not, at least not unless his view was 
translated into Keynesian language. If it was, he could be right even if he 
was wrong in The Theory of Unemployment. Keynes, of course, was simply 
right. In this manner, Robinson executed Keynes’s rhetorical strategy in 
handling the classics. At the same time she offered a gentle, muted, and 
decidedly un­Robinsonian critique of Pigou. Finally, she supplied herself 
with a safety net, publishing her review unsigned and making it unlikely 
that Pigou would be able to discover the identity of the reviewer even if 
he were interested in doing so.
On August 25, 1933, the day before the review was published, Keynes 
wrote Robinson, “I have seen a proof of your review of the Professor, and 
think it quite excellent. I agree that it had better be anonymous” (jvr/
vii/240/6–7). How did Robinson, who did not have contacts with jour­
nals of political opinion, arrange to publish an anonymous review of a 
large, specialized, difficult book on economic theory in the New Statesman 
and Nation? Although the following considerations are speculative, they 
seem reasonable given the evidence. In 1923, Keynes became chairman of 
the board of directors of the Nation, a political and literary weekly and the 
intellectual voice of the Liberal Party. When the New Statesman, a com­
petitor leaning to the left, acquired the Nation through a merger, he pro­
posed Kingsley Martin as editor of the new magazine. Keynes had known 
him since Martin’s undergraduate years at Magdalene College shortly 
after the war. After Martin’s dissertation failed to win a fellowship at 
King’s, Keynes recommended him for his first job in journalism (Skidel­
sky 1992, 134–39, 388). In light of these associations, consider two sce­
narios. The more probable in view of Keynes’s connection with the New 
Statesman and Nation: Keynes selected Robinson, who understood the 
response he wanted to draw from classical economists, to write the review 
and send it to the editor with whom he had arranged publication. The less 
probable: Robinson, who knew what Keynes wanted to see in a review 
of Pigou, suggested the idea and Keynes handled publication. Robinson 
did not want her name in circulation as the author of the review. On 
the same day Keynes read the proof, she asked Kahn to notify him that 
Martin had made her look foolish by altering several words in the review. 
She also saw that his editorial mistakes held advantages since evidence of 
elementary incompetence on the part of the unknown reviewer would 
be useful in maintaining her anonymity (rfk/13/90/1/246–47). Most im­
portant to Robinson, Keynes was happy with the result. As she wrote 
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Kahn on September 12 (ironically she was visiting Buttermere in the Lake 
District, where Pigou’s cottage was located): “Maynard sent me a note 
about my review. I was very pleased that he appreciated my low cunning” 
(rfk/13/90/1/249–51).
l e a r n i n g  m o n e t a r y  t h e o r y
During the Cambridge summer vacation of 1934, Robinson gave herself a 
quick course in monetary theory. Her immediate objective was to prepare 
lectures—applications of monetary theory—scheduled for the Lent term 
of 1935. A larger aim was to learn enough to contribute to Keynes’s cur­
rent research in the area and even to publish articles that she would write 
from a Keynesian perspective. Her first daughter had been born at the end 
of May. Vacationing with family near the coast of Cornwall in southwest 
England, she swam in the ocean, read Harrod, Hawtrey, and perhaps 
Wicksell, and wrote her lectures. In August, she began her first careful 
reading of the Treatise.35 Kahn was with Keynes at Tilton working on The 
General Theory. Robinson shared her impressions in studying the Treatise, 
sometimes writing him more than once a day. Although she found volume 
1 to be “an extraordinary combination of genius, confusion + sophistry,” 
volume 2 was an important contribution to her education.36 She also be­
gan an irreverent “Dictionary of the Treatise,” which offered simple defi­
nitions of basic concepts for which Keynes had generally supplied elabo­
rate, complex analyses. The “normal level of investment,” for example, 
meant the “level you first thought of.” “Overinvestment” was “more in­
vestment than before.”37 Although she worked in isolation from Keynes, 
she used her connection to Kahn to collaborate at a distance, asking him 
to make a case to Keynes in support of her proposals. For example, she 
anticipated that economists would find the new Keynesian doctrine on the 
equivalence of savings and investment counterintuitive. In order to fore­
stall objections, she offered a suggestion: “Try to get Maynard to quote 
the Treatise to the effect that saving + investment are necessarily equal. 
He is going to get such a lot of trouble about it. P. 126 or 140 are suitable 
passages.”38 In reading the Treatise, she also made plans to develop rough 
drafts of analyses on selected problems, to be reworked as articles later.39
Cristina Marcuzzo and Claudio Sardoni maintain that the summer of 
1934 marked a “change in the personal relationship” between Keynes and 
Robinson (Marcuzzo and Sardoni 2005, 176). As evidence they quote one 
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sentence of a letter Robinson wrote Kahn on August 15. She noted that in 
closing a letter to her by typing “yours faithfully,” Keynes had crossed this 
out in ink and had instead simply written “ever” (rfk/13/90/2/39–40). 
The full text of the letter shows that Robinson’s worries over her relation­
ship with Keynes remained. She had written a paper, “Indeterminacy,” 
based on her reading of the Treatise and sent it to Keynes, hoping to 
gain his approval for publication in the Review of Economic Studies, where 
Lerner was one of the editors. She had also sent Keynes the proofs of 
her essay on Euler’s Theorem, which would appear in the Economic Jour-
nal for September 1934. “Maynard,” she wrote Kahn, “sends a curt note 
saying there’s no objection to printing my Indeterminacy as far as he is 
concerned. But I put this down to toothache and I shall send it to Lerner 
as you approve of it. Maynard also says the proofs were all right. I see 
Maynard signed yours faithfully in type + crossed it out + put ever in 
ink so I can’t really complain” (rfk/13/90/2/39–40). Robinson was still 
in doubt about Keynes’s judgment of her, searching his letters for signs 
of her status and scrutinizing his phrases as if they were codes that might 
indicate her place in the Keynesian social and intellectual order. Was there 
some significance in the fact that his note was curt? In writing that her 
paper was unobjectionable as far as he was concerned, did this imply that 
it might be objectionable on other grounds? Or perhaps these locutions 
were not signals at all but merely a consequence of his toothache. After 
all, had he not struck out “yours faithfully” and added “ever” at the end of 
his note? Robinson’s letter is not a mark of her confidence in her stand­
ing with Keynes. There seem to be no grounds on which an extraprofes­
sional personal relationship can be ascribed to Keynes and Robinson in 
1934 or at any other point. When she had questions to put to Keynes or 
suggestions to offer concerning his work, she usually approached Kahn, 
who had an established and comfortable relationship with him. If she was 
on terms with Keynes that could be characterized as personal, it seems 
odd that she delegated the announcement of the birth of her daughter to 
Kahn.40 If Robinson could write Kahn on the birth of her daughter, why 
could she not write directly to Keynes?
Kahn and Robinson had a running joke on an imaginary request from 
Keynes: would she write a preface for his new book, showing how it 
draws on the Treatise but also departs from it? She would, of course, com­
ply, and Keynes would include a generous acknowledgment in The Gen-
eral Theory, thanking her for helping him understand what he had failed 
b e c o m i n g  a  k e y n e s i a n  `   191
to see. As she wrote Kahn on September 4, 1934, “Of course I would love 
to have a footnote from Maynard. ‘Mrs. Robinson has pointed out to 
me that this definition appears in my Treatise’—but Maynard knows bet­
ter than to put the family jokes in print (even when he sees them which 
isn’t often)” (rfk/13/90/2/85–88). The next day she continued their little 
game: “Of course I am absolutely full of views about the Treatise. Would 
Maynard like me to write him a preface for the new work showing in 
what respects his ideas have altered?”41 Missing the joke, Marcuzzo and 
Sardoni read the letter as a serious proposal to write a preface for The 
General Theory. This misunderstanding leads them to conclude that she 
had become “confident in her role as one of Keynes’s interlocutors” (Mar­
cuzzo and Sardoni 2005, 176). Quite the contrary. As the above consider­
ations show, she remained on uneasy grounds with Keynes throughout 
1934 and preoccupied with measures to win his confidence.
m i c r o p o l i t i c s
In early 1934, Robinson was appointed to a part­time probationary fac­
ulty lectureship. Her appointment quickly led to changes in the lecture 
list on money, which had been revised after considerable deliberation the 
year before. The terms of the appointment called for her to deliver one 
and one­half sets of lectures per year. Before 1934, she had supervised 
students and taught only occasionally on monopoly. This was standard 
practice in Cambridge economics; new lecturers taught relatively special­
ized courses on their research. Lectures that prepared students for the 
tripos were the responsibility of more senior faculty. In her first year as 
a probationary lecturer, however, she proposed to teach not only a short 
course of some five weeks on imperfect competition in the Michaelmas 
term of 1934 but also a new, full­term course in Lent 1935: applications of 
monetary theory, which was intended for second­year students who were 
preparing for Robertson’s advanced course on money in their third year. 
This proposal would reverse the changes in the lecture list on money that 
had been introduced in 1932–33. A few remarks on the history of changes 
in the curriculum on money are in order at this point.
In February 1930, the faculty board revised requirements for the Eco­
nomics Tripos. In order to pass the required paper on money, students 
would be expected to demonstrate some mastery of banking systems, 
currencies, price levels, trade, investment, and monetary theory—all of 
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which would require analyses of a wide range of monetary phenomena 
and their causal relations.42 To prepare students for these requirements, 
the board offered several sets of lectures in 1931–32. Part I students could 
attend Leonard Alston’s lectures on money and banking. Part II students 
would sit in Guillebaud’s three­term lectures on currency and banking 
in their second year. In their third and final year, Part II students would 
enroll in Robertson’s three­term set of lectures on money supplemented 
by Keynes’s eight lectures—delivered only once each year—on the pure 
theory of money in the Easter term, the last lectures before tripos ques­
tions were set. In 1932–33, the board had second thoughts about its new 
lecture list. Alston’s lectures were eliminated. Instead, first­year students 
heard Guillebaud on currency and banking. Lectures on money were de­
leted from the second year, following which Robertson continued his lec­
tures for third­year students. Keynes’s eight lectures would be devoted 
to the monetary theory of production in 1932–33 and to his drafts of the 
proto–General Theory the following year. Robertson, therefore, taught 
the principal course on money for Part II students.
The board accepted Robinson’s proposal, and she quickly began plan­
ning a syllabus. On March 26, 1934, she wrote Keynes, ostensibly seeking 
his advice on her preparations. The letter is a complex, multilayered text 
that expresses a variety of intentions, some stated clearly, others some­
what awkwardly veiled. Robinson had grandiose ambitions for her lec­
tures, which she would use as a pedagogical weapon to advance the cause 
of Keynes’s new ideas. She hoped to enlist him in this undertaking as her 
ally, advisor, and source of higher wisdom. She also wanted to inform 
him of an event that could be expected to complicate her professional 
agenda by limiting her ability to achieve such large objectives—her first 
pregnancy, which she announced with an insouciance that did not conceal 
some uncertainty:
My dear Maynard
I have not had time till now to write out my syllabus. Both versions are for your 
eye alone. When the time comes I will draw up a version suitable for the Lecture 
List Committee under your directions. I would very much like to be let loose on 
the Grand Scheme, but I quite see how it is. You must let me know how much 
you think I shall be able to get away with.
There’s another point I think I ought to mention—I am expecting to produce 
a baby in the summer. I don’t think myself that this ought to be considered rel­
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evant to the question of lecturing—but I quite see that there is another point of 
view.
I haven’t told any of our colleagues except Kahn + Piero. Do you think it 
might be left to dawn on the others gradually or ought it to be mentioned when 
my Lectures are discussed?
I hope this news does not disconcert you too much. I think it is a good idea.
There is another point where it comes in—you see that I have rather a lot to 
do one way + another, so I ought to start on these Lectures as soon as possible. 
I would be very grateful for your private view as to what line to start on, without 
prejudice, of course, to the discussions of the Committee.
The Children have asked me to find out if the E[conomic] J[ournal] would 
give them favorable terms for an advertisement.43 I don’t see why it should not if 
you are still feeling tender towards them perhaps you might.
My salutations to Lydia
Yours
Joan
I am polishing up on my learned article. I will send it along shortly.
Note to j.m.k.
Of course there is a lot to be said against starting from this high + dry way. But it 
has some advantages of which the chief is that it makes it possible to avoid contro­
versy entirely. The historical episodes can then be treated without any reference to 
conflicting interpretations. . . .
I have only given headings for the historical section to follow. They can be 
done straightforwardly if the theory is behind us. But see inferior scheme for de­
tails that will have to be brought out. (jmk/ua/5/3/124–30)
Robinson referred to two versions of her syllabus. The “Grand 
Scheme” was a plan for an unconventional and formidable set of lectures 
that would detach monetary theory from Marshallian foundations and 
reconstruct both theory and history by employing the emerging appa­
ratus of The General Theory. Beginning “high and dry” with an austere 
presentation of theoretical abstractions, she envisioned a critique of po­
litical economy and a reinterpretation of modern economic theory from 
a Keynesian standpoint, all in the space of some two months. The more 
modest and conventional syllabus that she called the “inferior scheme” 
would dispense with general theoretical considerations. Instead, specific 
economic problems would be analyzed by employing Keynes’s most 
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recent ideas. The draft of the inferior scheme is not in the King’s College 
archives, and the draft of the grand scheme is only a fragment. In the 
critique of political economy, which she placed under the general head­
ing “Controversy,” Robinson proposed to consider several versions of 
the quantity theory of money; the classical theory of the rate of inter­
est and its relation to modern theory; the “Treasury view” of monetary 
economics as a “degenerate descendent” of classical theory; various writ­
ers, including Ricardo, Karl Marx, Marshall, and Ludwig von Mises; and 
more indeterminate matters that she placed under the headings “cranks” 
and “modern cranks.” In her reconstruction of economic history, she 
planned to discuss the German inflation of the early 1920s, Great Britain 
on the gold standard in 1925–31, and the tract by Hubert Henderson and 
Keynes on this subject—The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill (1925), 
the crisis of the English pound, the New Deal (“The Roosevelt Experi­
ment”), and other matters as well (jmk/ua/5/3/124–30).
Keynes quickly saw that this syllabus was tendentious, beyond the 
powers of second­year students, and impossible to execute in a short pe­
riod. Robinson’s lectures had been approved by the board as a prereq­
uisite for the main lectures in this area delivered by Robertson; but her 
syllabus was more advanced than the course for which it was intended as 
a prerequisite. Finally, the grand scheme did not conform to Robertson’s 
approach to the analysis of money. The inconsistencies between the two 
sets of lectures would inevitably confuse students, embarrass Robertson, 
and intensify dissension among the faculty, who were already forming op­
posing camps as a result of Keynes’s new views. Thus Keynes’s judgment 
on March 29, 1934: “The grand scheme is really out of the question.” He 
approved her more modest plan: “By grouping your ideas round concrete 
problems, you avoid the strain of abstract treatment whilst really able to 
bring in the general sort of approach you want and can awaken their [the 
students’] curiosity in the right directions” (jmk/ua/5/3/131). An analysis 
of specific problems on Keynesian premises was a sound tactic for plant­
ing the principles and methods of the new economics in the minds of 
Cambridge students. A frontal assault would only end in disaster.
Did Keynes hope to dampen Robinson’s enthusiasm for more aggres­
sive revolutionary action at Cambridge, temper the conflict between her 
and Robertson, and neutralize her as a source of tension within the faculty 
generally? If so, his success was fleeting at best. Shortly after her appoint­
ment, the Appointments Committee of the board announced a new uni­
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versity lectureship, the position to begin in the Michaelmas term of 1935.44 
Robinson applied (Moggridge 1992, 599). On February 18, 1935, the com­
mittee—which included Fay, Keynes, and Robertson, who was the newly 
elected chairman of the board—recommended the young lse economist 
Hicks.45 Pigou then suggested to Keynes that Robinson be promoted to 
a full­time lectureship the following academic year, an appointment en­
tailing three full courses of lectures.46 Robinson used this opportunity to 
propose to the board that she teach applications of monetary theory over 
two terms, Michaelmas 1935 and Lent 1936. Keynes or Wynne Plumptre 
would complete the academic year with a third course on money in the 
Easter 1936 term.47
On March 1, 1935, the Lecture List Committee met to consider courses 
for the following academic year. The controversy generated by Robinson’s 
proposal is best understood in the atmosphere of confusion, anxiety, sus­
picion, and revolutionary fervor surrounding Keynes’s work on The Gen-
eral Theory. By this point, Robertson had seen drafts of Keynes’s critique of 
classical economics. He rejected Keynes’s account of classicism as prepos­
terous and intellectually dishonest. He also found much of Keynes’s new 
theoretical language to be “almost completely mumbo­jumbo” (in Keynes 
1973a, 505–06). Robinson, on the other hand, was a dedicated Keynesian 
partisan who took pleasure in staking out a position and fighting for it. 
Some members of the guild saw in her partisanship a contemptuous dis­
paragement of all pre­Keynesian monetary theory. The implications of 
her proposal to teach two full courses on money and enter Robertson’s 
domain in a faculty that remained small and understaffed in relation to its 
growing number of students were not attractive to Keynesian skeptics. 
Was she suggesting that Robertson, who had published extensively on 
monetary theory and enjoyed an international reputation as a foremost 
authority in the area, was incompetent? Or were the Keynesians intent 
on marginalizing Robertson and dominating the tripos, in which case the 
next generation of Cambridge economists would be lost to Keynesian 
dogmaticians? Robinson’s intervention fractured the uneasy peace in the 
faculty by forcing colleagues to take sides in the contentious atmosphere 
of 1935. Like revolutionary partisans generally, she was committed to clar­
ity, precision, formalism, and unequivocal positions. This held true not 
only in her research, but also in the stands she took in the economics fac­
ulty. In the Marshallian guild, conflicts were generally resolved consensu­
ally. Issues likely to divide the faculty into factions based on conflicting 
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positions concerning fundamental questions were not formulated with 
pristine clarity. In any case, the most important matters were not open 
to explicit formulations. As the unexpressed premises on which agree­
ments were based, they were not possible objects of formal agreement. 
Because every formal understanding presupposed a background of tacit 
assumptions, not all assumptions could be formalized. Moreover, preci­
sion changed the import and practical significance of controversies and 
exacerbated conflicts by exposing their ultimate premises. Efforts to drive 
disagreements down to their foundations were immensely risky because 
the directions they might take could not be anticipated. A clarification of 
positions not only articulated differences but also formed them, and the 
reduction of ambiguity and imprecision in faculty deliberations gener­
ated disagreements that would not otherwise arise. It was better to resist 
precise definitions, refuse to make ultimate commitments, and forego in­
terventions that revealed basic differences.48 By exposing sources of op­
position that otherwise would have remained latent, Robinson’s proposal 
created mistrust, resentment, and bad feelings generally. It frayed the ties 
that loosely bound members of the guild together in a community of mu­
tual trust, compromising a condition without which collective action by a 
small fellowship of academics would have been impossible.
Several factors are important in the response to Robinson’s proposal. 
The conversion of her position to a full­time lectureship took some mem­
bers of the board by surprise—among them Pigou, who had originally 
suggested the conversion to Keynes but forgot he had done so. Some 
members of the board were unaware that Robinson intended to deliver 
two sets of lectures on money. Robertson, the lecturer who would be 
most damaged by her proposal, was regarded by his colleagues as mod­
est and self­effacing, perhaps to a fault. It was unlikely he would raise 
objections on his own behalf. Austin’s membership on the board and his 
participation in the discussion made a frank appraisal of his wife’s propo­
sal and her credentials awkward at best. Finally, there was Keynes, who 
was on good terms with most of the faculty and legendary for his powers 
of persuasion. He enjoyed immense power and prestige outside Cam­
bridge as well as an intimate knowledge of what were then called affairs—
the world of Whitehall, the City, and the boardrooms of great banks, 
investment firms, and corporations in Britain and abroad. If he supported 
Robinson, others would find it more difficult to oppose her.
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Fay was one of the board members vexed by Robinson’s proposal. He 
had supposed that Pigou, as the professor of political economy and the 
most senior member of the faculty, would take the initiative in supporting 
Robertson. When this did not happen, he decided to act. Within hours of 
the committee meeting, he sent Robertson the following note:
You may think I have acted awkwardly, but I have written to Robinson and 
his wife, stating the apprehension which some people felt that her course would 
cramp the 3rd year money teaching and be rival rather than complementary, and 
hoping that it will not be so.
I shall in future speak openly at the [Appointments] Committee or the Board, 
whether Austin is present or not. I am a reader of senior standing and so are you; 
and if the Prof. does not take the lead it is our duty to step in, where the welfare of 
the Tripos is concerned, and I am ready to do so, without mincing matters.
My view of Keynes, and here again I shall mince no words in future, is that 
when he so desires he argues for a person, without regard to the principle. (dhr/
b2/1)
The board had an obligation to support its chairman, and on the deci­
sion over Robinson’s proposal it had failed do so. Fay had entered the 
meeting under the mistaken impression that Robertson and Pigou had 
conferred and reached an agreement on how to handle the Robinson mat­
ter. As he wrote Robertson, this was an error he did not intend to repeat: 
“I shall go more warily in the future and try to make sure that your hand 
is being in no way forced” (dhr/b2/1).
Although efforts to locate a copy of Fay’s letter to the Robinsons have 
not succeeded, the grounds for his dissatisfaction are stated in a letter he 
circulated the following day to Pigou, Keynes, and Shove—old Kings­
men and colleagues of long standing to whom he felt he could write in 
complete candor. The letter is a rambling, confusing, repetitious docu­
ment in which it is difficult to discern a coherent line of reasoning—fur­
ther evidence that Robinson’s adversaries had left the meeting the previ­
ous day in a state of puzzlement. Addressing “old friends at King’s,” Fay 
raised several matters that gave him special cause for worry. The meeting 
was held under “embarrassing circumstances” that made it difficult for 
the board to support its chairman. The source of the embarrassment was 
Austin, who did not recuse himself from deliberations on his wife’s pro­
posal. However, Fay did not hold Austin responsible for the result. On 
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an earlier occasion when she was under discussion, the board assured him 
that he should feel free to take part in the meeting, and he did so. In this 
case, Fay surmised, perhaps Austin felt that “it was his duty to do his best 
for his wife’s emphatic desire.”49 Fay also felt that no reason had been 
given for reinserting a course on money into the second­year lecture list, 
much less a two­term set of lectures by Robinson. The decision had no 
sound curricular basis. On the contrary, it was a result of coercive maneu­
vers. The previous evening, Fay had written as much to Austin “as an old 
friend and pupil”—as noted, it was Fay who had first encouraged Austin 
to become an academic. On the issue of subsequent board discussions of 
Robinson, Fay was not in favor of excluding Austin. Instead, he proposed 
an uncompromising and unrealistic standard of candor: “We must always 
speak of Mrs. Robinson exactly as we would if [Austin] Robinson were 
not present. Otherwise we will be guilty of a sort of favouritism.” It was 
obvious to Fay that the syllabus Robinson presented to the board was not 
a prerequisite for Robertson’s lectures. Her lectures would compete with 
his, very likely preempting his mode of analysis. The result would either 
dispose students against his approach or confuse them in their efforts to 
prepare for the tripos paper on money. In either case, the result would be 
a “disaster.”50
Robinson’s partisanship on behalf of Keynes’s new ideas was an im­
portant issue in the controversy. As Fay understood him, Keynes now 
seemed to think that solutions to most problems in economic theory 
could be derived from the theory of money. If “the money people” were 
granted their own territory, they would impose “a sort of theoretical su­
zerainty” on the faculty. Because it would stratify the faculty along the 
lines of theoretical allegiances, this was a dangerous prospect: “On the 
one hand,” Fay wrote, “the central theorists, and on the other hand 
the rest of us counting as frills.” Fay envisioned a new Keynesian regime 
at Cambridge that would produce a radical shift in the balance of power 
in the faculty and realign the status of its members. For the first time in the 
history of the Marshallian guild, status would be decided on the basis of 
theoretical commitments. An elite of monetary theorists—Keynes and his 
followers—would be positioned at the top of this new order. Those who 
failed to demonstrate appropriate enthusiasm for their views would suffer 
a loss of prestige. In essence, a theoretical loyalty test would determine the 
career chances of Cambridge economists. Fay also feared that Keynesian­
ism, at least in the lectures of Robinson, would become an economic the­
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ology at Cambridge. The golden age of the Marshallian guild and its lib­
eral intellectual culture of debate and innovation within the capacious and 
vaguely defined boundaries of Marshall’s Principles would be succeeded 
by a dark age of Keynesian dogmatism, sectarianism, and the prospect of 
internal ideological warfare. All this to accommodate the excessive ambi­
tions of one well­connected and ill­mannered woman? Fay insisted that 
there was “no conceivable danger” of a Keynesian hegemony if Keynes 
himself delivered the tripos lectures on money—this “because of his vast 
experience in affairs.” Robinson was not Keynes: “It would be altogether 
wrong to suggest to Mrs. Robinson that she is in any way capable of act­
ing as his substitute here.” In Fay’s abysmal vision of Cambridge econom­
ics, Robinson, Kahn, and Hicks—the youngest members of the faculty, 
whom he represented as followers of Keynes and ignorant of the realities 
of economic life—would dominate the curriculum.51 Fay’s solution to the 
immediate problem created by Robinson’s proposal was to restrict her 
to one set of second­year lectures on money in the Lent term that would 
equip students for Robertson’s lecture in their third year. Would this de­
prive Robinson of a full­time job? Perhaps, but that did not trouble Fay: 
“This change in her status was sprung upon us, as has indeed every change 
from the time when she asked permission to give occasional lectures.”52 
He concluded, perhaps somewhat sanctimoniously in light of his wither­
ing criticism of Robinson and her supporters, that his intention in writing 
at such length was “above all things to be loyal to our new Chairman.”53
Keynes found Fay’s letter both annoying and ominous. As he wrote 
Lydia on March 4, “The trouble between Joan and Dennis (which I 
thought I had settled) may crop up again. He’s getting dangerously near 
to trying to prevent her from lecturing; and if he were to succeed, the 
state of rift between the older people and the younger would be dreadful. 
I shall have to exert my full force, and it would end in Dennis being fright­
fully upset. Why are all economists mad?” (quoted in Moggridge 1992, 
600). Keynes’s diagnosis of the Robinson affair makes several points. As 
his letter indicates, the difference between Robinson and Robertson did 
not begin with this incident. He assumed that Robertson was the prime 
mover behind Fay’s letter. He also supposed that Robertson was respon­
sible for the attempt to restrict Robinson’s lectures, which he described 
as an effort to “prevent her from lecturing.” Keynes saw the dispute as 
an intergenerational confrontation. Although this perception was largely 
true, it did not identify the definitive feature of the conflict. The schism 
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was between followers of Keynes, most of whom were younger, and 
others he had stigmatized as classics, all of whom were older. He also 
failed to see that Robinson’s incursion into Robertson’s territory would 
inevitably intensify dissension regardless of the decision of the board or 
the direction in which he exercised his influence. A decision in favor of 
Robinson would damage Robertson. A decision in favor of Robertson 
would weaken the core of the revolutionary party at Cambridge. Finally, 
he seems to have forgotten that only a year before, he had told Robin­
son that the syllabus she called the Grand Scheme was unacceptable. Or 
had the constellation of powers and interests changed in the intervening 
months, causing Keynes to change his mind?
Keynes immediately began a counterinitiative to persuade Fay, Pigou, 
and Shove not to reopen the board’s discussion of Robinson’s lectures. In 
a letter of March 5 to Fay, he argued that a decision to veto Robinson’s 
proposal would be an excessively severe and virtually unprecedented step. 
It was not a measure to take against a lecturer whose success with students 
had been amply demonstrated. In addition, a veto would give the unfor­
tunate and mistaken impression that the board was censoring Robinson—
preventing her from “preaching her own line of approach.” This impres­
sion would suggest that Cambridge was becoming sectarian and moving 
in the direction of lse, “where differences of doctrinal opinion are capable 
of coming into the picture.”54 Keynes also reminded Fay that in proposing 
to convert Robinson’s lectureship to a full­time position, he was not tak­
ing the board by surprise. “I was,” he explained, “simply reminding Pigou 
that he had previously expressed the opinion to me that, as she was rather 
unlucky in not getting a University Lectureship, we should at any rate 
make her a full­time assistant lecturer, if she wanted to be one.” Keynes 
found this argument especially compelling, since Robinson’s position on 
the faculty did not match her scholarly accomplishments. If an entirely 
new set of lecturers were appointed, he asked, would not her credentials 
be judged superior to the qualifications of some current occupants? Fi­
nally, Keynes argued that in view of the current proliferation of theories 
of money, representation of more than one position in the tripos lectures 
was not only proper but inevitable. This was a case for “some measure 
of duplication and even a possible overweighting.”55 Regardless of the 
intentions behind this argument, it afforded him a convenient rationale 
for putting his most combative and unrestrained polemicist in place as a 
counterweight to Robertson, who was now an adversary.
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On the same day, Keynes wrote Shove along the same lines but much 
more briefly.56 Although it is not clear whether he also wrote Pigou—cor­
respondence between them on this matter has not survived—the Profes­
sor’s views can easily be reconstructed. It was Pigou who was impressed 
with The Economics of Imperfect Competition and suggested that the book 
would make Robinson a strong contender for the next lectureship.57 And 
it was Pigou who made the original suggestion to promote her to a full­
time position. Finally, a much later piece of evidence indicates that he 
supported Robinson’s proposal not because he agreed with her approach 
to economics but on the basis of the fundamental premise of intellectual 
liberalism: academic freedom.58
In the end Fay relented, insisting on two conditions. If the board ac­
cepted Robinson’s lectures as she proposed them, it would have to take 
measures to spare Robertson the embarrassment its decision would cause. 
In its next meeting, could Keynes offer a brief rationale to the board for 
this departure from the lecture list? He also called on the board to reject 
the assumption that Robinson or Kahn could replace Keynes in the cur­
riculum. This was out of the question given Keynes’s “superb knowledge 
of affairs,” which he claimed was “the greatest single asset of our Tri­
pos” and precisely the area in which Keynes’s followers were deficient. 
Fay had no reservations about Robinson’s competence, and he knew she 
was respected at lse and Oxford. However, he objected in strong terms 
to her abrasive style of self­presentation, which he regarded as crude and 
boorish. As he complained to Keynes, “It is an awful pity she is so bloody 
rude.”59 Notwithstanding Fay’s reservations, in the March meeting of 
the board, Robinson’s triumph was absolute. Her proposal to teach two 
courses on money in the coming academic year was approved, and she 
was permitted to continue her current lectures into the summer. With 
Keynes’s help, Pigou’s backing, her husband’s support, and her oppo­
nents’ confusion, disarray, and tolerance, she was able to implement the 
“Grand Scheme” Keynes had rejected the year before.
r e a d i n g  t h e  p r o o f s  o f  
t h e  g e n e r a l  t h e o r y
Keynes’s position in the dispute over Robinson’s lecture program was 
perhaps his first act of patronage on her behalf, the first occasion on which 
he employed his social and intellectual capital to advance her career. Both 
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the import and the timing of the event were of some significance for the 
patron. In the controversy of March 1935, Keynes made several choices; 
some were explicit and intentional, others perhaps tacit and unwitting. 
He supported Robinson’s freedom to lecture according to her own lights 
against arguments that would restrict this freedom. He advocated a plu­
ralist pedagogy in the theory of money, an academic policy that might 
result in conflicting and dueling lecturers, leaving students uncertain 
as to how they should approach tripos questions. He rejected a unified 
pedagogy designed for consistency and ease of comprehension because 
it did not conform to the fluid state of research on monetary theory. In 
a conflict between Robertson and Robinson, he took a strong stance 
in favor of his new advocate and against his old friend. It was Robert­
son, he thought, who was getting “dangerously near” to preventing her 
from lecturing. He was prepared to use all his resources and exercise his 
“full force” to see that this did not happen, even if his opposition caused 
Robertson to become “frightfully upset.” He supported younger members 
of the faculty over his contemporaries and older students. This meant sup­
porting Robinson, Austin, and Kahn against Fay, Robertson, and Shove. 
It also meant supporting Keynesian faculty against the classics, acting on 
behalf of proponents of his new theoretical program and against those 
he hoped to convert. And although he could not have been expected to 
see this at the time, it meant supporting the nascent party of the revolu­
tion against Robertson, who would become the most intransigent Cam­
bridge counterrevolutionary.
Some two months before the Robinson controversy, Keynes be­
gan to take advice on revising The General Theory by sending galleys to 
Robertson. The theoretical strategy of the book was underpinned by a rhe­
torical strategy. Keynes hoped to persuade economists to “re­examine criti­
cally certain of their basic presumptions” (Keynes 1936, vi). In conducting 
this reexamination, his readers would conclude that if their assumptions 
were employed to understand the economy, the results would be not only 
mistaken but “disastrous” (Keynes 1936, iii). He seems to have conceived 
The General Theory as an extended set of arguments the logic of which 
did not differ substantially from his Essays in Persuasion. His ideal readers 
were economists who felt secure in the magnificent edifice of the classical 
citadel. Their thinking would be reoriented by a combination of abstract 
argument and controversy. He would reformulate the basic elements of 
classical economics and expose its fundamental premises. Then he would 
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demonstrate that they were vulnerable to fatal objections and show how 
his theory could solve the problems these objections posed. When he had 
completed his arguments, economists would be ready to abandon their 
intellectual fortress, convinced by his analysis that the impressive super­
structure of classicism rested on irreparably flawed foundations.
During his years of work on the Treatise, Keynes regarded Robertson 
as his most valuable aide on theoretical questions. And with good reason. 
Robertson was an expert in the area of Keynes’s research on monetary 
theory. They agreed on basic theoretical assumptions, a requirement of 
scientific dialogue that Keynes regarded as indispensable. Discussion pre­
supposes what is beyond discussion, a bedrock of assumptions that are 
not open to question. Unless interlocutors accept this requirement and 
agree on their fundamental assumptions, the conditions for a Keynesian 
scientific discussion are not met. Robertson was a sympathetic reader ea­
ger to grasp Keynes’s insights. He possessed to a high degree a quality 
Keynes did not find in Hayek during their exchanges in 1930–31: good 
will, the determination to understand a writer’s ideas as he intended 
them to be taken. Robertson made suggestions that were designed to 
strengthen Keynes’s reasoning. He also developed analyses that translated 
Keynes’s speculative insights into arguments, the detailed work of proof 
for which Keynes had little patience and which he regarded as subordinate 
to the more challenging work of discovering new lines of inquiry. Finally, 
Robertson was open to persuasion. Within the limits of the assumptions 
they shared, he could be convinced that Keynes was on the right track con­
cerning the basic problems of economic theory and how to tackle them. 
By March 1935, Robertson was no longer Keynes’s ideal interlocutor, as 
Robertson himself recognized. Their discussion of the galleys during the 
first ten weeks of the year had not been successful. At first he was skeptical 
of Keynes’s ideas. As Keynes proved unwilling to budge on fundamentals, 
making it clear that it was the critic and not the author who was expected 
to change his thinking, Robertson became more resolute. He rejected 
Keynes’s account of orthodox economics as a bad parody, historically pre­
posterous, and intellectually dishonest. Keynes’s reconstruction of classi­
cism was irresponsible in the extreme, and his treatment of Marshall was a 
travesty. These abominations, as Robertson saw them, destroyed much of 
their common ground. He also found Keynes’s new theoretical language 
not merely wanting in clarity but unintelligible (in Keynes 1973a, 505–06). 
On February 10, he warned Keynes, “I’m afraid you’ll feel the general 
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tenor of my comments (which seems almost to have reached the dimen­
sions of a book) rather hostile” (in Keynes 1973a, 506).60 He remained 
defiant until March, when he concluded that their dialogue was futile. 
Keynes agreed. He had failed to move Robertson on the basic issues that 
separated them, and on March 14 their exchange was terminated (Keynes 
1973a, 522–23).61
Thus a few days after Keynes’s expression of support for Robinson 
in the board, his discussion with Robertson collapsed, giving him the 
first serious indication that his rhetorical strategy might be misguided. In 
spring 1931, Robinson had begun her ambitious project of socioprofes­
sional self­formation, writing on Keynes’s new ideas and preparing herself 
to carry out his commissions when he was finally ready to call on her. 
Some three months after the exchange between Keynes and Robertson 
lapsed, her efforts paid off. On June 8, Keynes wrote that he was sending 
Robinson the available galleys of the book in two installments. He would 
be “extremely grateful for any criticisms of form or substance.” The tone 
of this letter differed markedly from his previous correspondence with 
Robinson, which was correct but cool and sometimes perfunctory. The 
letter included an invitation to dinner and a concert: “Could you and 
Austin dine with Lydia and me in King’s on Thursday (June 13) at 8:0, 
and then come with us to the Handel afterwards?” (Keynes 1973a, 638). 
Robinson had finally arrived.
What had changed since the previous summer, when Robinson was 
offering suggestions on The General Theory to Kahn in the hope that they 
might be relayed to Keynes? In spring 1935, Keynes faced a new strate­
gic predicament. A draft of the book was now complete and being set 
in galleys. He needed assurances that it would indeed initiate a revolu­
tion in economic thought. Because of his failure to persuade Robertson, 
the problem that had bedeviled him in his controversy with Hayek arose 
once again, but in a more acute fashion. In order to revise the manuscript 
he had written with Kahn’s assistance, he needed to be satisfied that it 
was free of the kinds of embarrassing conceptual and theoretical errors 
Hayek had found in the Treatise. For this purpose, he needed a reader 
with the requisite logical and theoretical sophistication, someone who 
had followed the direction of his post­Treatise thinking, a critic of good 
will who was sympathetic to his new approach and could be expected 
to strengthen it by pointing out errors that he and Kahn had missed. By 
June 1935, Keynes believed Robinson was that reader. At this point, her 
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Keynesian self­education and efforts at self­presentation intersected with 
changes in his strategic position. Before the disappointing exchange with 
Robertson, he had no reason to see her as an attractive resource. Now he 
did. Given Keynes’s ambitions, limitations, and expectations, she could 
be useful, perhaps even valuable, in finishing the book. As in so many 
instances, events proved Keynes’s judgment sound even if not precisely in 
the way he anticipated. Within four days of receiving the second set of gal­
leys, Robinson sent him an extensive and detailed set of comments as well 
as her general impressions of the book (Keynes 1973a, 638–45). How was 
this extraordinarily swift and thorough response possible? Keynes sent 
Harrod the galleys on June 5 but did not hear from him until July 31 (see 
Keynes 1973a, 526–27). Hawtrey’s set was sent on June 12, and he replied 
by the end of the month (1973a, 567). In four days, how could Robinson 
read a difficult and confusing book, digest it, and write elaborate and care­
fully crafted suggestions, many of which Keynes adopted?
In addressing Keynes’s request so quickly, she profited from her long­
term investment in the study of Keynesian thought. In 1930–31, she was 
present at the meetings of the Circus when the building blocks of The 
General Theory were constructed. In spring 1932, she worked with Austin 
and Kahn on the manifesto and debated its merits with Keynes. There­
after she kept in touch with changes in his thinking through frequent dis­
cussions with Kahn, an important part of her professional routine. She 
also spoke more occasionally with Sraffa, who met with Keynes regularly 
to discuss their current research. And she decided to lecture on applica­
tions of monetary theory, which called for a self­taught crash course on 
the theory of money during the summer vacation of 1934. Her principal 
text was the Treatise. Robinson’s facility in commenting on Keynes’s gal­
leys was also due to the stunning simplicity of her understanding of the 
field of monetary theory. Theories of money were either true, approxima­
tions of the truth, misconceived, or false. Put another way, they fell into 
one of four categories: Keynes’s current views, positions that approxi­
mated them more or less closely, or positions that were either irrelevant 
to his views or inconsistent with them. Theories in the last two categories 
were either uninteresting or wrong. In either case, they did not merit 
serious study. Unlike Robinson, Robertson, Harrod, and Hawtrey were 
veterans in the field. Their reading of Keynes was informed by their own 
theoretical views and many years of work on the literature and its com­
plexities. They were positioned in a tradition of thought about monetary 
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questions and responded to Keynes from the standpoint of their loca­
tion in this tradition. This meant that they read The General Theory not 
as revealed truth but from the standpoint of the place it occupied in the 
history of monetary thought. Because they knew more than Robinson, 
they were able to see more—chiefly more problems posed by Keynes’s 
theoretical language, assumptions, mode of analysis, and scholarship. Not 
so Robinson, an enthusiast whose convictions did not recognize tradition 
as an authoritative source of knowledge. If serious work on monetary 
theory began with Keynes, other authors, to the extent they were worthy 
of consideration, could be routinely dispatched by reading them from the 
perspective of their consistency with his ideas. In this respect, Robinson 
was an ideal revolutionary activist. The founding text of the revolution 
could be fully inscribed as scientific truth in the relatively empty space of 
her mind, where it did not face competition from opposing positions. In 
The Economics of Imperfect Competition, she confessed with peculiar hau­
teur that she was almost completely innocent of mathematics. She was 
also innocent of much economic literature. To see The General Theory as 
the first genuinely significant contribution to monetary theory was to 
read Keynes independently of other work in this area. Criticism would 
necessarily be limited to immanent critique—criticism that presupposed 
his assumptions and their boundaries. In this regard, the narrow scope 
and relative superficiality of Robinson’s professional training were quite 
useful to an author seeking grounds for confidence that his analyses were 
sound.
Robinson’s letter of June 16 reproduces the time­honored idioms of 
client­patron relations. She offered effusive praise but not the false ap­
plause of the lackey. Lavish compliments were tempered by carefully con­
sidered suggestions, for which she made no claim to originality or even 
authorship. Keynes was assured that her proposals would have occurred 
to him in any event. Indeed, he might already have considered them and 
drawn his own conclusions, in which case Robinson’s gentle criticisms 
were implicitly ascribed to Keynes as original insights into his own work. 
Robinson began by apologizing for possible impertinence in expressing 
her delight with the book, as if it might be bad form on her part to offer 
an opinion, even though this is precisely what Keynes had asked her to 
do. Excesses of flattery followed. The book made “an impression of great 
power and coherence.” It was “the most readable book of its weight ever,” 
a view that generations of his readers would find difficult to credit. There 
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were “eloquent passages” that appeared at just the right point to keep 
the reader engaged. Because of the clarity and cogency of his analysis, it 
would be “extremely difficult to attack” (in Keynes 1973a, 638). Keynes’s 
correspondence with Robertson had given him reason to suspect that her 
last judgment was quite far off the mark, and the responses of Harrod and 
Hawtrey would strengthen this impression. Robinson did not seem to 
grasp Keynes’s fundamental rhetorical objective. His purpose was not to 
achieve immunity from attack by means of arguments that would gener­
ally be regarded as the last word on economic theory. Although he was 
convinced that his general line of analysis was sound, he knew his argu­
ments were unclear, fragmentary, and inconclusive. The General Theory 
was the beginning of the assault on classicism, not the final, victorious 
battle. His aim was to invite counterattacks by stimulating controversy. 
Robinson saw the book as a finished system, sufficiently free of flaws 
that criticism would be seen as frivolous and harmless, even laughable, 
with the result that critics would damage not Keynes but themselves (in 
Keynes 1973a, 638).
In the Robinsonian hermeneutic, The General Theory was self­inter­
preting. A clear understanding of its meaning flowed smoothly from the 
lucidity, internal consistency, and force of Keynes’s arguments. Its only 
errors lay in matters of detail. Because the book was a self­contained and 
transparent system, they could be corrected on the basis of its own logic. 
Keynes’s meta­interpretation was quite remote from Robinson’s. In his 
response to Harrod’s worry that his account of classical economics would 
gratuitously raise a “storm of dust” by indulging in criticisms that were 
ill­founded and easy to refute, he replied that his critique of economic 
orthodoxy was essential to the intelligibility of the book. It was neces­
sary to raise a storm of dust because “it is only out of the controversy 
that will arise that what I am saying will get understood” (Keynes 1973a, 
548). If Keynes’s assault on the classics was sharp enough, they would be 
compelled to respond, and the import of his own theory would emerge 
in the ensuing controversy. Otherwise it would be misunderstood or per­
haps not understood at all. On this view, The General Theory cannot be 
understood immanently. Moreover, it could not be understood in sum­
mer 1935, when it had not yet been published and subjected to the clas­
sical counterattack. This meant that it could not be understood by sym­
pathetic readers of the galleys such as Harrod, a point Keynes attempted 
to impress on him. Nor could it be understood by a partisan reader like 
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Robinson, a consequence of his hermeneutic that Keynes did not con­
sider. Because a proper understanding of The General Theory depended on 
adversarial dialogue, his attacks on classical economics were not merely 
an exercise in scientific polemics. They had a strategic function that was 
indispensable to his purpose. A harmonious or pacific reception would 
show that the book had failed in its objective of initiating a revolution 
in economic thought. Thus Keynes’s sharp and tendentious criticisms, 
the postpublication controversy, and achievement of his purpose were all 
tightly connected.
As Robinson’s letter of June 16 shows, she saw herself as Keynes’s 
comrade in arms, engaged in a scientific offensive that she conceived as 
a quasi­military operation. In The General Theory, he had succeeded in 
securing all the flanks of the revolutionary forces. As a result the move­
ment could “push ahead” without fear of damaging counterattacks (in 
Keynes 1973a, 638). Keynes was pleased with Robinson’s comments and 
especially interested in the difficulty she encountered in reading chapter 
17, “The Essential Properties of Interest and Money.” As he wrote on 
June 18, he was not troubled by possible errors in details or problems 
concerning specific concepts. His only worry was the coherence of the 
general analysis employed in the chapter. If that proved “fully intelligible 
in the long run,” he would be satisfied. For Keynes, the General Theory 
was not the book but how its ideas—unfamiliar and obscure not only to 
the reader but to the author as well—would be understood once they 
were in circulation and contested. Robinson sought, and in many respects 
supposed she had found, certainty in the text itself. This was not Keynes’s 
expectation. Clarity in all respects was not merely improbable but impos­
sible in principle without discussion of his ideas. If his strategy was sound, 
errors or sources of confusion would be cleared up to his advantage in 
subsequent controversy (Keynes 1973a, 645).
Keynes’s invitation to correspond on the proofs and his appreciation 
of Robinson’s comments seem to have strengthened her self­confidence. 
In responding to his remarks on chapter 17, she told him that his dif­
ficulties lay in advice he had taken from Kahn. She and Kahn had ar­
gued over the chapter and concluded that she was right and he was mis­
taken.62 She did not regard it as unacceptably presumptuous to instruct 
Keynes concerning his new concept of liquidity preference. Although he 
discussed liquidity and used the idea, he never specified with any preci­
sion the economic behavior that the concept was meant to designate. On 
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this point, Robinson moved beyond the task of offering comments and 
wrote a text that she invited Keynes to appropriate.63 She also asked to see 
the outstanding galleys once they were available. Keynes seems to have 
accepted Robinson’s new self­representation. On September 3, he sent 
her the remaining galleys, suggestions to facilitate her reading, requests 
for advice, and explanations of the current state of his revisions. He also 
put her on notice that she could expect to receive his revised versions of 
Books I and II. He had completely rewritten Book II in the weeks since 
she had seen the first set of galleys, with the result that “practically not 
a word of the version you had read has been left standing.” Her letter of 
September 7, which concerns dinner at her flat, makes it clear that she 
wanted him to know she was fully at his disposal: “Thursday at 8:00 will 
be fine. It is possible Austin may have to be away, but I won’t ask anyone 
in, in case you would like to talk about the book” (in Keynes 1973a, 651).64 
Personal access to Keynes began to deliver small benefits. On October 21, 
Robinson read a paper to his Political Economy Club, and Kahn celebrated 
the occasion by giving a dinner before the meeting. Keynes attended both 
events, finding her paper “crystal clear and extremely interesting” (Keynes 
1973a, 652).65 At the same time, he sent the first sixty­four page proofs 
for her scrutiny, promising further installments as they became available.
On November 20, Robinson accepted a more difficult assignment: 
a final settlement of Keynes’s accounts with Hawtrey over their differ­
ences concerning the book. From the standpoint of his original strategy, 
Hawtrey was one of the more important members of the cohort of econo­
mists to whom he had addressed The General Theory: a Cambridge con­
temporary and an old friend, in Keynes’s view the most sophisticated 
economist at the Treasury, and a proponent of Cambridge classicism. 
When Hawtrey began to read the galleys in June, he answered with long 
memoranda­like letters covering an extensive range of issues. An attempt 
to respond to Hawtrey’s memoranda point by point at the same time 
that Keynes was handling comments from Harrod, Kahn, and Robin­
son and rewriting much of the book was out of the question. Yet he 
was determined to persuade Hawtrey to execute a paradigm shift. Af­
ter struggling through some five months of exchanges in an attempt to 
woo Hawtrey from his commitment to the orthodoxy they had shared, 
Keynes concluded that he would not be moved. On some points Keynes 
had not been able to offer a satisfactory explanation of his new views, 
which Hawtrey still did not understand. In addition, his arguments were 
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cast in a new theoretical language. Hawtrey had misunderstood too many 
of these arguments because he had translated them into the language of 
orthodox theory, the premises of which rendered Keynes’s ideas either 
counterintuitive or nonsensical. He regarded most of Hawtrey’s objec­
tions as of minor importance. His main objective was to get Hawtrey 
to see the problems of economics in a new way by persuading him to 
think about them in his new language. If he succeeded, any outstand­
ing problems would eventually be resolved in his favor since they would 
be articulated in a language in which classical assumptions had no place. 
Keynes concluded that he had failed in this larger effort. Why did so many 
issues still divide them? Because, as he wrote Hawtrey shortly after he had 
sent his book to the printer: “So many points are still seen through your 
spectacles and not through mine!” (Keynes 1973a, 627).
On November 29, Keynes delegated the Hawtrey problem to Robinson: 
“Unless it would bore you, I would be rather grateful if you would look 
through this voluminous correspondence with Hawtrey. I have arranged 
it in chronological order. By the time you have got to the end of it, you will 
see that we are recurring over and over again to two or three points where 
I am indisposed to give way. My final letter to him, with today’s date on 
it, has not yet been dispatched. I should rather like to know whether, 
looking at it impartially, you feel that there are any further concessions 
which he can justly claim from me” (Keynes 1973a, 612). In sending the 
entire correspondence to her instead of first asking whether he might im­
pose on her time, Keynes evidently assumed she would respond as he 
expected. He was not disappointed. And as he surely knew, her answer 
to his question would not be impartial. Writing on December 2, Robin­
son compared Keynes’s handling of Hawtrey to the conduct of a higher 
moral being: “I don’t think an archangel could have taken more trouble 
to be fair and clear.” Like Robertson, Hawtrey had not “gotten” or “taken 
in” Keynes: he had not understood Keynes’s analysis as he intended it 
to be read. This was Hawtrey’s failure, not Keynes’s. Until he had prop­
erly read The General Theory, it was useless to argue with him. Additional 
concessions were not called for, and there was nothing further to be said 
(in Keynes 1973a, 612–13). On December 27, Keynes wrote Robinson a 
warm letter of appreciation, acknowledging his “great debt of gratitude” 
for her work on his proofs. He also confided his feelings at the end of 
five years of labor on a book from which he expected so much. “Author’s 
melancholy” had set in, and in his final reading of the proofs he found 
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the book “flat and stale.” Although the support of Kahn and Robinson 
had cheered him, Hawtrey’s final prepublication letter convinced Keynes 
he had failed utterly to change the thinking of an economist shaped by 
the orthodoxy of the time. Hawtrey’s letter now seemed “more heart­
breaking than ever” (jvr/vii/240/9–10).
If Hawtrey’s letter was heartbreaking, the intransigence of Robertson 
was surely even more painful. He spent much of the summer of 1936 
studying The General Theory, but with no change of mind. “It’s no use 
pretending,” he wrote Keynes on September 28, that “I like it much better 
or that I don’t agree more or less with most of the Prof ’s review, inclu­
ding the first section” (in Keynes 1979, 163). The review in question was 
Pigou’s blistering critique of The General Theory published in Economica 
for May 1936, which Keynes declared “most dreadful” and “profoundly 
frivolous.”66 In writing Robertson on September 20, he defended his po­
lemical account of classical economics, which Harrod, Hawtrey, Pigou, 
and Robertson all saw as an irresponsible caricature. At the same time he 
understood that his rhetorical strategy had not succeeded: “What some of 
you think my excessively controversial method is really due to the extent 
that I am bound in thought to my own past opinions and to those of my 
teachers and earlier pupils; which makes me want to emphasise and bring 
to a head all the differences of opinion. But I evidently make a mistake 
in this, not having realized either that the old ones would be merely ir­
ritated, or that to the young ones, who have been, apparently, so badly 
brought up as to believe nothing in particular, the controversy with older 
views would mean practically nothing” (Keynes 1973b, 87). Keynes’s theo­
retical language was novel, confusing—especially when it used orthodox 
terms in new ways—and either inconsistent with classical doctrines or un­
translatable into its theoretical language. In view of the epistemological 
and professional investment in orthodoxy made by his contemporaries, 
the expectations that Keynes imposed on them were unreasonably costly. 
In his metaphor of classicism as a military fortification, Hawtrey, Pigou, 
and Robertson surveyed the territory of economic theory from within its 
walls. He had given them no reason to believe that their fortress was inse­
cure. It was naïve in the extreme to suppose they would abandon a posi­
tion they had occupied with confidence for many years in favor of a blue­
print they regarded as defective and in large measure incomprehensible. 
In the revolutionary wars of the 1930s, classical economists were not likely 
to find Keynes’s book convincing. And it is not plausible to suppose they 
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would welcome a competitive dialogue that would drive the revolution 
to a successful conclusion: a debate in which The General Theory set the 
issues and the terms of the dispute.
Some three years before Keynes concluded that his strategy for engag­
ing his contemporaries was flawed, Robinson had seen that revolution­
ary ideas would be least attractive to economists who knew what they 
thought and were heavily invested in orthodoxy. The ideal readership of 
her article “A Parable on Saving and Investment” comprised individuals 
who had made no theoretical investments and did not know what to think 
(in Keynes 1973a, 268–69). It followed that Keynes’s neglect of the revo­
lutionary potential of the younger generation was a mistake. Because he 
believed that their scientific education was seriously deficient—they had 
been brought up so badly that they believed “nothing in particular”—he 
concluded that his efforts to undermine the foundations of orthodoxy 
would have no significance for them. Robinson saw their theoretical inno­
cence as an advantage in revolutionary recruitment. Precisely because of 
their ignorance of established theories, younger economists had made no 
professional commitments. Ideally, initiation into Keynes’s ideas would 
occur at the beginning of training. Students would learn economics on 
Keynesian premises and translate all economic positions into his theo­
retical language. An appreciation of Keynes’s struggle with his academic 
apprenticeship and his attack on classicism would have no place in this 
discussion. From the standpoint of the revolutionary movement, how­
ever, this was not a deficit. The architect of the revolution believed that 
its success depended on settling accounts with the past. Robinson, who 
would become the chief propagandist of the revolution, saw that success 
depended on forming young economists who would decide the future. 
Keynes’s ideas would show young people what to think by providing a ba­
sis for research programs, the production of scientific credentials, and the 
formation of professional identities. Wittingly or unwittingly, the work of 
the next generation would constitute an assault on the established order.
Robinson concluded that it was necessary to educate students in the 
doctrines of the revolution by designing new curricula and syllabi, writ­
ing lectures and examination questions, and planning supervisions to 
achieve the proper quality and level of indoctrination. Students could 
not be expected to join the great debate Keynes anticipated. Because they 
were “uncontaminated” by knowledge of the discipline, they lacked the 
b e c o m i n g  a  k e y n e s i a n  `   213
qualifications to participate. But because of their innocence, they were 
ideal recruits for the astute revolutionary lecturer. Both Robinson and 
Robertson were much more savvy than Keynes in grasping the impor­
tance of teaching as a decisive factor in the conflict between classicism and 
Keynesianism at Cambridge. Because most Cambridge economists were 
products of the Economics Tripos, Robinson and Robertson had good 
reason to think that the successors of the faculty of the 1930s were being 
trained in their lectures. Robinson seemed to have a firm grasp of the 
revolutionary tactic to which Keynes was apparently oblivious: if students 
were introduced to economics under her tutelage, she had a good chance 
of forming them into the Keynesians of the future.
t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p r o p a g a n d i s t
While Keynes was writing The General Theory, Robinson was already at 
work on articles intended to extend its scope and increase its explanatory 
power. As early as August 1934, she drafted a paper entitled “Indetermi­
nacy” that received his approval.67 In March 1936, only a month after The 
General Theory appeared, she published “The Long­Period Theory of Em­
ployment” (1936b). Keynes’s assumptions were restricted to the short pe­
riod. By attempting to show how The General Theory could be generalized 
to analyze long­term conditions, she made the case that his arguments 
were more powerful than his book suggested. In June 1936, her article 
“Disguised Unemployment” appeared (1936a). In discussing employ­
ment, Keynes considered conditions under which insufficient demand 
left workers completely idle—a state of open unemployment. Robinson 
argued that when workers are laid off they take less productive jobs in or­
der to survive even if they are reduced to selling matches on street corners. 
Although they are formally employed, their output is negligible. This 
was disguised unemployment. Robinson was able to move so quickly by 
closely following the development of Keynes’s thought as he drafted and 
revised The General Theory. In September 1934, when she was preparing 
her lectures on applications of monetary theory, her plan was to write 
rough drafts on Keynesian themes and problems that she would later pre­
pare for publication. This idea marked the beginning of more ambitious 
efforts to demonstrate to academic economists—and perhaps to Keynes 
himself—how The General Theory could be exploited.
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Promoting The General Theory:  
Essays in the Theory of Employment
In 1936, Robinson decided to publish a collection of papers that would 
employ the analytical tools of The General Theory to investigate problems 
it had not explored. This collection became her second book: Essays in the 
Theory of Employment (1937a). Between September and November of 1936, 
the proofs of this book were the subject of a spirited correspondence with 
Keynes that numbers twenty­two letters. This dialogue is of considerable 
interest, not least because of its marked contrast to their exchange on the 
manifesto in May 1932. By 1936, Robinson had acquired the theoretical 
knowledge and socioprofessional skills that were expected of a member 
of the Cambridge guild, competence she did not possess in 1932. Confi­
dent of her mastery of the protocols and techniques of scientific debate, 
she was no longer spellbound by the Keynesian aura. Her standing with 
Keynes had also been transformed. The appendage of Kahn had become 
an ally and critic on whom Keynes depended. The correspondence of 1936 
also exhibits a reversal in the roles taken by Keynes and Robinson. In 1935, 
she had moved closer to Keynes by working on his proofs. It was Keynes, 
the author and senior partner in the dialogue, who initiated the exchange. 
In 1936, she was the author, and Keynes was the reader and critic. It was 
Robinson who initiated the exchange by sending him proofs for com­
ment. Although the master had not become the apprentice, Robinson 
behaved as if her years of apprenticeship had ended. On the whole, she 
conducted her side of the debate as a dialogue between equals. She was 
still the junior partner and performed ritual acts of deference to his au­
thority. However, they were made in her acknowledgment of apprecia­
tion for his help after the dialogue had ended, not in the debate itself. 
Discussion of her proofs promised obvious benefits for Robinson. Yet 
there were advantages for Keynes as well. He was determined to begin 
an intensive disciplinary controversy over his book. The terms of engage­
ment were scientific polemics—a war of words in which classicists, once 
lured into combat, would be defeated by Keynesian arguments. Robinson 
was the most dedicated, fearless, and aggressive polemicist at his disposal. 
If a dialogue on her proofs would give him a voice in shaping her ar­
guments along lines he regarded as most favorable to the grand debate, 
so much the better. Given their interests, both parties played their parts 
well.
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Keynes took his role as commentator seriously, pointing out passages 
he regarded as factually mistaken, theoretically misguided, or logically 
fallacious. He tempered criticism with encouragement, praise, and his 
personal endorsement, which Robinson prized above all other marks of 
approbation. The tone of his remarks was not dogmatic or didactic, and 
there is no evidence here of the “attitude of omniscience on all topics” 
that Robert Skidelsky sees in the Keynes of late 1939 (Skidelsky 2000, 60). 
His observations were self­deprecatory and reserved, displaying one side 
of his fabled persuasive skills. The reader of this exchange does not find 
the world’s most famous economist addressing an acolyte from Olympian 
heights but two like­minded, antiorthodox Cambridge theoreticians at­
tempting to correct weaknesses in papers written by one of them. When 
he was convinced that Robinson was in danger of committing a damag­
ing error, he could be firm and insistent. Otherwise, he was often tenta­
tive, encouraging Robinson to enlighten him. Her boldness in arguing 
with Keynes over his theories is striking, demonstrating her version of 
discipleship, the extent to which his ideas had become hers, and the poise 
she had achieved in the relationship.
Most of Keynes’s reservations concerned two of the essays: “Mobility 
of Labour” and “The Foreign Exchanges.” In The General Theory, Keynes 
analyzed involuntary unemployment caused by a drop in aggregate 
expenditure. Although he recognized the existence of frictional unem­
ployment, it was not central to his analysis. In the first essay, Robinson 
considered frictional unemployment, caused by adventitious and ephem­
eral forces that rule out continuous full employment. She was chiefly 
interested in showing that frictional unemployment and aggregate ex­
penditure were interdependent. In a recession, for example, it is difficult 
for workers who quit their jobs to find other work because of the decline 
in aggregate expenditure. In “The Foreign Exchanges,” she argued that 
there was no unique equilibrium exchange rate. The exchange rate, the 
interest rate, the level of effective demand, and the level of money wages 
were mutually interdependent: it was impossible to determine the value 
of any one of these factors unless the other values were known. The Gen-
eral Theory was based on the assumption of a closed national economy. 
Because Keynes bracketed all extradomestic economic relations, he did 
not address problems posed by exchange rates.
Keynes found it difficult to comment on “Mobility of Labour” because 
he could not understand Robinson’s arguments. At several points, he 
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could identify no logic at all in her reasoning, leading him to conclude 
that the main theses of the paper were probably mistaken. As he wrote 
on October 15, “Will you think it over again and enlighten my darkness 
if I am simply misunderstanding it all” (Keynes 1973b, 138). The follow­
ing day, Robinson sent him a new version of the objectionable passages. 
But she, too, was dissatisfied with her analysis and recognized that it was 
vulnerable to criticism. “Perhaps,” she asked Keynes, “you could help me 
to clear it up—but the first step is to see if my argument is correct.” This 
was a new move on Robinson’s part. Not only did she ask Keynes for 
help with her work, she told him how to go about it. She also suggested 
that if he was free, they meet over the weekend to discuss this paper (in 
Keynes 1973b, 139). Shortly thereafter, Robinson notified Keynes that she 
was performing a “drastic overhaul” of the essay in an effort to clarify 
her argument and eliminate the grounds of their disagreement. When the 
new version was ready, she would send a copy (in Keynes 1973b, 140). She 
cheerfully assumed he was prepared to reserve part of his time at Cam­
bridge, on which there were many demands, to read successive drafts of 
her essays, write comments, and argue out contested points. She was not 
mistaken. On November 6, she thanked him for further comments, not­
ing that she would make most of the changes he had suggested. But in 
spite of his objections to the “general line” of her analysis, she intended 
to retain the current structure of her argument (in Keynes 1973b, 143). In 
this exchange, it seems, Keynes was not always recognized as the ultimate 
authority on Keynesian economics.68
In 1936, Robinson’s dialogue with Keynes on her Essays also exposed 
a fundamental difference in their conceptions of economic theory. On 
September 17, he commented on her paper on foreign exchanges, not­
ing “the extraordinary artificiality” of her position (Keynes 1973b, 136). 
On October 5, after he and Lydia had returned from Sweden, he wrote 
Robinson that during this trip he had read her first set of proofs, which 
included the essays “Full Employment” and “Certain Proposed Reme­
dies for Unemployment.” Although he praised the first paper, he noted 
the “formal and abstract” character of her argument in the second. This 
struck him as “a little unreal,” especially in an essay devoted to policy pro­
posals that were obviously intended to be empirically realistic and feasible 
(Keynes 1973b, 137). In comments written on November 4, he returned 
to her essay on foreign exchanges and the dangers of her method as he 
understood it. Robinson had begun the paper by assuming conditions 
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of neutral equilibrium that are a consequence of absolute liquidity pref­
erence. In his view, these conditions could not be expected to conform 
to real economic behavior. His chief objection, though, concerned not 
her counterfactual assumption but how she used it: to make deductions 
that she then applied to actual economic affairs in which liquidity prefer­
ence is not absolute. As he laconically observed, this method of argument 
was “unsafe and not likely to lead to reliable conclusions” (Keynes 1973b, 
141). Robinson sympathized with Keynes’s impression that her argument 
was indeed “very queer.” She too had been quite surprised when she dis­
covered the consequences that followed from her assumptions. But she 
was steadfast. If her reasoning was valid, the conclusions she reached did 
indeed follow and must be accepted as true even though they were coun­
terintuitive and “a bit disconcerting” (in Keynes 1973b, 142). If Keynes’s 
theoretical inferences contradicted his intuitions and failed to conform 
to economic facts as he understood them, he reexamined his theory to 
locate the problematic assumptions. If his results were unreasonable or 
implausible, the defects must lie in his theory, which required revision. 
Robinson, on the other hand, held fast to the philosophy of economic 
science she had sketched in Economics Is a Serious Subject in 1932. If her 
assumptions were “tractable”—amenable to current techniques of eco­
nomic analysis—then inconsistencies between the consequences of these 
assumptions and the facts were not worrisome. Tractable assumptions 
took precedence over facts. Economic theory was an axiomatic and de­
ductive project. Assumptions were not selected on grounds of empirical 
plausibility or even verifiability but by reference to their conformity with 
the existing apparatus of analysis. In choosing assumptions, the decisive 
question was always whether available methods could be employed to 
best advantage. The issue of whether the assumptions or their conse­
quences were consistent with economic facts was irrelevant.
The home of this philosophy of economic science was not Cambridge 
but Vienna; its author was Carl Menger, not Alfred Marshall. Both before 
and after The General Theory, Keynes conceived economics as a moral sci­
ence in the sense in which Marshall and Pigou understood this concept. 
In the final analysis, economics was defined teleologically. Its purpose was 
to advance human welfare by solving real economic problems. This meant 
that the chief desideratum in economics cannot be method. If the bedrock 
of economic science were constituted by methodological principles, eco­
nomic theory would be reduced to a sterile intellectual game. In making 
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theoretical assumptions, the decisive criterion was ethical and political: 
What premises were required to address the most serious and persistent 
economic problems of the time? For Keynes, economics remained po­
litical economy: an investigation of the economic conditions on which 
policies for enhancing human well­being can be pursued with the best 
prospect of success. Given the contingencies of human affairs, these con­
ditions can be expected to change. It follows that economic theory as a 
universal set of doctrines that remained valid at all times and under all cir­
cumstances was out of the question. Although he stressed his break with 
orthodoxy and his struggle to free himself from the tradition in which he 
was trained, in these respects The General Theory remained a Marshallian 
text. Its purpose was to construct a new engine of discovery and analysis 
that would improve human life.
Keynes’s conception of human well­being was indebted to G. E. 
Moore’s salon ethic of exquisite emotional and intellectual sensibilities. 
However, Moore’s Principia Ethica says nothing about the conditions that 
make possible a social world in which human beings can pursue intimate 
friendships, aesthetic delights, and the contemplation of knowledge as the 
highest goods (Moore 1903). The earlier Victorian moral fervor of human 
betterment that burned in Henry Sidgwick and Marshall also animated 
the work of Keynes. It is expressed in the toast he offered at a dinner given 
in February 1945 to celebrate his retirement as editor of the Economic Jour-
nal: “To economists, who are the trustees, not of civilisation, but of the 
possibility of civilisation” (in Skidelsky 2000, 168). Civilized life rests on a 
complex, fragile network of institutions that is possible only under special 
economic conditions. The final test of an economic theory is its contribu­
tion to the investigation of these conditions. Hypothetical and empiri­
cally arbitrary axioms that are detached from economic realities cannot 
pass this test. This is the ultimate reason Keynes rejected axiomatization 
and formalism as intrinsically important values in economics. A theory 
that pursued rigor for its own sake could not be expected to achieve the 
most powerful analysis of the economic underpinnings of civilization.
In her Essays, Robinson wrote as a model builder who made occasional 
pro forma and ad hoc gestures of deference to Cambridge moral science. 
Methodological refinements of theory were her primary consideration. 
Yet she was determined to become the most authentic of all Keynesians 
and the purest of the revolutionaries. On her interpretation, this meant 
absolute fidelity to Keynes’s intentions in The General Theory. Robinson 
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was not one of the younger generation of economists so badly educated 
that she did not know what to believe. She believed in the ideas of The 
General Theory. But in what sense was she committed to Keynes’s ideas? 
Keynes wrote theory as strategy, designed to address the main economic 
problems of his age. Although he was persuaded that the fundamentals 
of his book were sound, much remained doubtful to him even as he pub­
lished it. He wrote on the understanding that his ideas would require 
substantial reconsideration and revision. Robinson interpreted Keynes’s 
ideas as doctrinal truths to be translated and systematized into the ana­
lytical language of a postrevolutionary system of economic science and 
packaged for consumption by economists. This was the work of the chief 
ideologist and propagandist of the revolution, a post she created and re­
served for herself. Circa 1936, her conception of economics had no theo­
retical space for grandiose civilizational visions or moral objectives. As 
a body of economic truths, The General Theory was incomplete only in 
a formal sense: its assumptions had not been systematically stated, and 
their consequences had not been spelled out and analyzed. In light of her 
deviations from the spirit of Keynes’s thinking, Robinson’s acid criticisms 
of is-lm formalizations of The General Theory are not without irony. They 
suggest that notwithstanding her apparent zeal in pursuit of ideological 
purity, Robinson herself was perhaps the first “bastard Keynesian.”
Keynes had little sense of these departures from the fundamentals of 
his thought and Robinson none at all. The significance of their metatheo­
retical disagreements seems to have remained opaque to them both and 
proved to be no obstacle to the pursuit of their respective agendas. Keynes 
needed allies to prosecute the war he had declared on orthodoxy. Doctri­
nal purity was immaterial to his cause. In recruiting supporters, he fol­
lowed a latitudinarian principle not generally associated with leaders of 
revolutionary movements. Endorsement of the main lines of his analysis 
seems to have been the sole qualification, and he took a relaxed view of 
disagreement among his supporters. Since he was convinced that much re­
mained unclear and probably mistaken as well, a liberal principle of recruit­
ment that tolerated divergent readings of The General Theory made good 
sense. Disputes among the initiated that did not touch basic issues were 
largely insignificant. However, Robinson’s abstract formalism seemed to 
transgress even these permissive limits. Because it detached economics 
from economic reality, making any attempt to develop policy a theoreti­
cally arbitrary undertaking, the Robinsonian analytical economics of her 
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Essays was opposed to Keynes’s conception of economic theory and its 
aims. Nevertheless, Keynes’s objections remained marginal, and Robinson 
was able to “become a Keynesian,” believing in her fidelity to his inten­
tions and promoting The General Theory to the economics profession with 
remarkable success. At the same time, she pursued a methodological pro­
gram he had rejected as inconsistent with the objectives of the revolution.
In the end, Keynes gave the book his qualified blessing. The essays 
were uneven, as she knew. But on the whole he judged the results “splen­
did, full of originality and interest” (Keynes 1973b, 147). In 1932, his am­
bivalent evaluation of The Economics of Imperfect Competition was based 
largely on his judgment that the book lacked innovative ideas. It would be 
difficult to make a case that the Essays was a more original work. As Pigou 
observed, The Economics of Imperfect Competition developed and clarified 
an analytical apparatus that could not be found in the recent literature. 
In her first book, Robinson proved to be more of a toolmaker than a 
tool user. In the Essays, she employed Keynes’s tools. Both in intention 
and execution, the book was derivative. Theoretical premises and modes 
of analysis were drawn from The General Theory. Her aim was to make a 
case for Keynes’s new program by showing economists how it could be 
used to analyze specific questions in economic theory. Given Keynes’s 
ambitions, his judgment of the two books is perhaps not surprising. He 
had no interest in becoming the leader of a movement to promote the in­
vestigation of imperfect competition. In an oblique reference to the sharp 
polemics of the Essays, he speculated that Robinson’s fierceness might not 
be well received by some readers. But he was pleased with her more po­
lemical arguments, which were developed against his enemies, and did 
not encourage a more temperate rhetoric (Keynes 1973b, 147). In view 
of Keynes’s efforts on Robinson’s behalf, is it surprising that her preface 
includes no acknowledgment of his help? She rightly supposed he would 
not relish public recognition of his work on her proofs (in Keynes 1973b, 
148). The propaganda value of the Essays could only have been diminished 
by the impression that Keynes himself had taken a hand in writing it.
The Children’s Tale: Introduction to the  
Theory of Employment
Waiting for the page proofs of the Essays to arrive, Robinson was already 
contemplating a second Keynesian book. In the Essays, her audience was 
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the economics profession. She made a case for The General Theory by 
showing academic economists how to refine and extend it. Only four 
days after sending him a final note of thanks for his help, Robinson tried 
to interest Keynes in a plan to reach a much larger audience. Her idea 
was to write what she dismissively called a “told to the children” version 
of The General Theory, a textbook that could be assigned to complement 
introductory lectures in economics. The scope of The General Theory 
would be reduced to its basic principles. Analyses would be simplified 
to meet the needs of beginning students, who had no knowledge of the 
theoretical background against which Keynes was writing. In an elemen­
tary textbook, much of The General Theory would necessarily disappear. 
“I would,” Robinson explained to Keynes, “be as uncontroversial as pos­
sible and treat everything in the straightforward way that one can with 
an uncontaminated audience” (in Keynes 1979, 184–85). Because Keynes’s 
critique of classicism would be incomprehensible to beginning students, 
his criticisms of orthodoxy and orthodoxy itself would disappear. Or 
rather Keynes’s ideas, which were new and controversial, would be pre­
sented as if they constituted orthodoxy. Oblivious of alternatives, new 
students would be taught Keynesian economics, suitably translated and 
simplified, as if it were the only conception of how economics could be 
done. Although Robinson had already drafted some material, she did not 
want to proceed without Keynes’s approval. Was he interested (in Keynes 
1979, 184–85)?
Initially, Keynes was not. Waiting a week without a response, Robinson 
wrote again on November 25, asking for a meeting over the weekend 
when he would be in Cambridge. After they met, he wrote on December 
2, explaining his reservations about her proposal. He had two main wor­
ries. He was wary of any publication that would represent The General 
Theory as established doctrine. Convinced that the broad outlines of his 
analysis were acceptable, he had doubts about some of his conclusions 
and the methods he used in reaching them. Correspondence and reviews 
had persuaded him that the book was not a success in all respects. To what 
extent and in exactly what respects? Only subsequent controversy would 
tell. He was intent on keeping his ear tuned to responses of his critics: to 
“what raises difficulties and catches people’s attention—in which there are 
a good many surprises” (Keynes 1979, 185). What was and was not sound 
in The General Theory? Because of surprises hidden in controversies that 
were only beginning, this question could not be answered in December 
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1936. Nor was it possible to anticipate the criticisms that were indispens­
able in arriving at an answer. The book represented Keynes’s views as of 
December 1935. Because he believed that further progress depended on 
extensive debate, he suspended revisions in order to initiate this conver­
sation. However, publication did not suspend Keynes’s thinking on the 
problems of the book, which proceeded apace and without significant in­
terruption. Moreover, his ideas on the merits of particular analyses could 
change quite quickly as he responded to the impressions of his correspon­
dents. The General Theory was written in response to objections and sug­
gestions posed by the critics of the Treatise. In autumn 1936, Keynes was 
apparently thinking along similar lines. A new theoretical work would be 
needed to address the problems posed by critics of The General Theory. 
Criticism was already under way. Thus Keynes was against a simplified 
version of a book that was, in a sense, already dated. He was in favor of 
waiting, reflecting, and “gestation” (Keynes 1979, 186). Independent of 
these considerations, Keynes had no clear sense of how a popular ver­
sion of The General Theory should be written. Although this was a mat­
ter to which he had devoted some thought, at that point he had reached 
no conclusions. He was skeptical of any reduction of his book to lessons 
in economic policy. This would encourage applications of his ideas to 
current economic problems on the part of readers who did not have the 
training to grasp his formal theory (Keynes 1979, 186). Robinson assured 
Keynes that her children’s book would not be an exercise in populariza­
tion. She did not propose to bowdlerize his ideas and encourage readers 
to apply them to questions of policy. She had conceived a work of a quite 
different genre—a basic textbook that would reconstruct economics on 
Keynesian foundations and with Keynesian tools. The question of how 
such a book should best be written was a difficult matter. Her idea was to 
prepare a manuscript and test it on students that she, Austin, and Kahn 
supervised. Here the matter rested until March 6, 1937, when she wrote 
Keynes that her test marketing had demonstrated a “strong demand” 
for the manuscript. In addition, she was convinced that students in the 
Workers’ Educational Association—a charity founded in 1903 to educate 
adult workers—were “thirsting for The General Theory, and scorn tutors 
who serve up the old stuff.” Because of the knowledge of economics that 
Keynes presupposed, they found his book puzzling (in Keynes 1973b, 
148–49). Thus the need for her textbook. In December, Keynes had ex­
plained that in the interest of making progress with his theoretical work, 
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he was against “crystallising” his thinking on the basis of what he had 
published in The General Theory (Keynes 1979, 185). Robinson agreed with 
the wisdom of “not crystallising too soon.” But she did not regard his 
prudence in resisting premature closure on unsettled issues as an obstacle 
to her project, which would cover only basic principles. At this point she 
left Cambridge for a vacation in Syria and Palestine.
While she was away, Keynes reconsidered and reversed himself. On 
March 25, he sent a letter to her Cambridge address approving the proj­
ect. Although he maintained that the best elementary exposition of The 
General Theory would depart from the original more substantially than 
Robinson’s text had done, he had no suggestions as to how such an ex­
position might be written. Thus his advice: “By all means get on with 
this” (Keynes 1973b, 149). In early April, Robinson, still in Syria, had 
not received Keynes’s letter but only news from Austin in Cambridge 
that Keynes had written “rather hesitantly” about her book—a peculiar 
reading of his encouragement. As was her habit, Robinson attempted 
to press Kahn into service to intercede with Keynes on her behalf. Con­
cerning the book, she wrote on April 7, “I think you could have a heart 
to heart with him.” And yet she also insisted that she had no interest in 
whether she completed the book: “It is for you chaps to say if you need 
it” (rfk/13/90/2/173–74). This last remark hardly rings true. Robinson 
pushed herself to produce manuscripts and publish them. Between 1931 
and 1937, she moved swiftly from one project to another in spite of deficits 
in professional training, pregnancy and motherhood, and the difficulties 
presented by her relationships with Austin and Kahn. She was persistent 
in her efforts to gain Keynes’s benediction. She had written a manuscript 
and revised it, based on assessments of its use at Cambridge. When she 
returned to Cambridge, Keynes wrote again. He did “not really feel the 
least objection in the world” to her text and agreed that it would be valu­
able (Keynes 1973b, 150). The book was published later that year.
In several respects, the dialogue between Keynes and Robinson on 
the merits of her textbook reproduces the positions they took in their 
exchanges on her Essays. Keynes saw The General Theory as a work in 
progress subject to further clarification and revision. How should the 
theses of The General Theory be understood? Which of its claims were 
promising and which should be discarded? Answers to these questions 
would emerge from a grand disciplinary symposium. In order to initi­
ate hostilities, a declaration of war—The General Theory—was needed to 
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mark off contested territory, specify terms of engagement, and place po­
tential combatants on notice. Although Keynes was confident of ultimate 
victory, the question of how exactly his enemies would be vanquished 
could be decided only in the conduct of the war itself. On this matter, 
he took a Clausewitzian view of the contingencies of scientific warfare. 
Because every war has its own surprises, it was necessary to remain flex­
ible and alert to the kinds of criticisms readers raised. This meant that 
the project of The General Theory—as opposed to the text of The General 
Theory—was a strategic enterprise in which adventitious opportunities 
were paramount. It was driven not by its own immanent logic but by in­
terventions of economists in the great debate and by how Keynes and his 
supporters responded to them. Although it was impossible to predict the 
dynamics and consequences of this debate, Keynes was certain it would 
change his thinking and complete the work he could not have done as he 
was writing the book. Thus the dangers of crystallizing ideas prematurely, 
before the debate had run its course. In The General Theory, Keynes took 
the advice he gave economists in his essay on Marshall and followed the 
path he claimed Marshall did not take. He was prepared “to cast his half­
baked bread on the waters,” trusting “in the efficacy of the co­operation 
of many minds” and allowing “the big world to draw from him what sus­
tenance it could.” Like Jevons’s Political Economy, The General Theory was 
“no more than a brilliant brochure.” Like Jevons, Keynes was willing to 
“spill his ideas, to flick them at the world.” Leaving to Adam Smith, John 
Stuart Mill, and Marshall “the glory of the Quarto,” Keynes acted on his 
own imperative: “Write always sub species temporis” (Keynes 1951, 173–74).
This was not Robinson’s conception of The General Theory. Un­
like other work in economics, it should be read sub species aeternitatis. 
Keynes had discovered a body of economic truths that could be applied 
to resolve economic problems and provide the basis for a new pedagogy. 
Robinson had no doubts about what these truths were and how they 
should be understood. Doubts were inconsistent with her agenda. They 
would forestall her plan to indoctrinate beginning students, “uncontami­
nated” by training in economics. They would also compromise her own 
Keynesian research program. After publishing her first book, Robinson 
invested in Keynes. If his new ideas were quickly superseded by even newer 
developments in his thought, The General Theory might share the fate of 
the Treatise. In that case, it would be regarded not as his masterwork but 
as a flawed and transitional effort, overshadowed by the thinking that was 
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apparently germinating in autumn of 1936 and about which Robinson 
knew nothing. Suppose the canonical text of the revolution turned out 
to be not The General Theory but an as­yet­unwritten work. In that case, 
Robinson’s turn from imperfect competition to The General Theory might 
prove to be a disappointing investment. In order to retain her status as a 
leader of revolutionary elite, she would face the prospect of yet another 
investment, this time in Keynes’s post–General Theory work. And if the 
Treatise had been succeeded by The General Theory, which would be su­
perseded by another new work, was there any reason to believe that this 
unwritten work would not be replaced by yet another batch of new ideas, 
leavened by Keynes’s creative but restless brilliance? If one set of half­baked 
analyses was followed by another ad seriatim, could Robinson expect to 
arrive at settled doctrines she could believe in, market to economists, and 
exploit in her own research? These uncertainties dictated a commitment 
to the solidity of The General Theory. As regards fundamentals, Robinson 
wrote confidently that “we know near enough where we are” (in Keynes 
1973b, 149). Confirmation of basic Keynesian truths did not depend on 
the controversy produced by a general conflagration in economics. These 
truths were revealed hermetically through personal contact with the mas­
ter and his intimates. The qualification for understanding The General 
Theory was not participation in a disciplinary dialogue but membership 
in a charismatic set of the chosen, the privileged experience of being one 
of the Cambridge illuminati—“we happy few in Cambridge . . . we and 
Maynard,” as Robert Solow characterized the gnostic ethos of Keynes’s 
disciples in the 1930s (1989, 545).
Robinson’s understanding of The General Theory as revealed truth en­
tailed a distinctive conception of the dynamics of the Keynesian revolu­
tion. The lapsarian classical age of darkness was transformed into a new 
enlightened Keynesian age of grace. The revolution was a cataclysmic 
event, a scientific “ten days that shook the world,” following which eco­
nomics would settle into a new normality grounded in secure principles. 
This was not Keynes’s position. He saw the revolution not as a single 
shattering event but as a process of continuous reconsideration, revision, 
and renovation. This is why it was essential to maintain theoretical flex­
ibility and reject any apotheosis of his current ideas into a pseudocanon. 
For the near term, the only period he was prepared to consider, Keynes 
saw not the pacification of economics but implacable struggle, a condition 
that would approximate Trotsky’s state of permanent revolution: much 
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controversy, persistent argument over fundamentals, and no consensus 
or stability. A new state of normality was not on the horizon. Keynes, his 
mind in motion and his ideas in transition, would continue to stoke the 
fires that fueled the revolution.
t h e  l e c t u r e  l i s t  d i s p u t e
In October 1933, Kahn was appointed to a part­time university lectureship 
for a three­year term. On May 25, 1936, the faculty board recommended 
him for a full­time lectureship to the General Board of the Faculties (fb/
Min.V.118). As a part­time lecturer, he delivered two sets of lectures on 
the short period in the Lent and Easter terms to students in their final 
year of Part II of the tripos. On a full­time appointment, he would be re­
sponsible for an additional set of lectures. He decided on the title “Some 
Current Economic Problems,” which would include monetary theory. 
This meant that four lecturers would teach money in Part II of the tripos. 
Robinson’s lectures on applications of monetary theory covered the sec­
ond year in Michaelmas and Lent. Kahn, Keynes, and Robertson would 
teach third­year students. Robertson lectured on money in Michaelmas, 
Lent, and Easter. Keynes planned to lecture on the subject “Footnotes to 
the General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money” in Lent. And 
Kahn’s new lectures would be added in Michaelmas.69 Thus the Cam­
bridge curriculum on money would be represented by Keynes, his two 
most ardent disciples, and Robertson, the sole orthodox dissenter.
Kahn’s lecture proposal initiated a dispute in the economics faculty 
that centered on Robinson. Although not every piece of correspondence 
on this matter is available, its history can be reconstructed from extant 
documents. The discussion began in the Lecture List Committee, where 
the appropriate clientele for Kahn’s lectures was considered. Someone—
Kahn claimed it was not him—suggested opening his lectures to both 
second­ and third­year students. The committee decided in favor of this 
suggestion should it be found “humanly possible.” Kahn thought it was 
a good idea but at the same time declared: “The matter was not one on 
which I felt more than lukewarm.”70 This result seems to have caused con­
sternation in the committee, chiefly on the part of Robertson, as his later 
correspondence with Keynes shows.71 The general issue in the dispute 
was Robertson’s sense that the Keynesians were attempting to dominate 
the curriculum in monetary theory and discredit orthodox views. He was 
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especially unhappy with Robinson, “both the lecturer and the lectures,” as 
Keynes later put it.72 The specific issue was Robertson’s mistaken impres­
sion that Kahn intended to require attendance in Robinson’s lectures as a 
prerequisite for his course.
Kahn cleared up the mistake in a letter to Maurice Dobb, secretary 
of the faculty board, on June 2, using the occasion to indulge himself 
in a wicked parody of academic pedantry.73 The difference between 
Robinson’s lectures and his proposed lectures, as he explained it, was 
quite simple. She discussed examples of monetary issues in order to illu­
minate general theoretical principles. He would assume that his audience 
had covered the fundamentals of monetary theory and intended to discuss 
specific cases for their intrinsic interest. As a supervisor, he would advise 
his second­year pupils to attend her lectures, also informing them that “it 
was a matter of indifference whether they attended my lectures in their 
second or in their third year.” This indifference left open the possibility 
that, schedules permitting, a student might attend the lectures of both 
Robinson and Kahn in the same term, in which case her lectures could 
not serve as a prerequisite of his. Feigning bewilderment and indulging in 
witticisms at the expense of his colleagues while scrupulously observing 
the amenities, he offered his deepest apologies to Dobb and the commit­
tee for the trouble he had unwittingly caused them: “I thought that in 
making what seemed to me a very simple suggestion I was raising a matter 
of pure routine. I had no idea that any point of principle was involved. 
What that point is I cannot pretend to know. But I must apologise for 
having unwittingly raised it” (jmk/ua/5/4/9/10–11).
On being shown this letter by Keynes, Robertson confessed that he 
had misunderstood Kahn’s proposal. Robertson’s response to Keynes is a 
tortured document. Hypersensitive, he perceived slights that were not in­
tended and imagined conspiracies that did not exist. At the same time, he 
was punctilious on matters of form: “I should like to say that on reading 
Kahn’s letter again I can see that I was wrong in questioning your inter­
pretation of it, and did him injustice in suggesting that he was intimating 
to the Committee that he could regard it as objectionable to have at his 
Lectures men who had not attended Mrs. Robinson’s Lectures. I realised 
that he did not say this in so many words, but it seemed to me that in ef­
fect that was what his letter came to. I can see now that I was wrong.”74 
After admitting his error, Robertson apologized to virtually everyone in 
sight: Keynes, the entire Lecture List Committee, and indirectly, Kahn: 
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“I cannot well apologise to Kahn for something of which he is in igno­
rance. But I hope that if on his return word reaches him of our discussion, 
word will also reach him of this letter.”75 No apology was extended to 
Robinson.
In this fashion, the contretemps over Kahn’s lecture proposal seems to 
have been put to rest. Not so Robinson’s lectures to second­year students, 
which remained a source of disagreement. As a general rule, the second 
year of the economics curriculum was the first year of Part II of the tripos. 
Students who had read economics in their first year would have heard 
Pigou’s lectures on elementary principles, a paradigmatic exposition of 
classical economics by one of its most creative and influential contempo­
rary exponents. Students who had been instructed by Pigou in classical 
principles were not likely to find Robinson’s caricature of classical eco­
nomics convincing or even plausible. However, students arriving from 
Part I of the tripos of other fields to receive their baptism in the funda­
mentals of economics from Robinson were in a quite different position. 
In view of her provocative approach to teaching, their initial exposure to 
economics might well be disastrous for their receptivity to classicism and 
to Robertson’s lectures in particular.
In March 1935, the question of Robinson’s appointment as a full­time 
assistant lecturer and her proposal to deliver two terms of lectures on 
applications of monetary theory for second­year students had been a sub­
ject of bitter contention in the faculty. At the end of that dispute, Robinson 
won everything she wanted: the lectureship, the two­term course, and 
her tendentious syllabus. Her adversaries walked away with nothing. 
In 1936, Robertson, still the chairman of the board, raised objections to 
Robinson’s second­year lectures on money. He had two fundamental 
complaints. It was unacceptable to offer a narrow and tendentious set 
of lectures to students who had read no economics. As he wrote Keynes, 
“I don’t think it is good that people coming over from other subjects 
[into Part II of the Economics Tripos] should get their first introduc­
tion to this whole range of very controversial topics from someone who 
seems to think that everything that has been said and thought about it is 
‘moth­eaten’ rubbish except one book—and that, whatever its merits, 
a very difficult one!” (quoted in Moggridge 1992, 600). In addition, 
he maintained that Robinson’s conduct, and perhaps the behavior of 
her supporters, posed a threat to the liberal culture of the Marshallian 
guild by introducing dogmatic, ideological premises into disputes over 
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academic and scientific questions. Robertson regarded this as a dangerous 
innovation. As he wrote Keynes, “Over this business [concerning Robin­
son’s lectures] there is an atmosphere of dogmatism and proselytisation 
about into which our socialists and communists have never landed us + 
which is new and un­Cambridge­y” (quoted in Moggridge 1992, 600).
Keynes responded by taking Robinson’s part. His letter to Robertson 
was measured and diplomatic. He wrote not as a partisan but as an impar­
tial judge, full of good will for all parties. In his view, there were four seri­
ous weaknesses in Robertson’s position: (1) Perhaps most troublesome, 
Robertson’s intervention—essentially an attempt to force Robinson to 
change the content and perspective of her lectures—would set an un­
fortunate precedent. Keynes made it clear that Robertson was not the 
only guardian of the Cambridge tradition of intellectual liberalism and 
Lehrfreiheit. On the assumption that they covered the required territory, 
Keynes argued, it was understood that university lecturers had the right 
to follow their own lights. “It would have been a dangerous thing,” he 
warned, “for the Chairman of the Board to have used more than a very 
modest pressure to interfere with the lecturer’s strong wishes.” (2) Be­
cause of Robertson’s objections to both the lectures and the lecturer, his 
opposition would have left “a sense of persecution” in the minds of some 
colleagues. Keynes wanted to avoid this result. In opposing Robertson 
and supporting Robinson, he claimed that his sole motive was “to pre­
vent a very unpleasant personal situation from arising.” (3) Robertson 
had also failed to consider that monetary theory was in a state of disarray 
and the subject of considerable controversy. Using the argument for a 
pluralistic pedagogy in the field of money that he had employed in 1935, 
Keynes held that areas of the curriculum that were subjects of substan­
tial theoretical conflict required a laissez­faire pedagogy, not centralized 
planning by the board or the committee. In matters of university teach­
ing, apparently, classicism was still valid. (4) Finally, Keynes was per­
suaded that university lectures would make little difference, either in the 
long run or even in the short run, in deciding the controversy sparked by 
The General Theory. The great debate over Keynes’s ideas would be settled 
elsewhere.76
On September 28, Robertson conceded defeat but with little grace. He 
accepted the current lecture list as “the least bad in the circumstances.” At 
that point, nothing could be achieved by further argument. As he wrote 
Keynes, “I realise it’s no use at present our trying to see eye to eye about 
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this: and also that the position is complicated by my inability, after years 
of effort for Austin’s sake, to preserve personally cordial relations with 
Mrs. R.” (quoted in Moggridge 1992, 600).
a n t i c l i m a x :  
t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  l e c t u r e s h i p
Robinson’s appointment as assistant lecturer would expire in September 
1938. The main source of evidence concerning her appointment to a uni­
versity lectureship is a report that Kahn sent Keynes in a long letter writ­
ten over February 14–18, 1938. Kahn maintained that the board recom­
mended her appointment without enthusiasm, some members taking the 
view that her original part­time appointment had been a mistake. Keynes 
was not happy with the “wretches” on the board who had refused to ac­
knowledge her merits. However, he responded to Kahn’s news with some 
relief: “For if it [the appointment] had fallen through, it would really have 
been a cause for armed insurrection.”77 In light of Kahn’s report and the 
minutes of the board meeting, what can be said concerning the circum­
stances of Robinson’s appointment?
Kahn speculated that faculty thinking on the appointment began with 
Pigou. Toward the end of Michaelmas 1937, he met with Robertson to 
discuss what to do about Robinson’s position on the faculty. From the 
outset, the two seem to have assumed that she should be advanced to a 
university lectureship.78 The issue concerned the best way to secure the 
appointment. They concluded that the Appointments Committee of the 
board should recommend her for a lectureship on the assumption that 
the university would fund the position. The board, following standard 
procedure, would then petition the General Board of the Faculties to es­
tablish a lectureship in economics, which would be offered to Robinson. 
The committee was composed of the university vice chancellor as chair, 
Pigou, Keynes, Robertson, Fay, and two noneconomists appointed as 
representatives of the general board. Pigou and Robertson shared their 
thinking informally with at least one member of the Appointments Com­
mittee, who was not in favor of reserving the position for an inside candi­
date: on principle it should be filled only after a search governed by open 
competition. This view did not prevail, and the committee followed the 
Pigou­Robertson plan.
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As chairman of the board, Robertson prepared a draft on the appoint­
ment that was discussed in its meeting of January 24—“the curious draft 
report, prepared by Dennis,” as Kahn called it. It seems Robertson made 
a case for Robinson’s appointment without taking note of her qualifica­
tions for the job. His rationale was that a current university lecturer in 
economics, W. S. Thatcher, was leaving economics for geography. This 
meant that a lectureship in economics was about to be vacated and should 
be filled. The board quickly rejected this draft. As Kahn observed, one 
of the general board representatives “told us at once—as was indeed ob­
vious—that the Thatcher device was too thin to take in the G[eneral].
B[oard].” Kahn proposed that the board, like other such boards at Cam­
bridge, support the appointment on the basis of increased enrollments 
and sound pedagogy: although the number of undergraduates in eco­
nomics had risen sharply, the size of the economics faculty had remained 
stable, reducing the lecturer/student ratio. Appealing to the “Thatcher 
device” without making an independent argument for the appointment, 
Kahn claimed, would weaken the board’s case. Presumably he expected 
the general board to conclude that if the economists employed such a 
transparently weak argument for the position, they had no strong argu­
ment. However, Kahn’s proposal was roundly criticized and rejected.
At that point in the meeting, Shove finally introduced Robinson’s 
name into the discussion, suggesting that his colleagues be frank about 
their intentions. If they wanted not merely a lectureship but Robinson, 
they should say so. This prompted one member to introduce such a pro­
posal, which would call for a letter petitioning the general board to create 
a lectureship for Robinson. The board rejected this proposal as well, at 
least initially. It apparently escaped the board that its own Appointments 
Committee had already made precisely the proposal they were rejecting. 
This lapse is especially surprising since three members of the board—
Pigou, Robertson, and Fay—served on the committee. Faced with a dead­
line governing decisions on university lectureships and the possibility of 
an embarrassing conflict with its committee, the board reversed itself after 
a fashion. Shove was delegated to revise Robertson’s draft for the gen­
eral board. All members of the board signed the revised letter, which did 
not mention Robinson. Noting the expiration of the term of the assistant 
lectureship, the letter, in Kahn’s words, “left it studiously doubtful who 
would be appointed to a new lectureship (the present Assistant Lecturer 
or someone else).”79
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The general board responded on February 10. A new lectureship 
would be created on the proviso that the assistant lectureship about to 
expire would remain unfilled. As its language indicated, the general board 
seems to have assumed that the current assistant lecturer would occupy 
the new position: “That such a lectureship should be established on the 
understanding that the Faculty Assistant Lectureship so vacated should 
not for the present be filled.”80 The assistant lectureship would be vacated 
because the current occupant would fill the new position. As a result of 
this decision, the Appointments Committee quickly convened and unani­
mously recommended Robinson’s appointment to a university lecture­
ship in the event the position was created. The board met the next day and 
unanimously endorsed the committee’s recommendation. In this manner, 
Robinson became a university lecturer. When the board recommended 
Kahn for a full­time lectureship, its decision was “based on the impor­
tance attached by the Board to the retention of Mr Kahn’s services as a 
lecturer.”81 Not so the recommendation to appoint Robinson, which fell 
far short of a ringing endorsement. The minutes of the board meeting of 
February 14 recommending her appointment read as follows:
A discussion took place on a reply from the General Board concerning the Report 
on the Lectureship in the Faculty at present occupied by Mr. Thatcher. The fol­
lowing resolution was moved by Professor Pigou & was agreed to unanimously: 
“The Faculty Board of Economics & Politics learn that the Appointments Com­
mittee of the Faculty have agreed to appoint Mrs. J. V. Robinson to a Univer­
sity Lectureship for an initial period of three years in the event of the University 
deciding to establish such a lectureship. The Faculty Board accordingly agree to 
the proposal of the General Board in their letter of February 10: ‘That such a 
Lectureship should be established on the understanding that the Faculty Assistant 
Lectureship so vacated should not for the present be filled.[’]” (fb/Min.V.118)
Kahn’s account of the result was embittered by his sense that the board 
made Robinson the object of a degradation ceremony even as it approved 
her appointment. Although unanimous, the decision “could not conceiv­
ably have been more grudging.” Robinson’s record of scientific achieve­
ment was passed over in silence. Since her probationary appointment in 
1934, she had published two books and several important articles. The 
board made no case for either the intrinsic importance or influence of 
this work. Neither the broad disciplinary reputation she had achieved nor 
her success as a supervisor was discussed. The only rationale for the ap­
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pointment was an argument based on “legitimate expectations”: failure 
to make the appointment would have been a departure from the standard 
practice of granting regular lectureships to assistant lecturers whose per­
formance proved satisfactory. As a result, “it certainly seemed to tran­
spire that it was a great mistake to have taken Joan on in the first place.” 
Moreover, the board approved the appointment only in the sense that 
it accepted “the situation forced on them by the G.B.” Because of the 
rationale employed in the board’s original proposal to create the lecture­
ship, the general board approved the new position only on the condition 
that Robinson’s assistant lectureship be vacated—left open by her move 
into the new position. As Kahn read the decision, this gave the board no 
choice in naming the candidate. In his view, Robinson became a univer­
sity lecturer by default.82
“Who Is  
Joan Robinson?”
t w o  h i s t o r i o g r a p h i e s
In the main, the literature on Joan Robinson and Cambridge econom-
ics in the 1930s is devoted to the analysis of ideas and the explication of 
texts, several of which are now considered classics. The chief desidera-
tum is to understand her economic thought, identify the economists who 
influenced her, and show how her work was tied to the main currents 
in Cambridge economics of the time. This historiography—the story of 
economic theory as an immanent history of ideas—begins and ends with 
books and essays and traces their relationships to other books and essays. 
It is situated in a grand tradition of writing on the history of science, from 
Edwin A. Burtt (1926) and Herbert Butterfield (1957) to Alexander Koyré 
(1957) and E. J. Dijksterhuis (1961). As Richard Westfall’s masterful work 
on Isaac Newton shows (1981), this tradition maintained its force and 
vitality into the late twentieth century.
This book takes a different course. We analyze Robinson’s early work 
on economics, but we do so in order to explore her early career, examining 
her ideas only to understand how she established herself at Cambridge. 
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We consider how she understood imperfect competition and Keynes’s 
work but do so in offering an account of the formation and development 
of her professional identity. We are less concerned with how her think-
ing was tied to the Marshallian tradition or to Sraffa or Keynes than with 
the question of how she operated in the Marshallian guild—how she 
employed its resources as she moved from marginality to apprenticeship 
and, by 1935, to a position of power in the revolutionary cadre that trans-
formed the guild. In considering The Economics of Imperfect Competition, 
our concern is not principally what she wrote but the social process of 
composition. We are less interested in the precise sense in which she was 
a Keynesian than in the social dynamics of her acceptance and endorse-
ment by Keynes. We do not consider the respects in which her analyses 
may be valid and her conclusions true but the circumstances under which 
her writings were acknowledged as valuable contributions to Cambridge 
economics. During the 1930s, Robinson became a success at Cambridge. 
We analyze the conditions under which her success was achieved, how it 
was managed, and the resources on which it depended.
In sum, the foregoing account abandons the path of the standard 
historiography on the young Robinson in order to investigate the insti-
tutional and strategic foundations of her early career. The institutional 
strand of the analysis examines the rapidly changing social and intellectual 
resources that the Marshallian guild placed at her disposal. The strategic 
strand considers how these resources were mobilized and deployed on her 
behalf—generally by Robinson herself, sometimes by her advocates, and 
occasionally, in self-defeating fashion, by her adversaries, in all cases with 
consequences that worked to her advantage. Robinson’s integration of 
theoretical work, professional identity formation, and career production 
seems to approximate an ideal type of the scientist as strategist in the “ac-
tor-network theory” of Bruno Latour and his collaborators. On this view, 
science is a battleground on which actors compete for sponsors, allies, 
and resources in an effort to achieve mastery over the organization and 
practice of a scientific field. The objective of theorists is to gain leverage 
by establishing strong networks of support. Combatants on the scien-
tific battleground can succeed only by becoming Archimedean “macro-
actors” who gain access to powerful networks.1 This was Robinson’s 
position by the end of 1935, after she had commented on the proofs of 
The General Theory and Keynes’s correspondence with Hawtrey. Once le-
verage is achieved, relatively small-scale efforts by a scientist can achieve 
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consequences of considerable significance, as her Keynesian textbook 
shows.
In November 1952, apparently after Robinson experienced a psychi-
atric breakdown (less severe than her illness of 1938), she offered a retro-
spective explanation of her success. Writing Kahn, she observed: “I think 
the reason I have done so much more with a much weaker brain than any 
of us is because of my extremely simple minded attitude.”2 Putting aside 
the question of whom she might have meant by “any of us,” Robinson’s 
career in the 1930s cannot be understood this easily, even if her account 
of her “attitude” is accepted without a demurrer. In 1930, she was a fac-
ulty wife. By 1937–38, she was a power in the economics faculty and an 
internationally respected theoretician. How did this happen? We stress 
the respects in which she achieved success by leveraging herself into posi-
tions that served her purposes. During the 1930s, Robinson assembled 
a formidable strategic tool kit, linking herself to the interests of others, 
connecting them to her ambitions, and in the case of Keynes making her-
self a resource for the project of a powerful sponsor. In showing how she 
surmounted, dismantled, or evaded the various barriers to entry in her 
path, it is useful to see Robinson as equipped with several assets, some of 
which we consider in the ensuing.
s t r a t e g i c  s a v v y
Robinson consistently demonstrated an acute sensibility in recognizing 
contingencies as opportunities that could be exploited with substantial 
payoffs. In her first research program, she was perceptive in seeing imper-
fect competition as a new field that would excite interest. Quick to iden-
tify a well-defined but empty theoretical space, she did not hesitate to fill 
it with a technically innovative book. In doing so, she appropriated Cam-
bridge resources that were on hand and easily accessible. In this regard, 
the collaboration between Robinson and Kahn is quite instructive. When 
Kahn made his availability clear to her, she took advantage of his liberality 
in placing his time and skills at her disposal. Kahn was a resource she used 
for a variety of purposes as he helped draft, revise, edit, proofread, and 
promote her book.3 The Cambridge reception of The Economics of Imperfect 
Competition was secured in part by the method of the book’s production. 
In both research and writing, Robinson was adept in the uses of dialogue. 
Her colleagues proved willing interlocutors. Pigou, Keynes, Sraffa, and 
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Kahn all took some part in the work and had a stake in the result. More-
over, as we observe above, Robinson’s relationship with Robertson did 
not begin in a poisonous manner. In Michaelmas 1928, when Austin had 
given her the task of inquiring into possible fellowships and lectureships 
for him at Cambridge, the “charming” and winsome “Dennis” was her 
main contact with the faculty board.4 And when The Economics of Imperfect 
Competition was still at an early stage of composition, she tried to interest 
him in writing a preface, hoping to appropriate his reputation in order to 
smooth her path to a publisher. The book appeared without a preface or 
blessing from Robertson. However, in 1938, Robinson wrote Austin that 
long ago she had discovered that good reviews could always be secured by 
an appropriately congratulatory preface.5
Kahn’s efforts at Chicago on Robinson’s behalf seem to have paid off 
handsomely in the reception of the book outside Cambridge. Some three 
months after publication, Viner sent her a glowing letter of congratula-
tions from London, noting that she had succeeded in improving analyti-
cal technique and advancing the investigation of problems further than 
he had done:
I had hoped to find time before leaving England to read your book, but could 
not manage it. I am ordering a copy sent to me to Geneva, however, and will have 
time before long to go through it with the care it deserves. In the few minutes of 
turning its pages in Hicks’ study, I saw that you had the same type of discriminat-
ing monopoly solution as mine, but that you had apparently succeeded in going 
further than I could, since you appear to have a general mode of treatment of 
curves. Given any set of curves, I could solve the problem, but I was not able to find 
the criteria which led to the alternative types of results, except for straight lines.
I wonder if you have looked into the problem where the two markets are not 
wholly independent of each other, and where they cannot be served at identical 
cost to the seller—both conditions likely to prevail. Perhaps you have dealt with 
them and solved them in your book! I saw enough of it to see that it is an impor-
tant contribution.6
A letter of January 1935 from Paul Douglas, an economist at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, is evidence that The Economics of Imperfect Competition 
was being read as Robinson intended, indicating that she had succeeded 
in marking her identity as an innovator in a new theoretical field. Douglas 
stressed the originality of the book and its contribution to analyses of 
value and distribution:
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I am taking the liberty of writing you to tell you how much I have gained 
personally from your splendid book The Economics of Imperfect Competition. I have 
been working through it off and on for a number of months, and find it admirable 
in all respects. Your introduction of the marginal revenue curve gives us a most 
powerful weapon in the analysis of monopoly price and as you well bring out 
alters greatly the discussion of the problem of distribution. If I were rewriting my 
book on The Theory of Wages, I would certainly include another chapter discussing 
the effect of monopoly and of imperfect competition upon the shares of the fac-
tors. And it would, of course, be very largely based upon your work.7
Robinson’s second research program did not begin so easily. When 
Keynes was writing The General Theory, she was in no position to serve 
as midwife at the birth of the Keynesian revolution. Until August 1934, 
she had not even undertaken a careful reading of the Treatise. By that 
point, Keynes’s new ideas and the scaffolding of his conceptual appara-
tus were in place and drafting was under way. After the birth of her first 
child, however, she wasted little time in closing gaps in her training. In 
preparing to lecture on applications of monetary theory, she made a thor-
ough study of the Treatise, and, in conversations with Kahn and Sraffa, 
she kept abreast of changes in Keynes’s post-Treatise thinking. After read-
ing the proofs of The General Theory, she saw the problems posed for 
revolutionary propaganda by his conceptual and terminological innova-
tions and the introduction of analyses that were both counterintuitive and 
inconsistent with received economic doctrine. Other genres of economic 
writing would be needed to consummate the revolution he had begun. 
The General Theory required translation, adaptation, and extension—a re-
orchestration of the new economic score for audiences Keynes had not 
addressed. Because Robinson had made herself into a Keynesian as he 
was writing The General Theory, she was able to publish both her Essays 
and the Introduction the year after his book appeared. These works refash-
ioned her identity, distinguishing her as the leading Keynesian expositor 
of the day. The results of her efforts are nicely documented in a letter of 
congratulations on the Introduction from Evin Durbin, a lecturer at lse at 
the time. Although his theoretical sympathies were remote from Keynes’s 
ideas, he saw virtues in the Introduction she had not anticipated, suggest-
ing that the book had exceeded her expectations:
Since I have returned from America I have read your little book “The Introduc-
tion to the Theory of Employment”. I should like to say, if I may, how very much 
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I have enjoyed it. It seems to me to be one of the most brilliantly lucid books that 
I have ever read. You say that it is not addressed to your fellow economists; but I 
cannot help feeling that most of us, however professional we may be, will feel that 
great light has been thrown upon Mr. Keynes’ contributions to monetary theory 
by your own exposition of them. I am not sure that students will find the book 
quite as easy as I think you expect them to do. Rigid clarity is not always what the 
beginner can understand; but I have certainly profited. I expect I am a beginner.
I am sure you will understand that I do not pretend to be a convert to these 
views. Indeed, at some time in the future I must write you a long letter to explain 
why I still am not a convert. But it was a real intellectual pleasure to find a perfect 
statement, even of views with which one does not agree.8
Keynes’s patronage certified Robinson as an influential member of the 
most powerful network of economists at Cambridge, at the same time 
strengthening her position in her conflicts with Robertson during 1935–
38. Robertson not only refused to enroll in the Keynesian movement but 
became its most persistent and intransigent Cambridge critic. In oppos-
ing the Keynesians and failing to form a countervailing faction, he di-
minished his power to resolve differences with Robinson in his favor. As 
he became weaker by attacking The General Theory, she became stronger 
by performing as the ideal Keynesian critic—combining sympathy with 
the author, agreement on fundamentals, and logical acuity in correcting 
errors. After The General Theory was published, she acquired Keynes as a 
commentator on her proofs while Robertson languished, worrying over 
whether his long personal and professional friendship with Keynes was 
disintegrating. In this manner, the predicament of Robinson’s nemesis 
became increasingly uncertain as her position became more stable. By the 
Michaelmas term of 1938, she was a university lecturer, and Robertson 
was leaving Cambridge for a professorship in London, abandoning the 
intramural battle with the Keynesians and conceding defeat over the fu-
ture of Cambridge economics (Aslanbeigui and Oakes 2002).
i m p r e s s i o n  m a n a g e m e n t
When circumstances seemed to warrant it, Robinson could produce care-
fully calibrated impressions for key Cambridge colleagues. In her dia-
logues with Pigou on her article of December 1932, she was not prepared 
to admit she had failed to understand his mathematical objection. Instead 
“ w h o  i s  j o a n  r o b i n s o n ? ”  `   241
of confessing at that point her relative ignorance of mathematics to the 
professor of political economy, she continued the conversation, keeping 
Pigou engaged, sustaining his enthusiasm, and giving him time to solve 
his own problem. When he had done so, the results worked to her advan-
tage. In her exchanges with Shove over credit attribution and priority, 
Robinson resisted his attempts to eviscerate her claims to credit for work 
that would appear in her book. She was firm but also wary of his tendency 
to petulance and jealousy. As a result, she achieved her objective without 
antagonizing an old friend of Keynes and a member of the faculty board 
who would have influence on her career. She demonstrated the same in-
terpersonal management skills when Shove responded to her critique of 
the symposium of 1930. On this occasion, she represented herself as a 
model of reasonableness and an ally of Keynes in pacifying Shove.
In handling the assignment of commenting on the proofs of The Gen-
eral Theory, Robinson balanced the roles of champion and critic. On basic 
premises, she showered Keynes with praise. On details, her corrections were 
careful and moderately useful even if innocuous from the standpoint of 
the general program of the book. Unlike Hayek in 1930–31 and Robertson 
and Hawtrey in 1935, her performance satisfied the only audience that mat-
tered: Keynes, whose conception of scientific controversy depended on 
acute criticism of specifics within a framework of assumptions that were 
shared by both author and critic and were closed to debate. In consider-
ing Robinson’s efforts to form Keynes’s conception of her as a reliable and 
effective ally in the months following publication of The General Theory, 
Hubert Henderson’s lecture to the Marshall Society is instructive. When 
she published her article “The Long-Period Theory of Employment,” she 
sent Henderson a copy. Because his distaste for Keynes’s new analytical 
framework was well known in Cambridge, she surely anticipated objec-
tions on his part. In responding, Henderson did not conceal his vexation 
over The General Theory: “I’m afraid that, as you probably know, I’m un-
sympathetic to the point of acute exasperation with the whole method 
of approach of Maynard’s book, which your article follows.”9 Although 
Robinson’s reply has not been located, it is clear she did not change 
Henderson’s position. He remained, as he put it, “violently dissenting.”10 
Some three weeks later, he read a paper to the Marshall Society that set 
out the grounds for his dissent. Robinson attended, and on May 3, Keynes 
gave Lydia an account of the event:
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Hubert came to the Marshall Society yesterday, with Dennis in the Chair, to read 
his paper against my book. I was astonished at the violence of his emotion against 
it; he thinks it a poisonous book; yet when it came to the debate there was very 
little of the argument which he was really prepared to oppose. He came off badly 
in the debate with Joan and Alexander and myself barking round him. The un-
dergraduates enjoyed the cock fight outrageously. One got the impression that 
he was not really much interested in pure economic theory, but much dislikes 
for emotional or political reasons some of the practical conclusions to which my 
arguments seemed to point. As a theoretical attack there was almost nothing to 
answer. (jmk/pp/45/190/7)
Robinson had succeeded in representing herself as a valuable member of 
the revolutionary cadre, acting in concert with Keynes and his adjutant in 
defending The General Theory against an early enemy—a classical econo-
mist and precisely the sort of adversary Keynes was determined either to 
convert or defeat.
s i m p l i c i t y  a s  a  t a c t i c
On March 23, 1938, Robinson advised Keynes to rewrite a rejoinder he 
had drafted on a note that Robertson had submitted to the Economic Jour-
nal: “Abandon D.H.R. [Robertson] as hopeless and write as tho’ for a 
2nd year man who is hoping to get a II2 [Second Class in Part II of the 
Economics Tripos]. You want the reader, merging dazed from D.H.R., 
to feel that you represent simplicity and commonsense” (in Keynes 1979, 
169). Throughout the 1930s, Robinson wrote for academic economists 
as if they were Cambridge students. Writing economics, even her most 
abstract and demanding work, was not in principle distinguishable from 
teaching it. As she explained in a memorandum she prepared for Schum-
peter in early 1933 on how economics should be taught, economic “Laws 
and Doctrines can be divested of mysticism and turned into what they 
really are—simple but useful mental gadgets” (jvr/vii/2/1–9). Robinson 
reduced complex problems to simpler issues that could be explained by 
familiar examples or analogies. She did not indulge in the scholastic sub-
tleties that attracted some of her colleagues, and she was ruthless in wield-
ing Occam’s razor, introducing new analytical apparatus only when there 
seemed to be compelling reasons to do so and elucidating technical jargon 
in everyday language. In writing economics, she adopted the principle 
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that even the most recondite problems could be analyzed by mundane 
reasoning and in lucid prose. One result of theoretical demystification 
was a facile and eminently accessible style of writing high theory. It dif-
ferentiated her work from the writings of her contemporaries and was 
recognized as distinctively Robinsonian.
The basis of Robinson’s project of theoretical simplification was her 
methodological position: economics is its technique. The technique of 
her day, she insisted, was too unsophisticated to investigate the complexi-
ties of economic reality. Equipped with her box of tools, the analytical 
economist would find the facts of economic life intractable. In her meta-
phor, “the knives are of bone and the hammers of wood, only capable of 
cutting paper and driving pins into cardboard” (Robinson 1933d, 327). 
The hiatus irrationalis between method and reality called for “very severe 
simplifying measures” (Robinson 1933d, 327). Economists were instructed 
to abstract from the complexity of real problems and consider instead 
simplified hypothetical issues that were framed to demonstrate the power 
and limits of available methods. The theoretical assumptions required by 
Robinson’s methodology—“set out in all their naked unreality” (Robinson 
1933d, 8)—created imaginary buyers and sellers, firms, industries, and 
commodities that were amenable to analysis but, precisely for that reason, 
remote from the facts of real economies. The path to economic reality lay 
in the development of more powerful techniques, the prolegomenon for 
any future economics. In the 1930s, however, Robinson was determined 
to follow the logic of her methodology and its theoretical simplifications. 
Faced with a choice between sacrificing a “charming diagram” or attempt-
ing to match the complexity of empirical reality, her decision was un-
equivocal (Aslanbeigui and Oakes 2006, 424). She arrived at this position 
in 1932 and maintained it through the 1930s, as the exchanges with Keynes 
on her Essays in the Theory of Employment make clear.
However, Robinson’s commitment to simplicity as a tactic was also 
based on rhetorical considerations. Early drafts of The Economics of Im-
perfect Competition show that it was originally composed in a somewhat 
colloquial manner, as if the author were lecturing to students. Follow-
ing Keynes’s advice, she deleted many of these passages, at the same time 
taking measures to make the book readable. She provided instructions 
for technically unsophisticated readers, including cautionary footnotes 
advising novices to skip certain passages or even entire chapters in the in-
terest of understanding fundamentals. Deficiencies in technical skills, she 
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argued, were not impediments to following economic reasoning. Thus 
she saw no professional stigma in the declaration she made in the book 
that she was “almost entirely innocent of mathematics” (Robinson 1933d, 
12). Although Kahn and Newman—and, in one case, Pigou—supplied 
her with formal proofs, she insisted that mathematical demonstrations 
were never essential to her arguments. They were instruments of preci-
sion, devices for restating more exactly conclusions she had discovered by 
using “unsophisticated methods” based on “purely economic reasoning,” 
the concept of elasticity, and “one or two theorems from the book on 
triangles in a school geometry” (Robinson 1933d, 12).
Evidence considered above on the reception of Robinson’s work in the 
1930s shows that in this respect she achieved a brilliant success.11 Douglas 
underscored the pedagogical value of The Economics of Imperfect Competi-
tion, which he had been using in his classes. “You must be interested to 
know,” he wrote, “that introduction of your analysis into class work inter-
ested the students very much, and I notice on their part a far keener and 
more vivid interest than when I used a more antiquated type of analysis.” 
The type of analysis Douglas had employed presumably did not include 
Robinson’s suggestions to readers or her method of elucidating the logic 
of theoretical discovery by showing in a step-by-step fashion how her ar-
guments were constructed. Douglas was immensely impressed: “I wish 
to extend not only my congratulations but my personal appreciation for 
the good work which you have done and say that you have put us all in 
your debt.”12
The aims of theoretical demystification were both analytical and expos-
itory. An analysis would succeed in solving a problem only if it were clear. 
The solution would be grasped by readers only if it were explained in lan-
guage that was plain and simple. These aims were not universally under-
stood. On April 6, 1934, Frank Taussig, the editor of the Quarterly Journal 
of Economics at Harvard, wrote Robinson that he was pleased to accept her 
article “What Is Perfect Competition?” However, he suggested revisions 
that did not conform to her conception of how economic analysis should 
be written: “The first half of the paper, say as far as page 13, seems to be 
addressed to a somewhat younger audience and perhaps a more miscel-
laneous group than that which we ordinarily try to reach. Some of your 
illustrations—say, the ‘cherries’ and the ‘barkeeper’—are appropriate in an 
address, but less so when stated in cold print to the scientific reader” (jvr/
vii/442/1–3). Taussig did not grasp the point of Robinson’s expository 
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methods. Commonplace examples clarified and simplified complex argu-
ments. They were no less essential to an article than to a lecture. From 
Robinson’s perspective, the distinction between more and less profes-
sionalized readerships had no place in writing economics. In their efforts 
to understand new solutions to problems, all economists were students. 
Even in “cold print,” it was impossible to see that a position was sound 
unless it was stated with requisite clarity. And clarity could be achieved 
only by writing in a straightforward style and using everyday illustrations. 
In this respect, there was no difference between the theoretically sophisti-
cated—Taussig’s conception of the readership of the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics—and readers whose technical facility was relatively modest.
Robinson’s integration of scientific and scholarly writing with teaching 
was perhaps tied to the pleasure she took in teaching at Cambridge, es-
pecially when she was spurred by the influence of her imp.13 She enjoyed 
pleading with students, in the sense of making a case for a position.14 In 
making economic theory simple and sensible, listening to the voice of the 
imp by lecturing with a polemical edge, and taking definitive positions on 
basic issues instead of leaving students to decide controversial matters on 
their own, Robinson became a successful teacher and a pedagogical asset 
to the Cambridge faculty. When Fay attempted to prevent her from ex-
tending her one-term set of lectures on applications in monetary theory to 
two terms, Keynes responded with arguments that were based in part on 
her success as a lecturer. There was no question, he said, “as to the quality 
and popularity of the lectures.” From what he had heard, they were “ex-
ceedingly good and amongst the most successful with the young men.”15
“Who is Joan Robinson?” the young Viennese economist Gottfried 
Haberler asked Kahn shortly after reading the Economic Journal for De-
cember 1932. He had recently received an offprint of “Imperfect Competi-
tion and Falling Supply Price” from the author, whose name he did not 
recognize: “The Christian name sounds like a woman’s, but the article 
seems to me much too clever for a woman.”16 Robinson apparently had 
comparable questions about her professional identity before she wrote 
The Economics of Imperfect Competition. Shortly after recovering from an 
extremely stressful period of writing in October 1932, she wrote Austin 
in Africa that she had experienced a transformation comparable to a reli-
gious conversion: “The thing is that all these years I have suffered from 
the inferiority complex of an intelligent woman + the emotional conflicts 
of a hermaphrodite. But now I have (almost finished writing) written one 
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damn good book.” How did the experience of writing the book change 
Robinson’s conception of herself? “I feel absolutely differently now when 
j.m.k. sends for me to try out his new theory of interest, or Max [New-
man] explains to me quite earnestly about the ‘axiomatic method’ in pure 
mathematics. I used to think ‘what a joke for them to take a handsome 
young woman seriously on their own ground.’ Now it just seems quite 
natural, + as I am self-confident instead of merely conceited I can admire 
the great + suffer fools gladly + admit I have a conscience + generally 
behave in a perfectly grown up manner.”17 In fashioning her career in the 
1930s, Robinson took steps that ensured no economist of Haberler’s stat-
ure would have occasion to raise questions about her identity again or to 
commit the Haberler fallacy of conflating cleverness in economic analysis 
with masculinity.
`  n o t e s  `
c o l l a g e  w i t h  w o m a n  i n  f o r e g r o u n d
  1  See  special  issues of  the Cambridge Journal of Economics  1983,  and Review 










  8  See  also  Bruno  Latour  on  the  strategic  and  tactical  logic  at  work  in  the 
career  of  Louis  Pasteur  (Latour  1988)  and  the  physicist  Frédéric  Joliot 
(Latour  1999). We also  follow the path  taken by Guy Oakes and Arthur 
























matter  and  by  examining  the  lecture  lists  in  economics  published  in  the 
Cambridge University Reporter (1930–39), contemporaneous newspaper ar-
ticles, and calendars for the years in question.
  11  E. Roy Weintraub sketches some provocative historiographic issues posed 




  12  For  recent  scholarship on Sraffa’s  life  and work,  see  special  issues of  the 
Review of Political Economy (2005) and the European Journal of the History of 
Economic Thought (2005) as well as Kurz (2008).
1  t h e  i m p r o b a b l e  t h e o r e t i c i a n
  1  The university lectureship sealed Robinson’s career at Cambridge. She had 
received an appointment as part-time assistant lecturer in autumn 1934 and 







surprising  that her  candidacy was  a matter of  considerable dispute. Rec-







  4  Although Austin Robinson had exhibited great promise as a theorist in The 
Structure of Competitive Industry (1931),  he  had  shown  greater  interest  in 
university administration as well as work in applied economics.
  5  Cambridge University Reporter, 4/19/30, 917.
  6  On Kahn’s life and work, see the special issue of Cambridge Journal of Eco-
nomics, 1994. On his contributions to imperfect competition and The Gen-
eral Theory, see O’Shaughnessy 1994, Marcuzzo 1994, and Harcourt 1994.
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  11  Unless  otherwise  specified,  the  biographical  information  that  follows  is 





  13  On  the  events  of  May  1897,  see  McWilliams  Tullberg  (1998)  and 
Deslandes  (2005).  In  the  Cambridge  Union  debate  of  May  11,  the 
rooms of  the Union were opened to all male members of  the university. 
Women spectators were excluded from their customary places in the gal-






May  21,  graduates  with  master’s  degrees  arrived  to  vote,  and  effigies  of 
female students were prominently displayed outside the University Senate 
House.  The  M.A.’s  defeated  the  proposal  1,707  to  661.  An  independent 








  15  On  the vote of October 20,  1921,  see McWilliams Tullberg  1998, 98–118, 
163–65,  176. At  least  some of  the  leading Cambridge economists  seem to 
have taken a more progressive stance than the majority of their colleagues. 
T. E. B. Howarth claims that Pigou, Keynes, and the economic historians 
J. H. Clapham and Fay all  supported  the more  liberal grace of  1921  that 
would have granted degrees  to qualified women (Howarth  1978,  76).  In 
1923, Parliament was considering the Universities Bill, which would have 
substantially  equalized  the  status of men and women  in British universi-
ties. Robertson published an article in the Nation and Athenaeum criticizing 
























rooms  of  a  fellow,  followed  the  same  evening  by  an  unappetizing  and 
perfunctory dinner at one of the women’s colleges (Woolf 1993, 9–16). As 































  32  Marcuzzo  seems  to  be  mistaken  in  supposing  that  Robinson  attended 
Sraffa’s  lectures in Michaelmas 1928 (2005, 430). During this term, when 
Austin was still in India, she was based at the London flat of her parents, 
working  on  the  Indian  report,  reestablishing  contacts  with  friends,  and 
acting on Austin’s behalf  to explore prospects of  a  lectureship or  fellow-
ship for him at Cambridge. Sraffa, whose name she misspelled in a letter 




















Analysis of Output,” published in the Review of Economic Studies for Octo-
ber 1933. Thus there is no doubt she revised the October 1932 text before 
finally handing it to a typist. Robinson’s correspondence with Kahn shows 
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  39  See  Annalisa  Roselli’s  illuminating  essay  on  the  correspondence  of 
Robinson and Kahn (2005a), which  seems  to  treat Austin’s  story as his-
torical fact. Are there lessons here? Consider the inconsistencies between 
Robinson’s  laconic account  in  the  foreword and the Autobiography and 
Austin’s  more  colorful  reminiscences,  which  call  to  mind  C.  P.  Snow’s 






If his  version of  events was  true  in  1990,  it was  also  true  in  1933. These 





















  47  See  Raffaelli  (2007)  for  a  discussion  of  Marshall’s  methodological  meta-
phors.
  48  Although the pamphlet was written  in a playful manner,  this  should not 
give the impression that Robinson regarded it as a frivolous exercise. Sev-
eral members of the economics faculty at Cambridge received copies, each 
with  a  pithy  and  sometimes  cryptic  dedication  (for  the  dedications  and 
their  recipients,  see Harcourt  1990, 425). Robinson expected a  review of 
the pamphlet in the Economic Journal and was disappointed when none ap-
peared (letter from Robinson to Kahn, 3/3/33, rfk/13/90/1/168–72).
  49  The  pamphlet  is  dedicated  “To  The  Fundamental  Pessimist.”  This  was 
Sraffa.






very  little of  its argument remains  in the methodological  introduction to 
The Economics of Imperfect Competition  (Harcourt  1990,  412–13,  424).  We 












point  of  compositional  history,  the  typescript  of  the  Autobiography  is  a 





  53  Ibid., 425. Lionel Robbins published An Essay on the Nature & Significance 
of Economics Science (1932) only a few months before Robinson’s pamphlet 
appeared. Did she see Economics Is a Serious Subject as a Cambridge alterna-
tive to the Viennese metatheory of the time, imported by Robbins to lse 








to originality,  insisting  that he was merely  stating views  that qualified as 












  55  See,  for  example,  graphs  and  notes  by  Kahn,  rfk/16/1/27,  rfk/16/1/29–










































acquainted  with  the  William  Empson  matter  at  Cambridge  in  1929,  less 
than three years before Keynes surprised the pair in Kahn’s rooms. Empson, 
who would later distinguish himself as a literary scholar, was elected to a 
Magdalene  fellowship  and  appointed  junior  fellow  of  the  college.  Some 
seven  weeks  thereafter,  the  fellowship  election  was  nullified  and  he  was 
“sent down.” Empson’s offense was that he had occasionally entertained a 
woman for overnight visits in his rooms at a college hostel, a fact he made 




rounds  of  the  university  and  the  town.  The  fellows  of  Magdalene  could 
not revoke Empson’s degree. However, they performed an official degrada-
tion ceremony by exacting  the most  severe penalties at  their disposal  for 
sexual misconduct. Empson’s tutorial file and even his name were expunged 
from college records, and his right to reside in the town of Cambridge was 
rescinded.  As  the  historian  Frank  Salter,  one  of  the  more  liberal  fellows 
of Magdalene, wrote Empson’s mentor, I. A. Richards, “What has  to be 
remembered is that sexual misconduct is a University offence & that when 
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Chamberlain.  Austin  seems  to  have  been  against  a  war  irrespective  of 
consequences.  And  Robinson  took  an  aggressive  anti-German  position. 
In addition, British public opinion on  the crisis was fickle, varying with 
the  apparent  success  or  failure  of  Chamberlain’s  efforts  (see  Madge  and 
Harrison 1939).







  47  Letter  from  Kahn  to  Keynes,  10/3/38,  jmk/l/k/98–99.  In  his  letter  to 
Keynes, Kahn drew a parallel between Robinson’s “frenzy” of October 1–3 
and her state of mind in autumn 1932, when she wrote Economics Is a Serious 












her new conception of what she had achieved in The Economics of Imperfect 
Competition as a sudden revelation and a vision and claimed she had written 
her  methodological  essay  in  a  trance (Letters  from  Robinson  to  Austin, 
10/11/32,  eagr/Box  8/2/1/13/120–22;  10/16/32,  eagr/Box  8/2/1/13/124–26; 
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England and  failing  to act on Robertson’s warnings of  a German  spring 
offensive.  Lloyd  George  responded  to  attacks  on  his  government  in  the 
House of Commons and the press by claiming that Field Marshall Douglas 
Haig’s  army  was  considerably  stronger  in  January  1918  than  it  had  been 
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the initiative of the British Legion, whose activities he has always followed 























  63  Robinson’s  expenses  at  Brooke  House  for  the  period  October  3,  1938–
January 1,  1939—which did not  include the entire duration of her stay—


























  76  Letter  from  Robinson  to  Kahn,  12/15/39,  rfk/13/90/3/328–31;  Cairncross 
1993, 172.
  77  Letter from Robinson to Kahn, 11/20/40, rfk/13/90/4/354–55.




  3  See Pigou 1925, 85;  1939, 219–20; Keynes 1951,  190–92; Harrod 1951, 324; 
Robertson 1952, vi.
  4  The early work of Maurice Dobb documents Marshall’s preeminent status 
at Cambridge  in  the  early  1920s. Dobb was  an  anomalous figure  among 
the Cambridge Marshallians. An active member of the Communist Party 
since  1921,  he  achieved  a  First  in  both  parts  of  the  Economics  Tripos  in 
1922  and  then wrote  a doctoral dissertation with Edwin Cannan of lse. 
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  9  See  letters  from  Robinson  to  Kahn,  1/28/33,  rfk/13/90/1/78–83;  12/25/33, 
rfk/13/90/1/270–71.
  10  On the close collaboration between Keynes and Kahn, see Marcuzzo 2002.












ment  of  Chicago  economics  is  perhaps  due  to  superficial  impressions  of 
a  relatively  disengaged  visitor  with  little  understanding  of  the  changing 







  16  Letter  from Kahn  to Robinson, 2/15–21/33, rfk/13/90/1/131–38, quoted  in 
Aslanbeigui and Oakes 2008.
  17  Letter  from  Kahn  to  Robinson,  2/7–9/33,  rfk/13/90/1/95–100,  quoted  in 
Aslanbeigui and Oakes 2008. Schumpeter’s corruption by American ways 
must have been  remarkably  swift. He assumed his professorship  at Har-
vard only  the semester before Kahn’s arrival.  It  is  instructive  to compare 
Kahn’s perception of the quality of life in the Harvard Economics Depart-
ment  with  the  account  given  by  Schumpeter’s  most  recent  biographer. 
During his first  few years at Harvard, Schumpeter had  lunch and dinner 
most days with students and members of  the economics  faculty. The va-
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  18  Letter  from Kahn  to Robinson, 2/15–21/33, rfk/13/90/1/131–38, quoted  in 
Aslanbeigui and Oakes 2008.
  19  Woolf 1993, 10, 16, 21.
  20  Letter  from Kahn  to Robinson, 2/15–21/33, rfk/13/90/1/131–38, quoted  in 
Aslanbeigui and Oakes 2008.
  21  Ibid.
  22  Letter  from  Kahn  to  Robinson,  3/2–6/33,  rfk/13/90/1/162–67,  quoted  in 
Aslanbeigui and Oakes, 2008.
  23  Letter  from  Kahn  to  Robinson,  2/24/33,  rfk/13/90/1/147–54,  quoted  in 
Aslanbeigui and Oakes 2008. Kahn’s complaints and his sense of depriva-
tion—at Harvard, of all places—betray an insensitivity to Robinson’s cir-




discourse,  the  cuisine,  or  the  cellar  of  King’s  or  any  other  male  college. 
Nor was she in a position to indulge in comparisons of the quality of life 
at Cambridge, Chicago, and Harvard. In winter 1933, when she was read-
ing Kahn’s  letters,  she had no access  to  the academic culture he took for 
granted. Kahn’s withering observations on Harvard gastronomy also  ex-
press  a  remarkable  obtuseness,  especially  on  the  part  of  a  social  scientist 








as  if  there were no depression. Kahn’s  complaints were based on  the  as-
sumption that the absence of this political ethos in the United States was 
yet another defect of American society.















matical  derivation  but  credited  Kahn  only  for  the  derivation  (Robinson 
1933d, 40–41, n. 3; 193–94, n. 2).
  29  Letter from Robinson to Kahn, 3/30/31, rfk/16/1/59–60.
  30  See  letter,  notes,  and  questions  from  Robinson  to  Kahn,  3/31–4/2/31, 
rfk/16/1/63–64, rfk/16/1/28, and rfk/16/1/100–101.
  31  Kahn’s  Answers  to  Robinson’s  questions,  circa  early  April  1931,  rfk/
16/1/102–05.  For  Robinson’s  use  of  this  formula  without  attribution,  see 
The Economics of Imperfect Competition (1933d), 36, 54.


















  37  Letter from Robinson to Kahn, 12/30/32, rfk/13/90/1/24–25. The Economics 
of Imperfect Competition includes ten books numbered I–X. The books are 
divided into short chapters numbered 1–27.




telegram,  a  costly  affair  for  Kahn,  who  was  pressed  for  funds  generally, 
in debt to Keynes, and traveling on a fellowship stipend. “Would you be 




expense,  adding a  footnote  that  “if  20 words at  a weekend  is  cheaper  so 
much  the better”  (rfk/13/90/1/28–30). The  expense of dialogue by  cable 
does not seem to have posed an obstacle to Kahn. By January 26, Robinson 
was thanking him for his cabled revisions and noting that he had identified 
















  46  Letter  from  Kahn  to  Robinson,  2/24/33,  rfk/13/90/1/147–54,  quoted  in 
Aslanbeigui and Oakes 2008.
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  54  Letter  from  Pigou  to  Robinson,  circa  mid-January,  1933,  jvr/vii/347/13, 
quoted in Aslanbeigui and Oakes 2008.
  55  Letter from Pigou to Robinson, circa mid-January, 1933, jvr/vii/347/13.
  56  Letter  from Robinson  to Kahn,  1/14–16/33, rfk/13/90/1/52–54, quoted  in 
Aslanbeigui and Oakes 2008.























increase  production  substantially  without  raising  prices.  A  change  in  the 





















  82  See Swedberg  1991,  12. Schumpeter allowed  that he had not become the 
world’s greatest horseman.
  83  Letter  from  Kahn  to  Robinson,  2/10–13/33,  rfk/13/90/1/105–14.  Schum-
peter, who was also at work on a theory of money, took a quite different 
tone  in writing Keynes after  reading the Treatise: “This  is  truly a Ricard-
ian tour de force, and must cause you the most intense satisfaction. I believe 
it  will  ever  stand  as  a  landmark  in  its  field”  (Schumpeter  2000,  180–81). 
His  judgment  in  a  letter  to  the  Viennese  economist  Haberler  was  more 
temperate: “Certainly a splendid achievement by an immensely gifted man, 
but nothing new in the general approach—although perhaps  in many in-
dividual  points”  (Schumpeter  2000,  181–82,  our  translation).  When  The 
General Theory appeared  in  1936, Schumpeter wrote a dismissive  letter  to 















impressed”  with  what  he  had  seen  of  Robinson’s  proofs,  which  meant 
that it would be a “shocking waste” not to give him a full set (2/20–24/33, 
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  93  On  February  9,  Kahn  wrote  Robinson  that  he  was  about  to  meet  with 






with  Robinson  that  she  never  fought.  In  attempting  to  demonstrate  the 
derivative character of her book, he argued that his own work was strikingly 
innovative and without precedent. If Robinson saw far enough to write The 
Economics of Imperfect Competition, it was because she was standing on the 
shoulders of Marshall, Pigou, and Sraffa. He, on the other hand, was able 
to write The Theory of Monopolistic Competition not because he stood on the 
shoulders of giants or any other species of economist but simply because he 
saw further than others. Thus Chamberlin ascribed to himself the godlike 
power of  thinking  ex nihilo  and  creating  something out of nothing  (see 
Chamberlin  1961,  516,  532–33,  536–37).  This  self-assessment  cannot  with-
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  99  Letter  from Kahn to Robinson, 2/15–21/33, rfk/13/90/1/131–38. Later  that 




































theorem”  followed  by  a  sketch  of  its  argument  (2/10–13/33,  rfk/13/90/
1/105–114). Although Kahn did not publish on the theorem, Robinson did 
(Robinson 1934a).
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for his book. See letters from Robinson to Kahn, 3/8/33, rfk/13/90/1/173–
79, and 3/30/33, rfk/13/90/1/215–16.
  110  In The Economics of Imperfect Competition, Robinson stated  that  the older 
textbooks customarily “set out upon the analysis of value from the point 
of  view  of  perfect  competition.  The  whole  scheme  appeared  almost 
homogeneous and it had some aesthetic charm. But somewhere, in an iso-



































  132  On General Maurice’s financial predicament following his dismissal  from 
the army, see Kennedy 1951–60, 721–22.






3   b e c o m i n g  a  k e y n e s i a n















autonomous  reward  structures,  prestige  hierarchies,  and  career  paths  of 
modern science eliminated the  functions and payoffs of patronage by ty-
ing the scientific career to performance criteria that are internal to science? 








patronage  remain:  allocation  of  positions  in  the  scientific  establishment 
and  the  determination  of  socioprofessional  status,  the  distribution  of 




independent  scientific  institutions,  modern  scientists  performed  in  a  dis-
ciplinary and academic culture in which patronage practiced by masters of 
these institutions smoothed the path to a successful career. In the literature 
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on patronage and scientific careers, Dorinda Outram’s study of the French 





anisms  in  which  careers  are  made  and  sustained  by  patronage  networks. 



































“the  intellectual  aristocracy”  (Annan  1999,  304–51).  Her  maternal  grand-
father, Frederick Howard Marsh, was professor of surgery and master of 
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Downing  College,  Cambridge.  Her  uncle  Edward  Marsh,  a  graduate  of 
Cambridge  and  an  art  collector,  was  Winston  Churchill’s  chief  of  staff, 



























  25  Letter  from  Robinson  to  Kahn,  2/17/33,  rfk/13/90/1/127–30.  Robinson’s 
bemused  account  of  this  incident  illuminates  the  extent  to  which  Cam-

























was motivated by  the  ambitions of  a professional  academic  careerist  and 
attempted to achieve success both at Cambridge and in the cosmopolitan 
world of economics. As early as 1932, her work in economics, including her 





suasive: “I  feel  the sense of a definite point of view which  is worthwhile 
to convey to the young” (3/16–18/33, rfk/13/90/1/191–97). And in August 
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  42  Cambridge University Reporter, 3/25/30, 823–28.
  43  “The Children” was Robinson’s name for a group of young economists—
some  still  research  students—at  Cambridge,  Oxford,  and  lse  who  held 
occasional conferences to discuss their work and were associated with the 
Review of Economic Studies. As editor of the Economic Journal, Keynes could 
offer the Review reduced terms for an advertisement.










social  conflict  resolution.  At  the  time,  both  were  members  of  the  Com-
mittee  of  Economists  appointed  by  Prime  Minister  Ramsay  MacDonald 
to  diagnose  Britain’s  current  economic  problems.  As  chairman,  Keynes 
had the task of drafting its report. When he advocated a tariff on imported 
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  60  For the full exchanges between Keynes and Robertson on the galleys of The 
General Theory, see Keynes 1973a, 493–523.
  61  Robertson was not prepared  to resume the dialogue  later  in  the year.  In 
October, when Keynes suggested he send a complete set of revised proofs, 

















work  in a  letter  to Lydia  for  the first  time. Kahn was apparently arguing 
with Keynes on Robinson’s behalf. “Alexander is trying to come to the res-
cue of Joan’s article. But  it  is no good. They will have  to retreat on that 
chapter. The rest is very good” (jmk/pp/45/190/7).









































these problems  should be handled  (letter  from Keynes  to Kahn,  2/19/38, 
jmk/l/k/94–96).
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